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BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

THIRD NEW YORK SERIES.

VOLUME II.

NEW YORK:
D. & J. SADLER & CO., 164 WILLIAM STREET.
BOSTON:—P. DONAHOE, FRANKLIN ST.
LONDON:—CATHOLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY,
61 NEW BOND STREET.
1861.

C. A. ALVORD, PRINTER, 15 VANDEWATER STREET.

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1861.

ART. I. *On Nature and Grace: A Theological Treatise.*
Book I. Philosophical Introduction. By W. G. WARD,
D. P. H., late Lecturer in Dogmatic Theology at St.
Edmund's Seminary, Herts. London: Burns and Lam-
bert. 1860. 8vo. pp. lvi. and 490.

MR. WARD was one of the earliest and most distinguished of the converts to the Church from the now almost forgotten Oxford Movement, and we agree with our able and learned contemporary, *The Dublin Review*, that "no work since the appearance of the *Tracts for the Times* has issued from the English press that can equally claim the attention of Catholics" with his treatise on *Nature and Grace*, the first volume of which, embracing an elaborate preface and a philosophical introduction, is now published and before us.

The treatise, we are told in the preface, is composed of a part of the course of lectures on Dogmatic Theology given by the author in St. Edmund's Seminary, and "includes all those revealed truths which relate to each man's moral and spiritual condition; all those which concern his individual relations with God, his true end, whether tending toward that end, or unhappily moving in an opposite direction." It is divided into five books, of unequal length: 1. Philosophical Introduction; 2. Theological Prolegomena; 3. On Man's Moral Action; 4. On Divine Grace; 5. On God's Providence and Predestination. His work, the
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author tells us, corresponds, in the main, to the *Pars Secunda* of St. Thomas, borrowing, however, from the *Pars Prima*, the topics of *Providence and Predestination*, and from the *Pars Tertia*, that of *Attrition* in relation to the justification of adults in the sacraments of Baptism and Penance.

If we understand the learned and philosophical author, he embraces, under the head of Nature and Grace, all that part of theology, natural and revealed, which relates to the second cycle, or return of existences or creatures to God as their last end,—that is, all that part of theology which relates to God as the Final Cause, in distinction from that which relates to God in himself, and as First Cause. He contends that this, according to St. Thomas, the second part of theology, may be treated by itself, independently of the first part, or that which treats of the existence, nature, and attributes of God, of the Unity and the Trinity of God, and of God as Creator, or First Cause. He says St. Thomas, in the *pars secunda* of his *Summa Theologica*, takes a fresh start, and might as well have treated it in the first, as in the second place. “It is impossible to understand the *de Deo Trino* till we have studied the *de Deo Uno*; and it is impossible to understand *de Gratia*, till we have studied *de Actibus Humanis*. But that portion of science on the one hand which contains the *de Deo Uno et Trino*, and that portion, on the other hand, which contains the *de Actibus Humanis* and the *de Gratia*—these are mutually independent; it is a matter of indifference which is studied before the other. . . . Upon these two independent portions is founded the doctrine of the Incarnation, and all which follows.” But how can we scientifically treat *de Actibus Humanis* independently of the *de Deo Creatore*? of man’s end before we have treated of his origin? or of *de Gratia* before *de Incarnatione*, the origin and end of the “new creation,” or life of grace?

Theology, in its broadest sense, embraces both natural theology, or metaphysics, and supernatural theology, that is, all the truths we know by the natural light of reason, and all that we know by Divine Revelation, or the supernatural light of Faith. There is always, then, to be carried along, the double order, and the theologian has to treat the origin and end of man in the natural order, and his origin and end in the supernatural order, which, as to the end, in some sort *assumes* the natural. The origin and end of the natural order depend on God as Creator; of the supernatural, which presupposes

the natural, on God Incarnate. We should say, then, that the order of science, as of being, requires that the *de Deo Creatore* should, as in St. Thomas, precede *de Actibus Humanis*, and *de Incarnatione de Gratia*. It is true St. Thomas places *de Gratia* before *de Incarnatione*, and *de Incarnatione* only before *de Sacramentis*, as if the Incarnation is to be regarded as the effect of the *Gratia Dei*, and the source, or cause, only of Sacramental Grace. There may be a question whether in this he follows the true scientific order or not, because there is among theologians a question whether, if man had not sinned, the Second Person of the Ever-Adorable Trinity would, or would not have become Incarnate. Grace certainly pertains in the supernatural order to the First Cause, the first cycle or procession of the supernatural life from God, and if we hold with St. Thomas that if man had not sinned, the Word would not have assumed flesh, we must regard the Incarnation as the effect of the grace of God, and then treat it after treating grace; but if we regard, with the general current of modern theology, the Incarnation not as merely reparatory of the damage done by sin, and taking sin as the occasion of elevating man to a higher and nobler destiny than he would have attained had he not sinned, but as primarily intended to ennoble man, and to elevate him, as his final beatitude, to union by nature with his Creator, and, therefore, the Word would have been incarnated even if man had not sinned, we should, it seems to us, place *de Incarnatione* before *de Gratia*, immediately after *de Deo Creatore*, as we find it placed by Father Perrone in his *Prælectiones Theologicæ*. We incline to the latter view, and, therefore, we should maintain that no treatise on Nature and Grace can be scientifically constructed independently of *de Deo*, *de Deo Creatore*, and *de Incarnatione*, for we cannot understand how the Final Cause can be treated independently of the First Cause, or the return of existences to God as their last end independently of their procession by way of creation from Him as their first Beginning.

But, however it may be with regard to the Incarnation, we are certain that there can be no scientific treatment of Moral Theology, or the speculative part of Ethics, natural or supernatural, that excludes all consideration of God as First Cause; and nearly all the criticisms we shall have to make on the author's theory of morals, as set forth in the volume already published, grow out of his attempt to find

a solid basis of morals without taking into the account the creative act of God, or considering in its proper place and bearing man's relation to God as his First, as well as his Final Cause. But more of this hereafter.

The volume before us is introductory to the volumes that are to follow, but it is complete in itself, and contains a very full treatise on moral philosophy as distinguished from practical ethics. It is purely philosophical, that is, wholly within the province of natural reason, and treats of an important branch of natural theology. The matter treated is arranged in four chapters: 1. On the Principles of Morality; 2. On Ethical Psychology; 3. On Self Charity; 4. On various Kinds of Certainty and Impossibility. Our remarks in the present article will be confined, for the most part, to the first chapter—*On the Principles of Morality*. This chapter is subdivided into seven sections: 1. On Intuitions and on the Principle of Certitude; 2. On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth; 3. On the Relation between God and Moral Truth; 4. Catholic Authority on Independent Morality—placed at the end of the volume; 5. On the Idea of Moral Worthiness; 6. On the Extent of the Natural Rule; 7. On God's Power of Interference with the Natural Rule. We shall have, at present, little to say, except on the first three sections of the first chapter, which contain the fundamental principles of the whole Introduction. The author, we hardly need remark, is a psychologist, and, though professing to recognize objective truth, discusses all questions from the point of view of the subject, or his own *Ego*. He begins by distinguishing between judgments of consciousness and judgments of intuitions. I judge that I am this moment suffering the sensation of cold, hunger, or thirst; this is a judgment of consciousness. I remember that some time ago I suffered that sensation; this is a judgment of intuition, or intuitive judgment. Judgments of consciousness are simply the interior recognition of our own present mental state; intuitive judgments are the direct and immediate perception or apprehension of objective truth or reality, that is, something exterior to and independent of the percipient or intuitive subject. Intuition, then, in the author's sense, is the *perception* of the Scottish school, and the *judgment à posteriori* of the Kantian. It is the simple, direct, immediate apprehension of the object by the subject, and is presented as a purely subjective or psychological act.

It would seem, from this statement, that the author holds the judgments of memory to be judgments of intuition. There is, undoubtedly, a valid distinction between being conscious and remembering; between suffering the toothache as a present fact, and remembering it as a past fact; but is this memory of the fact properly an intuition? Is it, when not remembered, an objective fact, a fact exterior to myself? We do not profess to be able to unravel the mystery of memory, but we are disposed to maintain that a judgment of consciousness is always a judgment of consciousness, though not always a present sensation; for *judgment* is always an intellectual act. The fact remembered, though past in relation to the senses, or even to reflex consciousness, has always remained present to the soul in what is called *direct* consciousness,—present by virtue of the presence and light of being, in which the soul lives, moves, and has its being. We do not like to say *intuition* of memory; we prefer to say *perception* of memory. But this is a small matter. A graver matter is, that after having defined judgments of intuition to be the direct and immediate perception of objective reality, or judgment that the object really exists, the author provokingly tells us, that of intuitive judgments some are true, and some are false—that is, in intuition we sometimes *intue* something—to use his term—and sometimes nothing.

“Such, then,” he says (p. 7), “are intuitive judgments in the sense we shall consistently assign to that word. They are judgments, which I do not hold as being inferred in any way from other judgments, but as *immediately evident*. Yet, on the other hand, they are totally distinct from judgments of consciousness; or, in other words, from the various reflections made by the mind upon its actually present experience. *Many of the judgments we thus form are true; many are false.*” If this be so, how distinguish which is true, which is false? A—A. Intuition equals intuition, and what have we or can we have more certain than intuition with which to verify intuition? If he concedes it possible that intuition in any case may be false, he yields the whole question between him and the skeptic. He quotes the tests proposed by Father Buffier; but these tests he concedes are not wholly satisfactory, and indeed no tests can be; for no test, either in its origin or in its application, can be more certain or evident than intuition. He himself, whether consciously or not, seeks the test in the *sensus communis*,

or *consensus hominum*; but is it more certain to me that this or that is supported by the *sensus communis* or the *consensus hominum* than is the intuitive judgment itself? He claims to refute the skeptic by virtue of the principle that it is possible for an intuitive judgment to carry with it its own evidence of truth; but if there can be false intuitions,—that is, intuitions in which nothing is *intued* or apprehended,—he must concede that intuition alone does not, as the skeptic alleges, carry with it its own evidence.

The author seems to us to have in the outset made a fatal concession to the skeptic, and so far from refuting the skeptic, as he honestly believes, he has rendered him on his ground invulnerable. He has done this by distinguishing between the intuition and its evidence, and conceding the evidence to be necessary to sustain the truth of the intuition, or to establish the fact that in intuition something is *intued*, or that the idea or *noema* is not a mere illusion; for no evidence distinct from the intuition can be more evident than the intuition itself. We say such or such a proposition is self-evident, that is, it is intuitively evident, or we intuitively grasp or apprehend the objective truth or reality itself. No further evidence is possible or conceivable. But the moment you assert the possibility of false intuitions, then you deny that intuitions carry with them their own evidence, or that the fact of intuition by itself alone is a sufficient affirmation of the objective truth. The author falls into his error by confounding *intuition*, which is, and always must be true, and present the truth *à parte rei*, with *conception*, which may indeed be false, as well as obscure, indistinct, and inadequate; for it is an act sometimes of the imagination, sometimes of the reflective reason, and is subject to all the infirmities of the human subject. This part of his work, the author, we trust, will see reason to revise in a second edition.

We cannot stop long to discuss the author's principle of certitude, and his attempted refutation of skepticism. The question of certitude, as he understands it, and as all who follow the psychological instead of the ontological method must understand it, is vital, and on their ground and his own, Balmes is right, when he says in the opening sentence of his great work, "El estudio de la filosofía debe comenzar por el examen de las cuestiones sobre la certeza: antes de levantar el edificio es necesario pensar en el cimiento." Yet either skepticism must be accepted, or the whole

question of certitude excluded from philosophy. Either we know or we do not. If we know, the skeptic's question, how we *know* we know, is absurd; for, to know, equals to *know* we know; if we do not know, there is an end of the matter, and the skeptic's question is alike unaskable and unanswerable. If the point to be determined between us and the skeptic be, as Mr. Ward states, "Can reason be legitimately trusted?" we may as well give up the question at once, for we know nothing but Reason with which to prove the trustworthiness of Reason, and every argument we construct against the skeptic but simply begs the question. We have only one answer to the skeptic, namely, knowing is knowing, and we know that we know by knowing.

The objection does not lie against philosophy, properly so called, nor against our human faculties, but against the Peripatetic and psychological methods of philosophizing. Let us frankly reject the pretence of some that skepticism is a disease of the mind; for the greatest skeptics in practical life disavow their skepticism, and Hume, while he asserts no man can disprove skepticism, maintains that no man can practically accept it. Every man sees and knows it is false and absurd, which is a sufficient proof that our faculties are not in fault. We can assert its falsehood only by seeing and opposing to it the truth it denies. Then all men see and know objective truth. Where then is the difficulty? Why, the difficulty is, that we have adopted theories, according to which it is uncertain whether seeing be seeing, knowing be knowing, and which require us to prove after seeing that we see, that in knowing we know, that in perceiving we perceive, as if perception were not all that is perception of perception, as if knowing does not say just as much as knowing that we know, or seeing as much as seeing that we see. When I know, I know that I know, for in the fact of knowing, I possess at once the object as known, and myself as the subject knowing. The doubt is due neither to our faculties nor to things themselves, but to our false systems of philosophy, which make it necessary, after we have intuition, to determine whether the intuition be true or false—that is to say, whether intuition be intuition; whether the object *intued* be a reality existing independent of us, or a mere mode, affection or production, of the intuitive subject! This comes from giving the question of method precedence of the question of principles, and seeking the principle in the subject instead of the object.

Passing over this fatal concession, that intuitions may be false, we must still object to Mr. Ward, that he makes intuition the act of the subject, a simple perception or judgment *à posteriori*, or empirical intuition, impossible, as Kant has proved, without a synthetic judgment *à priori*, or ideal intuition. The synthetic judgment *à priori*, or intuition of the ideal or intelligible, cannot be primarily our mental act or judgment, since without it the mind cannot act at all, or even exist, any more than the will can elect to concur with grace, without the aid of grace. The mind is essentially active, and the soul is essentially a thinking substance. Its very essence is to think. It, then, cannot be conceived as existing and not thinking. It is not merely a power to think when the occasion arises. It may be *in potentia* to this or that particular thought, but not *in potentia* to all thought, for that would deny it all existence *in actu*, and suppose it a mere possible, not an actual soul. But thought is invariably and essentially a synthetic fact, embracing simultaneously and indissolubly three terms, subject, object, and their relation, and that, too, whether regarded psychologically or ontologically. There is no thought without the thinking subject, and none without the intelligible object. There is, again, no thought unless the subject and object are placed in direct relation. The subject prior to thought cannot place itself in relation to the object, for prior to thought it does not exist; since its very existence, if essentially a thinking substance, commences in thought. Then the object must not only exist independently of the subject, but must place itself in relation to the subject, and in so doing create it, and affirm itself to it. The primitive object, since its affirmation creates the subject, must be, and can only be, God himself in his intelligible being and creative act. It is evident, then, that the ideal intuition is *à priori*, and therefore primarily the act of the object, and only secondarily the concurrent act of the subject.

Mr. Ward does not seem to be aware of the necessity to the scientific treatment of his subject of the recognition of this primitive intuition, whence is derived the ideal and apodictic element of thought. He maintains, very properly and very justly, that what philosophers, whether in the moral order or the purely intellectual, call necessary truth, is God; but he does not provide in his system for the possession of necessary truth by the human mind,

since the mind must possess it before empirical intuitions or judgments *à posteriori* are possible, his doctrine seems to us to require the soul to think or perceive before it exists. To suppose the soul exists, and exists with all its faculties prior to the fact of intuition, would be to suppose it an independent existence and self-sufficing, which would be to suppose it being, not mere existence, and therefore God,—the Fichtean error. No creature or created existence has, or can have its being in itself; for all being properly so called is real, necessary, and eternal. We have our being, and live, and move, not in ourselves, but in God; as the Apostle says, in accordance with the highest philosophy, "In him we live, and move, and have our being." This must be as true of us in the sense we are thinking or intelligent creatures or existences, as in any other sense, if any other sense be conceivable. Then, since the object is as essential to thought as the subject, the soul cannot be conceived as having an independent power of thought, or as capable of initiating an intellectual act by itself alone, or otherwise than as created by the object and in concurrence with it,—a doctrine taught by all our theologians, in what they call the divine concurrence. If this be true, the soul cannot come into possession of necessary truth, or the ideal, the intelligible,—which Mr. Ward agrees with us is identical with God, although we know it not by direct and immediate intuition,—by any act or judgment primarily its own; and to suppose we obtain it by empirical intuition or judgment *à posteriori* is simply, if we did but know it a denial of the soul as creature, and the assertion, that it has its being not in God, but in itself, and therefore is itself God.

The author in words concedes synthetic judgments *à priori*, but, he will permit us to say, in words only. He says in a note that he accepts Kant's position, "that the mind *forms* various *à priori* synthetic judgments;" which, by the way, is not Kant's position, but rather its contradictory, for a great part of Kant's labor was devoted to proving that the mind does not, and cannot *form* synthetic judgments *à priori*; and yet without them no judgment *à posteriori* is possible. His doctrine is that the synthetic judgments *à priori* are innate, or inherent forms of the understanding, which the understanding supplies in the empirical fact, or judgment *à posteriori*. Besides, a judgment *formed* by the human mind is not *à priori*; and as the author holds, and

on his system, must hold, that all judgments are formed by the activity of the mind itself, it is clear that he does not and cannot concede any synthetic judgments really *à priori*.* All synthetic judgments formed by the mind are necessarily *à posteriori*—or, as we say, empirical judgments, or facts of experience. The author adopts, as does Father Buffier, as does the Scottish school, the psychological method; and no man who adopts that method and strictly follows it, can do otherwise than make all begin and end in and with the soul. It is impossible for the psychologist to escape from subjectivism, and pure subjectivism is the assertion that I am myself my own object, therefore that I suffice for myself; and therefore, again, that I am independent being, or God.

The only way to avoid this conclusion is to abandon the psychological method for the ontological. No doubt the point of departure for philosophy is thought; but it is necessary to observe that thought is never a purely subjective fact, is never the sole product of the activity of the subject. In every thought there is object as well as subject, and it is the object that affirms the subject, not the subject that affirms the object. The psychologist assumes that it is the subject that at once affirms the object and itself. It affirms itself, and then affirms what it sees that is not itself. But only Being can affirm itself; only God can say, in and of himself, I AM. The ontologist starts from thought, indeed, but from thought in the sense that it is objective as well as subjective, in which it reveals and affirms the subject to itself. We do not see or perceive, or, as Mr. Ward would say, *intue* ourselves in ourselves, for we are not intelligible in ourselves. Not intelligible in ourselves, St. Thomas maintains, because we are not pure intelligences in ourselves. If we could see ourselves in ourselves we should be intelligible in ourselves, and if intelligible in ourselves, we should be in ourselves both subject and object, therefore God; for only God has, or can have, his own object in himself. We see, know, or recognize ourselves only in the object, which, therefore, must affirm, intuitively, both itself

* Kant has approached much nearer the truth than we ourselves formerly supposed. His error was in making the categories the categories of the subjective reason, or innate ideas in the primitive Cartesian sense, instead of the objective reason illumining the subjective. Reduce all his categories, as may be done, to being and existence; supply, what he omits, the *verum*, or copula, and regard them as forms of the ideal, and you will have the ideal formula itself, *Ens creat existentias*, which we ourselves maintain.

and us or the subject. In this way we easily escape all the difficulties, both of the skeptic and of the subjectivist. On the psychological method it is impossible to find any passage from the subjective to the objective, for if the mind can exist and act with no object but itself, how can you prove that any thing but itself exists? How prove that there is any thing exterior to me, or that what I take to be an objective world is not merely myself projected? But by the ontological method, which starts from the ideal, the objective intuition, we find that it is only by the object that the subject exists and comes to a knowledge even of itself. The skeptic's problem cannot come up, for it is only by virtue of the presence and activity of the object, existing *à parte rei*, that there are, or can be, what Mr. Ward calls judgments of consciousness. Without the presence and activity of the ideal, the source of our internal light, there can be no consciousness, for the precise definition of consciousness is, the recognition of the soul as subject in the intuition of the object. Hence we maintain that the true scientific philosopher never has occasion to discuss the principle of certitude; the principle asserts itself.

The mistake of most philosophers in modern times is in placing the question of method before that of principles, as if principles were found or obtained, instead of being *given*. The principles determine the method, not the method the principles; and when once we understand principles are objective, we understand that our method must be objective, instead of subjective. The object determines the form of the thought, and all our faculties are distinguished and named, as every theologian is aware, from their respective objects. Everybody knows that first principles are and must be *à priori*, for the mind can neither exist nor act without them. They must, then, be given, and the first act in intuition must be on the part of the ideal, or intelligible object. We cannot, then, say with Mr. Ward, that we *intue*, see, or perceive the ideal, or necessary truth, but that it intuitively, directly, immediately affirms itself, and in affirming itself it creates the mind, and is its immediate object and light. Reflection, which must be distinguished from intuition, or this primitive *à priori* or ideal affirmation, or divine judgment, discovers, as we never cease to repeat, that, like every affirmation or judgment, it is a synthesis of three terms, subject, predicate, and copula, expressed in the ideal formula, *Being creates existences*. We

do not, of course, assert that we know by direct and immediate intuition that this formula expresses the primitive judgment, or judgment *à priori*, any more than that we know intuitively that necessary truth or the *being* affirmed, is identically the eternal and self-existing God. The identification, or the drawing out of the formula, is the work of reflection, operating on the original affirmation. This is the great work of philosophy, a long, laborious, and difficult work, and one which few of our race ever successfully accomplish. The intuitive judgment contains the three terms in their real relation, but we do not know intuitively that it contains them, and few persons ever reflect that the necessary truth we all assert in every judgment we form, is God himself intuitively present in reason. The demonstration of this identity is what is called the demonstration of the existence of God.

The good point in Mr. Ward's Treatise is his assertion of the identity of necessary truth with God, although his psychological method does not enable him to prove it. The error of most of our philosophers is in attempting to distinguish between the necessary and God, and this error is in no one more striking than in Rosmini, whose system has at least one able advocate in England, the young professor who writes for the *Rambler*, under the signature of M. All use the conception of the necessary as the basis of their demonstration that God is; but there are few who do not proceed on the assumption that it implies God, rather than that it is God, and thus fall into the fallacy of maintaining that more may be contained in the conclusion than in the premises, or that reflection can attain to a truth not given in intuition. There is affirmed to us in intuition that which is God, but that it is God we know only as demonstrated by reflection. The demonstration, however, is a simple identification, but an identification which the mass of mankind are practically incapable of making; and hence the mass of mankind, though asserting in every judgment they express that God is, would have no formal belief in God, if it were not for the supernatural or social instruction they receive,—the truth on which Traditionalism builds, but which, unhappily, it exaggerates and abuses. Perhaps the remarks we have just made on this point will relieve those of our friends who cannot see their way clear to accept the ideal formula, because they suppose its defenders maintain that it is not only given intuitively in its several terms, but is

given, as distinctly and formally stated by and for the reflective reason; which is a great mistake, for, if it were so, we should never meet either skepticism or subjectivism, atheism or pantheism.

Leaving what the author says of intuitions, we proceed now to the second section of his first chapter, which is "On the Essential Characteristics of Moral Truth." Here we find, or seem to find, the author very confused and obscure. We very naturally expect him to give us clear, distinct, and categorical statements of what, in his view, are the essential characteristics of moral truth. We expect him to define it *per genus et per differentiam*, so that we may recognize what it is in itself, and distinguish it from every thing else. But he hardly meets our expectations. He does not deal in definitions, nor in direct categorical statements; he prefers to leave us to collect his meaning from instances and illustrations, in which he is not always felicitous. All we can gather is, that moral truth is a simple intuitive judgment; a synthetic, not an analytic judgment; an intuition, not an inference; a necessary, not a contingent intuition. Its characteristics are simplicity and necessity, given us in direct, immediate intuition. But may not the same be said of all truth in the ideal order, indeed of the simply good itself? What special meaning, then, does he attach to the epithet, *moral*? What, in treating of *moral* truth, does he say that he would not say were he treating of truth, goodness, or fairness, each regarded as absolute? What, then, is the characteristic of moral truth, or by what does he distinguish it from other truth?

Moral truth, he says, is a simple, not a complex idea; synthetic, not analytic; given intuitively, not discursively obtained. As an instance of what he means, he says: "A friend of mine, who has loaded me with benefits, entrusts to my keeping a jewel of great value, for the sake of the safe custody, while he goes to seek his fortune in other lands. He returns in a state of great distress, and reclaims his jewel. I recognize immediately, and without the faintest shadow of doubt, that I ought to restore it: or, in other words, that I am under the moral obligation of restoring it." "Who has loaded me with benefits," and "in a state of great distress," may be dismissed as having nothing to do with the obligation of restoration. I should be equally bound in justice to restore the jewel on its reclamation by the depositor, if neither circumstance existed. This obli-

gation is, we take it, what he means by distinctively moral truth, and this, he says, is "a simple necessary *intuem*," or idea, or immediate intuitive judgment; but, to our understanding, it is clearly an illative judgment, or logical conclusion. I am bound to render unto every one, especially when he reclaims it, his own, or what is his. The jewel deposited with me for safe keeping is my friend's; it is his property, therefore I am bound to restore it on his reclaiming it. The moral judgment, I am under moral obligation to restore my friend's deposit, is but a particular application of a prior moral judgment, namely, "render unto every man his own." *Suum cuique*.

According to the author, to say I am under the moral obligation to restore the jewel is the same as to say it would be morally evil not to do it. Undoubtedly. But that is only a play on words. The term *moral* includes, in this case, all that we express by the term *obligation*, or the term *ought*, and the two propositions are, therefore, equivalent. But this is not the point. Does the epithet *moral*, applied to good or to evil, add any thing to simply good or simply evil? Is the judgment morally good, the same as the judgment good; or the judgment morally evil, the same as the judgment evil? If so, what is the difference between virtue and good, vice and evil; between the judgment virtuous man, and the judgment a good dog; between the judgment a vicious action, and the judgment a deformed leg or a clubbed foot? If not so, then the epithet *moral* must express something not expressed by the simple term good, or the simple term evil. What is this something? Be it what it may, it must be the characteristic of moral truth; and without telling us what it is, it is clear that the author does not and cannot tell us "what are the essential characteristics of moral truth."

We have a very profound respect for the author, but he must permit us to doubt if, in the present matter, he really understands himself. He maintains that moral truth is a simple necessary idea—*intuem*, as he says. The judgment is simple, like sweet or bitter, and morally good can be defined only as the opposite of morally evil, and morally evil can be defined only as the opposite of morally good. It is not only a simple idea, but a necessary idea. In his third section, *On the Relation of God to Moral Truth*, he maintains very properly, as we hold, that all necessary ideas, or what some philosophers call necessary truths, are God. But that

I ought to restore my friend's jewel, is a simple necessary truth, or idea; therefore, that I ought to restore it, is God! The obligation to restore it is not an obligation imposed upon me by God as my sovereign, but is identically God himself! It is clear, then, that by morally good, the author understands simply good, which, in the absolute sense or the good in itself, is undoubtedly God, the source and measure of every particular or participated good. The author, it seems to us, confounds moral obligation with the good in itself, which, we hardly need say, is to confound it with the end we are obliged to seek; a mistake of the same nature with that of confounding the effect with the cause,—the error of pantheism.

The author, no doubt, aims to prove that moral good and moral evil, virtue and vice, are not mere arbitrary distinctions, dependent on any will whatever, but are founded in the intrinsic nature of things. But between this and the assertion that moral obligation is God, or that "moral obligation by no means need imply the existence of any other person (is moral obligation a person?) who imposes it," there is, to our understanding, some difference. Ethics is a mixed science. It has an ideal, necessary, apodictic element, which is God, necessary, immutable, eternal as the Divine Essence itself; but it has also a contingent element, connected with the ideal only by the creative act, and as contingent, related to the nature and acts of the creature. Things are, no doubt, intrinsically good or evil, and that is a reason why they should be commanded or prohibited; but it is not the reason why they are or are not obligatory on my will. The author seems to hold, and it appears to us the great point with him, that the simple intellectual apprehension or intuition of the intrinsic good itself imposes the moral obligation, or rather is itself that moral obligation. This we cannot accept; for it would imply not that our reason or intellectual faculty perceives or takes cognizance of the law, or is the medium of its promulgation, but is itself the law imposing the obligation, which is not true, and which, if we understand him, is precisely what Suarez opposes in the doctrine, as he represents it, of Vasquez. In the first place, intellectual apprehension is not and cannot be law. I may and must intellectually apprehend the law, but my apprehension of it is not the law, for, as Suarez says, even as cited by the author, "there can be no law properly so called without

the will of some one giving command." *Lex enim propria et præceptiva non est, sine voluntate alicujus præcipientis.** Besides, a law imposed and promulgated by our intellect, would be only a human law, and no divine law at all, and would imply that the legislator, the law, and the subject on which it is to operate, are all identically one and the same. In this case the moral maxim would be that of the Transcendentalists, "obey thy self," which is only another way of saying, "thou art free from all law, therefore live as thou listest." Where there is no law, there is no obligation. It is the law that binds, and a law that does not bind is simply no law at all. To say a thing is obligatory is only saying, in other words, "it is the law," or "the law enjoins it." The law imposes the obligation. But if there can be no law without a law-giver, without some will, or as Suarez maintains, the will of some one commanding, how can the author assert that "moral obligation by no means need imply the existence of any other *person* (law-giver?) who imposes it?" There can be no obligation without law, and no law without a will, and we will add, without the will of the superior commanding.

The author's theory of morals, therefore, strikes us as unsound. It is founded on two assumptions, which we regard as unwarranted; the first, that the simple intellectual apprehension of good and evil is the apprehension of the morally good and the morally evil; and the second, that this apprehension imposes the obligation to do the one and to avoid the other. The first assumption identifies moral obligation with God, which is objective pantheism; the second, identifies it with our own intellect, which is subjective pantheism, or Fichteanism. That there is an intrinsic difference between good and evil, we, of course, concede; and that in this difference is founded, not the law, but the reason of the law or the moral obligation, we maintain as earnestly as any one can do. This intrinsic nature of things not Omnipotence itself can alter. It is not the law, indeed, but the measure of the Divine action as well as of the human. But what is meant by this intrinsic and immutable nature of things? Is this intrinsic nature of things, which not even Omnipotence can alter, and in which is to be sought the reason of the Divine commands and prohibitions, a mere abstraction, therefore nothing; or is it a reality—that is to say, being, since all reality is in

* *De Leg. Lib. II. Cap. 6 No. 1.*

being? If being, is it created or uncreated? That it is created, or creature, is not admissible. If it is uncreated being, then it is identically the Supreme Being we own and worship as God, or there are two self-existent, eternal, and independent beings. This last, of course, cannot be said. What, then, is this intrinsic nature of things?

We answer this question as we have answered it in these pages more than once: that it is the essence or intrinsic nature of God himself, and is immutable and eternal, because he himself, in his very nature, is immutable and eternal. He cannot alter it, because he cannot alter himself, or make himself other than he is. He cannot contradict or annihilate himself, but is obliged by the perfection or plenitude of his being to act always consistently with himself, or with his own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic goodness of the acts of creatures is in their conformity, their intrinsic evil is in their non-conformity to his intrinsic being. All that is necessary, all that is necessity is in him, is his being, as is asserted in the assertion that he is necessary being. In some sense he is himself necessitated. He is necessarily what he is. He is free in his creation and providence, but in case he creates and governs, he must create and govern according to his own essence or eternal and immutable ideas. He cannot make what is intrinsically good evil, nor what is intrinsically evil good; command his creatures to do evil, or forbid them to do good, for that would be to contradict himself, to change or annihilate his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being. When, then, we speak of the intrinsic nature of things, we mean, if we understand ourselves, the intrinsic nature of God, that is, God himself.

The author cites and approves our doctrine, as set forth in the "Conversations of Our Club," January, 1859, that good and God are identical, and therefore that to ask, if God be good, is absurd; but objects that it is not absurd to ask, if our Creator be good or benevolent, for it is imaginable, he says, that an evil and malignant being has created us. Perhaps so, perhaps not so, as we shall soon proceed to inquire. Suffice it now to say, that he concedes that good and God are identical. Then the good in itself, and being in itself are the same. Yet we fear he is not quite prepared to admit this conclusion. He does not seem to us to have any very lively sense of the unity and simplicity of God, or that God is as the schoolmen say, *Ens simpli-*

cissimum, most simple being, and therefore that his attributes are not distinguishable *in se* from his essence, or even from one another. The schoolmen all tell us that the distinction between the divine *essentia* and the divine *esse*, or between the divine being and the divine attributes, and between one attribute and another, is simply a *distinctio rationis ratiocinnata*—a distinction which exists not in God himself, but simply in our manner of conceiving him, or which we are forced to make in consequence of the feebleness and inadequateness of our faculties, which are incapable of apprehending his being at one view, in its simplicity and infinite fulness, and therefore compelling us to consider it under distinct and successive aspects. The distinction, owing to our limited powers, is valid *quoad nos*, but not *quoad Deum*, for *essentia*, *esse* and *attributum*, are one and the same in the simplicity of his being. The Divine *Bonum* and the Divine *Ens* must, then, be the same. If the *summum Bonum* be not identically *summum Ens*, it must be some quality added to it, and substantially or entitatively distinguishable from it, which would not only deny the Divine simplicity, but imply a *summum Ens*, distinguishable from the Divine Being, by participation of which God is good; which is absurd, since God is necessary being, and therefore is necessarily what and all he is.

We do not say that the Divine Being necessarily includes every perfection, and since good is a perfection, therefore must include good; because the term *perfection* is not strictly applicable to God himself, or to the intuition of God, and is applicable only to our conception of God, which is always inadequate and in need of completion by other conceptions. *Perfection* is a making perfect, a completing or finishing, and is inapplicable to God, who is necessarily being in its plenitude, to which nothing can be added, in which there is no imperfection, no want, no void, and therefore nothing to be perfected, completed, or filled up, finished. Also, we refuse to say it, because the intuition of God is logically prior to the notion of perfection or imperfection; and it is only by reference to him as measure or standard that we can say of any particular thing it is perfect or imperfect, complete or incomplete. The intuition of the Divine Being is the intuition of the Divine Pleroma or Fulness, and without that intuition all our conception of particular existences, substances, or qualities, would be meaningless, or simply impossible. We do not,

therefore, agree with those who suppose our notion of God is made up of particular notions, or notions of distinct excellencies discoverable in creatures, carried up to infinity, and added together as a sum total. God is not composed or made up of separate or distinct excellencies or perfections, but is originally, in the very unity and simplicity of being, infinite fulness, and it is only in the intuition of his being as infinitely full, and of creatures related to him and distinguishable from him, that the notion of imperfection, want, or incompleteness is possible. St. Anselm, indeed, attempts, in his *Monologium*, to rise by induction from the several finite excellencies discoverable in creatures to the conception of God or most perfect Being. Most philosophers, not of the first class, attempt to do the same; but in this way, we attain only to abstract being, and the God we assert is only an abstraction, a generalization, a creature of our own minds. St. Anselm himself appears to have been dissatisfied with his *Monologium*, in which he followed the ordinary method of the schools in his time, as well as ours, for he afterward wrote his *Proslogium*, in which he adopts quite another method, and proceeds in his demonstration of the existence and attributes of God ontologically, from the intuition, or, as he says, *idea* of the most perfect being, which he finds already in his mind, and without which we should and could have no mental standard, measure, or criterion of perfection or imperfection, of good or evil.

No doubt our conception of God includes eminently all our conceptions of particular or finite perfections, but we do not say God includes all perfections, that *summum ens* is necessarily *summum perfectum*, and therefore, as good is a perfection, God is good; we say, he is good because he is being, necessarily good because he is necessary being. Good and being are ontologically identical, and no distinction between them is possible or conceivable. All being is good, and all good is being; all creatures are good, participate of good in precisely the respect in which they participate of being. Good and being are identical *in re*, and are distinguishable only in relation to our faculties. Being, considered in relation to the intellect, is called the True, *Verum*; in relation to the will or the appetitive faculty, is called the Good, *Bonum*; in relation to the imagination, is called the Fair, *Pulchrum*: hence God is the True, the Good, and the Fair. But Truth, Goodness, Beauty, or

Fairness, are not distinct qualities added to being, but are, ontologically considered, being itself in its unity, simplicity, and fulness. He who says Being, says all he says who says Truth, Goodness, Fairness, as we are taught, in fact, by God himself, who reveals his name to Moses, as I AM THAT AM, SUM QUI SUM. Either the good in itself is being, therefore God, or it is nothing. Good, if good there be, is not a quality or attribute of being, but is being itself; and creatures are good, because through the creative act they participate in being. Hence, God saw the things he had made, and behold they were good, very good.

The author, we have said, holds, as well as we, that to ask, if God be good, is absurd; but to ask, if our Creator be good, is not absurd, for it is imaginable, though false, that an evil and malignant being might have created us. Imaginable, perhaps—but supposable, no; because it implies a contradiction in terms. Only being can create, for only being can act from its own energy alone, and all being is, by the fact that it is being, good. To create, is to produce from nothing by the sole power or energy of the creator. Then, no creature can create, because no creature can act without the concurrent action of being on which it is dependent. All that is and is not creature is being. To suppose, then, that our creator might have been evil and malignant is a contradiction, for it were to suppose being to be both being and not-being. Our author by not discriminating between good and moral good, or good and virtue, fails to perceive that good is in being, and evil in the privation of being; that good is positive; that evil, like falsehood, is negative; and seems to imagine that there is a positive principle of evil, as well as a positive principle of good, which is Manichæism, or Oriental Dualism. But there cannot be two eternal beings, one good and one evil; for, as good and being are identical, the idea of evil is repugnant to the idea of being, precisely as it is repugnant to the idea of good.

If the distinguished author had really understood and accepted our doctrine in the passage he cites from the "Conversations of Our Club," of the identity of good and God, as he professes to do, he would have spared us his elaborate and ingenious criticism. In those Conversations we are discussing the grounds of our obligation to obey God. Our obligation to obey God, or our duty to obey him, is simply the correlative to his right to command us. Whence, then, his right to command us? This right is in his sovereignty.

His sovereignty is in his dominion ; his dominion is in his right of property in us ; and his right of property is founded on his creative act, on the fact that he has created us, on the principle that the thing made belongs to the maker ; for it is the maker *mediante* his own act. God's right to command us, then, rests in the last analysis, on his creative act, and we are bound to obey him because he is our creator, and therefore our proprietor. "Then," says one of the interlocutors, "if the devil were our creator, we should be bound to him." The author agrees with us, if, *per impossibile*, God were not our creator, he would not have the right to command us, but denies if, *per impossibile*, the devil were our creator, we should be bound to obey the devil ; for it is not in the fact that "God is holy, but in his being our *holy* creator, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." We can assure him that we are as far as he from maintaining the proposition that if the devil, *per impossibile*, were our creator, we should be bound to obey his commands. And we had supposed that no reader could imagine for a moment that the proposition was introduced for any purpose but to show that it could not be entertained, because it implies a contradiction in terms. To suppose the devil to create, is to suppose the devil to be real and necessary being, therefore God, and no devil at all. The proposition, then, is absurd, and therefore an impossible proposition. The other proposition is supposable ; because God is a free creator, and the creative act is not necessary to his being ; and to suppose him not to be creator, does in no sense suppose him not to be, or not to be what and all he is, even being creator. The supposition that he is not our creator is impossible to be made by us, for he only can be our creator ; and if he did not create us, we should not exist, and therefore could make no supposition ; but, in regard to God himself, the supposition is possible, and involves no contradiction in terms.

We maintain, simply, that God's right to command, or his sovereignty, rests on his creative act, from which it no doubt follows that our creator, whoever he might be, would have the sovereign right to command us. Any being we can suppose as our creator, we may suppose to have the right of sovereignty over us ; but we cannot suppose the devil our creator, because the terms, *devil* and *creator*, mutually exclude each other. The author concedes that only our creator can have the right to command us, but main-

tains that even our creator has that right only by virtue of his sanctity; and therefore unless our creator proves himself holy creator (p. 86) we are not bound to obey him. He does not seem to see that, as Father John explains to him, the term *holy* is included in the term *creator*, precisely as is the term *being*. He labors to prove, as the basis of moral obligation, that God is holy. But what does he understand by proving that God is holy? That holiness or sanctity is distinguishable from real and necessary being, or that it is included in it? He must understand the latter, or that real and necessary being is necessarily sanctity. The judgment, God is holy, is analytic, not synthetic, for the predicate is contained in, not added to the subject, and is therefore included in the term creator. To say God is our *holy* creator, is to say in reality no more than to say God is our creator. The author is misled by his psychology, and does not see that the distinction he makes between the essence of God and his attributes is only a distinction *ex parte subjecti*, to which there is no corresponding distinction *ex parte objecti*; or, in other words, that God is *ens simplicissimum*. The judgment, God is creator, or God is sovereign, is synthetic, for the predicate is something joined to, not contained in the subject; but God is being, is self-existent, is necessary, is eternal, is immutable, is intelligent, is wise, is powerful, is good, or is holy, is an analytic judgment, for the predicate explains the subject, but adds nothing to it. Who says *ens*, or being, says all of God considered in himself that can be said. SUM QUI SUM is all that God can say of his own nature to us through natural reason; and all we say of him, however we multiply our words or vary our forms of expression, is simply QUI EST. Adjectives and qualifying terms add nothing to simple *ens*, or being, and are necessary only because our faculties cannot take in at one view all of being that is intelligible to us, or because it is necessary to guard against the false meanings an erroneous philosophy has attached to the word.

The author maintains, as a vital point, that moral truth, by which he means the morally good or the morally obligatory, is a simple synthetic judgment. As to its simplicity, we say nothing, for we are not quite clear as to what the author means by a simple judgment, or in what sense he holds a synthetic judgment is or can be simple. But that the moral judgment is a synthetic judgment, or a

judgment in which the predicate is joined to the subject, not contained in it, we hold to be unquestionable. But if this be so, how can the author hold that it is simple necessary truth, identically God himself? Where, in such case, is the synthesis? Every judgment, the logicians tell us, has three terms: subject, predicate, and copula. When the predicate is identical with the subject, or is contained in the subject, the judgment is analytic; when the three terms are distinct, and no one of them can be identified with another, or both of the others, the judgment is a synthetic judgment. The author says moral truth is a synthetic judgment. Then he must find in it a real synthesis of three distinct terms not resolvable one into another. Then how can he identify it with the single term, as he does when he identifies it with God? Does he not see that when he does so, he contradicts himself, and makes the judgment analytic, not synthetic?

The author has misunderstood us, and those who agree with us, in supposing that we identify moral truth with God. We identify all necessary truth, therefore the good in itself, and therefore the ideal or apodictic term of the moral judgment with God. But we hold that the judgment itself is synthetic, and, like all synthetic judgments, affirms a real synthesis of the subject and predicate, or of the necessary and contingent, or being and existences. The three terms of the judgment cannot be found in *Ens*, or God as being. They can be found only in three terms of the real synthesis of things, *Ens creat existentias*, as Gioberti has so fully and so clearly explained. The moral judgment demands as its condition the ideal formula, or the real synthetic judgment *a priori*, without which, as Kant demonstrates, no synthetic judgments *a posteriori* are possible. The principle of the moral judgment is in the three terms united of this formula, not in any one of them taken singly. Being alone cannot give us the conception of sovereignty, of law, or obligation, without which there can be no moral judgment; existence alone, or creation alone cannot furnish the principle, for neither is apprehensible or conceivable without *ens*, the first term of the formula. There can be no moral obligation, unless there are creatures; there can be no creatures without the creative act; and no creative act without *ens necessarium et reale*, or real and necessary being. The author, however strenuously he insists on the intrinsic nature of good and

evil, does not attempt to deduce analytically the conception of moral obligation from the conception of the being or the attributes of God. "It is not," he says, "on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." God is not, we repeat, a necessary creator, and the creative act is not included in the conception of the being, or the attributes of God. Therefore the author must modify his assertion, and instead of saying moral truth is God, he must say it is God *mediante actu creativo suo*, and agree with us, that the principle of moral obligation is in the divine creative act.

Take the instance once more of the jewel. I am bound to restore my friend's deposit, and am morally wrong if I do not. But this particular judgment depends on the more general judgment. I am bound to render unto every one his own, or his due. This is the principle of justice. Not to render unto every one his own or his due is to be unjust, to violate the demands of justice. The moral judgment in the instance selected is not that the jewel deposited with me by my friend for safe keeping is still his, but that being his, I *ought* in justice to restore it on his reclaiming it. The essential and distinctive moral judgment is expressed by this word *ought*, which is the same as the word *owe*, and in all languages the judgment is expressed by an equivalent word. In all languages we know any thing of, moral obligation is expressed as *debt*, something *owed*, and to be *paid*. I owe to justice the restoration of my friend's jewel, or its restoration is a debt due to justice. Justice, strictly taken, however, expresses the moral relation between God and his creatures, or the claims of God as creator on them, rather than God, or the Supreme Being himself; though taken absolutely, and as the just in itself, it is, and must be God, identical with his infinite and eternal being. The real moral judgment, then, is, I *owe* to God the restoration of my friend's deposit, or the restoration of my friend's deposit is a debt due to God. Grant now the owner of the debt is God, the debt itself cannot be God, for it is alike distinguished from him and from me. Whence comes this debt? How comes it that I owe it to the Supreme Being? I owe and can owe it to him only for the reason that he is my owner. If I owned myself, and my actions, I could not owe him the restoration, for being my own owner, neither he nor any one else could place me

under moral obligation, or call me to an account for my acts, or any use I see proper to make of myself. The moral judgment, then, implies God as my owner, or the judgment, I owe myself, and therefore my acts to God. God owns me and my acts, and I owe all I am, all I have, all I can do to him. Whence this divine ownership, the principle of all moral obligation? It certainly is not identifiable with the divine being, or in other words, the divine ownership in which is founded all moral obligation, is not inherent in or identical with the divine nature or essence, and therefore the distinctively moral truth is not, and cannot be identically God himself.

This divine ownership can be founded only in the creative act of God, by which he, by his sole energy, creates me from nothing. As the author himself concedes, when he says of God, "It is not on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." He owns us because he has made us, for the thing made belongs to the maker. The distinctively moral judgment, then, is not, in all its terms, a necessary judgment, or necessary truth, as the author asserts, for the obligation depends immediately on the copula, or creative act of God. The ideal or necessary term of the judgment is God, as it is in every judgment, but the predicate and copula are distinguishable from him as the act and its product are distinguishable from the actor; are, as in the divine judgment or primitive intuition itself, contingent, since, as we constantly repeat, creation *ex parte Dei* is a free and not a necessary act. The principle that the thing made is the maker's is a necessary and eternal truth, but that any thing is made, or that the occasion is created for the application of the principle, is a contingent fact, dependent on the will of God to create or not to create. Hence the eternal law, of which all just laws are transcripts, is eternal only *ex parte Dei*, not in its subjects, save in the sense that God's free purpose and decree to create them is eternal, or, as is more commonly said, from eternity. We cannot, then, accept, without important qualifications, the author's assertion that the moral judgment is simple and necessary, that is, simple necessary truth. Simple necessary truth is God, we grant; but the moral judgment is not the judgment God is, but the judgment God is our owner, or we owe to God our existence, and therefore our actions. We owe and can owe ourselves and actions to him, only because he is our maker.

The *owing* depends on creation, and connects us morally, as the creative act connects us physically, with God.

The author seems at one time to be an exclusive psychologist, and at another an exclusive ontologist, and we find him nowhere recollecting that the primitive judgment is the synthesis of the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*. In declaring the moral judgment necessary, or, as he understands it, necessary truth, therefore God, he makes the judgment analytic, not synthetic, and therefore exclusively ontological. He confounds good with moral good, or the good in itself with the moral obligation of creatures to seek good as their Final Cause; as he confounds the good as Final Cause, or Beatitude, with the good as First Cause. The good in both cases is ontologically the same, indeed, but not the same in respect of moral truth. Moral science, or the science of ethics, is founded on the two-fold relation of creatures to God; their relation to him as First Cause, and their relation to him as Final Cause. Creatures have a double movement, that of procession by his creative act from God as First Cause, and their return to him, without absorption in him, as their Final Cause, their last end, or Beatitude. God is the *terminus à quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of all existences. Creation,—since it is the free act of God, the free act of reason, intelligence, wisdom, love, as well as power,—must be an act *propter finem*, for some end and for some good end, and therefore for an end inseparable from being. But as God only is being, and is all being, or being in its plenitude, *qui est*, the end for which he creates must be himself. As he is the end for which he creates and creatures exist,—“all things are by him and for him,”—he is our end, and our good is in our return to him as our Final Cause. Our good, or the good for which creatures exist, is in his being or eternal essence. But our moral good is not in simply returning or attaining to him as our last end, but in doing so voluntarily, by our own free act; for we are created with free will. Our obligation to return to God is imposed by the creative act, which, as a free act, is the act of the divine will. The obligation is, then, imposed by the will of God, and consequently has the essential characteristic of law; since, as Suarez tells us, there is no law without some will commanding. It connects us in the moral, as the creative act connects us in the physical order with God, and is the copula between being and existences, the subject and predicate of

the ideal judgment ; only in the moral order the subject and predicate change sides, and existences attain to being as the product of their free activity.

It is not difficult, now, to clear up the mystery and solve the problems which come up as to the principles of morality,—the first part of natural moral theology, or speculative ethics. Are we asked what is good? We answer, God. Are we asked what is *our* good? We answer again, God. Are we asked why is he *our* good? We answer, because he is the good in itself. Why is he the good in itself? Because he is being, being in itself, and all good is in being, or rather is being. If you ask us what is moral good? we answer, in voluntarily returning to God, without absorption in him, as our Final Cause or last end. If you ask why we are morally obliged to return to God as our last end, or, in other words, to seek our own good, we answer, because it is the will of God, as he himself declares in the very act of creating us for that end. If it is asked, why are we bound to obey the will of God? we answer, because he has made us, and we are his; he is our owner, and the owner may do what he pleases with his own. We may go behind the will of God to find the reason of the law, for the reason of the law is in his own eternal reason; but we cannot go behind the will itself to find the reason of our obedience. God wills, is always the sufficient reason of man's obedience, because his will is the will of man's sovereign. To this last answer only does our author try to frame an objection, but he does not succeed. If God were not holy, he reasons, even though our creator, we should not be bound to obey him; and yet he does not found the obligation to obedience on the divine sanctity, for he says expressly, "It is not on his being holy, but on his being our holy *creator*, that his full claims on our allegiance are founded." What he means is, that the obligation is imposed neither by the sanctity alone, nor by the creative act alone, but by both conjointly; so that if we could conceive an unholy creator, we should not be bound to obey him. We are bound to do the will of him whose we are, and we are his who creates us, for we are the creator *mediante* the creative act, which act is his. If we could suppose the devil to be our creator, and devil still, we should be bound to do the devil's bidding—no question of that. But, as we have sufficiently shown, we cannot suppose the devil to be our creator, because only being can create, and no evil or malignant being is suppos-

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ble, conceivable, or imaginable, since the idea of being and the idea of good are identical; or all being, by the fact that it is being, is good. The difficulty of the author grows out of the fact that he confounds *ens* with *existens*, and as existences or creatures are evil or malignant in a greater or less degree, it implies, in his mind, no contradiction in terms to suppose or imagine an evil and malignant being, therefore an evil or malignant creator. In loose popular language we may and do call existences or creatures, beings; but philosophers should use language more strictly, and with more exactness and precision. The distinction Gioberti makes between being and existence or creature, *ens* and *existens*, is important and valid, and would save us much needless perplexity and much unmeaning speculation, if observed. The practice of the schools, of using the term *ens* indiscriminately for being and existence, real being and possible being, necessary being and contingent being,—as if the contingent and the necessary, the possible and the real, the creature and creator, could be put in the same category,—is as unphilosophical as any thing well can be, and seldom fails to have a most injurious effect on our speculations. To suppose the devil creator, is to suppose the devil being, therefore good and holy, as we have said, and no devil at all. Has the author ever undertaken the refutation of Manichæism? If he has, will he tell us what, in his view, is the principle of that refutation? If he supposes it possible that there should be an evil and malignant being, how can he demonstrate the falsity, or logically refute the doctrine of two original and eternal principles—the one good, and the other evil?

Indeed, the author seems to us to go farther in the Manichæan direction than he suspects. He makes evil a positive quality of actions. This he expressly maintains. Then it must be a positive quality of actors. Then it must have a positive original principle opposed to the principle of good, for good cannot create evil. Then he must suppose two eternal principles; therefore two eternal self-existent beings, two Gods, the one good, the other evil. He teaches us that morally good and morally evil are both positive. But St. Thomas holds, and so do most theologians, that good alone is the object of the will; consequently, that malice or evil will is privative, not positive, which must be the fact if, as we maintain, good and being are identical. But the author, though he asserts the identity of God and good, does not recognize the

identity of good and being, for he conceives, and even speaks of an evil and malignant being, as implying no contradiction in terms. The good, in his conception, is not being, but a quality, attribute, or accident of being. Accidentally, or as a fact, being is good, but not necessarily good in that it is being. That good, however, is an accident of being, in the scholastic sense, he cannot hold, for he holds that the good is a necessary truth. He can, then, hold it as an attribute of being only in the sense that the scholastics distinguish attributes from accidents,—that is, as an *essential* and necessary attribute, indistinguishable from the essence of the subject, attribute only in our mode of conceiving, but in reality no attribute at all, but the subject itself. Substance stands under and supports accidents, but does not stand under and support essential attributes, for they are the substance itself. The author labors at great length and with much earnestness to show that good is identical neither with the free command nor with the necessary command of God, that is, with the act of God; then, in identifying God and good as he does, he must identify good with the eternal *being* of God, and holds, if he understands himself, that the good and real and necessary being are identical, and that evil being is as much a contradiction in terms as an evil good, or a good evil. If so, he must concede that evil is not positive, but negative,—not being, but privation of being; consequently, that we cannot will evil, because evil being nothing in itself, to will evil would be to will nothing, and to will nothing is simply not to will.

Assuming, now, good and being to be identical, and our good to be from and in being, we can understand why the love of God imposes on us the obligation of returning to him as our Final Cause. The law, though imposed by the will of God, is yet not an arbitrary law, for it is the expression of his eternal reason, or his intrinsic wisdom, goodness, love. He enjoins us to return to him, because it is only in him that there is or can be any good or beatitude for us. Our good, as the good itself, is in being, and there is and can be no being but God; for he only can say *SUM QUI SUM*. As without him as First Cause we could not exist, so without him as Final Cause we can have no beatitude, cannot exist as blest; without him as First Cause we should be nothing in the order of physical existence, so without him as Final Cause we should be nothing in the moral order or order of beatitude. All movement toward God as our last end is a

movement toward being, in which alone is beatitude; all movement in the moral direction from God is a movement away from being toward no-being, therefore toward evil. Even the omnipotence of God cannot make it otherwise, because he cannot provide for beatitude without being, or create existences that shall have being in themselves, or not have their being in him, in his own necessary, eternal, and immutable being. Hence his law, imposing upon us the duty of returning to him as our end, imposes upon us no obligation but that of seeking our real beatitude where, and only where, it can be found. Hence the law of God is good, and philosophy itself requires us to say with the Psalmist, "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting souls; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. The precepts of the Lord are right, giving joy to hearts; the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, giving light to the eyes." [Ps. xviii., 8, 9.] God is the fulness of beatitude, because the fulness of being, and it is impossible for him to command us in his law what is not for our good, because it is impossible for him to command what is repugnant to his own nature and essence. His law, then, is the expression toward us of his love, not his wrath, and is our friend, not our enemy. Therefore, the good love the law and joy to do the will of God. In keeping his commandments there is joy, and in doing his will there is peace.

We may now understand the question of evil. Evil is no positive being or existence; it is simply privative. There is, then, and can be no physical evil, for all positive physical existence is good, inasmuch as it participates through the creative act in being. The only sort of evil that can be conceived is moral evil, and that is not a positive object or quality of the will, any more than falsehood is a positive object or quality of the understanding. It has pleased God to create men free moral agents, or with free will, which enables them to act not merely *ad finem*, but also *propter finem*. Free will implies freedom of election, or power of choice. Now, being created thus free, we may choose or will to act for God, that is, to return to him as our chosen Final Cause, and if so, we move morally toward good, and there is and can be no evil for us. Nothing can harm us, or do us the least conceivable injury; pain, suffering, trials, afflictions, temptations, however grievous while they last, are no evils, and are simply effective means to help us on in our march toward our final beatitude. We

may, also, choose not to act for God as our Final Cause, to disregard his law, and to turn, as it were, our backs upon him, and depart from him. We then depart from being, and turn our faces and march toward no-being, toward—nothing. The evil is not, then, in something positively inflicted on us, but in the rejection of the positive, and seeking our good where it is not, and in what is not. We, then, under the moral point of view, precipitate ourselves into the abyss of infinite Want, where there is no bread for our hunger, no water for our thirst. The soul participating as creature in being, and as creature having its being not in itself, has necessarily wants and desires, all good, since they spring from being, which only being can fill up or satisfy. Consequently, when it takes its portion of goods, turns its back on God, and departs for a far country, it leaves behind all that could satisfy its inherent desires, its internal wants, while its wants and desires remain in full force. The soul then suffers the rage, the torture, the agony of wants unfilled, desires unsatisfied. What it suffers is not something positive, but the want or privation of something positive. As heaven or beatitude is in the satisfaction or replenishment of the soul with Being, so hell, its opposite, the culmination of evil, the torments of the damned, we may suppose to consist not in something positive inflicted, but in the absence of this replenishment, with the consciousness of having forfeited it,—in the everlasting unappeasement of our inherent desires, in the everlasting torture of wants unfilled.

As evil is privative, it is never any thing positively willed, and we never do and never can will evil simply for the sake of evil. All sin implies malice, but malice, evil will, as we say, does not imply the willing of evil for the sake of evil. All evil is in *carentia* of some sort. When the soul turns away from God as its Final Cause, it does not mean to reject good, but means to find it in creatures, or in itself, ignorant, or not reflecting, that it cannot find it there. In not willing God as our good, we still will to fill up our wants, to appease our desires, therefore will beatitude. But elsewhere than in God our beatitude is not, for besides him there are only his creatures, and they have being only in him, none in themselves. The evil is not in our being created with wants and desires that only being can satisfy, for these spring from the high destiny of our nature, but in not seeking their satisfaction, where, and

only where, it can be found. But even this is not the result of pure malice, but of the ignorance which mistakes the creature for the creator, or the weakness that shrinks from the effort necessary to forego a present, temporary, and relative good, for the real and eternal good.

Other questions, and important questions, too, there are, in the first part of morals, but, as we are not writing a treatise of moral philosophy, we are not required here to solve them. If we mistake not, they are all solvable by the aid of the principles and method we have briefly and feebly defended in modification of the principles and doctrines set forth by our author. At any rate, it is time to bring our review of the first chapter of his *Philosophical Introduction* to a close. We may, perhaps, return to his volume hereafter, and offer some further remarks, for we consider his publication, however much we may differ with him, an event in our English-speaking world. It can hardly fail to provoke thought, and compel our frivolous public to betake themselves to graver studies, and profounder investigations. No man, probably, will be found, to whom his work will prove less satisfactory than to ourselves; yet we can assure him that we have not only a high esteem for him personally, but for his work, which, under many points of view, we regard as a great work, marked at times by profound, frequently by ingenious, and always by independent and manly thought.

ART. II—1. *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. New York. Harper and Brothers, 1860.

2. *The Catholic University Gazette*. 1854-55. Dublin. James Duffy.

FIFTY years ago, a young student of Baliol College presented himself to be examined for his academic degrees before the authorities of Oxford University, England. The vastness of his erudition, his perfect acquaintance with all ancient and modern literature, the incredible extent to which he had carried his researches in philosophy and scholastic theology, astounded his examiners. Aristotle, Plato, Proclus, Plotinus, and all the writers of the Alexandrian school; Themistius, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Averroes, Avicenna, the most philosophical of the Latin Fathers and writers, particularly

St. Augustine; St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and all the great scholastics of the Middle Ages; the most out-of-the-way writers of the Revival,—all these he had read and studied, and mastered before he was twenty-five. "In fourteen of the books on Greek philosophy, which he brought up for examination," says one who was present at this splendid academic display, "he was not questioned, the greater part of them being declared by the master too abstrusely metaphysical for examination." His triumph was complete. In 1812 he left Oxford, and became a member of the Scottish bar in Edinburgh. His mighty intellect could not brook the limits of one profession. Phrenology, medicine, anatomy, general literature, above all, mental and moral philosophy were the combined theatre of his researches. He struck a death-blow at the fallacies of George Combe, the phrenologist, and the cloudy nonsense of the German Transcendentalists, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, and did for philosophy what no man achieved before or since, with the exception, perhaps, of the Italian Gioberti. His was one of the most metaphysical minds that have adorned the annals of modern philosophy. His essays on Education, published originally in the *Edinburgh Review*, created a deep sensation throughout Great Britain, France, and Germany. His discussions on the merits and defects of the English Universities, his sketches of the history of education, and the comparative value of different systems, are replete with interesting suggestions, and constitute an invaluable treasure for the college professor. The individual in question was Sir William Hamilton, a native of Glasgow, Scotland. He was born in 1788, and died in May, 1856, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of the Scottish capital.

We propose in our present article to develop, with occasional references to Sir William's essays on Collegiate and University Reform, some of the remarks made in the July number of the *Review*, on Catholic Education in the United States.

God wishes and commands man to use, and, by using, to improve the gifts of mind and body with which he has endowed him. The distribution of talents varies with individuals; to some he gives more, to others, less; but from all he expects payment at the great accounting-day, of principal and interest. The man who neglects to exercise his body to such a degree, at least, as to enable it to act as the ready and subservient instrument of the rational soul, sins against the order of Providence; he leaves one of his talents unemployed. We do not advocate "muscular Christianity;" we do not bow in hero-worship before the tough bone-and-sinew worthies of Charles Kingsley's novels, or throw our cap in the air for the two world-champions of the manly art of self-defence. Still the truth stands that man is bound by the law of nature and of nature's God to educate his body, that is, so to develop or restrain its powers, its cravings, and aversions as to make it the faithful servant of the

imperial soul. But this soul, too, needs education. It is an instrument made for the sublimest of purposes, but an instrument blunt and unpolished when first united to the body to form man's individuality. God imposes on us the task of brightening it, of giving it a keen, trenchant edge, and of acquiring ease and gracefulness in its use. The fulfilment of this duty is called the education of the soul. It is a duty incumbent on all alike, the noble and the commoner, the rich and the poor,—for we are all bound to know truth and love goodness. Truth we cannot know, and goodness we cannot love, if mind and heart remain uneducated. The Catechism tells us that we are created to know God and to love him, and, therefore, to exercise our intellect and will, to educate them with reference to God as their object. Ignorance is a privation, a defect; but error, says St. Thomas, is an act superadded to ignorance. Error is the act of a mind in a state of ignorance, the passing of a judgment on an object not sufficiently known to warrant that judgment. Ignorance, as an occasion, a proximate cause of error, is always an evil, sometimes a moral evil or sin. It is the province of education to destroy error by striking at ignorance,—its root. The mind is essentially united, at the moment of its creation, with the objective truth; education strengthens and develops that union; it weaves numerous and beautiful links between the soul and the outward world.

The duty of educating the mind to a higher or lower pitch of intellectual excellence varies with man's circumstances of wealth, position in society, natural tastes, past habits, and future prospects. The duty always exists and always urges, in one degree or other. The Church recognizes it, and directs the attention of her children to it. She founds schools, and inculcates by word and example the necessity of education for the formation of a genuine Christian character. The State recognizes it, and she, too, founds schools; for the history of the world teaches that education is necessary for the formation of public-spirited, loyal-hearted citizens. Ignorance breeds factions and rebellions, murder and anarchy; it is equally ready to head a mob or bow its neck beneath the heels of the tyrant. We find fault with neither Church nor State for taking education under its protection, because the interests of civil and ecclesiastical society are here equally concerned with those of the individual and the family. In a country where thought and speech are free, education is more imperatively necessary. Where falsehood has a fair field, truth demands one also. Nor do we repine at a state of things in which both have the same external advantages, in which each has to depend on its own innate strength. Give truth elbow-room and fair play, and the laurel wreath will soon grace her modest and queenly brow. But if her champions are bores or socialists, they pinion her arms and deliver her over blindfolded to the smittings of falsehood's impious hand. There is no censorship of the press for American republicans. There is corruption in our government, cor-

ruption gnawing at the brain and the heart of republican liberty; but, thank God! we have not yet sunk as low as imperial France. Our thoughts, and our tongues, and our pens are our own, free and unmuzzled, and we have the right and it is our duty to speak out in the bold, manly, ringing tones of the freedom wherewith nature and Christ have made us free. Let us not sigh for the gauntleted hand of arbitrary power to be placed on the mouth of political ribaldry and infidel scoffing. Our turn would soon come; to-morrow it would be on our own mouths, and then, with a tiger's spring, its deadly gripe would clutch our throats. But what avails our freedom, if we know not how to use it; if, through our own supineness, reason, the godlike instrument of thought, has not been tempered and sharpened by liberal education; if our tongues stutter weak unmeaning words, the idle prattlings of intellectual infancy. A lofty destiny beckons us onward; a wider and more glorious field of contest and of triumph opens before us than ever burst on the vision of the soldiers of the Cross. We are strong in our numbers, strong in our faith, strong in our love of Holy Church; why cannot we be strong in liberal culture? Does Catholicity make a man's brain too giddy to stand on the mountain top of science? is the air too keen and pure there for Catholic lungs? Will the Catholic banner flap lazily and lifelessly in that high serene atmosphere, where falsehood and impiety, Protestantism and infidelity flutter their gaudy flags in mocking triumph? Culture, education, large-mindedness, and still larger-heartedness, these are what we want. The crown of grace is never more resplendent than when it rests on the lofty brow of natural excellence. Gold and precious stones are the foundations of the heavenly Jerusalem; philosophy and art are the fitting corner-stones of the city of God on earth.

"Vain dreamer! legislator for Utopia; fit inmate of the Paradise of fools! Talk of Catholics in this country having the same external advantages as their opponents—pshaw! moonshine all! Thou thrower of stones into a quiet pond; thou builder of castles in Spain, of universities and colleges in cloud-land! We are poor; we have neither time nor money for liberal education. We do not, as thou dost, consider salvation secure; we wish to save our souls and our children's; we must legislate for the heart first, and then, *Deo volente*, we shall legislate for the head. As it is, our schools are as good as any in the land. Our Catholic A. B.'s and A. M.'s can hold their heads as high as graduates of Yale or Harvard; they can dig as deep for Greek roots, and climb a genealogical tree of ancient worthies as nimbly as any disciple of Anthon and Felton, of Arnold and Hamilton. Recreant child, betrayer of the Catholic cause! hast thou forgotten that the Protestant universities which thou didst so flippantly praise, were founded by Catholics, that their glory is stolen property, that it was once our own?"

These were the words of reproof that echoed on the July air, the censorial lightnings that flashed in the July sky.

The remarks that called forth these criticisms from a portion of the Catholic press, were not novel. They had been advanced in substance three several times before in the pages of the *Review*, in articles by F. G., on "Our Colleges," and in the "Conversations of Our Club." Every day that the writer of this has spent in college has convinced him more forcibly of their truth. It was in that conviction, and in the belief that a time had come when the question of education imperiously clamored for a thorough agitation by all loyal children of the Church, that the article on Dr. Arnold as an educator was written. The literary revival in Ireland and Belgium, attested by the establishment of the Irish Catholic University and the rising fame of the University of Louvain; the beginning of a seminary to recruit the American Missions in connection with the latter institution; the founding by the Holy Father and the hierarchy of this country of the American College in Rome; and the many bulls and briefs in which, during the last ten years of his Pontificate, Pope Pius IX. has drawn the attention of the bishops and the clergy to the necessity of instant and persevering endeavors to promote Catholic education,—all these we took in good faith as signs of the times. We may have been deceived, imprudent, if you will, but we set down naught in malice. Does a Catholic transgress the bounds of propriety, of due respect for the opinions of those whose station and experience challenge his obedience and love, if, frankly and good temperedly, he tries to make good his stand on a free question,—a question open, from its very nature, to a wide divergence of opinion and practice? Does our true interest lie in the hush-up policy? Have we so little confidence in our cause and ourselves as to be afraid of discussion? Any subject apart from the dogmas and the traditional teaching and policy of the Church that cannot bear ventilation, merits not a moment's thought. If our systems and opinions must be kept in hermetically sealed cans, as we keep fruit and vegetables from summer to winter, they will soon mildew. If they cannot bear the air and rough handling, they are pretty toys, curious fossils, nothing more, and the sooner we get rid of them the better.

The past is the prophet of the future. We can argue from what we have done to what we can do. The thousands of crosses that shower down from Catholic steeples their silent benisons on the world beneath; our cathedrals and parish churches; our religious orders, and numerous secular clergy; our schools, hospitals, and asylums; the vast sums annually and ungrudgingly expended in noble charities,—all these prove that Catholic faith and Catholic zeal can work miracles. Are we to believe that the devotion of our people decreases in proportion to the increase of their numbers and wealth; that the poor emigrants of twenty years ago could do more for God

and his Church than their children of to-day? It may be so; it may be that the agencies that could sow Catholic schools and colleges broadcast over the land, are inadequate to support and improve them. It may be that we are like the man in the Gospel, who began to build without having wherewith to finish. Grant it all; but then we say, and truth says with us, that it is not want of means but want of will, want of disinterestedness, that cramps our efforts now. As the country advances in wealth and population, we advance too. As the engines of error are multiplied and improved, God provides that truth shall have the same advantages. But God acts by secondary causes; he leaves his work to be done in great measure by us. As the necessities of extensive, liberal education increase, God multiplies our means of education. Are the literary wants of American Catholics less pressing than those of their brethren in Ireland and Belgium, the two most Catholic nations of Europe? Are the enemies of religion less numerous and bitter here than on the other side of the Atlantic? Are they not freer and more rampant, for having the fewer checks? If Irish and Belgian Catholics, who have sucked in devotion to the Church, to every thing noble and good, with their mothers' milk, must needs keep their blood from stagnation, by walking in the groves of the Academy and the porch of Zeno, what of those whose blood is in danger of taint, of utter corruption, from the poison of indifference, heresy, and atheism, which they draw in with every breath!

From the State we receive no countenance. A system of Common Schools, which throws open the class-room door to admit Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, and to kick religion out, is radically wrong. It is atheistical, based on the assumption that the God of Christianity is a local divinity, at home in the sanctuary and pulpit, but as much out of place in the school-room and the pedagogue's chair, as an Esquimaux would be in the saloons of Paris. The attempt to educate without religion will entail misery on the individual and society. Practically, the schools find it impossible to exclude religion. It must enter, but it enters in a counterfeit form, in the guise of sectarianism. It will nestle, in spite of him, on the tongue of the teacher, and peep out from the pages of geographies and histories. Catholics cannot, of course, tolerate this state of things; they withdraw their children, and yet continue to pay taxes for an institution which is as just to them as the Anglican establishment in Ireland is to the Celtic peasant.

The State, we have said, has a right to take education under its patronage. Its prosperity, yea, its very existence depends on the intelligence and virtue of its citizens. The instinct of self-preservation leads it to establish schools, colleges, and universities as the centres and homes of political and moral science. More especially is the throne of Republican Liberty built on education, on the clear heads and the loyal hearts of freemen.

"Though the State," says Adam Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations*, "was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of the people, it would still deserve its attention, that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The State, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are, therefore, more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favorable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it."

The State, however, has no right to deny God by ejecting religion from education; neither has it a right to coerce the consciences or insult the convictions of its subjects by teaching a system of religion which they believe to be false. The practical question in regard to State education is to devise a plan which shall combine these two requisites,—the acknowledgment of religion as the most important element, the most energetic power in education, and the exclusion of what any class of citizens regard as sectarian. The system adopted in Germany is clearly the only one at all admissible. Before the State, all forms of religion stand on an equal footing; it is not within its province to decide on the respective claims of the Church and the sects. It must acknowledge, in its schools, the religious equality, in a civil point of view, of all forms of belief. The educational code of Prussia, drawn up in 1819, provides that difference of religion shall authorize separate schools—the Catholic schools to be, in the first instance, under the superintendence of the bishops, deans, and parish priests; the Evangelical, under those of their own clergy. If the union of schools of different persuasions be found expedient, both parties must consent to that union. The head master of the school is, in that case, to profess the faith of the majority of the pupils; his assistant, that of the minority. Never, however, is either religion to interfere with the other.

"The primitive question of every school," says the Prussian law, "is to train youth, that, with a knowledge of the relations of man to God, it may foster in them the desire of ruling their life by the spirit and principles of Christianity. The school shall, therefore, betimes, second and complete the first domestic training of the child to piety.

Prayer and edifying reflections shall commence and terminate the day; and the master must beware that this moral exercise do never degenerate into a matter of routine."

This is all fine enough on paper. Prussia provides for religion as an essential of education, and condemns sectarianism and proselytism, but her practice is not always consistent with her theory. The *Dublin University Gazette* gives the following information in regard to the state of education in Prussia in 1853 and 1854:

"There are in Prussia three Universities exclusively Protestant; none are exclusively Catholic. The Academies of Munster and Braunschweig have only two Faculties; and while one of these Academies receives nothing of the public money, the other one obtains an insignificant subsidy. The University of Berlin is not officially declared Protestant, but if it is not so *de jure*, it is, at least, *de facto*, and scarcely numbers any Catholics among its professors.

"There remain two mixed Universities, Breslau and Bonn. Here the parity between the two confessions is recognized *de jure*, and one would have expected that their equality would be actually observed. Nothing of the sort. Putting aside the Faculties of Theology, there are at Breslau, among the ordinary professors, thirty Protestants, and only five Catholics. At Bonn they number thirty-seven Protestants, and eleven Catholics. And it ought to be observed that the population of these Universities not only does not represent even the above-mentioned proportion of three to five, but the terms are reversed; and, while the number of Protestant professors has so vast an advantage over that of the Catholic professors, the number of the Catholic students is *double* that of the Protestants; at Breslau there are 475 Catholic students, and 235 Protestant students; at Bonn there are 561 Catholics, and only 288 Protestants.

"In the Province of Posen, which contains 422,920 Protestants, and 852,148 Catholics; that is to say, double the number of the former, there are three Protestant Gymnasias, or Colleges, and only three Catholic. In the Province of Silesia, where the numbers of the two religions are nearly equal, there are fourteen Protestant Gymnasias to eight Catholic.

"The public treasury, to which all the tax-paying population, whatever their religious confession, contribute in an equal manner, espouses all the preferences of the Prussian Government. The subsidies given by the State to the Protestant schools reach the sum of 629,265 francs, while the Catholic establishments receive but 39,270 francs; not even the fifteenth part of the sum destined for the Protestant schools."

Similar acts of injustice have occurred in Ireland. The Pope condemned the Queen's Colleges as godless, because they excluded religion entirely; and now the Irish Catholic hierarchy condemns, not so much the theory, though that is far from perfect, as the practice of the National Board of Education.

The Common School system in the United States is in theory

godless, and in practice sectarian. Both are crying evils, and naturally the efforts of Catholics are directed to obtaining one of two points: either, 1. A fair proportion of the school fund for the purpose of supporting exclusively Catholic schools; or, 2. The removal of the burden imposed on them of paying taxes to support a system of education inconsistent with itself, the practical workings of which give the lie to legislative enactments, which insults and injures us in what we hold dearer than life. The day may be far distant when success shall crown our labors, when we shall obtain our rights, but it is a long lane that has no turning. We have our tongues and our pens, and with these we must battle until we conquer. Our first duty is agitation, and our second duty is agitation, and our third duty is agitation. O'Connell has proved to a demonstration the omnipotence of cool, persevering agitation. Words strike deeper into brain and heart than sword-stabs or bayonet-thrusts, and ink often washes out more wrongs than the outpoured blood of legions.*

Thus stands the question. We have established schools and colleges in hundreds, independent of State patronage, and while burdened with State school taxes. The Catholics of America have done a noble work, but God expects of them a nobler. To begin is well; to advance and improve is better; to aspire to excellence better still; and to attain it is the reward of enthusiasm and perseverance. We began the work of education out of our own resources; with our own resources and God's right arm we must finish it. We cannot afford to sit down and admire the past, and belaud ourselves for what we have done, but, like the Apostle of the Gentiles, forgetting the things that are behind, we must stretch forward to those that are before, to the mark of the supernal vocation in Christ Jesus, to the goal of excellence in nature and in grace. There is a disposition among many of us to crow over our past labors and sacrifices, to strut pompously backward and forward between yesterday and to-day, instead of pursuing humbly and swiftly our journey toward to-morrow. *Cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator*, sings the Latin bard,—but remark it was an *empty* traveller, one whose pockets were unconscious of dimes or dollars. But we have immense wealth about us, and we shall lose it all if we stand like fools singing our own praises by the wayside. Here, we think, is the pitch, the sticking point of the whole difficulty. We have got tired of our work; we think we have done enough; we want to breathe for a while, to brood over the past, and to take heart for the future. We have schools enough, and good enough. If they are not what they might be, they are, at any rate, as good as those of non-Catholics. We have done our part, let our children do the rest. So down we sit, and chant a psalm, and—

* The writer in regard to Common Schools speaks for himself, not for the *Review*.—*Ed. B. Q. Review*.

Like little Jack Horner,
We squat in a corner,
And, jollily winking, agree
That each Catholic college
Is a fountain of knowledge,
And cry, "What a great people are we!"

Thus we idle away precious time, and make little gods of ourselves, while the impetuous stream of life and progress rushes by us. Some fine morning we shall be found fossilized on its bank.

The contemplation of the past is useful as an incentive to the future, but sometimes it unnerves us by making us satisfied with ourselves and the present. Laurel wreaths in politics and war, science and literature can be kept green and fresh only by new triumphs. The most unfortunate thing that can happen to some, is to distinguish themselves at an early age by a clever hit, an able essay, or a prize poem. Like single-speech Hamilton, whose first and grand display of oratory, in the British Parliament, nearly a hundred years ago, was his last and only one, they live on the fame of one successful feat, until that scanty capital is exhausted, and then sink to the level of ordinary mortals. The same fate may befall bodies of men and institutions. Mushroom in their origin and growth, they begin to imagine themselves great trees, beneath which all the fowls of the air may find shelter, when, in truth, like the gourd of the prophet, they flourish and die in a day. "Let another's tongue praise thee." Self-praise betrays both vanity and a want of trust in the native strength of our cause. If a stranger were to take up the Catholic papers during the months of July and August, and read the accounts of college and academy commencements, he would imagine, in his honest simplicity, that Attic scholarship was a pigmy by the side of the intellectual giant of American Catholicity; that our boys can write Greek plays as readily as Sophocles; that our girls can compose music like Beethoven, and sing it like Jenny Lind. But one who is behind the scenes knows that newspaper notices of school exhibitions are not unfrequently beautiful and lying monuments over literary graves, over lifeless institutions, and lifeless minds. He knows that the editor or correspondent,—who, by the way, is sometimes personally interested in the matter, as teacher or student,—has kissed the blarney-stone, and is laying on the soft soap as many feet deep as a southern editor threatened to pave Pennsylvania Avenue with corpses, if Abraham Lincoln were elected President of the United States. Yet if, in consequence of this knowledge, he ventures to suggest that a truer test of the efficiency of our educational institutions would be a thorough examination in all the branches taught in them, by a board of persons not connected with the institution, it is gently hinted to him to observe the eleventh commandment, by minding

his own business, and to keep his finger out of a pie that does not belong to him. Should he go further and express his doubts about the absolute perfection of Catholic schools, and give his reasons for those doubts, there are those who would brand him as a heretic, and answer his arguments by fulminating an anathema. We boast that we are free; the phrase means that our neighbor graciously accords us permission or freedom to think, and write, and act as he does. If we set up for ourselves, and boldly study out and express our sentiments on questions lying exclusively within the domain of reason, the leash is slipped, and the hounds are at our heels.

We have the means of improving our schools if we will but use them. These means are men and money; and both would be forthcoming if there existed among Catholics an enlightened public opinion on the necessity of liberal education. The difficulty lies in creating this opinion. It can be done only by the schools and colleges themselves; the supply must, in this case, precede the demand. A first-class institution would inspire its alumni with literary tastes; it would show them what education is, and the immense advantages the educated man enjoys. These young men would go into the world as apostles of a better order of things, of a higher learning; and the contrast between them and half-educated men would soon begin to tell effectually on society. The stagnant waters would be moved, and the stream of a pure and energetic public opinion would leap joyously forth from the barriers which prejudice had set to it. Let the present young generation be well trained, and the Catholic public will, in the next generation, have sound views of education. Parents are readily reached through their children,—the prejudice and sluggishness of age through the frankness and enthusiasm of youth. If one college were to elevate the standard of education to a high point, the others would be compelled, in self-defence, to emulate the example; for in education as in commerce, people go where they can get the best article. Let us have one model school, one model female academy, one model college, and we shall soon have twenty. Excellence multiplies and diffuses itself; "it is more active than all active things, and reaches everywhere by reason of its purity."

The literary supply must precede the demand. "Wisdom," says the Holy Ghost, "goeth about seeking such as are worthy of her, and she sheweth herself to them cheerfully in the ways, and meeteth them with all providence." So is it with education. Men will not respect and love her until they see her in her perfection,—until she offers herself, in her beauty and nobility, to their possession. The schools and universities of the Middle Ages created the intellectual activity of that epoch; they were not created by it. Alfred the Great, Theodore of Tarsus, Charlemagne, Alcuin, and Scotus Erigena inaugurated the system which was afterward improved by

William of Champeaux and Abelard, when the latter established the University of Paris. These scholars, and the institutions which they founded, created the thirst for knowledge, and that thirst, when once created, is never quenched. In all cases society is acted on and influenced by a chosen few. The man makes the men,—the university or college gives the tone to its time and country. The University of Cambridge, England, was not the result of an intellectual movement in English society, but of the professional ability and enthusiasm of a few French monks. Goisfred, a student of Orleans, came to England and became Abbot of Crowland. He sent four of his French *religieux* to Cottenham, near Cambridge, where they opened a school in a barn. Their lectures were attended with such success that, by the second year, neither house nor church sufficed for the number of their auditors, and they were compelled to form several schools. "Betimes, in the morning," says Wood, in his account of Cambridge, "Brother Odo, a very good grammarian and satirical poet, read grammar to the boys and those of the younger sort, according to the doctrine of Priscian; at one o'clock, a most acute and subtle sophist taught the elder sort of young men Aristotle's Logic; at three o'clock, Brother William read a lecture on Tully's Rhetoric and Quintilian's Flores. On Sundays and holidays, Master Gislebert preached the word of God to the people." These were the humble beginnings of the world-famed English university. The supply created the demand. Wisdom took up her abode on the banks of the Cam, and cried to all that passed by to come and drink of the waters free; and those waters became a fountain springing up for the intellectual life of "Merrie England."

We admit that our people are not alive to the necessity of education, but the fault lies at the door of the colleges and academies. They do not supply the genuine article; the public detects the counterfeit, and despises both it and its coiners. Too many of our teachers have hearts of ice, instead of hearts of fire; they kindle no warmth, no enthusiasm, no deep-rooted, reverent love of learning in the breasts of their pupils. The schools do not act on the world, and the world cannot be expected to act on them. Let life be infused into the high places of education, and then may they stretch themselves, like the prophet of old, on the corpse of society, and restore to its brain the pulsation of intellect, and to its heart the life of enthusiasm and love.

The influence of one institution is remarkably shown in the history of Jansenism. The Abbey of Port Royal was the soul of that heresy, a lighthouse amid the raging waves of theological and political strife, braving with a perseverant defiance, worthy of a better cause, the flashes of indignation and the thunders of St. Peter. The Arnaulds, men and women, priests and nuns, Pascal, De Sacy, and Nicoll, were, despite their errors, people of unconquerable wills,

whose thoughts and writings teemed with the luxuriance of an intense intellectual life. Here was the secret of their wonderful influence. Under the banner of Jansenism were enrolled the wit and poetry, the deep philosophy and historic talent of France. Port Royal was the home of literature, art, and criticism. There Racine composed dramas, and Tillemont wrote the annals of the early Church; there Anthony Arnould and Nicoll reared to the Catholic dogma of the Real Presence, the immortal monument of *la Perpetuité de la Foi*; there Mère Angelique and Mère Agnes prayed with the fervor of angels, and resisted the Church with the pride of Lucifer. The splendor of genius glittered around the abbey walls, and the charm of romance still haunts its ruins. Intellect will make itself felt; it is a power in itself distinct from Church and State. Give it a noble mouthpiece, be it man or institution, and its trumpet tones will ring over the world. But it is loath to use the tongue of Balaam's ass.

Our colleges cannot shift the responsibility of their defects upon the want of sympathy and support shown by the Catholic public. Let them make themselves a name based on realities, not on the flimsy and mendacious praises of newspapers and their own professors. Let them be beacons on the mountain tops, and the nations will flock to them for light and heat. Why did the proud Roman sit in reverent attention at the feet of Greek sophists in Athens,—Athens which Roman arms had conquered, and over whose Acropolis the lordly Roman eagle flapped his wing in the full flight of victory? And why, at a later period, did the imperial student tear himself away from the vineyards of Italy, the isles of Greece, the tropical beauty of Central and Southern Asia, to take up his abode on the marshy Delta of the Nile? Because, in both cases, Athens and Alexandria had that to offer which Rome and Naples, Constantinople and Antioch could not supply; because the city of Minerva and the city of the Macedonian Conqueror were the most illustrious universities of the ancient world. They had a supply which created a demand. So it was in the Middle Ages; Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Cambridge, and Salamanca were cosmopolitan cities. In their lecture halls Spanish gravity and French fancy, English sense and German subtlety met and fraternized. At the present day, the ecclesiastical student and the art student go to Italy, because she is one of the richest treasure-houses of sacred science, because her picture galleries and studios are colleges and universities of the beautiful. Set it down as truth, then, that educational reform must be inaugurated by the schools and colleges themselves; a new intellectual life must be generated from within. From its own ashes the phoenix springs to life.

We are as well off, it is said, in point of intellect and learning, as our neighbors; our institutions are as good as theirs. We say *transeat* to the assertion. But, granting that others are imperfect,

are we, therefore, justified in reining up at a dead stand-still? If non-Catholics despise secular learning, and make no efforts to improve a defective system of education, may we chuckle with delight because their supineness frees us from the trouble of extra work? Their holiday is our holiday; their resting-places on the uphill road of knowledge are ours also. Let us be consistent, then, and travel down hill with them when they turn their faces earthward. There may be an abyss at the foot; at any rate, we shall know of it with certainty when we get there. Shame on such reasoning, shame on the man who, when told of the beam in his own eye, points to as large a one in his neighbor's.

Nor is it any excuse for delaying the work of reform, to say that what we need now—that the pressing want of the time—is not head education, but heart education; that boys and girls must be made good before they can be made clever. The dangers that beset youth in American life are, perhaps, such as are to be met with in no other state of society. If we can guard our children against vice, if, by the establishment of sodalities and Sunday-schools, we can keep our young people faithful to their religious duties, we accomplish all that can be reasonably expected from us. Other times and more favorable circumstances will offer for the work of intellectual education. The fallacy contained in this line of argument was glanced at in the article on Dr. Arnold and Catholic Colleges. It was there asserted, that the attempt to teach morality without laying a foundation of positive dogmatic truth, without presenting to the intellect objects for its knowledge and belief, would end in a deplorable failure. The experience of any observant confessor or teacher will, we are confident, bear us out in our assertion. Intellect is one of the most potent instruments of religion. A refined and educated mind is free from a thousand temptations to which the uncultivated are, in spite of virtuous impulses and resolutions, too frequently exposed. Young people fall away from the Church, because instructors do the very thing which they claim as a merit, and which they think the best means of keeping the young within the path of duty. Their system has left the intellect of the people a blank, but it will not and cannot remain a blank. Objects it *will* find for its meditation, and if it has not been taught to think, to have a keen appetite for truth, and an instinctive readiness in detecting falsehood, we need not be surprised if infidelity in manhood is the practical result. There is, in the natural order, no better safeguard against skepticism and immorality than a love of letters. Not unfrequently the dew of God's blessed grace filters down to the heart through the clear, thoughtful brain. We are not endangering salvation, but making it more secure when we aim at elevating the standard of secular education.

The destinies of education are in the hands of the teacher. The accomplished instructor is a man of broad, general views, of deep

study, and extensive reading, skilled in that sublime philosophy which unites science and literature into one harmonious whole, and shows how the unity of truth in the order of nature, is distinct and yet inseparable from revelation. He is a moral man, a true Christian, a lover of God and his fellow men. Kind and affable, perfect master of his temper, he has in his hand the golden key that unlocks all hearts. The fire of enthusiasm is always glowing in his breast. His love of learning is pure and strong, and the ambition of his life is to communicate that love to others. He is a father and a friend among his pupils, for only thus can he unite their minds with his by the bonds of reverence and love, only thus can he influence them. Their access to him is at all times easy, and they ever meet with the same cordial reception. He encourages mental inquisitiveness, a love of questioning, and even, within certain limits, intellectual pugnacity. He has made methods of education his study; the teacher's duties are to him a science, just as mathematics or metaphysics. He has subjected himself to be trained by those skilled in education, before assuming the responsible position of an instructor of youth. He has been taught how to teach. He adds every day to his stock of knowledge, and keeps pace with the advance of science and letters. The present is for him a mirror, in which he sees the reflection of the past. He is ever drawing analogies between what is and what was, and detects in present questions, political, social, and religious, the development of principles whose germs belong to an earlier age. Reviews, periodicals, newspapers, theology, law, medicine, literature, art, all these he knows how to use and make subservient to the great end of his life—the formation of thinking, energetic men for society and for God. He has chosen his profession for life; it is his vocation; he does not look upon it as a stepping-stone to something else. The school-room and the professor's chair are to him home and family. In them his thoughts, interests, and affections all centre. In them he lives, in them he hopes to die. The hallowed stream of truth bears him along on its placid bosom, until he floats out on the boundless waters of the ocean of Eternal Truth, the wisdom of his Father and his God.

This standard may be placed too high; the perfection it requires may be unattainable; yet, the loftier the aim, the greater the probability of reaching at least a respectable height.

Our teachers consist of three classes: laymen, religious, and ecclesiastics. We have elsewhere pointed out the great drawback to the permanent employment of lay talent in educational pursuits,—the want of adequate remuneration. This evil might be remedied, at least in regard to colleges, if their number was diminished. We have too many of them, and not a few are one-horse institutions. If the clergy and laity were to unite in establishing one college or university for the country, or at least, one for each of the six ecclesias-

tical provinces, the revenues which are now divided between many might be concentrated on one. A provincial society, for the promotion of Catholic education, would, sooner or later, if presided over by energetic men, be patronized by the people, and the income accruing to it might be applied to endowing professorships in the provincial college. Literary work, such as the editing of books and periodicals, the delivery of lectures before scientific and literary institutes, should be committed, as far as possible, to the lay professors of this college or university. The compensation thence derived would be no inconsiderable item added to the professional salary. Yet some people are so thoughtless, we will not say cruel, as to imagine that authors and professors never want money. They are above filthy lucre; they have no need of buying food, and dress, and books; they and their families, if they have any, are not subject to the wants of vulgar humanity. Bread and butter, pork and beans, are meat for earth-plodders; literary people live amidst the stars of heaven or the caves of ocean. They are borne aloft by the breath of praise and fame to the summits of Parnassus and Olympus, where they feed on ambrosia, and drink the immortal nectar of the gods. What! shall a Catholic writer or lecturer have the impudence to ask for money? Is it not enough for him to have been invited, a thousand miles from home, by the Philaletic or Philogassic Society, to be introduced, by its president, to a Catholic audience of one or two hundred persons, and be rewarded for his journey and his lecture by the platitudinarian puffs of the next Catholic weekly!

Necessity compels a parish priest to engage schoolmasters and schoolmistresses who are incompetent for their work. The man is out of money; he has picked up some odds and ends of learning, and is willing to teach, for a year or two, the young idea how to shoot, and prepare himself meanwhile to handle the lancet and compound pills, to draw up a deed and plead a cause. He is to become a lawyer or doctor, and until then he is our educational tinker. The maiden or matron is out of sewing or service, and is ready, for the nonce, to turn governess or schoolmistress. Alas! for a state of things in which these evils must be tolerated. We despise quacks and pettifoggers, and keep them at arm's length, and yet we allow inexperienced, incapable teachers to experiment on the minds and hearts of the young. We have known of schools and of classes in college, in which the teacher's uncouthness of manner and sins against the Queen's English would disgrace his smallest pupil. The future soldier is subjected to a severe training of several years at West Point; the sailor at Annapolis; the disciple of Galen and Hippocrates must attend a course of lectures, pass his examination, and take out his degree, before he is licensed to practice; Blackstone and Kent, and a lawyer's office, are the elements of legal education. The priest is first a seminarian, a student of piety and

theology for three or four years, before he is commissioned to preach and sacrifice,—and yet, with cool inconsistency, we imagine that no preparatory training is necessary for the college professor, for the master or mistress of a parish school. A good moral character, knowledge of a little arithmetic, a little grammar, and very little history, and an empty purse, are passports to a pedagogue's chair, which any good-natured Catholic school board or parish priest will readily countersign. This system will put good men, pious Christians, at the head of the schools, but it will not secure able teachers. It is a sad mistake to confide the education of the very young to second-rate ability. Education has been defined by one of the most distinguished of British scholars to be "a process steadily carried on through years, on fixed principles, toward a definite end." The principle is to be fixed and acted on from the outset, if we wish to obtain a healthy and perfect development. A bad beginning, a false start, mars the whole work. As well attempt to build a house on cracked and loose foundations, as to expect giving a proper collegiate or university education to the young man of seventeen or eighteen, whose mind was tampered with and stunted by inefficient teachers. If the boy or girl has not been initiated in the right method of studying, the case of the youth or maiden in the later teens is hopeless.

Many a time have we heard bitter and yet just complaints from professors of the senior collegiate classes, of the ruined mental material thrown on their hands by the incompetency of those having charge of the sophomore and freshman departments. Young men we have known who were just beginning to have faint rude ideas of study and education, only some months before graduation,—young men of naturally good abilities, yet who had idled away four or five precious years in college. That loss was the fault of the ignorance, unskilfulness, and sluggishness of the teachers of the lower classes, or rather of those who placed them over those classes. Here lies one of the roots of the whole evil. The general disregard of intellectual pursuits, the distaste for study and reading which characterizes the young generation, is the consequence of negligent training in the beginning of school life. Children get disgusted with the dull monotony, the endless humdrum, the slavery of the memory, the torpor of the imagination and reason, which are enshrined as household gods in the school-room. Books are voted a bore; the slate-pencil and the chalk are tolerated, because they are philosopher's stones which commute all things into silver dimes and golden dollars. The only remedy that can reach the evil, as far as lay teachers are concerned, is the establishment of normal schools,—of institutions which shall be to the teacher what military and naval academies are to the officers of the army and navy, what the seminary is to the secular priest, and the novitiate to the religious. These normal schools are the glory of

the German educational system. France adopted them from Prussia, England is establishing them, and they have taken deep root in some of our own Eastern States. The regulations of the Prussian code in regard to *Schullehren Seminarien*, or seminaries for school-teachers, are in the main as follows: These seminaries, or normal schools, are to be established in towns of middling size, each to consist of no more than sixty or seventy alumni. In departments where Catholics and Protestants are equal, each religion is to have its own normal school. A complete course of primary instruction is necessary for admission, as the main object of the institution is to educate in the science of teaching, or what the Germans call *pædagogics* and *didactics*. The age of admission is from sixteen to eighteen, and the course lasts three years. The future pedagogues are taught by example as well as precept. They are sent to one of the schools of the town, and there made to apply the theory they learn in the normal seminary. Before receiving their certificates as licensed teachers, they are subjected to a rigorous examination, by a commission composed of two clerical and two lay members. The diploma specifies the moral character of the aspirant and the degrees of his qualification, as *just capable*, *sufficiently capable*, *eminently capable*. Incompetency is cashiered or remitted to more diligent studies. The names of the successful candidates are published semi-annually in the official papers of the department, and they succeed to the charge of the schools, as vacancies occur and their rank on the examiners' list. The following passage, from Sir William Hamilton's *Essay on German Schools*, we give unabridged:

"The provincial consistories, in electing able and zealous masters of the popular schools, should engage them to organize extensive associations among the schoolmasters of town and country, in order to foster the spirit of their calling, and to promote their improvement by regular meetings, by consultations, conversations, practical experiments, written essays, the study of particular branches of instruction, reading in common, well-chosen works, and by the discussions to which these give rise. The directors of such associations merit encouragement and support in proportion to their application and success. By degrees, every circle to have a society of schoolmasters. Distinguished masters, and those destined to the direction of primary seminaries, should likewise, with the approbation, or on the suggestion of the minister, be enabled, at the public expense, to travel in the interior of the country or abroad, in order to obtain information touching the organization and wants of the primary schools. Zeal and ability in the master to be rewarded by promotion to situations of a higher order, and even in particular cases, by extraordinary recompenses. The provincial consistories to prepare tables of the different places of schoolmasters, classed according to their emolument, and to take care that the promotion be in general made in conformity to these lists. No term of service affords of itself a valid claim to promotion; when a place is solicited superior to that for which the

petitioner has received a certificate, an examination for promotion must take place before the same authorities to whom the examination for appointment is intrusted. Where the competency is notorious, examination may, by the ratifying power, be dispensed with. The departmental authority must, at the end of each year, transmit to the ministry a list of all masters newly placed or promoted, with a statement of the value of the several appointments; and this authority is never excusable if it leave personal merit without employment and recompense, or the smallest service unacknowledged."

Several correspondents in the July numbers of the *London Weekly Register* proposed the formation of an association of the Catholic teachers of England, for the purpose of holding conferences on school matters, establishing courses of lectures, promoting social intercourse among the members of the same profession and the same religion, and last, though not least, providing for aged and infirm teachers. The project is excellent, and we hope that it will meet with the success it deserves. Why cannot a club of this kind be formed among our own teachers? Why can there not be an interchange of kind offices, of thoughts and suggestions on educational subjects, between college professors, between the instructresses in the higher branches in the conventual academies? Each may contribute only a mite of information, but mites have, before this, brought down the blessing of heaven; mite societies have, before this, wrought miracles. Mental intercourse is a necessary element of education, of intellectual life. Thought generates thought, enthusiasm spreads from its shrine in one noble heart like wild-fire. The intercommunion of many minds on the same subject creates similarity of views, harmony, and unity, and these together form *l'esprit de corps*. The soldier is a soldier because he is, day and night, surrounded by soldiers in camp and garrison; let him live amid civilians for any length of time, away from the mess-room and the parade, the music of fife and drum, and his military ardor will insensibly cool. Intercourse with those of our own profession is necessary to the preservation of a proper professional spirit.

If a society of the kind were established and supported, one or two members might be delegated to visit and report on the educational establishments of foreign countries. This is what Protestants do. Many of the reforms introduced into our Common School system are importations from abroad. If our memory serve us, Horace Mann, late President of Antioch College, Ohio, a man deservedly celebrated in the annals of education, visited the English and continental schools and universities, and many of the suggestions with which his addresses and reports abound, are fruits of his travels. *Etiam ab hoste doceri fas est*. But in this as in other matters we are too fond of talking and too slow in acting. "What good can come from Nazareth," cry out some Catholics; "what is

there intellectual or moral in Protestantism worth copying!" We answer in the words of our Lord: "the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light."

We proceed to the second class of teachers,—ecclesiastics. There is no incompatibility between the clerical and professional states, as some of the newspaper critics have charged us with holding. The clergy have given as many distinguished men to science and literature as the laity. The majority of chairs in Catholic colleges and universities in this country and in Europe are held by ecclesiastics. All that we asserted was the impossibility of uniting the missionary and the professorial life. If the priest is to be a teacher, then remove him entirely from the out-door work of the ministry. Give him time for study, for thought, for writing, and then, if he has a vocation for the school-room or the lecture-hall, he will succeed as well as a layman. But for heaven's sake do not impose on him sacerdotal duties which interfere with his academic pursuits. Do not require of him, as we know of places where it was required, to take care of a parish of between five hundred and one thousand people, and lecture besides to two or three classes a day. An overworked professor cannot discharge his duties with satisfaction, either to himself or his students. In the case of an ecclesiastical professor we must always sharply distinguish between his clerical character and his academic character. The latter is open to the criticisms of the public, the former they are always bound to respect. Yet we are disposed, at times, to let the sanctuary encroach on the lecture-room, and to judge of the clerical professor as we would judge of the priest at the altar or in the pulpit. In the latter case he speaks with authority as God's representative, in the former his academic opinions and acts are to be weighed in the same scales as those of a lay professor.

The evils that result from employing seminarians as teachers in colleges were briefly pointed out in our last article. Not one in twenty has a vocation for the work, and they necessarily injure both themselves and their pupils. If a young ecclesiastic shows decided talent and inclination for instruction, let him be set aside and trained up for a professorship. He will succeed in a college, because there lies his vocation, though he might cut a very sorry figure at the head of a parish. The indiscriminate employment, as teachers, of young men preparing for the priesthood has, we admit, some advantages. They are not a burden to the diocese for which they are studying, as their labors in the school-room cover the expenses of their tuition. They acquire some knowledge of boy-nature, and consequently of man-nature. But these advantages are dearly purchased at the sacrifice of time that ought to be devoted to the wide circle of ecclesiastical science; at the sacrifice of the true seminary spirit; at the sacrifice of the pupil's correct mental training. Talk as you please about the energy and activity that a

college professorship or tutorship infuses into a young man; what is it worth in the supernatural order, if the interior spirit be gone? Give us the man thoroughly conversant with ecclesiastical literature, the man of God, the holy man; he is the priest that will save souls and edify the Church.

In a letter dated July 10th, 1860, addressed by the Rt. Rev. Dr. Ullathorne, Bishop of Birmingham, England, to the patrons of St. Mary's College, Oscott, the venerable prelate, alluding to the system followed in that institution, says: "The divinity students are called upon, to the detriment of their proper pursuits, to supply for the deficiencies of older professors." He then proceeds to give notice of a change to be introduced: "A complete body of professors will be appointed and *exclusively* devoted to the work of teaching; and the old plan of largely employing divinity students as teachers, will be gradually abandoned. *Not only the efficiency of the lay department, but equally that of the ecclesiastical, demands this reform.*"

The very large majority of our instructors, male and female, are religious; of the hundred or more colleges and academies in this country, more than eighty are under their direction. They are, or ought to be, at home in the class-room, because they belong to orders which make education one of their chief objects. The Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, and the Jesuits, wear the academic laurels of centuries of successful teaching. The traditions of the learning and civilization of the ancient world were preserved for us by the disciples of St. Benedict; the Dominicans and the Franciscans triumphed, by the splendor of their talents and the vastness of their erudition, over the heresies and extravagances that were rampant in the schools and universities of the Middle Ages; they became the mouth-pieces of science and literature, and adorned the stately fabric of scholastic theology with the wealth and the beauty of human learning. We need not speak of the Society of Jesus. Its fame is world-wide, its praise is in all the churches; it has been to the army of Christ and St. Peter what the Tenth Legion was to Cæsar, the Janizaries to the Sultans, the Old Guard to Napoleon I., and the Zouaves to the Nephew of his Uncle. Wherever the battle rages fiercest, there waves the banner of Loyola, with the immortal motto, *Ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. That banner has gone down in many a disastrous fight only to be raised again in loftier triumph, dripping red with the blood of Jesuit martyrs. Far be it from us to say aught against one of the noblest bodies of men who have adorned the annals of the Church with the record of their virtues and their genius, their struggles and their victories. We but proposed in our last article the question: Is the system of education adopted by the colleges of the Society in the sixteenth century, fitted to answer the wants of Catholic youth in the nineteenth? There seemed to us a disposition, in some

quarters, to adhere too rigidly to an antiquated system. Conservatism, when it reaches a certain limit, becomes old fogyism, as readily as progress, when not rightly controlled, may run into license and rebellion. There is a pliability in the religious orders, in none more than in the Society of Jesus, by which they can make themselves at home everywhere, in every variety of time, place, and circumstance. The saints who founded them did not mean them to fossilize, but to advance with the age, to change their weapons and modes of attack in accordance with the shifting tactics of the world and the devil. Important reforms have been lately introduced into some of our orders. Schools and colleges have been discontinued in order to concentrate numbers and talent on a few leading institutions. This move is worthy of all praise, and we hope that it will be imitated by seculars, and that some of the colleges and academies that spring up after each vacation like mushrooms after rain, will soon be numbered among the things that were.

The mere fact of entering the novitiate of a religious order, will not qualify man or woman to be a teacher. A religious vocation is not necessarily a professional vocation. Many a monk can sanctify himself by prayer and fasting, and sanctify others by his missionary labors; many a good sister can emulate St. Vincent of Paul in love of the poor and orphans, and St. Camillus of Lelli in tender care of the sick, and yet both monk and nun may egregiously fail if they attempt to instruct in grammar or history, in mathematics or theology. They leave the sphere of God's special providence when they install themselves in a school-room. Even the contemplative orders, and those destined for out-door works of charity, have been compelled to resort, in this country, to education as a means of support. Necessity knows no rule, and though it were desirable that there should be religious communities of men and women, for the sole exclusive object of education—communities which should admit none into their ranks but such as have all the requisites of mind and body to make good teachers,—yet we may trust that God will not entirely refuse to bless the educational efforts of orders whose vocation is rather to the spiritual than the intellectual, who are distracted from the duties of the school-room by a thousand other calls, provided these orders energetically labor to fit themselves for their newly-assumed work.

Instructions on the method of teaching should enter into the novitiate training of young religious destined for the school-room. Intellectual life must exist in the colleges and academies of religious as well as in those of seculars. Even nuns and sisters, if they are to be teachers, must be ladies of cultivated minds, fond of study and of reading. God defend us from strong-minded women; God forbid that any daughter of St. Angela, St. Francis of Sales, or St. Vincent, should become an imitator of Fanny Wright or Rev. An-

toinette Brown; should merge her womanhood, the modesty and humility of her religious character in the rough obstreperousness of an intellectual Amazon. Yet the same obligation lies on nuns and sisters of being living women, that lies on college professors of being living men. They, as well as men, must learn how to think and reason, if they would teach young ladies to think and reason.

The cultivation of mind necessary for a teacher is the result of proper training in youth, and of a general acquaintance with literature in maturer age. Modern literature is, we will not say anti-Catholic, but un-Catholic, and yet it must be mastered by Catholic teachers, if they would keep pace with the age, and discharge their duties to their pupils. Literary pursuits make sad inroads on the domain of spirituality; they often take off the bloom of tender piety, and dry up the fountains of unction. When, however, the requirements of one's state of life demand literary tastes, then duty and conscience bid us apply to study and miscellaneous reading, and God will take care that no harm comes of it. Religious, especially in the female orders, may fall into the mistake of attaching too much importance to mere emotion or sentiment, and may feel very scrupulous about reading a Protestant historian like Ranke or Prescott; and, as for a Protestant novelist, like Scott or D'Israeli, the mention of the names would scandalize them. Let us not be misunderstood. Nuns or sisters not engaged in education, have no business with secular literature; for them all history, all poetry, all science, all art, are summed up in the crucifix. But for those engaged in tuition, particularly in the higher classes of conventual academics, literature is necessary; and we see not how they can do the task set them, if their rule absolutely debars them from a large, well-selected library of poetry and standard works, in history, biography, natural science, poetry, and romance. If they are to teach, they must have the means. The attention of convent authorities has not, we are certain, been drawn to this want and the necessity of supplying it. Only educated women can infuse a love of learning into girls, and educated women you cannot have if the school-sister is allowed only Thomas à Kempis and Butler's Lives of the Saints. Newspapers and reviews cannot be dispensed with any more than books. They are the chroniclers of the time, of its changes,—religious, social, and political. What a shame to have Catholic school-girls answer an examiner that Lombardy belongs to Austria, because a geography printed in 1858 says so; or that Parry and Franklin made the nearest approach to the north pole, on the authority of atlases ten years old. Their pious teachers never heard of Victor Emanuel and the peace of Villafranca, nor of Dr. Kane and the open Polar Sea. If the rule of existing orders requires the exclusion of literature, and forbids sisters and nuns to exercise their intellects on any but purely ascetic subjects, then let us have a new order that will be *exclusively* devoted to education,

that shall enforce, by rule, intellectual activity on its members, and require talent as one of the requisites for admission. The wants of the times demand it. We should have hesitated to make the suggestion, had not the necessity of changes of the kind been forcibly brought to our attention by the enlightened remarks of religious themselves.

Complaints have been made of the difficulty of getting young ladies of a high order of talent to enter the novitiates. One main reason is because the convents themselves do not give the education necessary to prepare successful teachers. Ecclesiastical seminaries are mainly recruited, as far as the native priesthood is concerned, from the colleges; the novitiates of the religious female orders from the conventual schools. If the latter do not send out accomplished pupils, they cannot expect accomplished teachers when the former school-girl becomes a sister. In the majority of cases our best instructresses were not educated in Catholic academies. According to the present system, the evil goes on perpetuating itself. Inefficient teachers form inefficient pupils, and they, in turn, become inefficient teachers; and so the sad work progresses.

The third and last point of our remarks concerns the *system* of our colleges and schools, parochial and conventual. The radical fault of the system is that it attempts too much,—that it attempts to unite elements the most heterogeneous, as opposite as the poles. There are institutions among us which combine, under the same roof, the infant school, the primary school, the grammar school, the secular college, the preparatory seminary, and the theological seminary,—institutions where the whole curriculum of sacred and profane science is taught, from c-a-t, cat, and twice two are four, up to the philosophy of the Absolute, the highest regions of pure mathematics, and the tenets of the Thomists, Scotists, and Congruists on the most abstruse questions in grace; and yet all these elements are expected to work in and out of one another with perfect harmony. The poor professor is expected to turn a somerset, with all the agility of a circus clown, from theology into arithmetic, thence head over heels into Latin or history, back into grammar, and forward into Holy Scripture.

Such institutions are literary monsters, seven-headed hydras. Heaven send us some Bellerophon, to do battle with them, and smite off the supernumerary heads. Nothing can be accomplished until college is separated from ecclesiastical seminary,—until, in fact, we adopt either the English or the German system. Let a primary school be a primary school, a college a college, a university a university, an ecclesiastical seminary an ecclesiastical seminary, and only that, nothing more, nothing less. The evils of the ollapodrida system in reference to the Catholic colleges of England have been so briefly and ably pointed out, by one of the most illustrious

prelates of the English hierarchy, that we prefer, instead of pursuing our own line of remarks, to give the letter which he published on the 10th of last July, announcing the changes to be introduced in St. Mary's college, Oscott. We take refuge behind the venerable name of the Rt. Rev. W. B. Ullathorne, Bishop of Birmingham.

"Complaints have been lately heard in various quarters, of the inefficiency of our colleges; but it should be remembered that they began their career under circumstances of great trial and difficulty, and with very slender resources, and that they were obliged to meet the requirements of a very limited circle, on the lowest possible terms. Hence, the work of conducting them has been one of clerical devotedness and self-denial, which has not always, perhaps, been duly appreciated. I will put the case in a brief, but I think an intelligent form. Catholic parents have been in the habit of expecting from our colleges a course of education on a very expanded system, and ranging from the first work of a preparatory school to the concluding studies of a university. And this course of studies they have expected to be accomplished within the period allotted in this country to a grammar school. Nor is this all.

"Ever reckoning on the indulgent kindness of the clergy, and not sufficiently alive to the importance of training on system, as the best preparation for any future career, individual families have required their sons to be put into exceptional lines of study, which throw them off the regular course. The evil that results from this interference with uniform system is four-fold.

"Whilst the plan of studies is already too widely extended for efficient training, it is constantly disturbed and interfered with; the professors are harassed and distracted from their proper work; the pupils gain only a superficial acquaintance with the many subjects between which their attention is divided; and the character of the establishment necessarily suffers. In the old public schools of this country a youth is educated up to his seventeenth or eighteenth year; and by that time he has acquired in regular course a considerable knowledge of the two classical languages, employed as instruments of training rather than for gaining information, English, a certain amount of geography and history, arithmetic, and the elements of mathematics. To these has been lately added, in some of them, a knowledge of French. During the same period of life, a Catholic youth is supposed in one of our colleges to have completed his classical education, and to have included in that education two or more modern languages, besides his own, rhetoric, logic, and a course of the physical sciences; whilst an additional year or so is supposed to give him a course of moral and mental philosophy.

"In a word, by the time he has reached his eighteenth or nineteenth year, his college is expected to have performed for the Catholic youth the four-fold office of a preparatory school, a grammar school, a college, and a university. I put from sight the functions of that college as an ecclesiastical seminary, because I am simply considering its relations with its lay students. But this is by no means a statement of the whole case.

"This vast amount of teaching is expected to be achieved at the cost of scarcely more than a quarter of what is paid for the training given to a youth at one of the old endowed schools of the country. And yet, for the causes mentioned, a much larger number of teachers is required by us for not half the number of scholars that frequent the public schools so often referred to.

"Under these circumstances, how can a college sustain a high character for efficiency? The clergy, indeed, devote themselves to the work from a high principle. They work, it may be said, almost if not altogether gratuitously, at a task that is always laborious and often thankless. And the divinity students are called upon, to the detriment of their proper pursuits, to supply for the deficiency of older professors. But it is gratifying to observe that the laity as well as clergy see that the time has now come for gradually, but effectually ameliorating this state of things; and the following principles have been adopted as a guidance in this work of reform. The system of studies requires to be wisely limited in its earlier period, and rather directed to open and train the faculties than to fill the mind.

"For to the young especially, a thorough, though limited knowledge is much better than a more extensive, but less accurate one. The course will be so arranged that those who follow it regularly will, at the proper age, be perfectly qualified to pass the examinations now required for military or civil employments, at home or in India.

"It will be requisite that the pupils henceforth received into the college should follow the regular course of the establishment.

"A complete body of professors will be appointed, and exclusively devoted to the work of teaching; and the old plan of largely employing divinity students as teachers will be gradually abandoned.

"Not only the efficiency of the lay department, but equally that of the ecclesiastical, demand this reform.

"And, as a necessary consequence of this step, the pension will be raised to all pupils entering the college after this time. The full particulars of this change, as also the programme of the course of studies, will be published as soon as possible. Meanwhile, I will only add that it is proposed to continue and enlarge the system of voluntary competitive examinations, with valuable prizes offered to the most successful candidates, which has already been found to be productive of much good during the past year, and generally to do more for the encouragement of emulation throughout the whole college."

In an article on ecclesiastical seminaries, published in the October number of the *Review* for 1859, we pointed out the necessity of an educated clergy. The combination of seminary and secular college renders it impossible to give a high-toned, finished, literary training to candidates for the priesthood. The wants of the mission compel our bishops to give but a short course to their seminarians. That young man is fortunate, indeed, who has been allowed to devote three full years to the study of theology, Sacred Scrip-

ture, and Church history. We have known cases of persons having been ordained after their first year's theology; and some have graduated in ecclesiastical science, after an extensive course of six months. Certainly every moment of a seminarian's limited time is as precious as gold. How can you expect him to fulfil the precept *labia sacerdotis custodient scientiam*; how can you expect him to be a scholar ready to hold his own and defend the Church in the midst of an intellectual Protestant society, if you distract and worry him, and break his spirit in the seminary, by the arduous labors of prefectship or tutorship? Arduous labors they are, if perfectly performed. Ten years of the seminary life has convinced us of the fact that the better the teacher or prefect, the worse the seminary, and *vice versa*. Those who devote themselves energetically to college studies, lose the spirit of their state, neglect their ecclesiastical studies, and finally suffer shipwreck of their vocation; whilst, on the other hand, the young man who is devoted to his purely ecclesiastical duties—who wishes to become a pious and learned priest,—cannot but repine at a system which makes this impossible. The union of seminary and college was the result of necessity. At a time when ecclesiastical institutions could not depend for their support upon the contributions of the faithful, a plan was devised, first, we believe, by the venerable Bishop Dubois, of enabling seminarians to clothe and educate themselves by teaching boys in a secular school attached to the seminary. That was fifty years ago. Things are quite different now. The laity are able and willing to support the diocesan or provincial seminary, but many of them demur to contribute to a mixed institution, when the secular may swallow up the spiritual, and when what was given for ecclesiastical purposes may, by the very necessities of the case, be engrossed by collegiate interests. It is the old difficulty, in another form, of the two orders, of the spiritual and temporal, Church and State. During the late quests for Papal alms, many Catholics said, "We are willing to give to the Pope as the head of the Church, as the representative of the spiritual order, but we will not contribute to his wants as a temporal prince." We do not say that they were right; we only state a fact.

Superiors and professors of ecclesiastical seminaries are painfully impressed with the want of general knowledge, of preparatory mental training shown by many students of theology. They are endeavoring to build the sublime structure of ecclesiastical science without the foundation of classical studies, and the attempt is, as might be expected, a miserable failure. There is no way of remedying the evil but that pointed out by J. W. C., in the article on "Vocations to the Priesthood," in the last number of the *Review*.

Boys, belonging to this country, manifesting hopeful signs of an ecclesiastical vocation, must be set aside from a tender age, and

trained in preparatory seminaries, by accomplished teachers, in all the branches of a classical education. Do not send them to the theological seminary until they have a fair knowledge of ancient and modern literature; until they are, in every respect, competent to master metaphysics and divinity. The plan that we proposed fifteen months ago, of making the diocesan seminaries feeders to the metropolitan seminary, was sneered at by some of our critics, as provincial. We confess to a want of appreciation of the force of the objection; there may be, however, more in it than we see.

The Council of Trent, it is true, admonishes each bishop to provide a seminary for his own diocese, and advises a provincial seminary only in case the individual dioceses are too poor to support their own. But we have an example, in our own day, that must forever silence all objections, of the erection of a metropolitan or provincial seminary, in the strict sense of the word, without interfering with the coexistence of the local or diocesan seminary. Pope Pius IX., by letters apostolic of June, 1853, founded in Rome, in the buildings of St. Apollinaris, the *Seminario Pio*, "in which" (we quote the words of the bull) "faithful clerics chosen from *all the dioceses*, may gratuitously be imbued with piety, the ecclesiastical spirit, and literature."

Each of the seventy-eight dioceses of the Pontifical States possesses, in the *Seminario Pio*, one scholarship. Sinigaglia, because it is the Pope's native place, has two. "Clerics," says the bull, "having received, at least, the first tonsure, taken from the diocesan seminary, are to be preferred; for their education, undertaken by the care of their own bishop, affords no slight testimony of their future progress and of their vocation." Why can we not imitate the example of the Holy Father? Two or three metropolitan seminaries, or theological universities, could coexist with the diocesan institutions, and would, in fact, elevate their character by supplying them with superiors and professors. Nothing is wanting to the success of educational reform but union, combination, harmony of view, and action. But, unfortunately, geographical institutions and local interests can exist in the sanctuary, as well as in politics. To the winds with all paltry jealousies; let us stand together, shoulder to shoulder, heart to heart, and our irresistible onslaught will sweep the field clear of all obstacles.

The elimination of the ecclesiastical from the lay element in our institutions of learning is only one step, though a mighty one, in the work of reform; it is the breaking of the first gleam of light on chaos, but chaos still remains. The college, to fulfil its mission, must rid its skirts of the grammar school, it must exclude infants and boys, and admit only young men, and them only after they have proved, by satisfactory examination, that they have already mastered the elements of Greek and Latin grammar, history, and arithmetic. According to the present system, there are huddled to-

gether in one house, individuals from five to twenty-five, and the youngster who can scarcely put on his own clothes and is learning to make pot-hooks in his copy-book, is as much a collegian as the student who is learning the choral odes of the *Œdipus Tyrannus*, or discussing with Plato the immortality of the soul. We cannot understand what a college should be without turning to the history of education.

With the foundation of the Benedictine order, in the sixth century, a brighter and more intellectual era dawned upon the world, over which an Egyptian darkness of ignorance had brooded since the fall of the Roman empire, a hundred years before. The disciples of St. Benedict established schools in their monasteries, chiefly, however, for the education of their own novices, or those who showed marks of a religious vocation. The laity were still in the mental bondage of ignorance. In the eighth century, cathedral schools were founded, and the cause of education was promoted by the congregations of canons first originated by St. Chrodegang of Metz, and generally imitated by the more learned and pious of the clergy throughout Europe. Then came Charlemagne, at the close of the eighth century. "He had in mind," says Bulaeus, "to found two kinds of schools, less and greater; the less he placed in bishops' palaces, canons' cloisters, monasteries, and elsewhere; the greater, however, he established in places which were public and suitable for public teaching; and he intended them not only for ecclesiastics, but for the nobility and their children, and, on the other hand, for poor scholars too; in short, for every rank, class, and race." In a letter addressed, on his return from Rome, in 787, to the prelates of his dominions, the great emperor says: "It is well that episcopal establishments and monasteries should pay attention to literature, in addition to the routine of their regular life and the practice of their holy religion. They who endeavor to please God by a good life, should not neglect to please him by correct phraseology. Although it is better to live a good life than to become learned, still knowledge precedes action. Each one, then, should understand whatever he aims at doing; and the mind comprehends its duty better in proportion as the tongue, in praising God, is free from mistakes of language."

The public schools which Charlemagne established were not universities. They contained only the faculty of Arts, or what in the Middle Ages was called the Trivium and Quadrivium, whereas a university contains, in addition, the faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine; teaching, as its name implies, all science, human and divine. William of Champeaux, and Abelard, in the beginning of the twelfth century, were the real founders of the university of Paris,—the mother and model of all the most celebrated universities of Europe. Drawn by the reputation of the professors of the new institutions, thousands and tens of thousands of students flocked

from the civilized world to Paris, Bologna, Oxford, Cambridge, Salamanca, and Armagh. The congregation of such vast numbers of individuals, with all the waywardness and passionate impulses of youth, in the capitals of Europe, led to the most serious evils. Lawlessness and the grossest immorality were rampant in the university cities. To remedy this state of things, colleges were established, first by the religious orders, for those of their own members who went up to the universities, and then for all students, lay or clerical, by private bequests, or the academic authorities themselves. These colleges were lodging-houses for the students of the university. In them they were subject to a discipline, intellectual and moral, founded in some measure on the system prevailing in monasteries. Tutors and prefects were appointed, whose duty it was to see that those committed to their charge rehearsed the lectures they had heard in the schools from the professors of the universities, applied diligently to private study, and, above all, regulated their moral conduct by the rules of reason and religion. No classes were taught in the colleges,—the duty of instruction devolved entirely on the university. They were merely academic boarding-houses or hotels. The system has survived in some of the colleges of Rome. The students of the Irish, Scotch, Greek, and Belgian colleges do not attend class in their own institutions, but frequent the schools in the Roman college, under the direction of the Jesuits or those of the Propaganda.

In lapse of time, some of the professors of the universities established courses of lectures in the colleges. Somewhat later, one of the four faculties, of Arts, Theology, Law, or Medicine, was permanently located in them, and then, finally, some colleges practically became universities, by having under their roof lectures in all four faculties. They still retained the name of colleges, though their original character had disappeared, and they enjoyed all the advantages of universities, as do now Trinity College, Dublin, and Georgetown, in our own country. The evils that attend the union of university and college have been ably pointed out by Sir William Hamilton. The wealth that accrued to the colleges from numerous foundations of scholarships enabled them, at times, to bid defiance to the superior authority of the university, and to monopolize functions which, by established law and custom, belonged to the organized academic body, represented by the university, of which they formed but parts. In all cases, however, the colleges, in their later form, remained institutions of liberal education in all or some of the four university faculties, and were entirely distinct and separate from the public or grammar schools. From their inmates they exacted a preparatory training or a satisfactory primary education. They only entered who aspired to the learned professions, to a life of literary pursuits, or whose rank and wealth sought literary refinement and high mental culture as their most becoming ornaments.

We do not advocate the necessity of collegiate education for all. Youths destined for commerce or agriculture do not need a liberal education, though it would not injure them or unfit them for their pursuits. A farmer would not be less successful in his rural occupations by having a tincture of letters; nor would a merchant be less capable of surmising the fluctuations of the market, and the rise or fall of stocks, by having a clear, well-trained, educated mind. But for the professions, for the Church, the bench, the bar, and the hospital, a liberal education is demanded. Young Catholic lawyers and doctors complain of the hopelessness of competing with the Protestant members of their profession. "Fair play is not given us," they say; "the fact of being a Catholic damns a man legally, politically, and medicinally." So they console themselves with smoking cigars and frequenting bar-rooms, and doing the dirty work of some prominent politician, by beating up the German and Irish vote.

The objection is the sheerest folly and excuse for ignorance, indolence, and dissipation. Let them be educated men, men of study, men of determined energy and perseverance, and their Catholicity will be no drawback to triumphant success. Our countrymen are not such fools as to care a straw whether a man be Jew or Turk, Protestant or Catholic, if he be the best man in his line of business. They will patronize him, and he will make his fortune and his name. He will do honor to his religion, and his fellow-citizens will do honor to him. There was once a mayor of Cork, who had a Protestant and a Catholic leg. It was the delight of his worship to thrust his Papist limb into every mud-hole he met, and in this delectable Orange amusement he completely smashed it, sickened, and went the way of all flesh. Yankee Protestant zeal does not go so far; it peruses the Bible with one eye, and with the other keeps a shrewd watch over the dollars and cents, and the *hæc omnia adjicientur vobis* of this world.

If a Papist hand is more skilful in manipulating with the scalpel and dissecting knife, Yankees will not reject it and allow a disciple of Luther, Calvin, or Theodore Parker to hack and mangle their bruised limbs. If nature has given a keener intellect to a Catholic lawyer, which he has improved by education; if he has taken care to develop to the full his gift of the gab, the American will have no objection to give his gratitude and his cash to the man who has won his suit. Let our young Catholics secure the benefit of a finished college education, let them keep aloof from low associations, from Phoenix clubs and United Irish societies, and they will leave their mark on their time and country. If national or religious prejudices impede their onward career, let them show fight, not with the fist or bowie-knife, but with the mind, the tongue, and the pen, and they will conquer.

The plan we propose is to separate colleges from grammar

schools, to admit none into the former who have not, by public and private tuition, acquired the elements of, and made some progress in English, Greek, and Latin literature. The best model that we can adopt is the Prussian system. It recognizes four grades in education, four distinct and separate classes of institutions,—the primary or elementary school, the high school or progymnasium, the gymnasium, and the university. All these are different parts, performing different functions of one grand harmonious system, under the direction of the State. It is this that gives them unity, and unity and greatness always go together. Nothing can be done for Catholic education in America, until the dioceses combine their efforts, until some of the effete institutions that now cumber the land be suppressed, until the remaining colleges or gymnasia be made feeders to two or more grand universities. We care not in whose hands the central authority over the whole system be lodged, whether of committee or of an individual, lay or clerical, provided the individual on the committee understands our needs, and knows how and is willing to supply them. What! With our dozen of Catholic weeklies, or *weaklies*—for the terms are often synonymous,—our scores of dozens of colleges, our national and geographical prejudices, we are abusing the advantages which American freedom gives us; trampling under foot opportunities, the like of which the Church has rarely enjoyed; bringing defeat and disgrace upon ourselves and our religion; and making American Catholicity a by-word of reproach among the nations. So much for the glaring evil of our system, the attempt to combine in one institution discordant elements. There is another which prevails in nearly all the schools, colleges, and academies with which we are acquainted,—that of neglecting the cultivation of the reasoning powers, and overtasking the memory. The study of words is substituted for the study of ideas. Boys and girls are compelled to get by rote, catechism, history, geography, and grammar. If a stranger were to enter the classes, and inquire the rationale of this or that grammatical rule; if he were to request the pupil to apply to the present the history of the past, both teacher and student would stare with astonishment. And yet only thus is knowledge acquired. Memory can supply facts, but we have knowledge when the intellect has mastered these facts, digested them, traced them to their origin, and contemplated them in their development and result.

It would require the patience of Job to suppress a burst of honest indignation at the tom-foolery, the loss of time, the debauching of the higher intellectual powers prevailing in some educational establishments. Teachers, male and female, go into the school-room with cloudy brains and icy hearts, run the pupils through the lesson, helter-skelter, and a sigh of relief escapes them when the irksome task is over. They never advert to the effect of personal influence, in the training of youth, by associating with them in their

recreative hours as friends rather than superiors; of exciting a thirst for knowledge by speaking on scholastic subjects, by reading in class, or even in times of relaxation, passages from standard authors, on points connected with their studies. Some of the happiest moments of our school life were those spent under the tuition of Mr. I——, a convert and a Jesuit, Professor of Rhetoric, now dead. He communicated to a class of young men, fifteen or twenty in number, his own ardent enthusiasm in intellectual pursuits. Perfect master of English literature, he instructed and delighted his students by reading aloud, and commenting on England's most distinguished writers. Sometimes in the midst of an eloquent exhortation, the bell would ring for recreation, and then the excited students rushed to the door to bar the professor's egress. "No, Mr. I——," they said, "we will not let you go yet, return to your chair, and finish what you have to say." In one of the very best of our female academies, situated in western Virginia, one of the sisters, to relieve the tedium of a long recreation, reads to the young ladies select passages from English authors, pausing from time to time to collect their opinions and remarks, and to give her own. The result that attends this exercise shows that the youthful mind needs only the stimulant of personal intercourse to be led into the field of thought, of real intellectual activity, and to work with a zeal that more than repays the teacher, and offers the surest earnest of future excellence.

Our task is finished. From the abundance of our heart we have written sincerely, conscientiously, candidly. To give offence has been far, very far from our intention. But we defy a man of any honesty of purpose to have lived for years in our colleges and seminaries, and not wish to do what God enables him to do to reform them. And if, in the accomplishment of a work imposed on him by an overmastering impulse, a keen, abiding, smarting sense of academic evils, and, at the same time, of the ease with which many of them could be remedied if Catholics were, but for one instant, to stand above their passions and prejudices, their blind veneration for the present system because it is the work of their forefathers,—if in these circumstances he draws down on himself the censure of those whom from his heart he reveres and loves; if he is cut off from the sympathy of the Catholic body, and marked as a black sheep in the flock, then he can but turn to his conscience and his God, and humbly trust that the seed that is now sown in sorrow may one day be reaped in joy.

W. J. B.

ART. III.—*Le Progrès par le Christianisme. Conférences de Notre-Dame de Paris, 1856-1860.* Par LE REVEREND PÈRE FÉLIX, de la Compagnie de Jesus. Paris, Le Clere & Cie.; 1858-1860. 5 Tomes 8vo.

THE first two volumes of the profound and brilliant *Conférences* of Father Felix were some time since briefly noticed in our pages. Since then, we have received two additional volumes, which, with the fifth, for 1860, not yet received, complete the series. We must reserve a full analysis and appreciation of the whole series till the last volume reaches us. In the meantime we call attention especially to the fourth volume, which treats of "The Progress of Society by Christianity," for we wish to offer some few remarks, which we trust will prove neither inopportune nor unimportant, on a topic it suggests to our mind, and in which we ourselves just now take no slight interest. We beg our readers to understand, however, that it is the topic suggested rather than the *Conférences* themselves, on which we propose to make our comments.

Father Felix, unless Father Lacordaire, the eminent Dominican, be an exception, is unquestionably the first preacher in France, and is not an unworthy successor of the lamented Père de Ravignan. His *Conférences* strike us as models of pulpit eloquence, and in brilliancy of style, simplicity and dignity of expression, depth of thought, earnestness of tone, and richness of illustration, they are unsurpassed by any modern series of sermons we have read or heard. The preacher is a man who thinks, and has thoroughly studied his subject, and if there are here and there views to which we cannot assent, they are the views of a mind of no ordinary capacity, and such as a man may entertain without discredit to his understanding or his general attainments. We esteem him the more, the more thoroughly we penetrate his spirit and master his doctrine; yet, as we said on the former occasion, his *Conférences* do not quite satisfy us, chiefly, however, because they are not what their title led us to expect. From the title, by our own fault it is very possible, we were led to expect a discussion of progress in the sense the word is usually taken, and to be shown that progress requires and receives the aid of Christianity. But we find that the *progress* he treats is the prog-

ress by grace in the interior life of individuals, and in society, only in so far as the exterior is the exponent of the interior. He discusses, we grant, a progress infinitely superior to that which we expected him to discuss, but, nevertheless, not it, and not in all respects easily attainable without it.

The reverend father will permit us to say, and we do so with all deference and respect, that we think (regard had to the state of things in Europe) these Conférences were not well timed, and that they would have been more opportune and more really useful, if they had been preached from 1846 to 1850, ten years earlier, when the immediate danger to European society was from socialism, communism, and red republicanism. It is always necessary, we grant, that people of all ranks and conditions should understand, that without religion and stable government, society cannot subsist and perform its appropriate functions; but even this great truth may be presented at such a time, or under such circumstances, as to have the effect of error, and to operate unfavorably both to moral and social progress. Brought out and insisted on with peculiar emphasis when the danger is from the efforts of power to extinguish freedom and suppress all voices and all institutions favorable to liberty, it can only tend to alienate minds opposed to despotism from both religion and authority. At the time these Conférences were preached there was a manifest increase of infidelity in France, provoked by the alliance of the clergy with the new-fangled Cæsarism of the day, and the savage bitterness with which their most influential organs treated the noble and disinterested men who, having for twenty years fought the battles of liberty and religion with success, regretted in the Imperial Constitution the absence of all adequate guaranties of political freedom, discussion, and publicity. Was this the time to insist specially on authority?

In 1848 society itself was threatened in its very foundation by the mad theories and mad deeds of revolutionists and anarchists; and the friends of order and religion, who had so bravely struggled during so many years for political and religious liberty, without in the least changing or abandoning any principle they had ever possessed, rallied to the standard of authority, and labored with what power and influence they had to restrain the revolution, to roll back the tide of anarchy, to re-establish order, and to save society. They did not labor to restore the old régime, or to re-estab-

lish the old governments against which they had warred, and which the revolution had prostrated; they accepted the republic the revolution proclaimed in France, and simply sought to make it an orderly republic, compatible alike with religion and social well-being; they denounced not the concessions made to popular demands in Prussia, Austria, and the smaller German states, nor did they demand their revocation when the danger to power was over; they only labored to restrain the revolution, and to prevent it from prostrating European society, and establishing the reign of anarchy on its ruins. But they were not strong enough to do this without accepting the aid of the partisans of the old régime everywhere overthrown or menaced. The conflagration was raging, and they must accept help to check and extinguish it, let it come whence it might. There was in consequence danger that after the revolution had been mastered, the sovereigns, or their ministers, taking a wrong lesson from their recent fright, would seek, and that the people, under the influence of the panic themselves had created, would encourage them to seek, to crush out liberty as well as the revolution, and to re-establish the very system with more stringency than before, which had provoked, and, in many minds sincerely attached to order and religion, had justified the revolutionary movement. They saw this danger, and we, acting with them, warned our readers to be on their guard against it so early as October, 1848; but the more pressing danger was from the excesses of liberty, and effectual precautions against the excesses of power could not well be taken.

But long before these Conférences were preached to the men of France, the counter-revolution had triumphed, and all danger from the socialists, communists, and red republicans, save as a reaction against despotic power, had passed away. The danger was then from the other side. Yet the reverend father seems totally unaware of this fact, and proceeds as if things remained as they were in 1848: yet in that very year 1848, the revolution had been defeated, crushed, in France, and order re-established under a republican form of government; and before the close of the following year the German princes had recovered their authority, Charles Albert had been repulsed from Lombardy, the Mazzinian republic had been put down at Rome, the Hungarian rebellion suppressed, and Venice reduced. Power, after 1850, was everywhere triumphant, and order was nowhere seri-

ously threatened. The movements of the revolutionists were only the spasmodic motions of the serpent's tail after its head has been severed from the body. Even then it was manifest to every man of some little foresight, that the danger was not from the revolution, but from the reaction of authority against it. What was foreseen in 1850 was an actual fact in 1856. The old system had been revived in most European countries, and the French empire, based on a new-fangled Cæsarism, itself reposing on *ex post facto* suffrage, had been restored, and the most stringent measures of repression were everywhere adopted against every species of liberty, except the liberty of praising Cæsar and insulting religion. At this moment these Conférences were commenced, with the apparent design of bringing the sacred lessons of religion to sustain authority, which, in the public mind, could only mean despotism.

There are certain lessons which ministers of religion, as well as ministers of state, would do well to learn and profit by,—that, in this age of the world, after the preaching of the Gospel for eighteen hundred years, no religious teaching, no religious discipline, no possible education or governmental repression will suffice to put an end to revolutions, and keep the people quiet and contented under despotism, or what they regard as despotism. The Church has too well educated the people, too thoroughly imbued them with the conviction that power without right or justice is without authority, and may be resisted without disobedience to God, for that any longer to be possible. All efforts to reconcile them to Cæsarism, or to any government that adopts the maxim, "All for the people, nothing by the people;" which allows them no free thought, no free speech, no initiatory movement, and no effective voice in the management of public affairs, will, however supported, prove abortive. Whether you hail this as the harbinger of a glorious future, or deprecate it as the forerunner of anti-Christ, it is a fact, and as a fact must be met and dealt with. All attempts, whether by ministers of religion or by ministers of state, to re-establish social peace on the basis of political absolutism, can end only in grave injury both to religion and society. The passion for change has become too strong to be resisted. To war against it is as idle as to plant yourself on a railway, and command the locomotive, thundering on at the rate of sixty miles an hour, to stop and go no farther. You may be crushed, but its speed will not be check-

ed. We speak of what is possible in the ordinary providence of God, not of what is possible to his miraculous power: we restrict not his power, nor attempt to interpret his secret purposes. In his ordinary providence, we are not afraid to assert that peace on the old system between the European populations and the governments is not possible. The war will continue, marked by alternate victories and defeats for each party. The excesses of power will give the victory to the mob; the excesses of the mob, in turn, will give the victory to power; and each alternate victory or defeat will only loosen still more the bonds of society, and render the war more desperate and vindictive.

We agree, assuredly, with Father Felix, that religion is necessary to render people truly loyal to authority, and that authority is necessary to liberty and social progress,—the two great truths he develops with equal force of thought and brilliancy of language. Here, certainly, we have no quarrel with him, for his thesis was ours from 1844 till 1850, and his Conférences were preached in substance in our pages some years before he preached them in the Church of Notre-Dame of Paris. Yet it is always necessary in our assertion of authority to be on our guard against giving it an origin or a character incompatible with national and individual freedom. The reverend father's theory of authority, if he intend on the one hand it shall be power, and on the other a support to freedom, requires, in our judgment, some important qualifications.

"Authority, considered in its origin," he says, "comes from creation. He who is creator is author, and he who is author is authority in relation to what he creates. This reason of authority is radical; it is in the root of things, and is written in the root of words. Strictly speaking, God is the only authority, for he is the only creator. He is master of all, for he is the beginning of all. But men, associated to his creative power, are associated also to his authority, in so far as their acts are creative. Where in *imitation of God* free agents create, there is authority. In this sense there are authorities in science, art, and literature. He who creates order in ideas, and makes them resplendent in speech, is an authority, and not meaningless is the expression, Royalty of speech, which we find in all languages. Wherever men encounter genius displaying creative power in its works, they say, Behold an authority. In vain do we protest against this domination; it asserts itself. Before their like men rise to the honor of authority just in proportion as they manifest creative power.

"On these principles, founded in the nature of things, it is not difficult to determine the true notion and the last reason of social authority. Social authority is also creative power, the power of founding society, the efficacious force of arranging men in order to the end of their association. Authority, with the Divine concurrence, creates society; and, as God the world, continues its creation in governing it. A man appears in a nation; men are in strife; things are in ruin; the people are in servitude; society is in the dust; by a power communicated to him by God, he unites all men, restores all things, makes a free people, a prosperous society. That man is authority. Whether God gives him power immediately as he did to Moses, or through the intervention of secondary causes co-operating with his providence, that man, with God, creates society, and having created, preserves it, and is its lord and master. Parties may deny, rivals may contest, enemies may attack his authority, but authority it is, and will be. Society is not deceived in him; and owing in its creator its master, it says to him: 'You are able to create order, liberty, productiveness—in a word, society; command, we obey.'"—Tome iv. pp. 10–12.

The reverend Father, in his eagerness to burn incense to Cæsar, forgets, for the moment, the dignity and authority of the priest of God, before whom kings and kaisers are simply men, standing on a level with the humblest of their subjects. We cannot concede the pretence that Louis Napoleon put down the revolution, re-established order, and created society in France; for the revolution had been defeated and order restored before he made his appearance on the scene, by the representatives of the people, and the French army under General Cavaignac. All we can give the nephew of his uncle credit for, is, that he and his friends succeeded in rendering insecure the republic he had sworn to uphold and defend, and by a well-managed *coup-d'état* overthrew the national authority, and seated himself in the throne he and they had made vacant; for we make no account of the suffrages of the nation, given *ex post facto*, after he had usurped the supreme authority, and left the nation no choice but him as supreme dictator or anarchy and its horrors. His special merit is in having so managed as to force or persuade the French people to abdicate their own authority, and vote themselves slaves.

"This doctrine," the author continues, "has nothing in common with the consecration of material force, and the glorification of despotism. Authority, thus conceived, is, in its very nature, a moral power. Let it come from the suffrages of the nation, the

right of birth, or a providential situation clearly manifesting the will of God, the power to create or restore society is essentially moral, and it is repugnant to the very nature of things that society should be guided to its end by material force. Authority, at need, may use material force to remove an obstacle interposed between it and the end of society, but the material force can never be the social authority itself. Armed or unarmed with material force, the social authority remains in its ground as in its essence, the efficacious power of creating society, that is to say, of creating order, liberty, productiveness, . . . order by giving it stability, liberty by giving it activity, and productiveness through stability and liberty. It is, therefore, for society the reason of being, growing, and producing, —the supreme reason of social progress.”—*Ibid.* pp. 13, 14.

There is in this doctrine a slight touch of the Hero-worship for many years so energetically preached to us by Thomas Carlyle. It places the right to govern in ability, and with Carlyle makes *king* come from *can*, can-ing, that is, Able-man. He has the right who has the ability to govern society. He is your real God-ordained king, kaiser, president, or governor; all others are shams, simulacra, and the sooner they are sent back to the pit whence they have ascended, the better for society. Does the illustrious preacher intend to endorse this doctrine, and thus resolve the *rights* of man into the *mights* of man? He derives authority from author, both as to the word and the thing. The man's authority depends on his creative power, or his power to imitate the creative act of God. It is then an inherent and personal power. How, then, can it come from national suffrage, the right of birth, or a providential situation? In the one case he makes power a personal and indefeasible right, in the other case he makes it a trust from God, or from society, or from both. How does he reconcile the two contradictory theories and make them one?

The distinction between authority and material force is important. Authority may use material force as an instrument, but is never itself material force. Nothing more true. But who has the right to use material force as an instrument of government? The preacher's doctrine answers, he who has the ability, which excludes, of course, all idea of moral and political right. If, again, authority be essentially moral power, the government which has no moral power and can sustain itself only by a permanent resort to material force, has no authority. Then it has no right to govern; then no right to use material force; then in using

it, it is a tyranny, and there is no treason, no crime, no sin, in resisting and attempting to subvert it; for tyranny has no rights, and where no rights are violated, no wrong is done. French Jacobins and Italian Carbonari will hardly ask for more than this. If you arm the government with physical force, which it may use to sustain itself whenever it judges proper, you confound authority with physical force itself, unless you have already established the right of the government to use physical force. How will you explain and establish this right?

Father Felix defines authority to be the efficacious power to create or to restore society, and maintains that the prince has the right to govern, because he creates social order, liberty, productiveness. If his moral power meets grave obstacles, that fact alone proves that it is not in itself alone efficacious, and therefore that it is not authority. Then the resort to physical force is tyranny. The preacher forgets that he must recognize the right of government when resisted and its moral force is inefficacious, or else he cannot assert its right to use material force, for it is only where moral power fails that material force is needed. Father Felix is a Christian preacher, and can no more intend to assert order without liberty, than liberty without order. He is right in founding authority on creation, but only in the case of God, who only is creator. Authority in God is a right, but not in man, who has no proper creative power, and it is only by a figure of speech we say of any man he is authority. His error lies in founding civil authority on man's act imitative of the divine creative act, instead of founding it on the act of God, immediately or mediately delegating it to man. God does not, as he supposes, delegate the authority through the medium of the act of the prince, but by his own act, mediate or immediate. He may, if he choose, delegate it immediately to an individual, as in the case of Moses, or to a particular family, as in the case of the family of David; but ordinarily he delegates it to the nation, and through the nation to the prince, who is therefore accountable for it, both to God and to the nation. This makes power in whose hands soever lodged a trust, and liable to forfeiture; in opposition to the divine and indefeasible right of kings defended by the English Solomon and his Anglican divines, from whom Bossuet seems to have borrowed it. In God power is a right, in man it is a trust. No man has created other men or society, and if *per impossi-*

bile he had, he would have no right by virtue of his creative act to govern them; because, as creature himself, he belongs to God, in all he is, in all he has, and in all he can produce by his faculties. *Non est potestas nisi a Deo.* The right of the prince is derived from God, who alone is the living law, not from his personal and inherent creative power.

Father Felix proceeds in his theory of authority on the supposition that simple moral checks on power are adequate safeguards of liberty. In this he lacks the practical experience of the statesman. He himself is aware that power, to maintain order, must be permitted at need to use material force; but liberty is as essential to society as order; and if authority needs material force to protect order, how much more must society need material force of some sort to protect liberty? The experience of all ages proves that power, with material force at its command, is sure to encroach on freedom, if not prevented by material checks in the very constitution of the state. Hence the wisdom of mankind rejects all the simple and absolute forms of government, as monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; and the statesman seeks to temper one absolute form with elements borrowed from the others, to constitute what is called mixed government; and by a wise division and distribution of powers to guard against the abuses of authority without impairing its unity or efficiency. Mr. Calhoun was accustomed to laud the admirable provision in the old Roman Constitution of the Tribunitial Veto, which while it left to the Patricians the positive exercise of authority, prevented them from adopting and carrying out any measure offensive to the *Plebs*. A constitutional negative of some sort on power when it would go beyond its just limits is necessary, if we mean the government shall maintain a free as well as a submissive people.

We had, indeed, no right to ask a statesman in the preacher, but we have the right—if he chooses to discuss a topic intimately connected, either by its own nature or by time and circumstance, with the political passions of the day—to ask that he avoid defending, in the name of religion, a theory that makes the prince the living law, and which, when it favors not Jacobinism, sustains the worst form of Caesarism. We doubt not the excellent intentions of the preacher, but we doubt, perhaps we more than doubt, the wisdom or justice of associating the interests of religion with a political system, not enjoined in the Gospel, which is

opposed by the living thought and intelligence of the age, which alienates vast numbers from the Church, and which all experience proves can be sustained only by the most stringent system of repression. The Church is a spiritual kingdom, independent and complete in and by herself. She prescribes for her children no particular form of civil polity, and her interests, whether spiritual or material, are necessarily attached for all times and places to no one form of government. As a man and a citizen, I may have my political preference, and even a very decided preference,—but let it be what form it may, I have no right to demand for it the positive sanction of the Church, or to put it forth in her name as the Catholic form of civil society. It is enough that she does not condemn it. The very worst service we can render her, is to labor to involve her in the political movements and party conflicts of the day, whether at home or abroad.

As a spiritual kingdom, the Church represents the spiritual order in the government of human affairs; and as that order changes not, is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, she must be fixed and unalterable in her principles, her doctrines, and her spiritual constitution,—speaking always in the same tongue, with the same voice, to all men, whether what she says accords with their sentiments and opinions, or arraigns and condemns them. She must be as unchangeable as truth, and as inflexible as justice. It is not for her to conform to the world, but for the world to conform to her. But in civil polity this inflexibleness and immutability would be out of place; for all wise human government is founded not on absolute principles, but in compromise. Civil government represents the human element, and demands not the attribute of immutability, but the faculty of change. No civil government answers the end of its institution, if between it and the sentiments and convictions, wants and wishes of its subjects there is a general and permanent antagonism; and it is a grave error on the part of statesmen to seek to constitute the state in imitation of the Church of God, and to render it like her, fixed and unalterable; as if like her it were designed to represent the absolute, not the relative,—the immutable and eternal, not the changeable and the temporary,—the divine, not the human,—God, not man. The changes from time to time demanded may be unwise, may be likely to introduce more evils than they will cure; but if earnestly, constantly, and generally insisted

on, they must be conceded, if they are within the scope of the temporal order, and involve no sacrifice of the rights of the spiritual. When the children of Israel grew tired of the government of the Lord through divinely-appointed judges, and demanded a king to go in and out before them, that they might be like other nations, he rebuked them sharply for their ingratitude, and exposed to them the folly of their request: nevertheless, he complied with it, and gave them a king.

Undoubtedly, the changes which it is lawful to demand or to concede are such as lie within the province of the temporal, in regard to which the people under God are sovereign, and have the right to follow their own will. Certainly, the state has no right to make at the popular demand any concessions incompatible with the moral and spiritual order represented by the Church; for neither it nor the people have any authority in that order. The proper sphere of all human government is the sphere of human prudence, and it is only within this sphere that changes are admissible. All in human society that must be fixed and unalterable, and all that, though not fixed and unalterable, which pertains to spiritual discipline, is placed under the jurisdiction of the Church, whose authority both prince and people must always respect, and never contravene. But civil society, saving the supremacy of the spiritual and the freedom and independence of the Church, is free to act for itself, and to make such changes and compromises as it judges expedient under the circumstances of the time and place. As the state represents not the absolute and unalterable, but the relative and the changeable, it should always be constituted with the faculty of change, of keeping itself in harmony with the wants and wishes of the age and nation. In this necessity of change on the part of civil society, we may see the reason why the Church leaves the constitution of the state to the people, and prescribes no particular form of civil polity. It is because no one particular form is adapted to all nations, nor to the same nation through all the stages of its existence.

That the clergy, as a body, have a strong tendency to introduce into civil society the fixedness and unalterability of the Church, is no doubt a fact; and in this fact we may probably find the reason why sacerdotal governments are generally regarded with disfavor by both statesmen and the people. Dealing in their own order with

fixed and unalterable principles, with the absolute and inflexible, only softened in the administration by kindness and charity, they are apt, from their special education and habits of mind, to look upon change as evil, and to seek to prevent it in the civil administration, and to compress all civil and political thought and action within certain fixed and unalterable rules, which permit the people no free spontaneous motion. It has been pretended that the great aim of Pope St. Gregory VII. was to establish a theocratic or sacerdotal government for Christendom, but unjustly; for he labored only to emancipate the Church from the domination of Cæsar, and to compel princes and peoples to respect her freedom and independence. The same charge has been brought against that great and much maligned Pope, Boniface VIII.; but he tells us expressly that he had no thought of interfering with the civil rights of princes, or the civil independence of their crowns. Certainly, in distinguishing the two orders, and in giving to each a separate representative, our Lord did not alter their natural relation one to the other. As the temporal order is, by its own nature, inferior and subordinate to the spiritual, so is the state inferior and subordinate to the Church, against which it has and can have no rights. But under the Church in spirituals, in its own order the state is free and independent.

The distinction of the two orders under separate representatives is asserted with unanimous voice by all Catholic theologians, and has been recognized by every Sovereign Pontiff who has had occasion to touch the subject. A Catholic Prelate, one of the ablest theologians we have ever had in this country, and whose resignation of his See on account of continued ill health and departure from among us all good men must lament, publicly criticized, some years since, some essays in the *Review* on the Papal Power, because he thought we pushed the doctrine of spiritual sovereignty so far as to deny this distinction, and to absorb the state in the Church. He misapprehended our meaning, as did many others; but, however inexact, unusual, or unguarded our language at times may have been, we have never used a word which meant, in our own mind, any thing incompatible with the distinction of the two powers contended for by the eminent Prelate himself, or which we are now asserting. We asserted then, we assert now, and we trust we always shall assert, the supremacy of the spiritual,

and, therefore, the duty of the temporal to recognize and conform to the spiritual order; but we have always understood and maintained that the spiritual leaves the temporal its freedom and independence in its own order. What we were, and still are sedulous to guard against, is political atheism, or the assumption of the *spiritual* independence of the temporal, or the freedom of the state from the law of God as interpreted and applied by the Church. As against the spiritual, or the Church, the temporal has no rights, no freedom, no independence; but within its own order, and taking care not to contravene the spiritual, it is free, and may follow its own judgment.

The importance of this distinction of the two powers is not always recognized and appreciated by statesmen. Conservative statesmen usually study in the constitution and administration of political power to copy the fixedness and unalterability of the spiritual order, and to make the state a *quasi* Church. Radicals or reformers aim to copy in the Church the mobility and changeableness of all things human, and to reduce the Church to simple civil society. Reformers understand well that the faculty of change—progress in their language—is essential to the political constitution of society, and therefore conclude that the Church should have the same faculty, and change as the world changes. Conservatives understand equally well that the Church, as representing the divine, must have the attribute of immutability, and hence conclude that political society should also be immutable, and repress instead of yielding to the demand for change on the part of the people. The one reasons from the human to the divine; the other from the divine to the human. Each has a truth, and each an error. The truth of each is preserved and the error avoided by the distinction of the two powers, and the understanding that the Church represents the unchangeable, and the state the changeable or the progressive. We may demand progress in civil society, provide for amendment or alteration in its constitution, as in the imperial constitution of France and the several republican constitutions in our own country, but not in the essential constitution of the Church, because that was perfect in the beginning and adapted to the spiritual wants of all ages and nations.

The neglect to recognize in its true light this distinction between the two powers has led to the standing charge against the Church, that she favors social immobility,

permits no progress, and is therefore the support of despotism, the enemy of light and liberty, and the friend of darkness and slavery. She is believed to be leagued with the old system of government which has outlived its time, and has now become tyrannical and oppressive, and a barrier to all social progress. For this reason men make war on her, and large masses of the European populations are alienated from her, are exceedingly mad against her, and persuade themselves that the secular rights of individuals and nations can be secured only by her destruction. All this is false as false can be; but, unhappily, there is a class of very excellent people, and very excellent Catholics, learned and devout, where there is no question of politics,—called in Italy *oscurantisti*, who, by their words and deeds, contribute much to confirm in the minds of the alienated this false charge. They are, no doubt, honestly attached to the old régime and to modern Cæsarism, and firmly believe that the changes contended for by the popular party cannot be introduced without serious detriment both to religion and society. They deny that the hostility manifested to the Church is primarily hostility to the politics which it is falsely assumed she upholds with her spiritual authority, and quietly dispose of the undeniable recrudescence of infidelity in the last few years by ascribing it to the native wickedness of the human heart, or to the machinations of the Enemy of souls. Instead of yielding in the order of the changeable to the demands of the age, they do all that in them lies to strengthen the hands of power, to render more stringent the system of repression, and to exaggerate, if possible, the odious features of the very system which provokes opposition. Here is our great difficulty.

We honor and respect these people for their many virtues, and we honor their inflexibility and their superiority to all demagogical arts, and perhaps our own natural disposition would associate us with them. But we believe them mistaken. We believe we know these disaffected classes better than they do, and we do not concede that it is to the Church or to any thing essentially Catholic that, as a body, they are primarily opposed, but that it is to the politics defended in her name, and with which they believe her necessarily associated. The political and social obscurantism they find supported by what seem to be her accredited organs, they are determined to get rid of, and they imagine that they can successfully attack it only over her prostrate form.

We speak not without warrant when we say their hostility to the Church not seldom springs from the only good that is left in them. They are wrong, fearfully wrong; but their hostility to the Church does not, as our conservative brethren believe, as a general thing, spring from their hostility to Catholicity because it teaches the truth, and enjoins purity of heart or sanctity of life. Men do not reject a religion for such a reason, however corrupt or vicious they may be; for that is precisely what the worst of men believe religion should do. It may be a reason why they neglect to practise it, but it is not a reason why they seek to drive it from the world. The real cause is to be sought in their own political passions and convictions opposed to the political system maintained in her name, or as essential to her interests, by the *oscurantisti*, and we have little doubt that the great body of them would gradually abandon their hostility if these would cease to interpose themselves as an opaque substance between them and her, and to prevent them from seeing the Immaculate Spouse of God in her own resplendent beauty.

We of course do not accept the politics of the *oscurantisti*, for we are republicans, and opposed to the social system they defend. We are of the New World, not the Old. But we do not quarrel with them simply because they differ from us in politics. They have the same right to defend their honest political convictions that we have to defend ours. What we deny them is the right to defend their political system in the name of our common religion, and to claim for it the positive sanction of the Church. They have no such right in relation to their politics, as we have no such right in relation to ours. If they are Catholics, so are we; and we claim to be as good and as orthodox Catholics as they are, as firmly attached to our faith, and as submissive to the Holy See. It is for them to vindicate their Catholicity to us, as much as it is for us to vindicate ours to them; for it does not follow that a man is a good orthodox Catholic because he defends antiquated despotism, and anathematizes liberty. We arraign not them as unorthodox on account of their politics, and they must not question our Catholicity on account of ours. Our quarrel with them is not that they are *oscurantisti*, but that they associate their *oscurantismo* with the Church, and obscure her fair face with their own dark shadow. We know nothing in the temporal order of *Catholic* politics. A Catholic church we know and

love; a Catholic civil polity, except in a negative sense, we know not. Lamennais was not condemned because he opposed the old monarchical system of Europe, and defended democracy; but because he attempted to do it in the name of religion, represented it the duty of the Church to cut herself loose from the governments with which her Chief as temporal prince was necessarily associated, and to make common cause with the people in their war for liberty; or, in other words, because he defended his democracy as *enjoined* by Catholicity. The Church does not proscribe monarchy and prescribe democracy, or proscribe democracy and prescribe monarchy. She positively approves, she positively condemns no form of civil polity, and therefore no form can either be defended or opposed on her authority, and she should never be dragged into our political controversies and conflicts. Besides, neither proscribing nor prescribing any particular form, she can never be a party to any revolution having for its object the change of the form of government.

There is no doubt that the people we speak of honestly believe that the material interests of the Church are so bound up with the political order now generally warred against by the European populations, or at least by those who take the liberty to speak in their name, that they would be grossly compromised by the change demanded—that of securing to the people in each nation an effective voice in the management of their own affairs. But we would ask them to reflect seriously whether, after all, religious interests could suffer more by the success of the movement party than they must suffer by association with a civil regimen that has lost its moral power, is opposed by the sentiments and convictions of the mass of thinking people, and is sustained only by a rigid system of repression by material force, which tends naturally, and cannot but tend, to exasperate and brutalize the public mind? What hope for religious interests is there under the despotic governments of Europe, when, as in France, the Church can address the public on her own affairs only by permission of the minister of the interior, or the *préfet de police*? Has not our experience during the last forty years proved that under the domination of Cæsarism, whether in large states or small states, the Church is restricted in her freedom, and her interests sacrificed to the pettiest reasons of state, while the people,—from her supposed league with the political order

of which she is only the victim—are every day becoming more and more alienated from her, and exasperated against her.

That there is something to be apprehended from the success of the movement party, we do not deny; but what is, after all, the very worst that can befall Catholic interests? The party may for the time being deprive the clergy of political influence, rob the Sovereign Pontiff of his temporal principality, and render the Church as poor in this world's goods as were the Apostles when they went forth from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to convert the world. Her priests and religions may lose what remains of their former ample revenues, and be reduced, as they already are in Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States, to live on the alms of the faithful, and every now and then exposed to be insulted or even assassinated by the fury of a mob. Here is the worst to be expected. It is, no doubt, bad enough, but nothing to frighten the followers of Him who won his kingdom by dying on the Cross. The Church may suffer from plethoric wealth and worldly prosperity; from poverty and adversity never. Her most glorious ages were her martyr ages, when she concealed herself in the catacombs, or was lacerated by wild beasts in the amphitheatre. It was then she conquered the world to her Lord,—not by slaying, but by being slain. Were she driven back anew to the catacombs, or cast anew to the lions, she would still survive in her divine beauty and majesty, still continue under her Chief her divine mission with unabated vigor and unabated success. We overrate in our worldly-mindedness the material interests of the Church, and suffer them to make cowards of us, and to wed us to a policy which embarrasses the visible Head of the Church, and restrains his freedom of action.

Here is the worst. How much worse is it, after all, than what has often occurred, and is continually occurring, under the *régime* the *oscurantisti* seek to maintain or restore? And, what is more to the purpose, how much of this will be averted by wedding the Church to that old *régime*, and placing her in open and direct hostility to the movement party? Are the people struggling for liberty less to be trusted than kings and kaisers struggling for dominion? Have we read history; or have we only gone to sleep over its open pages? Even the old French Revolution, in the very tempest of its fury, went not farther than professedly Catholic sovereigns more than once have gone. Did Pius

VI. die in exile? So did St. Gregory VII. Did the republican armies invade Italy, and inflict terrible injuries on that beautiful country? So did Frederic Barbarossa, with his twenty-five years of war, rapine, and devastation, inflict far greater injuries. And how much greater were the horrors of the republican entry into Rome, in the eighteenth century, than the capture of that city, and its sack which continued for nine months, by the soldiers of the Emperor Charles V. in the sixteenth? Or how much worse fared the Church in France, even under the Reign of Terror, than in England under Henry VIII., Edward VI., and the daughter of Anne Boleyn? Why such distrust of the people, and such confidence in kings and kaisers? Why such maledictions on the crimes of the people, and such ready condonation of the greater misdeeds of anointed sovereigns? Is it because crimes are the exception with the people, and the rule with kings and kaisers?

Our *oscurantisti* might take, if they would, a lesson from the popular revolutions of 1830 and 1848. Under these revolutions we saw, indeed, isolated cases of violence, the outbreak of the fury of an infidel mob here, or the insolent tyranny of an infidel *commissaire* there, but no systematic outrages on religion, the clergy, or the vested rights of the Church. In Belgium the revolution emancipated Catholics from their thralldom to a bigoted Calvinistic king, and gave them the control of public affairs, and if they have lost it since, they have only themselves to thank. In France the Church prospered far more under the Monarchy of July than under the Empire or the Restoration, and never was she freer, never did she speak with a bolder or more energetic voice, or make richer conquests for her Lord, than under the Republic of 1848. In the various German States the revolution, so far as it affected Catholics at all, gained them rights and improved their *status*. Even in Rome, where it showed its worst features, it did not make systematic war on the clergy, confiscate the goods of the Church, or suppress the freedom of the Catholic worship. If, indeed, republicans drove the Holy Father from Rome and deprived him of his temporal principality, republicans were found to restore and reinstate him in his temporal dominions. If he has lost it again, it is not to republicans he owes it, but to Imperial France, to Louis Napoleon, whom our French and other Catholics have been wont to laud as a second Charlemagne, or a second St. Louis, and whose revival of the Empire even

Father Ventura likened to the resurrection of our Lord from the dead. Have our conservative friends retained the memory of these facts; and have they asked themselves why those popular revolutions did not assume a decidedly anti-Catholic character? Let them bear in mind that it was because at the time men's minds were beginning to be disabused of the false notion which the *oscurantisti* do their best to generate and confirm, that the Church is leagued with the sovereigns and hostile to all movements in behalf of political liberty; because a large body of the clergy and a larger body of eminent Catholic laymen had imbibed the truth without the error of the movement initiated by the Abbé Lamennais, and proved by their words and their deeds that men can struggle bravely for liberty without disloyalty to the Church; because, in 1848, Gioberti and his friends had coupled the advocacy of liberty with the defence of the profoundest philosophy and the highest-toned Catholicity; because Pius IX., gloriously reigning, had inaugurated his Pontificate in 1846 by breaking, as temporal prince, with the repressive policy of his predecessor, amnestying political offenders, recalling political exiles, and promising his subjects liberal institutions; and, last, but not least, because the bishops and clergy of France, the day after the proclamation of the Republic of 1848, formally accepted it, as it was believed, without any *arrière pensée*, exerted themselves, and exhorted the faithful to exert themselves also, to restrain the revolution, to restore order, and consolidate the government of the nation by itself. Here are the reasons why these revolutions did not assume a decidedly anti-Catholic character; why they in general respected the rights of the Church, and did not interrupt the clergy in the performance of their sacred functions. They are reasons, too, which prove our position that the movement is directed against the old political *régime*, and that it makes no war on the Church when the Church makes not war on it, or when no war is made on it in her name.

Now, do our conservative friends believe themselves able to arrest the movement party? Have they asked themselves by what means they expect to do it; what they would gain if they should do it; and what would be the consequence of attempting and failing? Suppose Austria, backed by Russia and Germany, should intervene, what could she do? At best restore the *statu quo*, that is to say, Austrian prepotence in the Peninsula. Is that what you

want? Would that settle any thing? Would it not leave all the old causes of disaffection in full operation, and only repeat for us the experience of the last forty, not to say the last four hundred years? The odium of [the Austrian rule would be cast on the Church, and she would have to bear the blame of a policy of which she would be the victim. The war would be renewed at the first opportunity, and victory would at last, as it must, declare for the liberal and national party. If you have succeeded in placing the Church, even in appearance only, on the side of the defeated, what have you secured for her, but the well-known *res victis*? They who expect help from Austria are like the children of Israel whom the prophets reproved for turning to Egypt and trusting in the chariots and horsemen of Pharaoh.

We may be wrong, but we have long been decided in our conviction that peace, durable peace we mean, between Church or state and the people of Europe, is impossible till the old system is abandoned alike by statesmen and churchmen, liberal institutions are established, and the relations of Church and state are placed on the same footing they are with us in the United States. Without arraigning in the least the old system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government which prevailed in the Middle Ages, and some vestiges of which still remain, or doubting in the least its wisdom and excellence for the time when adopted and for centuries afterward, or being prepared to maintain that our American system is better than that, if that were still practicable, we must say that we do not believe that the Church will recover her influence over the populations of Europe, and win back to her communion those who have gone stray, till she is loosened from all political connection with the state, and voluntarily consents to forego all state patronage, and contents herself with simple immunity in her inherent rights as the spiritual kingdom of God in this world; nor until the state ceases to regard itself, or to be regarded as *Episcopus externus*, as the Cæsars were sometimes called, and consents to leave the Church full and unrestricted freedom and independence in spirituals,—perfectly free to do whatever she thinks proper to advance the interests of religion without permission asked or permission granted. We believe this, whatever was the case in the past, or whatever may be the case in a distant future, is now the best arrangement practicable; and we think, also,

that the breaking up of the *statu quo* in Italy affords a not unfavorable opportunity of introducing it.

But as strongly as we are convinced of the growing necessity of abandoning the old system and of introducing what we must be permitted to call the American system, we have been opposed and are still opposed to effecting the change by force or violence, or by any means incompatible with good faith and the sacredness of vested rights. After a change has been effected we may accept it, though we joined not in effecting it, and which, though believing it necessary, we had opposed with what strength we had, because we were opposed to the means adopted for its introduction. The *statu quo* we have defended as long as we could see the least prospect of retaining it. It was broken down by the unprovoked and unjustifiable war of France and Sardinia on Austria in 1859, and what has followed since is no more than was to have been expected when Napoleon evoked the revolution and summoned the Italians to arms. We opposed that war, not because we were in favor of Austrian prepotence, or even hostile to the unity and independence of Italy, but because we distrusted the intentions of Napoleon, and because we saw no way open to that unity and independence without a flagrant violation of public law and vested rights. We do not believe it lawful to do evil that good may come, and we believe right is never violated with impunity. We opposed the war, as the first step in what we regarded and regard as an unjustifiable policy. But our warnings fell on listless ears. Catholics then had confidence in Louis Napoleon, who was to drive Austria out of Italy, protect the Holy Father in his temporal dominions, and thrash England. We would gladly have accepted the plan of a federal union for Italy under the presidency of the Pope, recommended by the two emperors at the peace of Villafranca, and wrote in favor of it. We still hoped for it after the annexation of the Duchies to Sardinia.

We understood the Napoleon-Cavour policy. It was for France to expel Austria, to prevent all intervention by non-Italian powers, and to leave the several Italian powers to settle their own affairs the best way they could. If Sardinia, by using the revolution, by encouraging filibuster operations, by intervention at need with her own army, and by *ex post facto* suffrage, could effect the union of all Italy, with the exception of the city of Rome and its environs, she was to be free to do it, without opposition from France. At least such

was the policy, supposing Napoleon to act in good faith toward the father-in-law of his cousin. If he observed good faith it was still possible, it seemed to us, to defeat the policy, and to prepare the way for a confederated Italy. It was not unreasonable to suppose that the Pope and Naples would be able to resist both Sardinia and the revolution. We hailed, therefore, with joy, as our pages show, the acceptance of the command of the Papal army by the brave Lamoricière, and the accession to that army of recruits and volunteers from every rank and every country of Christendom. We regretted that we were too old to join them. All honor to those noble volunteers, and a place of refreshment and eternal rest to those who fell fighting against immense odds at Perugia, Spoleto, Castelfidardo, and at Ancona. They fell fighting for public right, and the inviolability of independent states, the victims of a treachery seldom equalled.

But the ease with which Garibaldi with a handful of followers made himself Dictator of Sicily in the name of Victor Emanuel, the feeble resistance offered by the royal army, the defection of the royal fleet, the treachery of the Neapolitan ministry, the entrance of the Dictator into Naples without opposition, the withdrawal of the king from his capital with the loyal part of his troops without striking a blow, appeared to prove that the people of southern Italy, or at least their leaders, had been gained to the Cavour policy, and that all hope of seriously opposing it, especially when Sardinia, without any declaration of war, invaded Umbria and the Marches, must be abandoned. We could see, when writing our article on the Rights of the Temporal, no power in Italy strong enough to resist effectually, as we had hoped, the policy, and things are still more unfavorable now. The Neapolitan army has since fought well, and proved that our calculations were not wholly without reason. But, though at the time we are writing the royal army still holds out at Gaëta, victory, unless aided by Napoleon, is hopeless. If left to herself, Italy, for aught we can see, must become either Mazzinian or Sardinian. The defeat of the Papal army, and the virtual annihilation of the royal forces of Naples, change the whole aspect of the case, and we felt last October, and we feel to-day, that the policy we opposed can be no longer successfully resisted. The point of honor is saved, and enough, we think, has been sacrificed to abstract political right, which, after all, is never an absolute right, requiring

to be maintained at all hazards. It may always be yielded without any abandonment of principle when its farther maintenance has become impracticable without inflicting greater evils than it can prevent. Things have gone so far now, we think the less evil is in letting them go farther, and to avail ourselves of the breaking down of the old system to introduce the new. We do not think it possible now to restore the old system if we would; and personally, we would not now if we could. Restorations are always unhappy, and when a system is really dead, the best thing is to bury it out of sight, and let the living go to the work of the day. The Church will not suffer, for she has the capacity to adapt herself to all changes that go on in the world around her.

We think it desirable now to settle on a durable, and, as far as possible, a satisfactory basis, both the Italian Question and the Roman Question. The illustrious Count Montalembert, from whom we never differ without some misgivings, appears still to hope to settle both questions by an Italian confederacy. It is too late, in our judgment, to hope any longer for that. It has been strongly opposed by Great Britain, and, we presume, never seriously favored by the Emperor of the French, and only thrown out by him to amuse the public, quiet the minds of Catholics, and mask his ulterior designs. Besides, a confederated Italy would now be too weak to stand without Austrian or French protection, which means Austrian or French domination; for it is clear that the Italian people have gone beyond it, and would not now be satisfied with it, or give it a firm and cordial support. They demand not now, whether republicans or monarchists, union, but unity. All proves this; and a confederacy is not in their thought, and could be established only by foreign power or influence. Their disaffection everywhere, unless in the city of Rome, undeniably springs from the passion for unity. Whatever the form it assumes, we repeat, it does not originate in hostility to religion, though some of them may be without faith; not in opposition to the Papacy as a spiritual sovereignty, nor yet in the bad government of the several princes dispossessed. It is not that. It is that the old governments are in the way of a unitary and independent Italy. They are opposed to being parcelled out into several petty states, each with its separate government, and no one strong enough to sustain itself without a non-Italian alliance; and they are deter-

mined to constitute an Italy capable of taking rank as a great power, and of maintaining her independence alike of France and of Austria. No internal reforms in the several Italian states, no liberal constitutions, no administration, however wise, just, or liberal, would remove or in any degree weaken their disaffection. Nothing will satisfy them but the unity and independence of Italy. A few years ago they would have consented to federal union, but they will not now.

But this unity and independence is not possible without the surrender to Italy, by the Holy Father, of his temporal principality. His principality cuts the Peninsula, from sea to sea, into two parts, and is more indispensable to Italian unity than Venetia herself, never only in part Italian. The only grave obstacle to the national policy is the temporal government of the Pope, and this obstacle is all the greater and more embarrassing because the Pope is a spiritual person, the chief of religion, and the states he governs are the states of the Church. Here is the secret of the hostility to the Papal government, and, in some sort, to the Church herself. We count for nothing what is said against that government; we blow to the winds the charges of tyranny and oppression brought against its administration. They are brought to discredit it in the public mind, and to gain a pretext for depriving the Holy Father of his states, and incorporating them into the new Italian kingdom or republic. The real objection is not to any thing it has done or not done, but to its existence; and as long as it exists at all, it will not cease to be opposed by the active and controlling portion of the Italian people. Here is the fact, the fact we have now to deal with.

Now, is there any imperative religious or social interest that requires the maintenance of the temporal government of the Pope, when it seems clear that its existence can serve no longer the proper end of civil government, and can only tend to alienate the affections of the Italian people from the Papacy, and to give occasion to a vast amount of crime, sacrilege, and infidelity? M. de Montalembert, in a recent letter to Count Cavour, expresses himself against great centralized states, and in favor of small confederated states. In principle we agree with him, and would go with him in practice if we believed there was the slightest probability of getting the great centralized states of Europe to consent to become small confederated states. We are the citizen of a federal union, and

defend the system wherever practicable, with all our might. But when you are surrounded by great centralized states, if you are a small state, or a loosely confederated state, like the German Bund, you hold your independence only at the mercy of your neighbors. When all Europe was divided into small feudal states, when Venice and Genoa were the great commercial capitals of Europe, the division of Italy, under a sort of suzerainty of the Pope, into several separate and mutually independent states, was in harmony with the political order of the times, and did not hinder her from maintaining the rank of a great power, or from leading the civilization of the world; but when the maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth had opened new routes of commerce, and transferred the seats of trade from the Italian states, successively to Portugal, to Spain, to Holland, and to Great Britain; when the monarchs, by the aid of the commons, had gained the victory over the feudal nobility, and established great centralized monarchies; and above all, when the old public law of Europe, which asserted the inviolability of sovereign states, however small, had ceased to command respect, and European diplomacy had adopted a system of political atheism, and unscrupulously made reasons of state override reasons of religion and morality; then this division of Italy placed her out of proportion with the new times, deprived her of her former rank and weight in the scale of European states, and reduced her to a mere "geographical expression." For three centuries and more she has been a battle field between France and Spain, or France and Austria, or a ball to be cast by European diplomacy into one scale or the other as necessary to keep or restore the balance of power. For three centuries or more she has ceased to hold the political rank to which she is entitled by her traditions, her geographical position, her fine climate and productive soil, and the genius, the capacity, the education, and the industry of her people, and as things are and are likely to be, it is morally certain that she cannot recover it so long as she remains parcelled out into several petty states, each too weak to stand alone.

We may be told that the Italian people will gain nothing by becoming united and a great power, and entering upon the rivalry with the other great powers in the race of mere material civilization, and that she would have been far wiser to have remained contented under the paternal rule

of the Pope and her old dukes, grand-dukes, and petty kings, devoting herself to science, art, and literature. Perhaps so, if she were contented. But the precise difficulty is, she was not contented, and could not be persuaded to be contented. When a people are tired of their nonage, you must recognize their majority, and let them set up a separate establishment of their own. Persuade the Italians that they would be better off as they have been for three hundred years, than they will be when they gain their unity and independence, and we shall have not a word to say. But the doctrine we have been all along advocating in this article is, that no civil government is a good government, does or can answer the end of its institution, if it generally and permanently fails to meet the sentiments and convictions, wants and wishes of the people who live under it, whether the fault of the failure is on its side or on theirs; and when they are generally and permanently bent on a change within the limits in which change is allowable, the change must not be resisted. When the division of Italy did not prevent the Italians from holding the political rank due to their country, the Papal government was a good government; it was in harmony with the times, and incompatible with no national interests; nay, it was eminently national, nearly the only truly national government in Italy, and the chief support of Italian nationality and independence against the German, the Frenchman, and the Spaniard, as well as of European civilization against the Saracen and the Turk. Italy and all Europe owe, and always will owe, a debt of eternal gratitude to that government, and we are very far from believing the new Italian government will ever succeed in making its memory forgotten. We love it and honor it for what it has done, and could still do, if the Italians would be contented to let it stand. It has been only by fraud and violence that it is overthrown, and no Catholic heart but will feel a pang to learn that it is suppressed. Yet, without offering one word in extenuation of what we regard as the guilt of Napoleon, Victor Emanuel, and Count Cavour, we see not how it can in future, things being as they are and are likely to remain, serve the cause of either religion or society, and we see no way of restoring peace but by yielding to the pressure of circumstances, and suffering it to go to make up the new kingdom of Italy under the House of Savoy.

In Italy herself we see no human means of restoring and

preserving the Pope's temporal principality. Austria, as things are, cannot do it. France could, but will not. The Emperor of the French holds the city of Rome and its environs; but if in the name, not in the interest of the Holy Father. He is at Rome to gain credit with Catholics as the only active protector of the Father of Christendom, to hold Sardinia in check, to have something to exchange with her for the island of Sardinia, or some other portion of Italy; or if Sardinia reluncts, to let loose the revolution, and to gain a plausible pretext to interfere as the friend of religion and order, and establish French domination over both the Pope and all Italy not retained by Austria. As the case now stands, there are, as far as we can see, four alternatives, and only four, for Italy: 1. Austria and the *statu quo*. That nobody desires. 2. French domination, and the Holy Father a prisoner or pensioner of France. That is much worse. 3. The revolution, establishing the humanitarian republic, or installing the people-god, under the Mazzinis, the Saffis, the Crispis, the Bertanis, and men of their tribe. Worse and worse still. 4. The political unity and independence of Italy under the liberal constitutional monarchy of the House of Savoy. If there are any other alternatives, we cannot imagine them; we know not what they are. Of the four we have enumerated, the last is certainly the least objectionable; and supposing it accepted by the Holy Father with a just indemnification to the Holy See, it strikes us as, under the circumstances, no bad solution of the Italian Question, and even of the Roman Question. It is the best solution that is likely to satisfy the Italian people. It is the only solution that can protect Italy against worse solutions, and prepare the way for placing the relations of Church and state throughout the world on the American footing. Without Sardinia, we have no power in Italy strong enough to put down the Mazzinians, or that can absorb them and prevent the experiment of the humanitarian republic from being repeated. Without the speedy organization and consolidation of the kingdom of Italy, rallying the body of the Italian people to its support, it will not be possible to prevent the establishment of French, or in case of the defeat of France by a coalition of Austria and the northern powers, not likely, the restoration of Austrian domination in the Peninsula.

As we read the horoscope of Europe, the danger to the unity and independence of Italy lies precisely on the side

of France. Napoleon, we presume, wants an Italian kingdom, but he wants it strong enough to be useful as an ally, while it is weak enough to stand in need of French protection. He would have it nominally independent, but really a vassal of his own empire. Hence we find him stopping his victorious arms at the Mincio, leaving to Austria a part of Lombardy and all of Venetia; and also demanding of Sardinia the cession to France of Savoy and Nizza, or Nice. He does not want an Italy strong enough to suffice for herself, and he will be the first to raise a disturbance if he finds it likely to become so. He must be defeated, or all is lost. How defeat him without Austrian intervention, which could be effectual only in case the Italians co-operated heartily with Austria in their own defence, which, as yet, we cannot expect them to do? It is necessary to rally the whole Italian people, at least with the exception of the Venetians, around the King of Italy, and by the popular confidence render him so strong that, backed as he is sure to be by the moral and diplomatic support of Great Britain, who is bent on defeating the Emperor's Italian policy, Napoleon will judge it advisable to leave Italy to herself. We believe the freedom and independence of the Holy See demand the constitution of a united, strong, and independent Italy, able to defend herself against any single power disposed to attack her. After the loss of her own temporal estates, this becomes highly desirable for the Holy See, and is the only thing that can atone for their loss.

Certainly, as regards the interests of religion, the Sardinians are to be preferred to the Mazzinians, and we can see no reason, when all causes of political rivalry or dissension are removed, why a powerful and independent King of Italy should not be as loyal to the Church, to say the least, as the Emperor of France or the Emperor of Austria. He would always stand more in need of her moral support than sovereigns at a greater distance, and his interests would lead him to pursue a policy that would command it. We know Victor Emanuel and his advisers have not given the best evidence in the world of their loyal Catholic intentions; but their acts which have called forth the paternal chastisements of the Holy Father, inexcusable as they certainly are, cannot be said to be unprecedented in the history of Catholic states, and by no means preclude the hope of peace between their authors and the Church. We think scant justice is done to the Italian people, and that sufficient

allowance is not always made for the peculiarities of their situation. It is easy to call them a miserable rabble, villains, robbers, cut-throats, cowards, traitors, assassins, infidels, fiends of hell, and all that, but from all we can learn, we think—though some among them, as in every nation, deserve these epithets—the Italian people, as a nation, are a brave and noble people, and however far they may be led astray for the moment by their political and national passions and interests, they are at bottom sincerely a Catholic people,—none more so,—strong in their faith, ardent in their devotion, and warmly attached to the Holy See; and, we doubt not, when the Italian kingdom is once constituted, when the passion excited by the struggle to found it shall have had time to subside, and the interests disturbed by the change shall have adjusted themselves to the new order of things, it will be found the most truly Catholic kingdom on earth, and the most loyal and firm supporter of Catholic interests as they will exist when the old system of mixed civil and ecclesiastical government has been fairly given up by both Church and state. The chief causes of collision heretofore existing will be no longer operative. In a political point of view, the establishment of a free parliamentary government really representing the body of the nation, by so powerful a state as Italy must become, if united and independent, will throw the preponderance on the side of liberal institutions, and hardly fail to make an end of both Jacobinism and Cæsarism throughout the continent of Europe, restore Italy to her political primacy, and, what to us Catholics is of moment, give the leadership of civilization to a Catholic nation.

We shall be told, we doubt not, that the Catholic should have nothing to do with political exigencies and complications; but, recognizing the rights of the Holy See, he should defend them with all the power he has, regardless of consequences. So we should the *spiritual* rights of the Holy See, which are inalienable and can bend to no political exigency. We have all along contended that there is and can be no compromise of the spiritual, and we have on more occasions than one had a severe battle to fight with our latitudinarian and compromising Catholics, who would conceal or explain away every thing in their religion offensive to "our separated brethren." On this head we are safe. If any man in the country has the character of a stern, uncompromising Catholic, we have it. It is for poli-

tics to bend to religion, not religion to politics; and our precise quarrel with the *oscurantisti* is, that they, in our judgment, sacrifice the interests of their religion to their old world politics. They, not we, are the party to be rebuked on this head; at least on this head we have no lessons to learn from them. The only rights of the Holy See we have intimated could be yielded are certain political rights, which, it seems to us, can no longer be successfully defended, and which, as things are, we think can be yielded without detriment to religion or society. Foreseeing what was likely to come, we took occasion, last October, in discussing the rights of the temporal, to meet this objection, by showing that the right of the Pope to his temporal principality, though the right of a spiritual person, is not itself a spiritual, but a temporal right; or, in other words, his temporal principality is a temporal, not a spiritual principality, and therefore stands on the footing, and subject to all the conditions, of any other temporal principality justly acquired and legitimately held. There is then no question here of the spiritual rights of the Holy See, or compromise of any principle, doctrine, precept, or right, in the religious or spiritual order.

We hardly need repeat what is so well known to our readers, that we carry our views of the supremacy of the Pope, as representative of the spiritual order, as far as any man can do. We hold that he has, by virtue of his office as supreme Vicar of our Lord on earth, supreme authority in all that touches the law of God, the law of conscience, or wherever there is a question of doctrine or morals, or of ecclesiastical administration, and the full right, as the vicegerent of God, to rebuke, reprove, chastise, and even deprive of his dignity for Catholics, any and every professedly Catholic prince who forgets, in his civil administration, the law of God, the rights of the Church, the liberty of the Catholic conscience, and proves himself determined to oppress, cruelly, grossly, and persistently, his subjects. This, we maintain, is his inherent and indefeasible right as vicegerent of God, as the divinely appointed chief of religion, and as the Father and Protector of the Faithful. This is enough, and, as many Catholics hold, too much. But we do not hold, and never have held that the Pope holds his temporal principality by the same title by which he holds this power. We have heard his right of temporal prince defended on various grounds: on the ground of first occupant and prescription; the grants or concessions of princes, Constantine,

Pepin, Charlemagne, the Countess Matilda ; on popular suffrage or request of the people ; on the necessity of protecting and providing for the people abandoned and left without a civil ruler by the Iconoclastic emperors of Constantinople ; but we have never heard it pretended that he holds it by virtue of his commission as Vicar of Jesus Christ, or by the title by which he holds his Apostolic authority in the Church. His right is an acquired right, valid, inviolable, but still acquired and outside of his right as Sovereign Pontiff. No doubt the spiritual government of the Church is more or less mixed up with the Pope's temporal government, and many of the existing arrangements for the administration of ecclesiastical affairs are more or less modified to meet, or are based upon the fact that the Pope is a temporal sovereign, and has a temporal principality. The supreme administration of the state and the supreme administration of the Church are, for the most part, in the same hands. Much in the mode of transacting ecclesiastical affairs may require to be changed if the separation of Church and State be carried out, but still the papal state, as any other, lies in the temporal order.

Assuming this, the whole question we have been discussing lies in the order where compromises are allowable and even necessary. No temporal right, whether held by a secular or a spiritual person or corporation, is absolute, and to be maintained at all hazards. It is held in subordination to religion and society, and when in the changes that take place it becomes incompatible with the good of either, it may be surrendered or redeemed, though not taken away by violence, when not forfeited by abuse, which in the present case is not to be pretended. We assert the principle. It is not for us to apply it. All we wish to establish here is, that though mixed up with the practical administration of ecclesiastical affairs, the Pope's temporal government, in its origin and character, is neither a spiritual nor a *quasi*-spiritual government, and therefore with the consent of the Pope may be suppressed. As supreme judge of religious interests, the Pope is free to act in the case as he judges proper, but how far the feeling among Catholics, that it is in some way intimately connected with the Papacy, and essential to it, a feeling that has to be taken into the account, may embarrass his freedom, we are unable to say. All we say is, that we hold him free to consent to a total severing of all *political* bonds between Church and State, and we see

no other way, with the tendencies of the modern world such as they evidently are, of arriving at a passable solution of the terrible problems pressing every day more and more for solution.

This solution involves in a certain sense the triumph of the *Politiques*, as they were called in the time of Henry IV., or what we have strenuously opposed under the name of Political Atheism, over public right, or system of international law and vested rights introduced by the Sovereign Pontiffs into Christendom, and consecrated by Christian diplomacy. We confess it; but all history proves that a victory against the Church is a defeat. Our Lord won his kingdom in being crucified by wicked hands; the early Christians conquered the world in being slain, not by slaying. When the Jews shut their ears to the word of God, the Apostles turned to the Gentiles; and we must turn from kings and kaisers who have betrayed their God, betrayed the Church, betrayed society, and betrayed themselves, to the people. THE CHURCH AND THE PEOPLE STILL LIVE. Here is our hope for the future, and here our readers may see why we so strenuously defend the popular cause, so strenuously advocate for all Christendom free forms of government, forms which secure to the people a constitutional and effective voice in public affairs; why we so earnestly insist on the education of the people, on a high and thorough education, as far as practicable, of the whole community; why we defend the political separation of Church and State, and wage unrelenting war against the *oscurantisti*, or defenders of the old order of things now out of date. Right or wrong, our policy is clear and well-defined, and holds together in all its parts. Through the people we believe the Church can revindicate her system of public right and international law, and recover, though under another form, more than she has lost through the perfidy of the sovereigns and the intrigues and complications of politicians. The majority of the American people are un-Catholic, if not anti-Catholic, and yet no people as a state has more scrupulously observed the great principles of natural justice and public right insisted on by the Church; and there is no country on earth where the Church is as free and independent and her relations are on so satisfactory a footing as in these United States. To those who doubt, we point triumphantly to this grand fact in proof of the justness of our views. Through the people invested with political power, free and intelligent, without forming

with them any political bonds, the Church may gain a victory, which will more than compensate her for what she has lost by the politicians and sovereigns.

And this brings us back, as a fitting close, to the eloquent and profound Conférences of Father Felix, which contain the very lessons, bating a few passages which smack of Cæsarism and hero-worship, needed by a republican people, or a state of society in which the people through their representatives possess the supreme power, and the danger is not on the side of authority, but on the side of liberty. They set forth in the clearest and most attractive style the great, invariable, and universal principles of Christianity, and show their bearing on individual, social, and domestic life. Nothing can be better adapted to protect us against our chronic danger, that of pushing liberty to license, making the people God, and regarding worldly success as the test of merit. They rebuke our demagogie and our political atheism, by showing the folly and absurdity of both. Let them be translated, and with the addition of a few notes, circulated through the length and breadth of the land. They who read them, will find themselves wiser and better.

ART. IV.—SEMINARIES AND SEMINARIANS.

It is commonly given as an answer at Rome to many persons who go thither to indulge in complaints and lamentations, "We have no time here to listen to fault-finding with the past; tell us what there is that can be done for the future."

This wise reflection indicates the spirit which should guide him who may feel it his duty to write on the delicate subject of measures, the adoption of which is calculated, as he believes, to advance the interests of religion in this country. We do not hesitate to add, that earnestness and zeal for the truth furnish no good excuse for undue severity of expression. They may serve to explain, but they cannot justify a want of charity and kindly feeling, unless, indeed, such want should exist more in appearance than in reality.

It is not our purpose to find fault with our brethren, the clergy of the American church, or to recommend any rule

of sacerdotal life. We make no suggestions, we offer no views touching their affairs for them to approve or disapprove. We are truly and sincerely persuaded that it is not our place to address the venerable priesthood of the Church on the duties of their holy office, and we do not see that the discussion of our subject requires us to do so. But we surely violate no propriety by inquiring into the qualifications of young laymen who may be candidates for the ministry, and in stating frankly what we may think renders them fit or unfit for admission into an Ecclesiastical Seminary. If we offered nothing but our own views and opinions on this important subject, we should be entitled to no more consideration than what is due to the arguments we might bring forward in support of our assertions. But the question we are ventilating has been subjected to earnest and careful examination by the Church, and after long and mature deliberation her decision has been made known. It is not left to the option of each diocese to keep up the body of its clergy, or to add to their numbers in any way, or from any source it may choose, but stringent rules have been made that must be obeyed, unless where circumstances render obedience impossible. Does the reader inquire where we find such a rule, and what may be its purport? We shall give him the rule in a few plain words; it is as follows:

"If children are not trained to the ecclesiastical state from their tender years, they will not be fit for it unless by an extraordinary favor of Providence. It is therefore decreed, that every diocese shall choose out, and support, and educate a certain number of boys from their twelfth year, or thereabouts, to be Priests. These boys shall be taken from the city or diocese, or at least from the province in which they are one day to be Priests."

This rule was drawn up by the General Council of Trent. We have quoted its exact words, leaving out only such circumstances as are not just now necessary to the understanding of our subject. The reader will find the original words of the Decree in the *Review* for last October, p. 507.

But perhaps the reader may here remark, that the Holy Council, no doubt, leaves the arrangement of all such matters as this to the Bishop of the diocese. It is for him to say whether he will have a Diocesan Seminary or not, and whether or not he will fill the ranks of the priesthood from the younger members of his flock, or from some other

source. A very slight examination of the words of the Council will show that the Fathers did not intend to leave this matter to the discretion of each Bishop, that they foresaw this objection, and framed the law so as to forestall it, and reply to it with unmistakable clearness.

They say, in substance, that in this matter of educating boys for the sanctuary, the Bishops are not free, that is, they are bound in conscience to attend to it, as the Council prescribes. If a Bishop neglects to discharge his duty in this respect, the Council goes on to say that the Archbishop must "sharply reprimand" him for his neglect, and "compel him" to get together and educate the young seminarians above described. And if the Archbishop should neglect, on his part, to do his duty, the Provincial Council is authorized and obliged to "sharply reprimand" the Archbishop for his neglect, and "compel him" to get together the boys as above described, and provide a seminary for their education. (See *Review*, 1860, pp. 508, 9.)

"But all this," the reader may exclaim, "amounts to a rule for the Bishops of countries in which the Canon Law obtains in full force. Such is not the case in the United States, for here the Council of Trent has never been promulgated, and is not, therefore, the ecclesiastical law of the country." We reply, that whether the Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent have been promulgated or not, the observance of this particular statute regarding the erection of Diocesan Preparatory Seminaries has been emphatically urged upon the Bishops of this country by the Pope and the American Councils. The Fathers of the second Council of Baltimore, held in 1833, recommended all Bishops to use every endeavor for the erection and maintenance of Diocesan Seminaries, and to do all things in the form prescribed by the Fathers of Trent, in so far as local circumstances would allow. They are to exhort the people frequently to contribute generously to a work which the Council declares to be one of necessity to the Church. (*Ibid.*, p. 511.) The different dioceses of the country have all, or nearly all, accepted in their Synods the Decrees of Baltimore for their own special guidance, and by such acceptance have declared that they consider the ecclesiastical education of boys belonging to the diocese, in the manner prescribed by the famous decree of Trent, to be a work of necessity to the Church.

Benedict XIV., a great Pope and a great theologian, took into consideration this same question, whether the

Bishops are bound or not to obey the decree of the Council of Trent respecting the education of young seminarians. It is true that there were at the time he wrote no Bishops in the United States, but there were many other missionary countries in existence, and the Holy Father addressed himself, without distinction, to all the Bishops of the world. We translate an extract from his "Letter of admonition to all the Bishops of the world," referring, for the original, to our *Review* for last October, p. 509 :

"Inasmuch as it is a matter of the very highest importance that they who are called to the ecclesiastical state shall be formed from their early years to piety, blameless conduct, and canonical discipline, as tender plants are formed while still young, therefore, you (the Bishops) must take a heart-felt interest in having ecclesiastical seminaries erected as soon as possible where there have been none up to the present, and in enlarging them where they exist, should the well-being of the churches require a greater number of students. The Bishops will use, for the purpose of getting the necessary funds, the powers wherewith they are already clothed (by the Council of Trent), and if such powers are too limited, on learning the need from you, we will ourselves add to them. It is necessary you should make such colleges the special objects of your fostering care, visiting them frequently, investigating the conduct, dispositions, and progress in study of each of the youthful inmates, appointing able teachers and persons endowed with the ecclesiastical spirit to educate them, honoring with your presence now and then their literary exercises and ecclesiastical celebrations, and conferring some beneficence upon those who have given the highest proofs of virtue and proficiency. Let it not weary you to give to these young plants, while they are tender and yet attaining their growth, the benefit of this kind of irrigation, for your labor will be one day happily rewarded by plentiful fruit in the persons of numerous good clergymen. Bishops have been in the habit of complaining that the harvest, indeed, is great, but the laborers are few, yet they had reason also, perhaps, to grieve that they themselves did not take pains to form the right kind of laborers for the harvest. For good and able laborers are not born, but are made, and it depends especially upon the watchfulness and care of the Bishops to make them what they ought to be."

Years after the date of this letter, Pope Benedict refers to it, and states that he wrote it for the express purpose of urging the Bishops to carry out the views of the Fathers of Trent touching seminaries and seminarians. We cannot help admiring the wisdom and prudence of the Holy Father

in his treatment of this delicate subject. He utters no reproofs in reference to the past, he does not complain of what has been done or what has not been done in years gone by, but he nevertheless states clearly and distinctly that the Bishops are bound in conscience to obey the ancient rule of the Church in the provisions they make for filling the ranks of their clergy. We translate another extract from page 510 of the *Review* for October :

“These laws of ancient discipline are in full force at the present day; but there is so much looseness in the manner of observing them as to make them appear well-nigh ineffectual, unless the Prelates of the different churches shall endeavor earnestly to preserve them in all their rigor, in so far forth as the trying circumstances or time and place will permit them to do so. . . . But how many dioceses there are which have no seminaries at all! How many seminaries there are in which masters are only partially provided to give the future ministers of the Church instructions that are necessary to their calling! . . . How few dioceses there are in which full obedience is given to the long-established rule of discipline requiring that no one shall be admitted to Holy Orders who has not been educated in the seminary, and who does not, therefore, reach the clerical office by the straight road !”

Two further quotations remain for us to translate. One affords negative and the other positive evidence to show what is the mind of the Church in this country in reference to the subject we are treating. The Fathers of the Plenary Council of Baltimore, held in 1852, decreed as follows :

“In order that priests who move about and are not well known may not be too easily admitted to the exercise of the ministry, to the danger of souls, we do not wish priests coming from Europe to be received into the ranks of our clergy, unless by letters of their Bishops previously forwarded they shall have obtained the consent of the Bishop into whose diocese they wish to transfer themselves.”

The fourteenth decree of the same Council returns to the subject of the seminary :

“Those Bishops who have no seminary of their own, are to be advised that they enter into an understanding with the other Bishops of the same province so that they may establish at least one seminary in each province.”

We have deemed it well to give these authorities in English

in the present article, so as to call more particularly to them the attention of our readers. We have given the subject much attention for the last fourteen years, passed since being admitted into the ranks of the priesthood, and we purposely keep back for the present many weighty authorities collected during that time, so that our argument may appear clear to even a casual observer. We hold that there is a normal rule adopted by the Church in reference to the supply of her priesthood as death gradually thins away its ranks, and that this normal rule is the careful selection of good and bright boys, who are to be trained from tender years for the priestly office. This rule is set forth by the Council of Trent. In order to show that its provisions were not confined to any particular time or place, we have quoted Benedict XIV., who, in language stronger than we should dare to make use of, states distinctly that it is meant for the whole Church, and must be observed wherever it is possible to introduce it. We have added to this the action of our own Bishops in council assembled, who have adopted the rule thus given and thus explained as the law of the Church in this country. They speak with great prudence and moderation, adopting the language of advice rather than that of command, and making due allowance for the poverty under which so many of our dioceses labor; but they show clearly that wherever the rule can be adopted, it is their wish that it be adopted as soon as possible, and they do not hesitate to tell the people that the work is one of necessity to the welfare and progress of the Church.

In applying this rule to the circumstances of our time and country, we do not desire to extend it beyond the intention of its framers. We claim for it that it is the normal rule recommended by the Church, and that she wishes it to be observed wherever it can be, and in so far as it can be adopted. There are many cases in which exceptions must be made, and many in which it is well to follow the exception even when the strict rule might perhaps be enforced. Still, it seems to be very clearly established that the Church desires the diocese or province to furnish the main body of the candidates for the ministry, and wishes the training of her priests, generally speaking, to begin from their early youth. We do not say that they break the rule, who send their young seminarians to Europe, or to Canada, or to a neighboring diocese to be educated, provided these seminarians belong to the city, diocese, or province by birth, or

at least by residence. Further, we do not say that they break the rule, who take many of their subjects from other countries, provided these subjects are trained in some American seminary for a time, at least until they become sufficiently acquainted with the ways of this country. Those who take by preference priests from other countries, not as the exception but as the rule; those who fail to do what they might well do, if they wished to encourage and bring forward toward the ministry the proper kind of young persons belonging to the country, must settle it with their own consciences whether they obey or disobey the laws of the Church.

There is in this connection no question of birth-place, nationality, or race. No comparison is sought to be instituted between the clergymen who may spring from the soil of any given country, and those who may come from another to exercise in our behalf the functions of the holy ministry. The inquiry stands simply as follows: Is it better to have candidates for the priesthood who understand the peculiar wants of their place of mission, or candidates who do not understand them? Is it better to have persons trained for their peculiar work from early boyhood, or persons who take up that work after being trained for another entirely different? Is it better to have young ministers whose thoughts, habits, and feelings are already in harmony with those of the class they wish to attract to the Church, or such as are entirely different from them in these important particulars? The rules which should guide us in answering these questions are the ordinary rules of practical wisdom, by which we are led to adopt for any given end the means which will enable us most easily and readily to gain it. Were we to discuss the merits of our subject on national grounds, we should have to assert that each class of immigrants who have made this country their home ought to be served by clergymen born in the same place as themselves. We do not contend for this. But we do mean to say that the best class of priests for them, other things being equal, will be men who understand the peculiar difficulties to which they are exposed in this country, and who are the most likely to have the knowledge, experience, and influence necessary to help them in overcoming such difficulties and in securing temporal advantages without losing their eternal salvation. We have no thought of recommending to the Catholics of the United States the rejection of priests

with whom they are familiar, and the adoption of others to whom they are strangers. We simply ask, Is it better for them to have clergymen who know nothing about the ways of this country, who were grown-up men and priests before they came here, or their own children educated properly for the priesthood—not only—but educated for the priestly work of this particular country? It has been said that these children are not fit to be priests. Do their parents believe this? We do not think they will be found ready to admit such a statement as true. He pays our Catholic immigrants a poor compliment who asserts or takes it quietly for granted that their stock has so noticeably deteriorated in a single generation.

In the case of other professional men we feel pretty sure that there would be no hesitation in arriving at a preference. The effort would be made to get the person who presents the most advantages and the fewest disadvantages for the furtherance of the purpose in view. If, for instance, one has to choose a legal adviser, would he not prefer to consult a lawyer whose whole training has made him familiar with American life and customs, rather than place himself in the hands of a European, however learned and eloquent he might have been esteemed in his own country? The same illustration may be drawn from reference to a physician, or an engineer, a merchant, or other man of business, and we do not think it necessary to delay to point out the analogy existing in natural interests between their case and the case of him who has a far higher and holier calling. It will be seen from these remarks that we do not directly advocate the superiority of a *native* clergy, or at least we ask no preference for them on the ground of *nativism*. We are anxious only to have a *trained* clergy, that is to say, a body of ecclesiastics the majority of whom, from early youth, have been educated for the particular kind of work which they are expected to do after being ordained.

It is said that an ancient philosopher was asked what things boys should learn, and gave this plain and sensible answer: "Those things which they will need when they become men." We are guided in this discussion by a similar principle of foresight, and when our friends ask what kind of boys we wish to become seminarians, we answer: Those who are most likely to learn the things they will need when they become priests. We do not limit their good dispositions to the simple talent for study, nor their knowledge to what they can be taught by books. We wish to take into

consideration all personal circumstances that may fit them for the American mission, and all the requirements that may render them useful and influential among their fellow-Catholics and their un-Catholic neighbors. We protest against our remarks being construed into a criticism on the past policy of the Church in the United States or an attack on the priesthood as it now stands. We speak only of the policy that is evidently demanded by the welfare of the Church here, and of the candidates who ought to be prepared to fill the ranks of our *future* clergy. We do not claim that the argument we have based upon the authority of the Council of Trent, the encyclicals of the Pope, and the action of our own councils and synods, goes so far as to call for a native clergy exclusively. We hope that at all times we shall have among the ranks of our clergy men similar to the noble and learned bishops and priests by whom the Church in America was planted and watered until God gave it increase. To ask for the exclusion of European clergymen from the American Church, under any circumstances, would be ungrateful in the highest degree, monstrously inhospitable and uncharitable, and it would, moreover, be a suicidal policy. No! we advocate no such exclusive and un-Catholic ideas. We combat the spirit of exclusivism and narrow-minded prejudice in others. We cheerfully concede all that is claimed by them in favor of the benefits conferred upon this country by clergymen who came from Europe. We admit the right of the great body of Catholics in this country to have, if they prefer it, clergymen of the nationalities from which they spring. We bow before the ancient glories, the venerable traditions, and the present dignity of the Church in the Catholic countries of Europe. We are willing even to respect the prejudices to which all men, even good men, are liable. But when all this has been unaffectedly and sincerely admitted, we conceive that we still have the right to ask that native-born recruits be looked after, that their vocations be inquired into and encouraged, and the means provided for them to form, as they ought to do in time, the majority of the priesthood of the country. Thus, while we have none of that hostility to foreigners which has been sneeringly designated Americanism, we do not understand that the fact of our being Catholics requires us to approve of the arrogant and impolitic contempt for this country which, borrowing a word from our opponents, we may be permitted to style *anti-Americanism*.

We have also noticed with unfeigned regret a disposition on the part of persons entitled to our respect and esteem to encourage the belief that there are no vocations among the youth of this country, or that American children are not fit to be trained for the sanctuary. We do not say that such sentiments were in all cases clearly enunciated, or even definitely formed in the minds of the speakers. But enough was quietly taken for granted in this direction to dampen active exertion in forming those preparatory seminaries, those "*novellas plantationes*" that Pope Benedict held to be so important. We have always considered this impression to be fraught with injurious consequences to the prosperity of the Church in our midst. Especially it has seemed to us calculated to retard any thing like successful effort toward the conversion of our non-Catholic brethren. The mind of most people in this country is surrounded with a breastwork of prejudices, which must be overthrown before the citadel can be approached. We cannot believe that any fair and dispassionate reasoner will deny that clergymen belonging to the country will have more influence in removing these bristling prejudices than others who are strangers. It is surely no derogation from the merit of the latter to say that they are less adapted to this peculiar work than the former. There is in the mind of non-Catholics a very great indisposition to hear any thing in favor of the Catholic religion from any priest, but when the clergyman who addresses them is a stranger by birth, education, and character, there is a prejudice against him personally which makes his work longer and his ultimate success far more difficult.

Under these circumstances, charity and zeal for the salvation of souls, as well as the simple rules of ordinary prudence, would teach us to avoid increasing the obstacles which are already too numerous in the way of conversion. We appeal to the goodness and kindness of foreign clergymen, and ask them to have compassion on the human weaknesses of those who have not had the advantage of a knowledge of the faith from their childhood. We ask them to prepare young Catholics for the ministry, and to send them later to place within reach of their fellow-countrymen the means of saving their souls. These youths for whom we plead are, after all, your children; they owe their knowledge of the faith and all the blessings which follow in its train to you. If they give evidences of virtue or piety, it is your hand that planted the good seed in their hearts, and if, encouraged by you, they

should in time do aught of worthful in the service of their Church and their country, to you, under God, will be the glory, and to you the undying reward.

We have been led, at times, to believe that some among the priests, who are too noble and too good to be influenced by any exclusive or partisan feeling, do not look with much favor on the system of taking young boys and training them for the ecclesiastical state. Now, the result of our studies and observations, and the opinion of the wisest and best of our friends, have led us to consider this system as one that must be adopted in these United States, if we are ever to have a clergy suited to the needs of the time and place in which we live. Our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived is, in the first place, the law of the Church, which we have set forth in the beginning of this article. The system is laid down clearly, plainly, and repeatedly, and no difference of circumstances, of age, or country, seems to have had the effect of shaking the determination of the Church, that wherever it is possible, the candidates for her ministry shall be set apart in early boyhood, to be jealously reared up in piety and study for the exalted service of the altar. We do not say that the Church has allowed no deviation from this rule; on the contrary, she is ever satisfied with doing the best that can be done under the circumstances. But this is the plan to be preferred—the regular system—the normal rule which she wishes to see obeyed all over the world, wherever and whenever she can have her way. The saints have, as a general practice, kept in view the advantages of following this rule when forming plans, or establishing institutions for the education of clergymen, whether secular or regular. Look, for instance, at the practice of the holy patriarch St. Benedict. He found Europe resounding with the clash of arms, and the minds and hearts of men taken up with the distracting excitements of the military mania. Men were valued only in proportion to their knowledge of the art of war, and their courage or ability in the field, and comparatively few thought of showing their regard for their religion in any other way than by fighting for it. St. Benedict, in the peaceful shade of the monasteries which he erected in pleasant retreats, secluded from the noisy occupations of the age, formed and trained a body of men who reformed the character of the clergy throughout Europe, diffused abroad the love of science and all the gentler arts, and prepared the world for the advent

of the schoolmen and the universities, Dante and Columbus, Leo and the Council of Trent. Not satisfied with taking young men, Benedict adopted little children. His two favorite disciples, Maurus and Placidus, afterward Abbots and canonized saints, were adopted by the holy founder when the first was twelve, and the second no more than seven years old. Others were housed in the monastery even younger, and in Benedictine monasteries it has always been the custom to receive young boys for training, the dear little fellows in their monkish habits looking like statuettes of Benedictines carved by some cunning artist in a moment of playfulness.

St. Ignatius chose, indeed, young men at the University of Paris for his first companions, but the two gems of his order were Stanislas and Aloysius Gonzaga, received into the noviceship when they were young boys. We must imitate the wisdom of the saints if we would meet the wants of this age and country. We must adopt boys for the sanctuary—not, indeed, for the purpose of bringing them up in seclusion, but for the purpose of placing them under the guardianship of the Church, and interesting them in the divine work of the salvation of souls, before they are absorbed by the cares and excitements of the world. We cannot prevent their seeing the world, nor their becoming acquainted with its ways, but we can accustom them to know it without being of it, or becoming corrupted by its vanities and seductions. We would do no more than follow the wisdom of Solomon's proverb, as applied to our special case: "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it."

But besides the wisdom of this course, there would appear to be no alternative left to us in this country but to adopt it. If we do not initiate our candidates early into the virtuous practices which shall lead them to consider themselves set apart for the Lord, the world will be beforehand with us, and the stir and bustle of the contest for riches and advancement will speedily drown the still small voice of conscience, urging on the heart of the young man the neglected claims of a religious vocation. What choice have we left between forming our clerical candidates in preparatory seminaries, or trusting to replace our priests as they fall one by one at their post with whatever recruits Providence may chance to send our way from the various dioceses of the Old World? None. But every one can easily see

that the uncertainty of the latter arrangement makes it undesirable, even if there were no better reasons to prefer the former.

It will be said, perhaps, that this education of young boys is uncertain, too; for in the long lapse of years from their adoption to the time of ordination, many will grow weary and recede. Such, no doubt, will be the case, but we see no help for it. When we adopt boys we do it to give them an opportunity to test their vocations. Some will be found to have vocations, and some not. Let us thank God that those who have no vocations retire in time. It is better for their own souls that they should do so, and better for the souls of the people. Still, this argument proves nothing more than that no system can be devised by men but has its imperfections. We shall have the same trouble, more or less, whatever course we pursue. Many leave the seminary, although they have entered at a period when every one would suppose that they ought to know fully their own minds; and many, too, fall into bad health from confinement and application to study. They have not been used to seminary life, and they break down under a system of discipline which does not injure those who have been brought up to it from an earlier age. But, suppose that in spite of want of vocation in some, and the impaired health of others, we succeed in ordaining *fifty per cent.* of the number we started with in the beginning; would not the system be even then worth adopting? If we are guided by the considerations which actuate men in other matters, we think we shall be likely to answer in the affirmative. If we have fifty picked men to ordain out of every hundred, as we should have in the case supposed, we shall be amply rewarded for our pains, and should be well satisfied with having made the venture. But we hear it said of the plan, It is expensive. We beg pardon for the Yankeeism of the expression, if we reply, Granted; it is expensive, but it pays. You cannot give a professional man a finished education without paying well for it. Good education and pauperism cannot go together. The modern world has been trying to combine the two by every ingenious device for a long time, but with very indifferent success. The education that is cheaply got will be found always to be rudimental, hasty, and unfinished. Thoroughness requires time, and time is money. You can save time by shortening the process, but whatever plan you resort to you will ultimately

find that, with very rare exceptions, you have made your purchase cheap only by cheapening the article purchased.

This may seem a novel way of dealing with clerical education, namely, to bring it down to its market value; but those who do not like it must blame the modern world, not the unfortunate present writer, who regrets, as much as he can, that the modern world is not as good as it ought to be. We know very well that a great outlay is not necessary to make a seminarian pious, but generous expenditure is necessary to procure for him the time, the leisure, the study, the tuition, the books, the training, and the associations that are necessary to give him thorough scholarship. If we are asked which of the two we prefer, learning or piety, we answer that "piety is useful to all things," and we pray Heaven to deliver us from that dangerous character, the man of learning who has no piety. Still, while piety alone may save my own soul, I clearly see that I require learning to be useful in saving the souls of my neighbors.

In conclusion, the best rule in this connection would appear to be that of St. Francis de Sales, who says, when speaking of the choice of a director: "If you want a man to pray for you, go to a pious man; if you want a man to give you advice, go to a man of learning." The most useful priest, we take it, will be he who best combines piety with learning, and learning with the practical knowledge of men and things.

We do not intend to urge these considerations upon any portion of the Church, whether in this or other countries, where absolute poverty and inability can be pleaded as an excuse for not taking any step toward the education of clergymen who shall succeed the actual missionaries. Whoever does not help himself because he is unable to do it, has the right to call on the Lord to help him, and to leave the whole task of the required assistance to Providence. Even he who already has the means of self-relief, must, when he has done his best, place all his hopes of success and fears of failure in the hands of his merciful Father who is in heaven. It was Saint Ignatius, we believe, who uttered the maxim, "Do at first as if there were no God, but only yourself to depend on, and when you have done all in your power, do as if there were no self in existence, but only the good God." We ask no one to do what it is out of his power, or above his power to do. But have we done what we can do? have we given what we can really afford to give to this work which

the Fathers of Trent say is a most holy work, and the Fathers of Baltimore add is a work necessary to the welfare of the Church? There is no other work of religion or charity so important that it must of necessity be attended to, even to the total exclusion of this. It is of more consequence to have a priest than to have a church; for once the priest is made sure of, the church will follow. Moreover, he who educates a priest, provides indirectly for all the works of charity and benevolence that Catholics are ever called upon to take part in, and he who by his means or his exertions increases the number of priests, increases the probability of such good works being done on a more durable footing and a more extended scale.

It has been said that when Catholics build a church, they establish a bank on which the poor, the sick, the widow and the orphan, the friendless and the homeless may all draw in the hour of their need. In like manner it may be said, that he who sends a good priest among the people, makes sure of the erection of churches, hospitals, and asylums, and of all the institutions and associations that may be required for the promotion of good-will and loving-kindness between man and man for the honor and glory of God. Oh! if our wealthy Catholic laymen would reflect on the greatness and usefulness of the priestly character, they would do without urging all in their power to assist in forwarding the cause of early clerical education. The poet says that "An honest man's the noblest work of God," and he might have added that a good priest is the noblest of all honest men. The truly honest man must begin by being a truly just man before God, and he will then be truly honorable and fair in all his dealings with his fellow-men. The good priest is nearer to God than any other man; he is styled by preference a man of God. He is also, by his very office and occupation, called upon to exercise a greater amount of self-denial and self-sacrifice than other men, and is thereby able and ready at all times to devote himself from the highest motives to the service of his fellow-men, especially of those among them in greatest need of his kind and generous assistance.

The Catholic laity, when they are poor, and struggling for the necessary means of subsistence, are not obliged to erect costly and beautiful churches. The great object of priest and people, under such circumstances, is to make ready some place respectable though plain, where the Holy Sacrifice may be offered up for the living and the dead. When they,

become more affluent, they are expected to contribute more freely toward the erection of temples not holier, but still more ornate than the humble chapel in which their fathers worshipped the Lord of holiness and truth. Let the same rule regulate the outlay for the erection of seminaries, and the time and care which are expended in the education of candidates for the sacred ministry. When the great object is to obtain speedily some anointed Levite who may break the bread of life to the people of God, no further care is necessary than to ascertain that the candidate presenting himself for orders has a vocation, the spirit of holy piety, and the unblemished reputation that are indispensable for the priestly office. But in times and places where the immediate spiritual necessities of the people have been attended to, and their very position makes it proper and feasible that something more be done for them than to administer the sacraments to themselves and their children, ampler provisions should be made, and the expense cheerfully encountered which is necessary to train up and form young students into truly good and pious priests, who are at the same time thoroughly educated for the work they are expected to perform.

It cannot be denied that this is the great want of the Church in this country. The early formation of clergymen suited to this particular mission is the great fundamental work to be done before we can reasonably talk of reform, amelioration, or progress in the Catholic life of the country. On this depends any hope of placing ourselves in harmony with the discipline which has governed the administration of Catholic affairs in the happiest and holiest times known to our forefathers in the faith. On this depends all reasonable prospect of doing any thing toward the conversion of the country, so strongly recommended by our present Holy Father, Pope Pius IX. Finally, with few exceptions, all the best and wisest among our clergy and laity call for an effort to be made toward the general improvement of our system of clerical education. Such improvement in fact is demanded by the Catholic public sentiment of the whole country. Honor and success await those who shall do what is in their power to benefit the Church and country by the elevation of its priesthood. Choice blessings are in reserve for them, too, at the hand of the Great High Priest of the New Law, who gave to his Apostles and their successors

not the name of servants, but the noble and endearing title of his brethren and his friends.

Since the foregoing was written we have received a copy of a letter addressed to the able and distinguished editor of the *New Orleans Catholic Standard*, by the Right Rev. Bishop of Natchez. The letter is written in a spirit of warm-hearted honesty that would entitle it at once to respect even were we unacquainted with the distinguished merits and the exalted position of the writer. The bishop thinks that we have done injustice to the clergy of the Diocese of Natchez and others, whom he justly holds in high esteem. As the best means of repairing any such injustice, we republish the bishop's letter in full, thereby giving to it the same circulation that was given to the article complained of.

"DEAR SIR:—The October number of *Brownson's Review* has called forth a good many strictures. But there is one point in it which seems to require a more positive and formal correction than can be given by the ordinary criticisms of the papers.

"It is only a few days since I got an opportunity to read the article entitled *Vocations to the Priesthood*. The intentions of the writer, as he declares in the conclusion, were, no doubt, excellent, and, in general, he has treated a most important subject in an interesting and truthful manner. If the initials do not mislead me, he is one whom I have long esteemed, and who, I believe, would not intentionally be guilty of wronging any one. But some of his remarks are certainly unjust in sentiment and incorrect in fact. I presume that in his own mind he limited their application to a small number of persons; but, unfortunately, the limitation is not expressed, and as the article reads, it contains a most offensive aspersion upon men to whom we owe all gratitude. I refer to pages 505, 506, and 507.

"Though probably the author did not intend it, yet the language clearly implies that, at the present time, only those ecclesiastics come from Europe to our country who can do no better, who are not fitted for home service! I happen to be in a position which in a particular manner enables me, and in common justice requires me, to render testimony against this statement. The Diocese of Natchez bears all over it both the evidences and the fruits of the contrary fact; that up to this present time, during these last few months, ecclesiastics have come from Europe to the United States who could have done vastly better, for comfort, for position, for pleasantness of occupation, and for the gratification of the most estimable feelings of the natural man, if they had listened to those natural feelings and remained in their native diocese; seminarians and priests so esteemed and loved by their bishop in Europe, that with great difficulty and

after great delays they obtained his consent; that he never loses sight of them, and is always ready to give them a fatherly reception and a home if they should honorably return from their missions.

"By such men has been done the most of whatever has been done for religion in this diocese; and such men are still laboring with all zeal to carry on the work. God forgive me if, after they have torn themselves from such bishops, and come four thousand miles to labor by my side, I should be silent when language is used which includes them with the few unfortunate objects whom, I suppose, the writer had in view.

"I know, too, that other dioceses have received such men in the last few years: perhaps many other dioceses.

"And, besides these especial cases, there are many clergymen coming to our country, under other circumstances, who are far from meriting to be included under the contemptuous language of the article—language which I do not like to transcribe, because it is painful to see these cant phrases used at all in connection with the sublime dignity of the sacred priesthood.

"If the writer knows some persons to whom he thinks his language applicable, I am happy to bear testimony again, that I know a great many who deserve all praise and gratitude; for they are an honor to the Church and a blessing to the country. And I believe that every bishop and almost every priest in the country could bear similar testimony.

"Even those who would have remained at home if they had found occupation or opportunity to prosecute their studies, are not, for this reason, to be little thought of. Of course it is a monstrous error to suppose that a man unfit for the sacred priesthood at home is good enough to make a missionary. But it is scarcely less monstrous to assume that, because a man could find no place at home, therefore he is unfit for the holy ministry.

"It has always been the case that some countries and some dioceses furnish a larger number of exemplary and efficient priests than they have need of at home. If some of these, to pursue their holy vocations, come over to help us in the labors for which we are unequal, are they to be despised only because they have left still better men behind them?

"Nor even should it be assumed that they are inferior to those who stay at home. There is such a thing as Vocation to the Missions, and God can, if he pleases, draw the best man to the most needy field, whether by inspiring him with a desire of going, or by arranging circumstances so as to lead or force him to it.

"No doubt, the number of efficient missionaries coming hither from Europe is diminishing. Not for want of revolutions and troubles to drive them out. If we read the Annals of the Propagation, we shall be inclined to believe that Europe is this day sending out missionaries of the highest abilities, and in greater numbers than

ever before. But now, as we are growing better able to form a native clergy, Providence seems to be attracting men of apostolic spirit chiefly to other countries less able to help themselves: chiefly, but not entirely; and happy is it for us that some still continue to give us the benefit of their zeal. We need yet more of them for the accomplishment of this very work of forming a native clergy. To establish new seminaries we want more priests; and these boys of twelve years will not be priests for twelve years more; meanwhile all our present missions must be attended to; and then priests are dying, and new missions opening every day.

"If some unfortunate persons come over here, only because they are deemed at home unfit for the sacred ministry, let us, in speaking of them, be careful to discriminate between their miserable case and the zeal of the truly apostolic men, of times not past but present, coming, not only from France and Ireland, but from Germany, Belgium, Italy, and other countries, and entitling themselves to praise and thanks which cannot be expressed in words. I have met none more earnestly desirous than they of forming a native clergy, none more ready to put themselves to real pains to accomplish it.

"Let us, on all occasions, show that we appreciate their labors, and are grateful for their generosity. Let us all unite our efforts and our hearts, and then we shall succeed in the work which the writer recommends.

"For in union there is strength, and in brotherly love there is God's blessing.

"Your humble servant in Christ,

"WILLIAM HENRY ELDER,

"*Bishop of Natchez.*

"Sulphur Springs, Mississippi, Nov. 10th, 1860."

We heartily concur in the merit claimed for foreign clergymen by our Right Reverend friend the Bishop of Natchez. We confess the immense debt of gratitude which this country owes them, and we stated as much in our article on "*Vocations to the Priesthood.*" We have urged the necessity of forming and training candidates to succeed them, but we assure the bishop that it is not because we have known any "unfortunate men" who came from other countries, or intended to make any reference to them. If there are, as he states, some unfortunate foreigners in this country, there may be, and there will be, no doubt, unfortunate Americans as well. We do not treat the question on the grounds of comparative personal or national virtue, piety, or merit. We have asked, Is it better to have priests for this mission who are educated especially for it, or priests who are edu-

coated for some other place ; priests who understand the ways of the country, or priests who do not understand them ; in short, priests who are every way fitted for the work to be done, or the reverse ? We earnestly desire that the decrees of the Councils of the Church be observed, only, of course, where it is practicable.

The bishop tells us that he knows dioceses where there are excellent priests who have come to them from across the ocean. We can assure him that we are acquainted with no diocese in the country that has not more or less excellent clergymen such as he describes. But we can also show him more than one diocese where there is great room for improvement in the nature of the preparations made to provide successors for its present clergy, and where means are not wanting to make such improvement. We beg to thank the bishop for what he says to encourage this work, so necessary to the progress of the Church, and we shall try to imitate the gravity and moderation of the language he uses in recommending it. We were wrong, perhaps, in using commercial phrases to illustrate our meaning when speaking of the clergy, but we live in a bustling, commercial community, and our neighbors use nothing but commercial and financial talk from morning till night. We have been wrongfully accused, however, of having stated that there were any "cheap priest factories" in Ireland. We know of no such places in Ireland, but, to our knowledge, the evil we complained of does exist where we placed it, namely, "on the continent of Europe." We used these words for the express purpose of showing that we did *not* mean to apply that paragraph to the Emerald Isle. We deny, too, that we used any disrespectful or unkind phrases in speaking of the students of All-Hallows College. We did not state that they wanted either learning or piety, but we merely said that they had wrong notions about this country, and lacked the ready activity that a man requires to be useful in this new world. We advocate the plan of sending young men from here to be educated at All-Hallows for the American mission. When we visited the institution in 1857, we freely expressed a preference for this plan, and were much gratified to find that the Superiors of All-Hallows College approved of our opinion. In conclusion, we are fully impressed with the truth of Bishop Elder's remark, that it is to the foreign clergy themselves that we must look for the enlightened zeal which will train for the priesthood youths born in this

country. They can address these youths in the words of St. Paul, "In Christo Jesu per Evangelium ego vos genui," and they will not fail, we hope, to feel a paternal interest in their spiritual children. Our chief encouragement in writing on the subject of vocations to the priesthood is the knowledge that many of the worthiest and noblest men among the clergy of the United States, though not natives of this country, approve of the movement which we are striving to defend.

J. W. C.

AET. V.—*An Essay on the Harmonious Relations between Divine Faith and Natural Reason; to which are added Two Chapters on the Divine Office of the Church.* By A. C. BAINE, Esq. Baltimore: Murphy & Co., 1861. 12mo, pp. 406.

JUDGE BAINE, we are told, is a distinguished jurist in California, and a convert from some form of Protestantism to our most holy faith. His work comes to us most cordially recommended by the Archbishop of San Francisco, and with the approbation of the Archbishop of Baltimore, Primate of the Church of the United States. It is an able work, written in a free, popular style, unincumbered by legal, philosophical, or theological technicalities and refinements, addressed to the plain common sense of non-Catholics. The author devotes, as his Grace of San Francisco well remarks, "his logical mind to prove, that the Catholic Church is, as she was, the TEACHER, vested with God's commission to impart Christian revelation. This is done in a style rather new, yet forcible; familiar, yet conclusive."

The design of the author is to exhibit the harmonious relations between Faith and Reason,—or rather, to show that the claim of the Church to teach a supernatural revelation with infallible authority is, supposing such a revelation made and committed to her to be taught, in perfect accordance with reason, and in no sense contravenes the rights of reason, or encroaches on its domain. The whole book is substantially devoted to the development and establishment of this thesis. We cannot say that the author's method of developing and sustaining this thesis is always strictly scientific or rigidly logical, but no honest man can read and understand his argument as a whole, without being convinced that it can-

not be successfully controverted. The author is not a learned theologian, nor a profound metaphysician, and he is too diffuse, declamatory, and inexact as a writer to satisfy our fastidious taste and habits of mind, but his work will probably be none the less popular or useful on that account. It is not wholly out of the reach of non-Catholics, and it gives them Catholic thoughts in their own tongue, after their own manner, and is more likely to get the truth intelligibly before them than if it were more rigidly exact in its exposition, and strictly scientific in its method. Non-Catholics are exceedingly averse in religious matters from precise statements and exact definitions; and in some measure require an argument to be conducted in a loose, vague, and popular manner, in order to be favorably affected by it. They set their faces against an argument which crushes them from first to last, which leaves them no respite from their torture, and if we would convince them, we must take care not to be too conclusive, so as to give them room to retain a little respect for their own understandings, and to display, in yielding to us, a little generosity. We must give them opportunity to say, in yielding, "We yield not to your arguments, which, upon the whole, are weak, but to the truth, which we see very clearly is on your side."

Judge Baine is, as far as we have discovered, orthodox in his real, honest meaning, but some of his expressions betray a want of familiarity with several important theological questions. Indeed, he uses, from first to last, a line of argument, not peculiar to him, which, rigidly taken, tends rather to shake than to confirm his thesis. His purpose is to show that the method of the Church,—teaching a supernatural revelation by infallible authority,—is in strict accordance with the dictates of reason and common sense. He seeks to do this by showing the incompetency of reason, maintaining that its office is to submit to authority without presuming to form any judgment in the case, which is not showing the harmony between the methods of authority and reason, but placing them in direct antagonism. He furthermore has the appearance of founding the necessity of divine revelation on the fact of the primitive Fall, whereas without divine revelation we could not even assert the fact of the Fall. "The capacities of the human mind," he says (p. 15), "had become so enfeebled by the original disobedience, and the accumulations of error consequent upon the primal crime, that it could not have sustained, or even have embraced, revealed

truth without supernatural aid." Could the human mind have done it before the "primal crime"? The natural powers of the human mind were no more adequate to the discovery, acceptance, and retention of supernatural truth before original disobedience than they have been since. Man did not, as Luther and Calvin teach, lose by the Fall his natural spiritual faculties, and so become incapable of understanding truth or willing good. The justice or righteousness in which man was constituted before his disobedience, was by supernatural grace no less than the justice to which he is now elevated by the Sacrament of Regeneration. After the Fall, man needed what he did not need before, namely, medicinal grace,—but the grace that reveals supernatural truth, and the grace that elevates man to the plane of that truth, and enables him to believe and conform to it, were as necessary before as after the Fall. The necessity of a revelation of the supernatural, or the necessity of an infallible authority to teach it after it is made, cannot be based on any loss or enfeeblement of our powers by original disobedience or its consequences. The necessity of either cannot be known or conceived till the revelation itself is made, because natural reason in its best estate has of itself alone no conception, anticipation, or *prolepsis* of a supernatural order. But we let the author speak further on this point for himself:

"At the institution of the Church she taught the *supernatural* facts of divine revelation, and denounced judgment upon those who refused to believe, without regard to the plea that reason gave them no evidence of the faith propounded for their acceptance and practice. What the Church did at her institution, she does yet. She makes no war upon reason, but she sternly rebukes reason when it invades the province of faith. The holy Catholic Church knows, and so instructs the world, that natural reason cannot weigh and measure the facts of divine revelation by her feeble, limited, and ruined capacity. The mysteries of divine revelation are not to be annulled because *puny reason* cannot unravel them and weave them into harmony with her philosophy. These mysteries are the foundation of the Church which was to 'teach all nations' whatsoever Christ *had* commanded her, *before* his ascension; and the Church received the Holy Ghost to bring to her remembrance all the things which *had* been commanded, and to guide her into all truth, and this Spirit was promised to abide with her for ever. It is obvious that none of these things are on a level with natural reason. It is equally obvious that reason could not perpetuate them any more than she

could invent or originate them, nor could any other power of the human soul. If any could, the Holy Ghost would not have been given as a perpetual remembrancer and guide into all truth. If reason could have perpetuated the infallible truth revealed to the Church, the supernatural power of the Holy Ghost to be her remembrancer and guide in addition to reason, would not have been required or given. Reason may safely affirm that God would do neither a vain nor an unnecessary thing to perpetuate the divine truth committed to his apostolic Church to teach to all nations to the end of the world. So that we conclude, upon the most certain principle of reason herself, that she was not only inadequate to originate or invent the divine truths of revelation, but, also, that she had no capacity to perpetuate them in their original purity and integrity, or else the Holy Ghost had not been given for this special purpose. Let reason now be put to the rack and interrogated under torture, and she will tell you that she is not equal to all or any of this scheme of divine faith and mystery. What then did our Saviour command his apostolic Church to teach? Those who protest against the teaching of the Church, and who make their canon of reason supreme and contradictory to divine faith, *must believe that this Church was restricted to teaching a system strictly in accordance and agreement with, and not of a superior order to, the system of natural and mental philosophy to which they adhere, when they protest against the teaching of the Church, because, as they allege, she teaches for a revelation from God facts which are contrary to their reason.*

“Is this not the analysis, the fact of their creed? We appeal to them, with all the fraternity of our nature, to examine the fact, and the principle of their position in relation to the divine faith the Church has always and now teaches. Approach with us the examination of the principle, with the utmost candor and most perfect good-will. The truth of God is not a matter for hot blood and disingenuous prevarication. Its investigation demands the sincerest honesty, the utmost simplicity, and the purest regard for those with whom we investigate its teachings. Then let us repeat the substance of the statement, and let it be examined in the spirit we invoke for its investigation. We say, then, that those who protest against the teaching by the Church of the faith revealed to her, *because it is contrary to their reason, must maintain the principle (however covertly it has insinuated itself among, and however secretly it has concealed itself with, the foundations of their doctrines), that the apostolic Church was restricted to teaching a revelation from God, so as to make the revealed truth accord, agree with, and not go above, or out of the rationale of the systems of natural or mental philosophy to which they adhere, as being the principles of right reason, and to which, in their judgment, human faith must conform, in the divine order as well as in the natural order.*”—pp 23-27.

What the author means by all this, may be very sound and very just, but he evidently does not mean precisely what he says, otherwise he would never have spoken in the title of his book of the "harmonious," but rather of the "discordant" relations between faith and reason. We have the right to assume beforehand that divine revelation, if made, and reason must be in perfect accord with one another. Thus the Holy See, in the first of the four articles required to be signed by the Traditionalists defines: "Et si fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen vera dissensio, nullum dissidium inter ipsas inveniri unquam, cum ambæ ab uno, eodemque immutabili veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriantur, atque ita sibi mutuam opem ferant." "Although faith is *above* reason, there can never be any *dissension* or *disagreement* between it and reason, since both have their origin in one and the same immutable source of truth, Almighty God, and mutually assist each other." It is as important to assert the mutual accord of faith and reason as it is to assert that the former is above the latter. It is necessary that a divine revelation, although above reason, should agree or accord with reason, because God cannot be in contradiction with himself. He may teach us in revelation what he does not teach us in reason, but nothing contradictory to reason; for it is a maxim in theology that grace supposes nature,—*gratia supponit naturam*,—therefore, revelation or faith supposes reason. If you bring as the revelation of God what really is contradictory to reason, I have the right, and it is my duty to reject it as an imposition. We say, then, the Church is necessarily restricted to teach as the revelation of God what perfectly *accords* with reason, though not to what does not transcend or rise *above* reason. What the author means to deny, is the assumption that the Church can teach as revelation only what is on a level with reason, and within its comprehension, and that we have no right to reject any thing she teaches on the ground that it contradicts or does not accord with our own developments of reason, or systems of natural or intellectual philosophy, which is certainly true. His thought is just; only his expression is not felicitous.

Still the extract, and others we might make, show that the author has not wholly escaped the tendency to disparage reason, in order the better to prove the necessity of revelation,—the tendency to make reason commit suicide in order to get a good reason for asserting authority. The author's

rhetoric is better than his logic, and he must permit us to tell him, that the ordinary method of abasing the natural in order to be able to conclude the necessity of the supernatural, is far more specious than solid, and is founded on what we regard as unsound theology. It makes reason commit suicide. The method is well hit off in Gordon and Trenchard's *Independent Whig*, which, speaking of a certain class of persons, says: "They reason against reason, use reason against the use of reason, and sometimes give a very good reason why reason should not be used." What have you in your method of arguing but reason with which to prove the worthlessness of reason? If reason is worthless, why take her own worthlessness on her own word? A confirmed liar is no more to be believed when he tells you he lies, than when he tells you he speaks the truth. The method answers well for rhetoric, but not for logic. What can be more absurd than to begin by knocking reason in the head, and then galvanizing it into life, in order to prove that to accept the method of authority is the most reasonable thing in the world? If the method of authority is reasonable,—if it accords with reason, and is such as reason accepts, which we hold to be the fact,—why begin by disparaging reason, representing it as feeble, puny, impotent, so as to render its acceptance of authority worth as little as possible? The higher the dignity and truthfulness of reason, the more valuable is its acceptance of authority. But if the method does not accord with reason, if it is only the ruin of reason by the Fall that renders necessary the authority, and if the method can be adopted only in the absence or in the destruction of reason, why talk of the harmonious relations between faith and reason?

The author means right, and is laboring to bring out and establish the truth, but he operates on Calvinistic or Jansenistic, rather than on Catholic premises. The necessity of supernatural revelation, or of grace to embrace and sustain supernatural revelation, does in no sense depend on the Fall of Man, as we have already seen, nor does it grow out of the natural weakness or impotence of reason in its own order. If we had been originally intended for a natural destiny, and if we had been left to that destiny, reason would have sufficed, and we could have had no conception of its impotence or feebleness, for it would have been in proportion to our destiny. Man's natural reason is propor-

tioned to man's natural destiny. But our Maker having designed us for a supernal destiny, it is evident that, however exalted or strong he might have created natural reason, between it and a supernatural end there could be no proportion. It is not to natural beatitude, but to supernatural beatitude that natural reason is disproportioned, and to that it must always be disproportioned, for there is, and can be no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, since they are of different orders. The supernatural is not merely the super-sensible, or the super-intelligible, nor is it connected with the super-intelligible by the faculty of super-intelligence, as Gioberti seems to teach. The supernatural is a new creation, or regeneration, which presupposes the primitive creation or the order of genesis. In the latter reason, in the former, during our pilgrimage, faith is our principle of life.

The harmonious relation between divine faith and natural reason is the harmonious relation between these two orders. The new creation does not destroy or supersede the old; regeneration does not deny or supersede generation, but supposes it, and therefore necessarily accords with it. Faith and reason accord, for though it requires something more than reason to elicit an act of divine or Catholic faith, yet there is, and can be, no act of faith of any sort, without the assent of reason. Faith, *ex parte subjecti*, is in the intellect as its subject, *tantum in subjecto*, as St. Thomas teaches, and therefore cannot be discordant with reason, or require the suppression, or the abeyance of reason. Faith demands, and can demand, no *blind* submission; reason submits to authority, indeed, but only on conviction, only with its eyes open, because, convinced that the proposition to which its assent is demanded is true. There are two ways in which reason may be convinced—the one mediate, the other immediate. It is convinced immediately, when it apprehends the intrinsic truth or evidence of the proposition; mediately, when the proposition is presented by an authority which it knows can neither deceive nor be deceived. Convince a man that God has given the Church full authority to teach and define the revelation he has made and committed to her, and you convince him that whatever she teaches or defines to be God's revelation is his revelation. If God's revelation, he is convinced that it is true, for he knows that God is truth itself, and therefore can neither deceive nor be deceived. He believes the truth of the revelation on the ve-

racity of God ; he believes that the revelation is God's revelation on the authority of the Church ; and he believes the authority of the Church on the evidence that convinces him God has authorized or commissioned her to keep, teach, and define his revelation.

Now, the conviction of reason is as real in this process as in the case of immediate evidence, or in the case of strict logical demonstration. Reason, in both cases, submits, but in both cases its submission is an intellectual assent, and is precisely of the same nature in assenting to the Mystery of the Trinity or the Mystery of the Incarnation, as in assenting to the proposition, two and two make four. This is precisely what the author wishes to establish. He wishes to establish, that belief or assent on the authority of the Church, divinely commissioned to teach, is in accordance with reason, and is, therefore, not a blind, unintellectual act, but a truly reasonable act. What need, then, of incumbering the question with declamations about the feebleness or insufficiency of reason. Reason is sufficient for all that is asked of reason—to do all that is necessary in the case of a reasonable being it should do. There is more in the act of faith, as a theological virtue, than reason ; but there is no less than reason, and reason is no less in that act than in any other act it performs. Indeed, if it comes to that, there is more of reason in eliciting the act of faith than in any other act of reason. It is reason's greatest, highest, noblest act, and we know no other that so fully demonstrates the greatness and dignity of human reason.

What it is of the greatest importance to establish in these days of little science and no faith, is the dignity and authority of reason. We know the age is regarded as rationalistic, but its real malady is its doubt of reason. It dares not trust reason when it asserts the authority of the Church of God, and escapes assent by taking refuge in skepticism. It is this doubt of reason more than rationalism that the leading Catholic writers of our day feel it necessary to combat. They feel it necessary to restore men to reason as the condition of elevating them to faith in the supernatural revelation of God. We should, then, it seems to us, be on our guard against speaking disparagingly of reason, or of giving the slightest encouragement to the Calvinistic and Jansenistic, and, we may add, Traditionalistic error of founding faith on skepticism. All we wish to impress on rationalists is, that our faith does not supersede our reason any more

than the supernatural supersedes the natural. We would have them understand that we have not merely in divine revelation a something which they have not, but that we have all they have, and divine revelation to boot. Have they reason? So have we, and as much reason, as good, as cultivated, and as free a reason as they. At the very lowest we have all they have at the very highest, and at worst are as well off as they can be at best. Here is why we do not allow ourselves to speak disparagingly of reason, or to represent faith as demanding the submission, as distinguished from the conviction, of reason.

The point Judge Baine makes is a good one, only we do not quite like the way in which he puts it. The great principle he contends for, no man, who professes to believe in revelation at all, really questions, or can question. The so-called orthodox Protestant asserts it as strongly as does the Catholic. The controversy between him and us does not turn on the principle of authority. He holds that principle as well as we. He holds, as well as we, that a supernatural revelation can be taught only by a supernatural authority, and he holds that this supernatural authority is and must be infallible. He is as strenuous as we in asserting infallible authority. The question between him and us is, not as to the necessity of authority, but as to what and where is this authority. He says it is in the written word and the interior guidance of the Holy Spirit, and nowhere else. We hold all he asserts, but do not concede his denial. We hold the written word to be infallible, and we hold as firmly to the interior light and guidance of the Holy Ghost as he does; but we hold, that we have also the living apostolic authority in the Church, the same infallible apostolic authority which was established in the beginning. We have all he has at best, and something more; and at the very worst are as well off as he at the very best. The only question to be debated between him and us is, as to the continuance of the infallible apostolic authority in the Church. Here, again, he has to meet all the difficulties in the way of asserting such authority that we have to meet, for he holds that it was once in the Church, and in our Church, too, since he concedes that ours was once the true Church. Holding there was once such authority in our Church, it is for him to prove that it has ceased to exist, and no longer continues.

It is a curious fact that the *soi-disant* orthodox Protestant

reasons against us Catholics with apparent unconsciousness that every objection he brings against faith by infallible authority, bears equally against his professed rule of faith,—the infallible authority of the written word. If the authority of the Church is incompatible with the rights of reason, how can the authority of the written word, of a book, be less so? He, as well as we, has to meet all the objections of the rationalist, the interior-light men, or Quakers, and skeptics, and he has far less with which to meet them, for while he has all the disadvantages of the principle of authority to overcome, he has none of its advantages to offer. Of all men in the world he is the most unreasonable; for, as to the Bible, he has to meet all the objections, in order to assert its authority, that we have to meet in order to assert the authority of the Church, and when he has asserted it, it avails him nothing, since it speaks only as he gives it a tongue. A very large portion of the Protestant world see this, and tell him he would be far more consistent and logical if he would go back to Mother Church; and, unwilling to occupy his position, they turn liberal Christians, and embrace a Christianity which each one makes for himself, in his own image and likeness. These are farther removed from the supernatural than he is, but they are more true to the natural, though they should never call themselves Christians.

Either Christianity lies in the supernatural order, the order of regeneration, or it does not. If it does, then it is evident it can be known only through the medium of a supernatural revelation, for natural reason, by the very force of the term, cannot go out of the order of nature. The confusion in semi-rationalistic minds on this subject is, that while they concede a supernatural revelation has been made, they forget that the matter or truth revealed is also supernatural. God, they admit, has in a supernatural manner made known to us certain things which we should,—perhaps could,—never have found out by our natural reason, nevertheless, things which lie in the order of nature, and therefore in their own nature and character are in the same order with reason, and in no sense supernatural. Assuming this, they are perfectly consistent and perfectly just in assuming that the things revealed, when revealed, are on a level with reason, and as much within the jurisdiction of reason as any thing else within the natural order. This is wherefore they claim for reason the right to judge not merely of the proofs of the

revelation or the credentials of the teacher, but also of the intrinsic truth of the matter revealed. Hence, as reason judges the matter revealed, no special authority, after the revelation, to teach and interpret it is necessary. Reason itself, common to all men, suffices for that. Their reasoning on their own premises is just enough, and from reason alone you cannot refute them. It is no use now of talking to them of the weakness or aberrations of reason, for reason here is no weaker or more liable to error than elsewhere; and if it suffices in other matters, it must suffice in these. Nor will it be of any use here to speak of the arrogance or presumption of reason in pretending to judge the revelation; for there is, on the supposition, no more arrogance or presumption than in judging the facts of natural science.

The author has hardly done justice to this class of non-Catholics, for in his argumentation with them, he assumes, or takes for granted, what it is necessary to prove. He assumes, not proves, that a revelation, if made, must contain mysteries above the reach of reason. Yet he should remember that in the Christian revelation is contained the revelation of the natural law, not as St. Thomas teaches us, because the *élite* of the race could not know it without a revelation, but because the simple and uncultivated could not easily, if at all, come to a knowledge of it. Before you can refute them you must prove to them that the revelation is not the simple revelation or reproduction of the natural law, but the revelation, also, of a supernatural order of life and truth unknown and unsuspected by reason, and therefore an order cognizable in our present life, by faith only, not by science. There is no necessity of proving that, supposing God reveals such an order, a living infallible authority is necessary to teach it, for that follows as a necessary consequence, and very few, if any of the class of persons we speak of would deny it. The usual argument of Catholics on this point has always struck us as defective when urged against those who deny that there are any mysteries in religion, or that the revelation, though supernaturally made, reveals any things supernatural. The argument is good only against those who admit a revelation of the supernatural, for the supernatural is a mystery to natural reason, as lying out of its order, and known only as taught. To all others it is necessary to begin by proving the fact of the apostolic commission, or the divine commission of the Church to teach all men and nations, the revelation God has made.

The divine commission carries with it the pledge of infallibility in all matters covered by it, for God, who is truth itself, cannot authorize, directly or indirectly, the teaching of error. The fact of the commission may be proved either by taking the body claiming to have received it, for there is only one claimant, and showing that its claim has been steadily made from the present back to the very time of the Apostles; or in the usual way in which we prove the authority of the Scriptures. In proving the authority of the Scriptures, we must necessarily prove the apostolic commission, as the voucher for this authority. It is then easy from the Scriptures themselves to prove that the commission was not simply a personal commission to the Apostles, but to an apostolic body, which was to remain until the consummation of the world. Either method is logical and conclusive. The authority to teach vindicates itself anew to reason the moment it begins to teach, for then it discloses mysteries which reason at once concedes demand a teaching authority.

Having shown that the method of authority is reasonable, in accordance with what reason demands in case the supernatural is to be taught and believed, and farther shown that the authority is competent and infallible, since commissioned by God himself, reason herself is convinced that whatever authority teaches as divine revelation, is such revelation, and therefore true, since the word of God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. The whole process is in harmony with reason, and the act of faith is a reasonable act. All this the jurist proves in reality, but not without some little defect of method, logical distinctness, and scientific development.

There is one other sense, not distinctly drawn out by the author, in which there must be a "harmonious relation" between revelation and reason, and in which reason has the right to sit in judgment not on what is proved to be revelation, but on what is proposed as revelation. Grace supposes nature, faith supposes reason; and the Holy See tells us that, although faith is above reason, there is no dissension or discord between them.* Consequently any thing proposed as revela-

* We cite here the four articles which the Holy See required Mr. Bonnetty and his friends to subscribe. We cited them at length in the Essay on Rationalism and Traditionalism in our Review for last October. In the third, it is said, "*Rationis usus fidem præcedit, et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit*," as we defended in the Essay. Our good friend in the *Dublin Weekly Telegraph* gravely accuses us, in consequence, of giving reason the precedence

tion, clearly and unequivocally contradictory to reason, we have the right, without further inquiry, to reject. God cannot teach one thing in reason and its contradictory in faith, and the Holy See has condemned the proposition that what is theologically true can be philosophically false, or what is philosophically false can be theologically true. This negative authority reason undoubtedly has even in regard to what is proposed as revelation. We do not understand Judge Baine to deny it; but he denies, and very properly, our right to take our systems of philosophy as the measure of reason, and to reject, as contradicting reason, whatever contradicts them.

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

We have no right to say a thing cannot be true because it contradicts our opinions or is not reconcilable with our theories, for it may still turn out that our opinions are erroneous and our systems false. Some years ago, Catholicity was said to be false because it was unfavorable to the rights of kings; it is now argued that it cannot be true because opposed to rights of the people. At one time men argue that she is false because repugnant to nature; at another, because she is not repugnant to our corrupt nature. Nothing of this sort is admissible. It is nothing that we merely regard as reasonable that can invalidate the claims of revelation. An alleged revelation that contradicts an evident principle of reason, that teaches that of contradictories, both may be true, that God is a malignant being, is changeable, untruthful, the author of sin, decreeing that men shall sin necessarily that he may damn them justly, that hatred and revenge are virtues, and the unbridled indulgence of the lusts of the human heart is sanctity, pleasing to God and entitled to a reward, we pronounce beforehand to be no revelation from God, and we make no inquiry as to the authority on which it is taught, for we know, *a priori*, that it cannot be a divine authority. But, unless it contradict some well-known and undeniable principle of reason, natural truth, justice, or

of faith: that is, of placing reason above faith! Does our friend understand Latin? or does he mean to deny that the *us* of reason precedes faith, and thus give the lie to the Congregation of the *Index*? We can assure him that the opinion he charges us with maintaining is not ours, nor authorized by any thing to be found in our *Review*.

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morality, we cannot decide against it without examination. But reason can conclude nothing against a supernatural proposition merely because it is unable to see its truth.

But in the case of the teaching of the Church there is never occasion to apply this negative test. We believe the Church only because we have all the proof reason demands that she is divinely commissioned and assisted to teach the revelation God has made to man. We know she cannot err in teaching his revelation, because we know he has authorized her to teach, and cannot authorize the teaching of error, as he would do if she could err as to his word. We have, for the infallibility of the Church in regard to faith and morals, the endorsement, so to speak, of Almighty God, and that is security good enough for any reasonable man. We know, then, that whatever she teaches is truth, and truth without mixture of error; consequently, it never comes into our heads for our own sakes, for the satisfaction of our own minds, to institute any inquiry as to the fact whether what she teaches agrees with natural reason or not, for we know, *a priori*, that it cannot disagree with it. Whenever we institute the inquiry, it is to remove the difficulties of those who, in the name of reason, object to her teaching, or else to increase our admiration of the Divine Wisdom by obtaining a more lively sense of the harmony of all the Creator's works.

For our own part, we dwelt at length on the necessity and proofs of authority in the earlier volumes of our *Review*, and said all that we feel it necessary to say on that head. Latterly, we have been more intent on showing the compatibility of authority with liberty, and the concord between nature and grace. We alienate in our age many minds from the Church, as well as fail to recall those who have gone astray, if we present them the Church only under the aspect of authority, and simply demand, in her name, unquestioning obedience. The Church reasons, persuades, and resorts to her authority to command only when all other means fail; not that she distrusts her authority, or concedes to reason the right to dispute it, but because she is forbidden to lord it over God's heritage, and because she seeks for God a willing obedience. We do her great injustice when we represent her only as stern and inflexible authority, saying in imperative tones, "Believe or be damned," although it is certainly true that he that believeth not will be damned. We have felt that, having vindicated the authority of the Church, proved her ability to teach and to govern all men

and nations in all things spiritual, we could not better serve her interests than by showing that her authority by no means abridges our natural liberty or supersedes the necessity of the exercise of our natural reason. Outside of the Church, men are driven by the false supernaturalism of Calvinists and Evangelicals to rationalism and naturalism, while non-Catholics, who do not profess to be orthodox Protestants, very generally suppose that false supernaturalism is precisely what the Church herself teaches. We have believed we could render no better service to religion than to do our best to correct this injurious impression. We have labored for several years, not so much to establish the divinity as the humanity of the Church: in other words, to prove, not so much that our Lord is God as that he is God made man, the Word made flesh, that he is perfect man as well as perfect God. In doing this, we have had not only false supernaturalism, which demolishes nature to make way for grace, outside of the Church, but not a few Jansenistic tendencies among our own friends, to combat, which has led some to suppose we were turning our arms against Catholics instead of the common enemy. We leave it to time to write our vindication. We believe that what is now wanted by the non-Catholic world is not arguments in proof of our religion, but explanations which disabuse non-Catholics of their prejudices against the Church and her doctrines—explanations that shall enable them to see clearly how much of what offends them belongs to Catholic tradition, how much to the traditions of Catholics, which is not of faith, and how much to the invention of the enemies of the Church. To this end Judge Baine's work has been intended by the author to contribute, and no doubt will contribute much. His book is not adapted to all classes of minds; but there is a large class to which it is adapted, and it will sweep away a mass of prejudice from the minds of most non-Catholics who will read it.

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. In the *Review* last October, we made some remarks on *The History of the Protestant Reformation*, by M. J. Spalding, D. D., the highly distinguished Bishop of Louisville, and offered, *apropos* of it, some suggestions as to the sort of history of that disastrous event we should ourselves like to see written. Our remarks and suggestions seem not to have met the approbation of the Right Reverend author, and we find the following review of the reviewer in the *Louisville Guardian*,—a review written, we are assured, by the bishop himself. Presuming him to be the writer, we, out of our profound respect to him as a prelate, our high appreciation of his merits as an author, and our gratitude to him as a friend, transfer it entire to our pages, without other comment than to request all our readers to buy the bishop's valuable and interesting History, read it carefully and critically, and decide for themselves whether our criticisms are well founded or not. It will give us great pleasure to find that we were in the wrong.

"In his notice of Bishop Spalding's History of the Protestant Reformation, Dr. Brownson makes some remarks, upon which we shall offer a few brief comments, but we trust in no unfriendly spirit. We have not been in the number of those who have been denounced by our eminent publicist as having dealt with unnecessary severity in his regard; but we have rather sought to excuse his eccentricities in our admiration for his genius and boldness. What we will now say will be simply in the interests of historic truth and justice.

"The reviewer characterizes the bishop's History of the Reformation as 'a new, revised, and much-enlarged edition of Essays and Reviews which he had previously published.' This is scarcely correct. About two-thirds of the present publication, including the entire second volume and about one-third of the first, are entirely new, while the original Review or Essay (not Essays and Reviews,) has been to a certain extent remodelled.

"The reviewer blames the bishop for dwelling too much on the wickedness of the men who brought about the Reformation, and he alleges that 'Francis I., of France, was not surpassed, if equalled, in dissoluteness and real depravity by any German prince who sustained Luther or Calvin.' Allow this to have been the case, what does it prove? Francis I. propounded no new creed, and set himself up as the champion of no new reformation, in the name of God, whereas, Luther, Calvin, and the other reformers, did give themselves forth as men divinely called to reform the Church of God, and to inaugurate a new order of things. This makes all the difference in the two cases; as we naturally may look for common decency, if not for superior sanctity, in those who set themselves up as the apostles of a new religion—a reformation of the old, believed to have been divinely inspired, but to have decayed. The bishop clearly stated and sufficiently unfolded this principle in the very first

chapter of his first volume, in which he treated of the character of the pretended reformers.

"The reviewer had not certainly read the work, or even glanced over its sufficiently comprehensive table of contents, else he would not have censured the author for dwelling too much on the depravity of the reformers. The fact is, that the author of the work devotes but a portion of a single chapter to the development of this argument. The body of the work is devoted to unfolding the causes and manner of the Reformation, and its influence on religion, on morals, on liberty, on literature, and on general civilization. This will be apparent to any one who will but glance over the pages of the work, the scope of which is to discuss, chiefly on Protestant authority, the whole subject of the Reformation, in all its length and breadth, and in its various influences on society.

"It is not true, as the reviewer would seem to imply, that the author 'ascribed the Reformation in Germany to the rivalry of the Augustinians and Dominicans, and to the rapacity of the princes and nobles, bent on grasping the temporalities of the Church, and in England, to the refusal of the Pope to grant Henry VIII. a divorce from his wife.' These motives are, indeed, assigned, the first only incidentally, and the other two more at length; but they are not insisted on as the only adequate causes of the movement. The author takes a much wider view. They are alleged, along with other causes which, combined with them, present an 'adequate' explanation of the rapidity with which the Reformation extended over a large portion of Europe.

"The reviewer wholly ignores the two lengthy historical Introductions, in which the religious history of Europe and of England, preliminary to the Reformation, is summarily glanced at, with a view to explain how it was that the way was prepared for the movement throughout Europe, and how the rapidity with which it succeeded may be sufficiently accounted for. Yet this is an important, if not an essential element of the publication, which should not have been passed over lightly, much less left wholly unnoticed. This preliminary history, together with the various proximate causes and agencies which were brought to bear at the time upon the Reformation, may be said to contain much of that 'deeper history and philosophy' of the movement, which the reviewer laments that the author did not think it necessary to furnish. If there be any 'deeper philosophy' of the Protestant Reformation than that which is based upon the facts of history, we are wholly ignorant of its existence. Speculation, no matter how elaborate and philosophical, without a solid basis of facts to rest on, is, in our view, wholly worthless, if not mischievous, in a historical writer, as it can scarcely fail to mislead. For this reason, we do not suppose the author will comply with the reviewer's wish for him to publish a new volume.

"In this connection, we beg to call the reviewer's attention especially to the Introduction to the second volume, in which, if we are not much mistaken, he will find the explanation of the causes which led to the success of the Anglican Reformation, very similar to that furnished by himself in an article on the subject. If he be in the habit of previously reading what he reviews, he can scarcely doubt the accuracy of this remark.

"The reviewer refers to the objection made by Dr. Nevin and others, based on the fact that men so wicked as the reformers are represented to have been, should have been reared up in the bosom of the Catholic

Church, which they are inclined to hold responsible for their depravity. This is scarcely a more valid objection than that which would hold Christ responsible for the treason of Judas! The bishop referred to this very objection in the first chapter, first volume, of the History, the scope of which is to show that Martin Luther was a passably good man while in the Church, but that he changed greatly for the worse after his apostasy. The Church is surely not fairly responsible for the wickedness of men whom she condemns and excludes from her communion. A mother is not responsible for her rebellious children whom she loved and sought to correct.

"The reviewer thinks that Dr. Forbes struck the 'key-note' of Protestant opposition to the Catholic Church, when he alleged that the Church deprived man of his natural liberty; and he expresses a wish that the bishop had taken up this point and answered it to the satisfaction of the Protestant caviller. Had Dr. Brownson taken the trouble to read the work, or even to glance over its table of contents, he would have been spared the trouble of making this remark. The author treats this very subject at considerable length, devoting four or five long chapters to its elucidation. We refer to the chapters in the first volume, on the influence of the Reformation on doctrinal belief, on civil and religious liberty, on literature, and on general civilization. We refer also to the second volume, in which this very view of the Reformation is a prominent element. The author proves, by Protestant authority which cannot be gainsaid, that in every country in Europe the Protestant Reformation, instead of advancing, retarded the progress of liberty, both civil and religious, and thwarted sound civilization; that, in fact, it crushed out rational liberty everywhere, and substituted therefor an unmitigated despotism, with union of Church and state, and this in the name of that very liberty of which it was so loudly boasting! All this he proves by cumulative evidence. We do not know, indeed, what he could have added on this very subject, which is the one most prominently treated of in the History, and most insisted on.

"In conclusion, we beg to say, that we are great admirers of the ability with which Dr. Brownson writes, of his boldness in maintaining his positions, and of his sincerity, which we shall not willingly doubt. But we fear, from the whole tenor of his last number, that something must have recently occurred to sour his temperament and to disturb his orthodoxy. We confess to a feeling of sadness in perusing several of his articles, especially that most inopportune one—to say the least—on the Rights of the Temporal. While claiming freedom of thought and discussion for himself, within the strict limits of orthodoxy, he should not be so hard on those who venture to differ from him, and he should not allude with so much feeling to the 'quarterly onslaughts' on his Review. So great an advocate of freedom himself, he should surely allow something of it to others. He is not certainly, and does not claim to be infallible, and he may be, and we believe is, sometimes wrong in his premises and in his conclusions, though honestly wrong. Why may not others attempt to set him right when they honestly consider him wrong? Keeping within the boundaries of the faith, strictly construed, he yet often indulges in speculations which grate harshly on Catholic minds and hearts. He has a knack of stumbling on the most delicate and inopportune subjects, and of treating them as a surgeon, knife in hand, treats the unfortunate *subject* who falls into his power. Can he be surprised if,

under **such** circumstances, he sometimes provokes opposition, and even his **adversaries** do not always observe the rules of moderation and Christian **courtesy**?

"He should not be so impatient of contradiction. He should take as he gives. He is but the child of the Church, not a divinely-commissioned teacher. His statements and reasonings are worth just as much **as** they logically amount to—neither more nor less. We could scarcely expect of one who had been so long following implicitly the **rush-light** of human reason to bend at once, and without reluctance, to the **teachings** of faith, and to enter into all the feelings of a simple child of the Church, reared up under her teachings, and imbued, through his **mother's** milk, or rather through the holy laver of baptism received in **infancy**, with the docile spirit of a true child of the Church; but what we have a right to expect of him is a little more humility."

We may add, that the last two paragraphs of the article contain some remarks not precisely in our own style nor to our own taste; but we presume the writer thought them richly merited, and likely to make us behave ourselves better in future. There is, no doubt, room for a difference of opinion between him and us, and we hope while we leave him to his opinion he will leave us to ours. We do not recollect that the elder brother, in the parable of the Prodigal Son, was commended for being angry at the reception the returning prodigal received from his father. We shall, at our earliest leisure, re-examine the bishop's History, and if we find that we have really done him injustice, we shall cheerfully and promptly acknowledge it.

2. Messrs. Murphy & Co., Baltimore, have sent us *The Papal Sovereignty: Viewed in its Relation to the Catholic Religion, and to the Law of Europe*. From the French of Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans. 16mo., pp. 468. 1860. Mgr. Dupanloup is one of the most distinguished prelates, and, indeed, one of the first men in France, and we regret that his work on the Papal Sovereignty did not reach us before the article on the Separation of Church and State was written and in the hands of the printer, for our space is now too limited to enable us to give it the full and extended notice its importance and ability demand. We can only say that it is a triumphant vindication of the temporal rights of the Holy See, and a most eloquent and masterly appeal to the Catholic sentiment of the world against the arts and intrigues, the fraud and violence by which the Holy Father has been deprived of his temporal principality. If any one doubts that foul wrong has been done to the sovereign of the Roman States, let him read and ponder the facts set forth in the volume before us. Nevertheless, the venerable and illustrious prelate, we hope, will permit us to say without offence, that, while we accept his appeal as just, we believe it comes too late, and will fail of its purpose.

3. Messrs. Kelly, Hedian, & Piet have sent us the concluding volume of Archbishop Kenrick's Revised Edition of the Douay

Version of the Holy Scriptures, with Notes Critical and Explanatory. The work is now complete, and is a monument to the learning and industry of its Most Reverend author that will endure. The more we examine it, the better are we pleased with it; and we think it richly deserves to supersede the Douay version as revised by the excellent Bishop Challoner now in common use.

* * W. J. B. develops and defends his views of Catholic Education in the present number. This article closes the discussion of the subject in our pages, unless a reply on the part of the colleges is sent in. A well-written reply will be admitted. After that the subject must be dropped for the present.

J. W. C. concludes in the present number the discussion, for the present, on *Vocations to the Priesthood*, and we think that those who were so displeased with his first article will find, on reading his second, that they judged him quite too hastily, and did him great injustice. We also conclude in the present number what we had to say specially on the Rights of the Temporal and on the Italian and Roman Questions. Indeed, we regard all questions which we have heretofore opened, as closed, till new and unforeseen events reopen them.

Some change will hereafter be made in the mode of conducting the Review. Hereafter our pages will be open only to articles and essays which meet our own approbation, and the public will hold us responsible for whatever is inserted. We make this rule because it is the only way in which we can maintain unity of doctrine and of purpose.

We advise our friends also that our son, who has been some time in France, has returned to assist us in editing the Review. He will bring to it several qualities much needed in the editorial department, will do much to lighten our own labors, becoming quite too heavy for us, and add much to the variety and interest of the Review. We shall be able to devote more time and space to several classes of subjects that have heretofore been quite too much neglected.

With this number we enter upon the seventeenth year of our Review as a Catholic Review. We have been long enough before the public as a Catholic editor to have an established character. The Review will be in future what it has been, only we shall endeavor to render it more worthy of the liberal support it has received for seventeen years. Its doctrines and aims will remain unchanged. It will study, as it always has studied, to be exact in matters of faith, and free and outspoken on all open questions, for we believe that it is only by being so that the cause of religion can be advanced in our country or our age. With these remarks, we greet all old and new friends with the compliments of the season, and wish them a "happy New Year."

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1861.

ART. I.—*Christ the Spirit: Being an Attempt to state the Primitive View of Christianity.* By THE AUTHOR of "Remarks on Alchemy and the Alchemists," &c. Second Edition, enlarged. New York: Francis & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 468.

It is singular what a strong hold Christianity has on the minds even of those who reject entirely its historical truth and dogmatic teaching. Here is a writer who denies that there ever lived such a person as Jesus of Nazareth, who rejects the miracles and all other facts recorded in the New Testament, and yet is fascinated by the very name of Christ, and seems not to have a doubt that if he can only get for his own views the sanction of primitive Christianity, he has established their truth. The author rejects Christ, and yet assumes the truth of Christianity, and proceeds from beginning to end on the assumption that when any view is proved to be a really Christian view, it is proved to be true. So hard is it even for an unbeliever to get entirely rid of the belief that Christianity is from God and the true religion!

We know personally the author of the work before us, and we highly esteem him as a man and a gentleman. He is, we believe, a man of strict moral integrity, of great purity and tenderness of heart, more than ordinary powers of mind, and of studious habits. We believe him a very ardent lover of truth, as he understands it, and capable of

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making great sacrifices for it. How happens it that such a man should, at the age of sixty and upward, be still wandering in the mazes of error, repeating the platitudes of Strauss, or seeking to revive the old so-called Hermetic philosophy, and to substitute it for the religion of Jesus Christ? It is idle to pretend that he is rendered averse from the truth by vicious propensities and vicious habits, and almost as idle to pretend that he is kept from seeing and embracing it, by his pride of intellect, for though doubtless he has more or less of that pride, it does not seem to be the governing principle of his life. Doubtless he finds a fascination in the mystery with which the old Hermetic philosophers surrounded themselves,—a pleasure in interpreting the mystic jargon of the old Alchemists, and an agreeable stimulus in the hope of being able one day to read the riddle of the Sphinx; but the mysteries of the Gospel are infinitely greater and grander, the Christian mysticism is infinitely richer and profounder than the Hermesian, and the solution of the enigma of life given by our holy faith is far clearer and sublimer than that even promised by the old Chaldean star-gazers, or the modern Rosicrucians. We agree with the author, that those whom, in another work, he calls the true Alchemists were, if you will, Hermetic philosophers, and that the philosopher's stone they were in pursuit of is to be understood in a moral, not in a gross material sense; but the secret of compounding that stone does not match the secret of the Christian life taught to every Christian child in the Catechism. Their secret was nothing, as is really conceded in their uniform confession that it can never be written, or spoken, or communicated by one man to another; and, after all, their speculations end in the truism, Be good and do good, and then—you will be good and do good. They neither tell you what is good, nor impart to you the power either to be or to do good. The whole class of Hermetic or Alchemic philosophers are admirably described by the Apostle St. James, as those who say to the cold, the naked, and the hungry, "Be ye warmed, be ye clothed, be ye filled," while they give not one of the things needed.

The great aim of the author in this work is to get rid of the historical Christ, to reject the historical sense of the Holy Scriptures, to bring Christianity within the order of nature, and to make it by interpretation coincide with the so-called Hermetic philosophy. Now we will not say that

he does not believe that the two are coincident; but we will say that he can never prove it. He says the Scriptures are to be allegorically interpreted, and he proceeds by allegorizing them to make them coincide with his Hermesianism; but what is his authority for asserting that the Scriptures are to be interpreted as a collection of allegories, or, if they are to be so interpreted, that he has seized their true allegorical sense? If the Holy Scriptures contain no truth but the Hermesian, are never to be taken in their plain historical sense, why does he trouble his head about them; why not bring out his Hermetic philosophy independently of them, and leave it to stand on its own bottom, if bottom it has? It is true, the fathers recognize in the Holy Scriptures a moral and a spiritual sense distinct from the historical sense, and Origen allegorizes large portions of them; but both Origen and the fathers recognize and maintain also their plain, literal, and historical sense; and if the author relies on them as authority for allegorizing them, he must take their authority throughout, accept the literal historical sense, and allegorize only in subordination to it, as they did. He cannot take the testimony of his own witnesses when it is in his favor, and reject it when it is against him.

Then, again, how does he prove his Hermesian teaching is true? He cannot as a good logician take it as his guide in allegorizing the Scriptures, and then the Scriptures Hermesianically allegorized to prove it. That would be not only to reason in a circle, but in a *vicious* circle. Will he maintain that his Hermesianism is true philosophy, and attempt to demonstrate it from natural reason? But the Hermetic philosophy, or the philosophy called after the mythic Hermes, is pantheistic, and pantheism is repudiated by natural reason. If there is any thing certain to reason, it is that man is *from* God, but not God. If we know any thing, we know that we are contingent and dependent existences, and that God is necessary and independent being, in whom there is and can be no contingency or dependency.

The author rejects the personal or historical Christ, but seeks to preserve "Christ the Spirit." We understand very well his doctrine, for we encountered it years ago with the Boston Transcendentalists. But the very authority on which he relies for asserting Christ the Spirit, asserts Christ the man, Christ conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the

Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, who was dead, and buried, and the third day rose again from the dead. Reject this authority and you know nothing of Jesus Christ at all, neither as person nor as spirit; accept it, and you must accept him not as spirit only, but as spirit with flesh and bones, as a real, historical person. We cannot allow you to accept what suits your purpose and reject what militates against it. The authority, if good for the existence of Christ the Spirit, is good for the existence of Christ the person, Christ the incarnate God.

We will not enter here into any formal argument to prove that our Lord was a real person, and not a myth as Strauss would have us believe; for that has been amply done by both Catholics and Protestants in their refutation of the mythical theory as applied to the Gospels. It suffices for the present to say that we have in the Church, in her doctrines, in her sacraments, in her rites and usages, undeniably extending back to Apostolic times, a living testimony to the fact that there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth. The Church in her festivals of the Nativity and of the Resurrection is an unimpeachable witness to it, as well as in her whole liturgical service, in which she commemorates his death on the cross. It is impossible to explain the origin of the sacrament of the holy Eucharist or the sacrifice of the Mass, without admitting the real existence of the historical Christ of the New Testament. The Church is here to-day, a real institution, dating from the very time he is said to have lived, died, and risen from the dead, and her whole constitution, her whole significance is based on the reality of the historical facts recorded in the Gospels. You cannot explain the fact of her existence if you call in question these facts, any more than you can explain an effect without admitting a cause. This is enough for us, and enough for any man who is competent to judge of the matter.

The author questions these facts on the ground that they are improbable, and indeed impossible, since they contravene the permanent order of nature. He says:—

“In addition to this, there comes in the philosophical doctrine of the permanent order of nature, tending to enforce the same conclusion; for, although this doctrine is general, and does not definitively fix the line between the natural and the miraculous, yet the doctrine is sufficiently established among thinking men to make it

certain, to a disciplined mind, that the curing of a physically blind man by spittle and earth; the actual walking on the water by a grown real man; the actual raising of one from the dead, who had been dead four days, and whose body stank; though, I say, the line between the possible and the impossible be considered as indefinite on the doctrine of order, still such miracles as these must be regarded as impossible, or no relations can be so. If, therefore, we accept these miracles as historical realities, we must refuse the idea of law altogether, and must admit that there is no truth in the doctrine which affirms an *order* in the course of nature; and if this can be affirmed—that is, if the doctrine of order can be denied—we must then deny the possibility of science, in all its branches; and this must be extended to logic and reasoning, for these depend upon the permanent operation of our faculties, and then there could be no further reasoning, or inquiry even into the subject itself under consideration, and we must hold our hands and receive every thing as equally possible, and must live in an acknowledged anarchy of both nature and intellect. In such a case, we should have no rule for selecting and preferring, among ancient relations, any one from many; we should have, for example, no ground in reason for rejecting the ancient Greek mythology—for this mythology can only be rejected by that decision of the reason which excludes it from the order of nature, and denies to it a veracious basis in that order, as literal truth. Hence, in modern times, that mythology is looked upon as poetry, or as philosophy in fiction, and by interpretation a great deal of beauty is discovered in it.

“These considerations will gain force in proportion as we reflect—with any tolerable reliance upon our instinctive conceptions and apprehensions of the nature of God—upon the impossibility, for example, of realizing, or even imagining, without attempting to understand it, the story of the supernatural birth. That story, if taken literally, stands for us only as a form of words; for no man can conceive, or represent to his imagination even, the truth of it, and perceive, in any manner, how the infinite and invisible God could come out of his infinitude, and give occasion, in a finite sphere of action preserving his infinitude, for a local history of his doings and sayings. Not that God does not appear in all history; but, for the very reason that he is in all history, universally, we are obliged to say that he is not specifically in any single history. When we say that God is everywhere, we introduce a contradiction into our minds by affirming that he is, or has been, *especially* in some local place; for this implies that he is, or was, not in other places. Those who deny this, do not seem to perceive how easy it is to speak without ideas, that is, without adjusting ideas to their necessary conditions; but words without ideas must necessarily be without sense.

“But this may be thought a speculative consideration, or a metaphysical abstraction, which ought not to be urged, as if any thing of

the kind could put a limit upon the power of God. But this, when properly understood, does not assert a limit to the power of God. It only shows that there is a limit to our own power of affirmation; it denies to us the privilege of asserting any thing in contradiction to the organism of reason which God has given us. In this view, to submit to reason is to submit to God. In this obedience, we do not affirm a limitation to God, but we confess a limitation upon ourselves. There is no negation in God; nothing but infinite affirmation. If in the imperfection of language, we seem to deny any thing of God, we can only mean to deny the possibility of our conception of the thing; and this, I say, is simply a confession of the limitations under which we live. But, on the other hand, this is no reason for making affirmations, with respect to the Divine Being, which we do not understand, or which inclose contradictions; for this is so far from a modest confession of weakness or limitation, that it shows both ignorance and arrogance. It is the indication of a presumptuous spirit, and is in no sense a mark of piety."—pp. 26–29.

It is clear, from the way in which he expresses himself, that the author half suspects a fallacy in this reasoning, and that he feels that reason cannot, after all, deny the possibility of miracles. The facts recorded are impossible in the order of nature, or by natural agencies, we grant, and thank the author for the admission. Then their existence is a proof of a power or agency above nature; and he must prove that there is no such power before he can assert miracles are impossible, and from their impossibility conclude the falsity of the history recording them. He may say, and we will say it with him, that they are impossible by any natural agency, but not that they are impossible by supernatural agency, unless he knows the full power of the infinite God, which he will not pretend. For aught he or we know they are possible, and then the whole question is one of fact or of testimony. If the testimony is sufficient, we must believe the facts the same as any other class of facts. Hume, indeed, contends that no testimony is sufficient to accredit a miracle; because it is more in accordance with experience that a man should lie than that nature should go out of her course, or depart from her permanent order. But the objection is founded on a false definition of miracle. Nature does not and cannot go out of her course; she does not and cannot depart from her permanent order. Nobody pretends it, for nobody pretends that nature works the miracle. The very notion of miracle is that of a fact produced not by nature, but by a power above nature. No

man who believes in God at all, can deny the existence of such power, and therefore no man who so believes can deny the possibility of miracles. If the possibility of a miracle cannot be denied, the miraculous fact is provable by testimony, and the only question is, Is the testimony sufficient? We recognize as fully as the author the order of nature, and we recognize, too, its permanence. Miracles do not change or interrupt that order, for they presuppose it, and belong themselves to an order above it—to the supernatural order which they reveal and affirm, and which without it could not be called supernatural. The difficulty experienced arises from conceiving the miracle as *pro tanto* the destruction of the natural order, and therefore from conceiving the natural and the supernatural as opposed one to the other. But they are no more opposed one to the other than are the upper and lower stories of the same house. The supernatural order is above the natural, but is not placed over against it; it presupposes the natural, and though it may operate on the natural, and manifest itself through it, it by no means changes or impairs it. Nature, as nature, remains during and after the miracle precisely what it was before; and all the miracle does is to introduce and affirm the existence of a supernatural order. We do not and cannot know by natural reason that there actually is a supernatural order; but we can and do know by natural reason that there is a power above nature; for we know that the production of nature has not exhausted the creative energy of its author, since that energy is infinite, and therefore inexhaustible. We know, then, by natural reason that God, if he chooses, can create and reveal a supernatural order of life, and therefore that miracles are possible, and consequently provable. The whole reasoning of unbelievers and rationalists against miracles is based on a shallow sophism, and concludes nothing.

We grant it is impossible for man, if restricted in his knowledge to the order of nature, to conceive or imagine what the author calls "the story of the supernatural birth." The mystery of the Incarnation, from first to last, lies out of the order of nature, out of the reach of natural reason, and is without any analogies in nature. But what is to be concluded from that? that it is false? Not at all, but simply that it is not and could not have been a human invention, conception, or imagination. Man has no faculty by which he could have invented or imagined such a mystery.

This is what the author himself virtually maintains. Then, since the mystery is apprehended and believed, we must conclude that it has been revealed by a superhuman power. Then the existence of the mystery in human belief becomes, if we duly consider it, a conclusive proof of its truth; for none but God could have revealed it, and he could not have revealed it if it were not true, since he is Truth itself, and can neither deceive nor be deceived. The author is right in denying that "God could come out of his infinitude." But in the Incarnation, God does not come out of his infinitude, and become in his divine nature finite. The divinity remains in its own infinitude, unchanged and unaffected by the Incarnation; for it is the divine that assumes the human, not the human that assumes the divine. The "local history" is not the local history of the divinity, or God in his divine nature, for the divinity has and can have no history; but of God in his human nature. By the Incarnation he took human nature up to himself, and made it, without changing it, really, truly, substantially his own nature, his own *human* nature, as much so as the divine nature itself. The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. Christ the incarnate Word is at once perfect God and perfect man. In his perfect manhood God may have a local history, be born, grow, and die, the same as any one else. All that may be affirmed of man, sin excepted, may be affirmed of him in his human nature. God in his divinity is not localized, nor is God in his humanity ubiquitous. Keeping in mind the distinction of the two natures, the contradictions the author conjures up disappear, and reason has nothing to allege against this stupendous mystery.

The author contends that to deny the possibility of miracles, "is not to limit the power of God, but to place a limit on our powers of affirmation." But he must permit us to dispute it. When I say God cannot do this or that, it is precisely his power, not mine, that I deny, and precisely my power of affirmation that I assert. I assume, not that I am unable to affirm that God *can*, but that I am able to affirm that God can *not*, do this or that. Surely here is no denial of my power of affirmation, but its assertion. We agree that we "can assert nothing in contradiction to the organism of reason which has been given us;" but reason herself teaches that God can do any thing but deny, contradict, or annihilate himself, as has been often shown in our pages. We are subject, no doubt, to the limitations of reason, and therefore

we are not able to affirm the impossibility of miracles, for reason cannot say a miracle is contrary to the being, or nature, or power of God. We are able to say, on the contrary, that miracles are possible; but whether God works or will work miracles, we can say only on testimony appropriate in the case.

The author gives us a long account of the Jewish sects, especially the Essenes, and maintains that the Gospels were produced by persons who were or had been members of that Jewish sect. This is possible; but it is, as far as we can see, a matter of no moment to him or to us. The Essenes were Jews, and in some sense an ascetic or monastic community under the old covenant. They and the Therapeutæ were Jewish ascetics, the portion of the Jewish people among whom, in our Lord's time, spiritual life still retained some degree of vigor. We should naturally expect members of these bodies to have been among the first to recognize in our Lord the promised Messiah; but we have no evidence that such was the fact. We should naturally expect to find them forming the nucleus of the first Christian congregation among the Jews; but there is nothing in history that proves that it was so. As they, better than the Sadducees or the Pharisees, retained the spiritual sense of the Jewish Scriptures, there would necessarily be a greater similarity of doctrine between them and Christians, than between Christians and the other Jewish sects. But whether so or not, amounts to nothing; for no Christian pretends that his religion originated at the epoch of our Saviour's Incarnation. Our Lord did not come to teach a new religion, a religion different from that of the Jewish, but to fulfil the promises made to the fathers, and to do those things without which their faith would have been vain, as St. Paul teaches in his Epistle to the Hebrews.

We are aware that several able and learned writers, especially in Germany, have endeavored to disprove Christianity, by showing that much it teaches was held and taught by the Gentiles, long before the coming of our Lord. We believe it. There never has been, there never could be, but one religion in the world. "Times vary," says St. Austin, "but faith does not vary. As believed the fathers, so believe we; only they believed in a Christ to come, and we in a Christ who has come." "Christianity as Old as the World," said the Englishman Tindal, in the title of a work intended to overthrow it; we say also that it is as old as

the world, and maintain with St. Thomas, the angel of the schools, that there has never been but one revelation, for the whole faith was revealed in substance to our first parents in the garden. The mystery of the Incarnation, on which all that is distinctively Christian depends, was revealed to our first parents, when the Lord God promised that the woman or the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. Then the great mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, in which is included the whole Christian revelation and all that is necessary to believe *necessitate medii* even now, must have been more or less explicitly revealed. Hence the fact that much coincident with the Gospel is found in the Jewish and Gentile writings prior to the advent of our Lord, militates in no sense against the claims of the Christian revelation or of the Catholic Church. Suppose you find in the Gospels traces of the doctrines and practices of the Essenes, indicating that their authors had been members of the Essenean community, what does it prove? It proves nothing against their genuineness, their authenticity, their inspiration, or their authority. All you can conclude from it, even if established, would be that the Essenes retained prior to their acceptance of our Lord as the promised Messiah, in greater or less purity, more or less complete, the primitive revelation made to our first parents in the garden.*

* We have purposely passed over in the text the special argument on which the author relies, because we have chosen to refute it indirectly by the general doctrine we bring out. His argument is, that the Gospels were produced during what are commonly called the first three centuries, in the bosom of the Essenean community. But the Essenes were Hermetic philosophers, and therefore the Gospels are to be interpreted in an Hermesian sense. Christianity is simply the old Hermetic philosophy itself, and the blunder of Christians in all subsequent centuries has been in giving a literal interpretation to the symbolical language of the Gospels. Being himself an Hermetic philosopher, and heir to the lore of old Hermes Trismegistus, he is able to detect the blunder, and give us a true key to the Christian symbolism. But the fact that the Gospels were produced in the bosom of the Essenean community nothing indicates, except certain coincidences of doctrine, which, conceding them, prove nothing, as we have shown in the text. The other assertion, that the Essenes were Hermetic philosophers, rests on certain alleged coincidences between their doctrines and those ascribed to Hermes, and the assumption that they were a secret society. The coincidences prove nothing; first, because it is impossible to fix the date of the so-called Hermetic philosophy, or to prove that in the form we have it, it is older than the Gospels; and second, because the coincidences alleged are not coincidences with anything peculiar to the Hermesians, but with views which they hold in common with others. That the Essenes were a secret society is not proved, and nothing in Philo, Josephus or Eusebius indicates. The most that can be said is, that they were a corporation, into which new members were admitted only after a longer or shorter probation. But, even if they were a secret society, that does not prove that they were Hermesians; for the author will hardly pretend that there never was, is, or can be a secret society not composed of Hermetic philosophers. His argument therefore will not bear examination, and the general observations in the text suffice to deprive it of all force or pertinency.

Christianity, in a general sense, includes the publication of the law of nature, and the supernatural revelation made to man. By the law of nature is meant simply the dictates of natural reason common to all men. It is not strange, then, that in so far as relates to the dictates of reason, we should find the ancient Jews and Gentiles coinciding with the Christians, for they all do or may draw from the same source. The primitive revelation including, in substance, the whole supernatural revelation, being made to our first parents, therefore to the whole human race, necessarily enters, in some form and in some degree, into the primitive and universal beliefs of mankind. The dictates of natural reason form the basis of natural morality recognized and promulgated anew, with supernatural sanctions, by the Gospel; the primitive supernatural revelation forms the basis of all the religions of all ages and nations of the world. In the great elements and principal precepts of natural morality, in what comes within the appropriate sphere of reason, you find the whole world substantially agreed. In regard to supernatural revelation, you find wide differences indeed; but you find also a substantial unity underlying the various and manifold forms adopted, showing that all the various religions of the world have their type in the Christian revelation. Eliminate from these religions their anomalies, inconsistencies, and what is repugnant to natural reason, and supply their defects so as to make them rounded and complete realizations of their original type, and you have the Christian religion as held and taught to-day by the Catholic Church. Over your Greek and Roman polytheism hovers always, more or less distinctly visible, the divine unity, and in Indian and Egyptian incarnations are indications of the incarnation of the Word, originally promised to Adam and Eve before their expulsion from the garden. Analyze all the superstitions and idolatries of the world, however gross, immoral, inhuman, or absurd, and you will find that they are only corruptions, perversions, or travesties of Christian principles and dogmas, bearing testimony alike to the unity of the human race, and to the unity and universality of the original revelation. We cheerfully accept the facts brought out during the last sixty or seventy years by German scholars, tending to prove the common origin of all religions, though we do not accept their inference. They draw wrong conclusions, because they start with false premises. They start with the

assumption that Christians hold, and must hold, that their religion was a revelation made to the world for the first time when our Lord is said to have tabernacled in the flesh. Protestants may hold this, and even some Catholics in combating the errors of Lamennais and his school, may not always be careful to show that Christians do not hold the same. Starting with this assumption, these learned writers adduce the facts in question as irrefragable evidence against the claims of Christianity to be a supernatural revelation.

But this assumption is unwarranted, and must be, so long as the Church asserts the inspiration and authority of the Jewish Scriptures. Even our Lord himself, though he promises to build his Church on Peter, speaks of the Church as something already existing. The doctrine of the fathers and the theologians is, that the Church is the continuation, under other conditions indeed, of the Synagogue, as the Synagogue was the continuation of the patriarchal religion. In a restricted sense, the Christian Church no doubt extends back only to the time of our Lord and his Apostles, but in a larger and more general sense it extends back to the promise made that the woman, or the seed of the woman, should bruise the serpent's head, and embraces all the faithful before as well as since the coming of Christ. Adam and Seth, Enoch and Noah, Shem and Job, Abraham and Melchisedek, belonged to the Church of Christ as well as Peter and John, Jerome and Austin, Thomas and Bonaventura, Bossuet and Fénelon. It is so we understand the teaching of our Church, and this is confirmed by the Catechism, which tells us the Church is catholic, "because she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth." She is catholic or universal, then, in time as well as in space. It is not the doctrine, then, of the Catholic Church that the revelation of which she is the depository, teacher, and interpreter, was a new and original revelation, made for the first time after the Incarnation. Our Lord came to fulfil the promises, that is, to do the things which would perfect the faith of those who had believed in him before his coming, and also, as he himself says, "that we may have grace, and have it more abundantly." Many things are more explicitly revealed under the new than under the old law; old institutions have been abolished and new institutions founded; but we are aware of no new dogmatic truth, no new moral principle

or moral precept that has been added to the primitive revelation.

The argument the author seeks to draw against historical Christianity from the supposition that the writers of the Gospels were Essenes, is then worth nothing. If the fact were as he alleges, it would not prove them to be forgeries, or not what they profess to be. The author's arguments against the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels are not new, and though very well put, have been shown over and over again to be inconclusive. The question he raises we have examined on all sides, in all moods of mind, both as an unbeliever and as a believer; and we are satisfied that the evidence of the genuineness and authenticity of the four Gospels is far stronger than that in the case of any other books that have come down to us from an equally remote antiquity. We need not undertake to justify this conclusion, for it has been done unanswerably by writers of the first ability and learning, among both Catholics and Protestants. The mythical theory of Strauss, which the author adopts, is the absurdest of all theories that can be imagined. The author supposes the books were written and the facts invented in order to symbolize, to set forth, or rather to conceal doctrines or ideas previously entertained chiefly by the Essenes. But he forgets that there is something besides doctrines or ideas to be accounted for. There are institutions, sacraments, rites, and festivals, external positive institutions to be explained, which presuppose and are intended to commemorate actual historical facts. These do not grow out of ideas, but necessarily out of facts. Deny the historical facts they commemorate and they are without meaning, and their origin is inexplicable. They are found too early, too near the date of the alleged events, to have allowed time for the myths to have grown up, and to have been received as facts. A myth to be received as an historical fact, and to have institutions founded on it, and festivals established to commemorate it, requires the lapse of more than one, two, or three centuries; and the author in the present case has not a half a century at his disposal. Moreover, the sacrament of the Eucharist we know was instituted professedly to commemorate an event said to have recently happened, and amongst a people who must have known whether it commemorated a real fact or only a fact invented to symbolize an idea.

The author relies on the alleged ignorance of the period

in which the historical facts are said to have occurred; also on the alleged silence of external or profane history. The alleged silence of profane historians, if proved, would not move us. We have not all the historical works that were written during the period, and cannot say that our Lord was mentioned by no profane contemporary historian. Besides, it appears to have been the policy of profane writers to take as little notice as possible of Christ or his religion; first, through contempt, and afterward because they still, down to the Barbarian conquest, trusted the old religion would be restored, and all traces of the new be obliterated. Thus Claudian, a poet and courtier under the reign of the orthodox Honorius, in the fifth century, sings the praises of the emperor and of the empire, without letting slip a single word that indicates that he had ever heard of our Lord and his religion, or that he was aware that the old idolatry and superstition were not as flourishing as in the days of Augustus. But we find the Christians persecuted by Nero, and mentioned by Tacitus and Pliny in the first century, to say nothing of the disputed passage in Josephus—a passage which has never been proved to our satisfaction to be an interpolation. There were already, in the first century, imperial edicts against the Christians, and neither the earliest Jewish nor Gentile opponents of Christianity known to us, dispute the historical facts of the Gospel, regarded simply as facts.

It will not do to rely too much on the ignorance of the period when the Gospel histories must have been produced, for we must remember that it was the Augustan age—the golden age of Roman literature. The state of learning and intellectual culture among the Jews may in some measure be judged of by the works of Philo and Josephus still extant, and in the East generally by the subtile and erudite character of the early heresies. Our age is hardly able to understand the old Gnostic heresy which dates from the first century, and our author honestly believes that he is enlightening the nineteenth century, by reviving the exploded heresies of the second. Whoever has some knowledge of Roman literature, art, science, and philosophy, from Cicero down to the rise of Neoplatonism, with Plotinus, about the middle of the third century, needs no argument to convince him that the age in which the Gospel histories were produced was by no means an age remarkable for its ignorance, but the most enlightened and highly cultivated

age in all Roman history. It was precisely the age in which flourished the great imperial schools throughout the empire, and the last age that could be selected for the production of such a gigantic imposture as Christianity must be, if we are to believe our author.

The New Testament writers themselves, though some of them lacked the training of the schools, regarded as the author must regard them, as uninspired men, are remarkable for their sobriety, good sense, profound and accurate knowledge. We find in them no enthusiasm, no eccentricity, no exaggeration. Their writings are full of historical references; but nobody has yet been able to convict them of a single historical error. The subtlest and profoundest philosopher can convict them of not the slightest error in philosophy or morals. They relate things which transcend reason, but not an instance can be found in which they come in conflict with any principle of reason or known fact of the natural order. Wherever we have the means of testing their statements, we find them standing the most rigid tests we can apply, both as to the letter and spirit. This does not indicate any remarkable degree of ignorance, nor writers who are merely constructing myths in an age of ignorance and superstition. We hazard nothing in saying that the Gospel histories have not a trait in common with the mythical histories of Greece and Rome, or India and Egypt; and we do not fear to assert that they never could have been invented or fabricated by philosophers or anybody else, as symbols of ideas or doctrines, or the gradual outgrowth of a people seeking to localize or to give form and color to their ideas, sentiments, and convictions. They bear on their face the stamp of reality, and their existence is inexplicable on any other hypothesis than that of their strict historical truth. They could have been produced only by men narrating events of which they had been eye-witnesses, or by men who drew from the relations of eye-witnesses. To suppose them to have been fabricated as symbols of ideas, or to be simply mythical productions, would be to suppose a more stupendous miracle than any recorded in them.

But, suppose we take the author at his word, what does he offer us that we have not already? What do we gain by rejecting historical Christianity, and by having it proved to us that Christianity at bottom is only the old Hermetic philosophy, and that its true expounders and faithful followers are the Alchemists babbling of the philosopher's

stone and the elixir of life, and their salt, sulphur, and mercury? Grant, if you will, that the old Alchemists were not vulgar chemists, seeking the transmutation of metals and the production of material gold; grant that they did not dabble in the black art, that they were no conjurors, no mighty magicians, inspired and aided by Satan; we yet may ask, What were they? What do we owe them? What can they give us? For what art or science is the world indebted to them? What eternal principle, what truth, moral or spiritual, had they, or have their modern followers, that we have not, either in our natural reason, in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, or in the teaching of the Church? Grant that they were, as the author holds, sages and philosophers; yet they had, as he himself maintains, no superhuman wisdom, no superhuman power, and wrapped up in their mystic jargon and unintelligible cipher, no knowledge that transcends the reach of natural reason. Whatever their pretended "incommunicable secret," it was within the natural order, and therefore above neither our natural strength nor our natural intellect. But as we have all there is of nature and reason, they can, however much they may have retained of the mystic lore of ancient Egypt and Chaldaea, have no order of knowledge or kind of power we have not already without their aid.

The author, carried away by certain discoveries which he thinks he has made, is not, we suspect, fully aware of what he does in attempting to prove that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures are Hermetic writings, and that Christianity rightly understood is nothing but the so-called Hermetic philosophy. Suppose the fact to be as he alleges, what conclusion is to be drawn? Simply that, since we have those Scriptures, and since Hermesianism is only a system of philosophy constructed by human reason, we have already the Hermesian doctrine, and all that we should have in case we rejected historical Christianity. The Hermetic philosophers can give us nothing which we have not in our own reason and Scriptures. They can teach us nothing that we do not already know, or which we may not know without them, for reason is common to all men, and the same in every man. Were we then to listen to him, to follow him, we might indeed lose something we have, and something of great value, but we could gain no increase of wisdom or power, for he has nothing to offer us above our natural reason and strength. His book, then, if good for any thing,

is, rightly considered, good for nothing, and proves, if any thing, that it was not needed, since we already have all it can teach us, if not something more, of which it would deprive us.

Non-Catholics are slow to learn that we as Catholics have all they have or can have, and that all they can do is to persuade us to give up something that we have, which they have not. They remind us of the old fable of the fox. A certain fox had the misfortune to lose his tail by its being caught in a trap, whereupon he assembled his brother foxes, and made them an eloquent and feeling oration to persuade them to cut off their tails as an inconvenient and unseemly incumbrance. Our rationalistic friends wish not to be singular, and having by their folly or predatory expeditions lost their tails, they would have us cut off ours, so that we may be tailless like them. This is in human nature, as we see in that story which is told of those poor French Icarians who settled for a time in Texas. Their grand aim was to realize practically their fundamental dogma of equality. It was essential to their scheme that all Icarians should be equal. One day their settlement was attacked by the Indians, who barbarously scalped two of the settlers, and departed. The poor Icarians were struck with consternation. Their dogma of equality had been savagely violated. The Icarians were no longer equal. There was introduced among them the inequality of the scalped and the non-scalped. What should be done? After much deliberation and many speeches, it was resolved the non-scalped should be scalped, so that the Icarian equality should be re-established. We have all the rationalists and transcendentalists have or can have. Our scalps remain on our heads where God has placed them, and the rationalists and transcendentalists, finding themselves scalped, are trying to persuade us to tear off our scalps, so that we shall have no more than they have.

Suppose we reject the historical Christ, and fall back on Christ the Spirit, we gain nothing, for we already have Christ the Spirit, and believe as firmly in Christ the Spirit as the author does, or as his Alchemic friends do. The historical Christ does not deny, conceal, or weaken Christ the Spirit, but manifests him to us. In asserting spiritual influence he asserts nothing more, but a great deal less than we assert; for he asserts the spiritual influence without a real spirit that influences. We lose much, but we gain nothing.

We wish him to ponder this well ; we wish him to understand that there is no need of giving up any thing we hold, in order to be able to accept any thing not a negation that he can offer. The truth in the natural order, which he asserts, contradicts nothing we as Catholics hold to be truth. We have as much nature with our clothes on, as we should have were we to walk the streets *in puris naturalibus*.

The author is a rationalist, and like all rationalists, we suppose imagines that in laboring to free us from historical Christianity, and to bring all religion down to the natural order, he is vindicating reason and restoring us to the rights of nature. He, like all rationalists in religion, seems to suppose that Christians are in a sort of mental thralldom, for he holds, and supposes Christians hold, that the supernatural opposes the natural, and faith suppresses or supersedes reason, and forbids its use. He may be partially right as to Calvinists and Jansenists, but he is wholly wrong as to Catholics. No Catholic can hold, without falling under the censure of his Church, that the supernatural is hostile to the natural, or that faith denies reason or does away with the necessity of its exercise. The author must not cite against us an article in the "official organ" of our Most Reverend Archbishop, the 22d of last December, written against our Review, and copied, without censure, into several of our Catholic papers ; for however disparagingly it may speak of reason in comparison with faith, it maintains with us, that "faith is from God, and so is reason ; and both, coming from the same divine source, must necessarily be consistent with each other, whether the weakness of our understanding prevents us from apprehending this harmony or not." This is the doctrine of the article, and it is ours.

All Catholic theologians adopt the maxim, Grace supposes nature, *gratia supponit naturam* ; and if grace or the supernatural supposes nature, it cannot oppose it. The Church herself has left us no room to doubt what is her mind on this point. She has asserted the harmony of faith and reason, declared that there is no dissension between them, and vindicated the use of reason, in four articles which she required Mr. Bonnetty and his friends to subscribe, and which we copied into our Review, p. 440, for last October. They prove that the author's assumption, with regard to Catholics at least, is unfounded. The Holy See in the first of these articles defines that, "although

faith is above reason, yet no dissension, no disagreement can ever be found between them, since both come from the infinite and good God, one and the same immutable fountain of truth, and lend each other a mutual support. *Etsi fides supra rationem, tamen nulla dissentio, nullum dissidium inter ipsas inveniri unquam potest, cum ambæ ab uno eodemque immutabili veritatis fonte, Deo optimo maximo, oriantur, atque ita sibi mutuam opem ferant.*" This asserts explicitly that there is not only no discrepancy between reason and faith, but that they mutually assist each other. The second article shows that the Church neither forbids the exercise of reason, nor suffers it to be disparaged or denounced as impotent, false, or illusory. "*Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, animæ spiritualitatem, hominis libertatem cum certitudine probare protest. Fides posterior revelatione, proindeque ad probandum Dei existentiam contra atheum, ad probandum animæ rationalis spiritualitatem, ac libertatem contra naturalismi, ac fatalismi sectatorem allegari convenienter nequit.*" Reason or reasoning can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the free-will of man. Faith is subsequent to revelation, and therefore cannot properly be alleged in proof of the existence of God against the atheist, or in proof of the spirituality and free-will of the rational soul against the follower of materialism and fatalism." Catholics, then, hold and must hold that reason is to be used, and that her light, within her sphere, is a true, certain, not a false and illusory light. They must hold her as indispensable in faith as in science; for these great truths, which depend on reason, are the preamble to faith, and must be proved before faith itself can be proved. In the third article the Holy See condemns the doctrine of the traditionalists that reason depends on faith. "*Rationis usus fidem præcedit, et ad eam hominem ope revelationis et gratiæ conducit.*" The use of reason precedes faith, and by the aid of revelation and grace leads man to it." So far is reason from being opposed to faith, or from being superseded by it, it is itself which by the aid of revelation and grace leads to faith; or, in other words, it is by the use of reason that, assisted by revelation and grace, we attain to faith; so that faith is an act of reason, or it is reason that in faith is the believing subject. We cannot by reason without the assistance of revelation and grace attain to faith, but still it is reason, or the soul as rational, that

does attain to it, and all the revelation and grace in the world could not produce faith in an irrational soul. We need nothing more to settle the question that, however the case may stand with those the Church condemns as heretics, Catholics assert, and can assert, no antagonism between faith and reason, and cannot denounce reason as useless, impotent, false, or illusory. If Catholicity is to be believed, reason is from God, a divine light, and therefore, in relation to all it illumines, a true and infallible light.

If on this point we ever find any thing among Catholics that seems to favor the notion that grace opposes nature, or revelation contradicts, suppresses, or supersedes reason, we must ascribe it to ignorance of the real teaching of the Church, to the misapprehension or misapplication of the phraseology of the ascetics, or to the failure to distinguish accurately between the natural and the supernatural. There are, no doubt, among Catholics, many who are uninstructed on some points of Catholic doctrine, persons whose attainments, capacity, occupations, or state of life render them unfit to engage in discussions on faith, and who, were they to attempt to reason about it, would only involve themselves in doubt and perplexity, unsettle their faith, lose their peace of mind, and, perhaps, their souls. These a wise pastor will caution against reasoning, and bid them hold fast with simplicity and docility to what they have been taught. Let their faith suffice them. But these may misunderstand the reason of this caution, and conclude erroneously that reason is not to be used, or that there is some antagonism between faith and reason. The motive of the advice is not that reason is not to be trusted, but that they to whom it is given have not the requisite cultivation, the requisite knowledge or facilities in the use of reasoning, to solve by reason the many problems they may encounter.

Others may be led into error on this point by misapplying the frequent phraseology of our ascetic writers. The ascetics, undoubtedly, speak of a warfare, a conflict, a struggle between nature and grace, and insist that nature must be mortified and crucified; but the nature of which they speak is the inferior soul, the carnal mind, the flesh, which lusteth against the spirit, and too often brings the rational soul, reason and free-will, into bondage to sin and death. But even this lower nature, the carnal mind, the flesh, *concupiscentia*, though it contains the *fomes* or seed

of sin, is not itself sin. The Holy Council of Trent has defined that it is not properly sin, but simply inclines to sin, *ad peccatum inclinat*. The mortification or crucifixion demanded is moral, not physical, the denial of its special gratification, which introduces disorder into the bosom of the individual and of society, and its moral subordination to the law of internal harmony, and the ultimate end of man. Some of our writers, no doubt, dwell on the impotence of reason, and, from its weakness and the errors of men left to reason alone, deduce an argument in favor of revelation and grace; but, though they may neglect certain necessary distinctions, they do not mean that reason is impotent, false, or illusory in her own order, but that reason alone cannot suffice in the actual state in which we are placed to conduct us to that sublime beatitude to which all men, through the reminiscences of the original revelation, in some sense, aspire.

The author, then, has no right to proceed on the assumption that in warring against Christianity as a supernatural religion, and asserting the truths naturally intelligible to natural reason, he is vindicating the rights of nature, or bringing out any truth denied or not even held by Christians themselves. We assert, no doubt, supernatural virtues; but we also assert and enjoin all the natural virtues. It is true, we hold that the simply natural virtues cannot merit the supernatural life proffered in the Gospel; but we maintain, nevertheless, that they are virtues, and that the eternal life cannot be merited or obtained without them. For the law that bids us love God with all our heart, bids us love our brother also, and if we love not our brother whom we have seen, how can we love God whom we have not seen? He who fails in the natural, fails, *a fortiori*, in the supernatural. There is no acceptable religion without morality. Reason does and can dictate nothing which Christianity does not suppose and include in her own code. In so far as rationalists present truth, they present only what we already have; in so far as they insist on the moral virtues dictated by our Maker through natural reason, they only insist on what the Church always insists on with greater energy than they do or can, and with supernatural sanctions. Let them understand, then, that nature suffers no lesion from the supernatural, that reason receives no wrong from revelation, and that we under the supernatural and under divine revelation have all the reason or nature

they have or can have, and consequently that there are no rights of reason or of nature for them to assert or vindicate against us. All their labor against us, in this direction, is labor lost, for at worst we have all they have at best.

Rationalists and unbelievers generally, as we find them in our times, fall into their grave error by taking for the Christianity they oppose, the doctrines and propositions which the Church has formally condemned as heretical or as erroneous. The authorities on which they rely are, in the main, Calvinists and Jansenists, who in the eyes of Catholics are condemned heretics. Not an objection which we as an unbeliever or as a rationalist ever conceived against the doctrine or morality of the Gospel, bears against any thing taught or enjoined by the Catholic Church. It is to what are called the "doctrines of the Reformation," more especially as refined upon by the Jansenists, that we must attribute the rationalism and infidelity of modern times. The antagonism of the supernatural to the natural, and of supernatural revelation to natural reason, which gives birth, by way of reaction, to rationalism and infidelity, is asserted only in Protestant or Jansenistic teaching, and is essentially repugnant to the belief of Catholics. By the Protestant doctrine, that man by the fall lost his natural spiritual functions, and became wholly corrupted in his nature, man's natural light becomes darkness, and we become unable to think a true thought or to perform a deed not sinful, till renewed by grace, or even then, for justification in the Calvinistic sense is simply forensic, making no change in the intrinsic character of the justified. Hence we find Luther calling reason all manner of hard names, and the Jansenist Pascal seeking in faith the certainty he despairs of obtaining from reason. Pascal's whole argument for Christianity is drawn entirely from the weakness and untrustworthiness or the false and deceptive light of reason. Wherever Jansenism, Calvinism, or Lutheranism is confounded with Christianity, rationalism, or the rejection of the entire supernatural order asserted in the Gospel becomes the only resource of men who have the ability and the courage to think for themselves, as we have seen in Germany, Geneva, Holland, France, and our own New England. Without Jansenius, St. Cyr, Pascal, Arnauld, Quesnel, we should hardly have had a Voltaire, a Diderot, or a D'Alembert. It is against heresy, not Catholicity, the objections of rationalists have force.

We do not deny that the Pelagian heresy is rife in the modern world, but it is so only as a reaction against Calvinism and Jansenism; and rationalism is, in fact, to a great extent, only an honorable protest of reason and nature against the false and exaggerated supernaturalism introduced, or revived from earlier heretics, by the leading reformers of the sixteenth century. If we would save Christianity, and recall those who have gone astray, we must sweep away every vestige of Calvinism and Jansenism, recognize the legitimacy of nature, and restore reason to the right and the place assigned by the Church. We must re-dedicate human nature and human reason, and show that there is a real harmony between reason and faith, and between the natural and the supernatural, and that the antagonism between them, assumed by all rationalists and unbelievers, has no existence but in the false interpretation either of the one or the other by condemned heretics. Reason is worthless out of her own order, we very well know; but in her order she is as infallible as we Catholics believe the Church to be in the order of revelation.

We say not that reason is equally developed in all men; we say not that all see equally and fully understand either the strength or the weakness of reason. Men may err through defective intelligence, and draw erroneous inferences in consequence of not seeing the whole case, or fully understanding their premises. But this we do say, that reason, as far as it goes, is never false; that, as far as it sees at all, it sees things as they are; that its light, as far as it shines, is a true light, and never does or can deceive. It may be feeble, but it is never false or deceptive. The world, in so far as it has followed reason, has never gone astray in relation to the natural order; and men, in so far as they have adhered to reason, have never disagreed among themselves. The *dictamina rationis*, or dictates of reason, are, and always have been, the same for all men, in all ages and nations. If we find individuals who cannot discern them, the laws of all nations treat them as idiotic or insane, and do not hold them responsible for their acts. That part of Christianity which lies within the order of nature, or the province of natural reason, was recognized and held by the world from the beginning, and is the moral and intellectual sense, the common sense, of mankind. With regard to this not even the ancient Gentiles fell into any substantial error. Plato and Aristotle hold still their place in our schools of philosophy,

and the teaching of the Gentiles in natural ethics, forms still the basis of the teaching of our own moral theologians. The *jus gentium* of the ancient Greeks and Romans is the foundation of the laws which are held even now to be binding upon all nations.

We, of course, mean not to deny the gross errors and abominable practices of the ancient or modern heathen; but we do deny that these errors are the errors of reason, or that reason ever approves these practices. They were and are seen by reason to be contrary to her own dictates. What Calvinist does not see that his Calvinism is unreasonable? or believes he can defend it without maintaining that reason is a false and deceptive light not to be trusted? The false religions and abominable superstitions of the old heathen world were never the creations of reason, and were as repugnant to the reason of their adherents as they are to ours. Reason no more approved of the human sacrifices, the prostitutions, the cruelties, and gross impurities of those superstitions, the Bacchic and Isiac orgies, or the worship of the phallus, than it does of the *decretum horribile* defended by John Calvin in his *Institutes*. We know it from the writings of Gentile philosophers and sages themselves, and from the arguments used against them by the free and acute reason of the fathers of the Church. These superstitions all grew up out of the perversion and corruption, due not to reason, but to ignorance, passion, or lust, aided by Satanic influence, of the original supernatural revelation made to our first parents, and were submitted to not as rational convictions, but as commands of the gods. St. Paul, in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, vindicates reason, and gives us the key to the origin and existence of these abominable superstitions. "The wrath of God from heaven," he says, "is revealed upon all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice; because that which is known of God is manifest to them. For God hath manifested it to them. For his invisible things from the creation of the world are seen, being understood by those things which are made; his eternal power also and divinity: so that they are inexcusable. Because, when they knew God they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks; but they became foolish in their thoughts, and their senseless heart was darkened; for saying that they were wise they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness and image of corruptible

man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their hearts, unto uncleanness; shamefully to abuse their own bodies.”*

The Scriptures mean by a “fool,” not a man destitute of knowledge, but one destitute of wisdom, or the true application of what he knows. It is clear from this passage, and what follows, that the ancients knew the truth of God, that neither their reason nor their knowledge was at fault, and therefore, they were inexcusable; for they, through self-conceit, pride, passion, sensuality, perverted in practice the truth they knew. There is nothing worse than the perversion or corruption of that which is good, and revelation is sure to be perverted or corrupted if left to be applied by private judgment and passion. The great evil was in what is called the Gentile apostasy, followed and in part produced by the dispersion of the human race after the confusion of language at Babel, and their division into separate tribes and nations. Unity in the supernatural was lost; pride and passion became its interpreters; and Satan, seizing on these as his ministers, originated the terrible superstitions of the old world, brought reason and will into bondage to the flesh, and established his own worship in the place of that of God, as in time he will do with those who now follow the Protestant apostasy, if they do not return to unity and submit to the divinely-assisted guidance of the Holy Catholic Church; for though they have reason, they have no sure guide in the order of the supernatural. The cause will not lie in the insufficiency of reason in her own order, but in their attempting to make it serve them in an order which it does not and cannot enlighten,—not in the corruption of nature, but in their neglect of the means of grace, without which they cannot live the life of Christ.

Here we find a reason why our author, if successful, would do the world a most serious injury. We have shown him that we have all that is in reason and the natural order, and therefore that by reducing Christianity to pure rationalism, he can give us nothing that we have not already in as great perfection at least as he has. But we tell him now, that by depriving us of what we have that he has not, he would deprive us of what is necessary to save the world from the abominable superstitions and practices of the hea-

* Romans, i. 18-24, *et seq.*

then world. He cannot keep the world at the point of pure rationalism. All history proves it. There is more in the world than rationalism. There is more than simple nature. God placed man in the beginning under a supernatural providence, and gave him a supernatural revelation, because he would ennoble him, and give him a higher good than it is possible for any creature to attain to by his natural strength and faculties. He gave him a supernatural religion. But this supernatural religion becomes a savor of life unto life to the willing and obedient, and a savor of death unto death to the indocile and the disobedient. There is no use in quarrelling with this, for the fact is so, and cannot be changed by us.

Now, if we attempt to break from this religion, and to suffice for ourselves, we fall away from reason itself, come under the dominion of the flesh, and run into all the absurd and abominable superstitions of the heathen. The world cannot desert the true supernatural and fall back on the purely natural, and remain there; it can only desert the true supernatural for the false, leave God only for the devil. You have, practically, no alternative between Christianity and superstition. This is seen even now in our own country. They who had gone farthest in infidelity have become spiritists and demon-worshippers. They have not remained with rationalism, but have passed on to superstition, and a superstition, which, if not checked, will hardly fail to equal the grossest, the most abominable, the most inhuman, and the most impure recorded in history. With individuals it has already gone nearly as far. The only protection against the false is the possession of the true. The only safeguard against superstition is true religion, the religion of Christ, as infallibly taught by his Church.

Here is a consideration that we address to the benevolence, the humanity, to the justice of the author. Religion men will have, or if not religion, superstition. Let him regard that as a "fixed fact." If we deprive them of Catholicity, of the true religion in its purity and integrity, we plunge them into superstition, and cover the land anew with horrors. The author, then, in his undertaking, can do us no good, but may do us infinite harm. We tell him we cannot live in this bleak and wintry world without clothes. We must have something to cover the nakedness of nature. Let him ponder this well. It alone should teach him to abandon his work of destruction, and to cease to serve

Apollyon. We have, of course, other and stronger reasons to allege, but this, of itself, is sufficient, and is enough for the present. We shall, as we proceed in the discussion to which he has invited us, show him that in his warring against Christianity as a supernatural religion, he is warring against the truth, against God himself, as well as against the true interests of both man and society.

ART. II.—*Pape et Empereur*. Par J. M. CAYLA. Paris : Dentu. 1860. 8vo. pp. 32.

MR. CAYLA's weak and silly pamphlet, *Pope and Emperor*, has made no little noise among non-Catholics, and considerable importance has been attached to it on the supposition that it was written under imperial inspiration to prepare the French mind for a separation of the Church in France from communion with Rome, and its erection into a schismatic national Church under the Emperor as its Supreme Pontiff. We think this supposition is gratuitous. We find in the pamphlet no mark of the imperial mind, and we detect in the policy it recommends no *Idée Napoléonienne*. The Emperor may have been quite willing to permit its publication, but its responsibility, we presume, rests with the obscure journalist under whose name it is sent forth.

We think none too well of the Emperor's Catholicity to believe him capable of adopting the policy recommended by Mr. Cayla, if he regarded it as necessary or useful to his own interests or those of his dynasty ; or, at least, of postponing or sacrificing the interests of the Church, without any scruple, to what he regards as the interests of the state ; yet we do not believe him hostile to the Church, unless where she is hostile to him ; and we believe him too able a politician not to see that he could gain nothing, and might lose much by separating from Rome and placing himself at the head of a schismatic Church. He has no religious motives, and we can see no political reasons he can have for doing it. France is the most powerful Catholic nation in the world, and could gain no increase of power or consideration by breaking with the Pope, and placing herself on the line with other heretical or schismatic states. She has nothing to fear from the politics of

Rome, for she is strong enough to defeat any coalition of Catholic powers the Pope, if so disposed, could form against her. The other Catholic powers, with Austria at their head, would not be a match for her, and could defeat her arms or her policy only by coalitions with non-Catholic powers; and these coalitions could be as easily formed against her as a schismatic power, as they could be against her as a Catholic power.

If France were a small or weak state in comparison with other Catholic states, and communion with Rome compelled her to adopt a policy which she regarded as contrary to her own political or social interests, she might have a pretext for breaking that communion; but such is not the case now, and is not likely to be the case hereafter. She has undeniably the leadership among Catholic powers, and, though she may force her policy upon them, they cannot force theirs upon her. Neither has the Emperor any thing to apprehend from the old system of public law and Catholic politics sustained by the Sovereign Pontiffs in past ages. He has not only emancipated himself, but also all Europe from that system. The Treaty of Paris, March, 1856, put an end to Christendom, and with it to all apprehension from Papal politics. The appeals of the Holy Father, backed by nearly all the bishops throughout the world, however they may touch Catholic hearts and move Catholic sympathies, bring no response from the political world. As to exterior politics, the Emperor, then, has nothing to gain by schism. France could only lose her Catholic prestige among Catholic powers, and the sympathies of all Catholics throughout the world, without acquiring any additional respect from non-Catholic powers.

In the interior, the Emperor could hardly be more independent than he already is. With the *Édit* of Louis XIV. relative to the four articles of the French clergy, in 1682, which he has revived, and the *lois organiques* promulgated by his uncle along with the Concordat of 1801, which he refused, when Dictator, to repeal, he has nearly all the substantial power over the Church in France that he would have in case he were its acknowledged head. He has all the power over the Church in France that the old French kings had, and they, Fénelon tells us, "were more Popes in France than the Pope himself." He could hardly have more power to subject the Church to his will were he to adopt the policy of the pamphlet, while his re-

sponsibility would be much increased. It is true, his appointments of bishops need the confirmation of the Holy Father, but, ordinarily, these appointments are confirmed as a matter of course, and it is not worth while to throw off entirely the Papal power, in order to get now and then a favorite appointed. Just now Rome has refused to confirm, as Bishop of the see of Vannes, the Abbé Maret, not unknown to our readers; and the Emperor, very possibly, is not pleased. But the contest will not be pushed to extremes by either party, and will end in a compromise, or in one or the other party's giving way. He cannot, on account of occasional opposition of this sort to his will, afford to break with the Holy See, to isolate himself from the whole Catholic world, and to lose that influence, so important to him, which he has exerted and still exerts over the Catholics of other countries, especially Catholics in non-Catholic states, as the representative of the first Catholic power in the world.

The "Napoleonic idea" is not to separate France from the Catholic world, but to place her at the head of that world, and, through the pressure her chief may bring to bear on the Pope, to compel it to follow her lead, and to support her policy. The Pope is a necessary element in the Napoleonic policy; and to withdraw France from his communion would be a political blunder. It would lose the Emperor a useful friend, if it did not raise him up a dangerous enemy. The elder Napoleon re-established the Papal authority in France, because he wanted the Pope as an ally, by whose aid he might secure the co-operation of Catholics in his policy, and through them and his own military and administrative genius, be able to make all non-Catholic powers his vassals, and secure to his dynasty the empire of the world. He found the Pope indeed less tractable than he had hoped, but the blunder of attempting to coerce him into support of his policy lost him the throne of France, and sent him to fret himself to death on the barren isle of St. Helena. The present Emperor understands tolerably well the blunder of his uncle, and will not be likely to repeat it, although he no doubt counts less than his uncle did on the aid to be derived from the Pope.

The policy recommended by Mr. Cayla is inconsistent with what is evidently the policy of the Emperor. The Emperor's policy, we take it, is to favor by turns all the parties in France, without giving himself to any one of

them. He will give no one party a complete victory over another; but, without completely satisfying any one, he will labor to make each feel that it has, upon the whole, more to hope and less to fear from his government than from any other government that could be established in its place. When he finds the Church party too strong for their enemies, he will restore the equilibrium by favoring the anti-Church party; and when this party becomes too strong for his purpose, he will favor again the Church party, and do some act that will gratify his Catholic subjects. He seeks to maintain the equilibrium of parties, and his command of all, by alternately exciting the fears and the hopes of each. Thus, in accordance with the wishes of the liberals, he makes war on Austria, permits, perhaps encourages Victor Emanuel to rob the Holy Father of the greater part of his temporal dominions, and to win back the sympathy of Catholics, sends an expedition into Syria ostensibly to protect their brethren against Mahometan ferocity.

His Italian policy, as long as it was directed chiefly against Austrian prepotence in the Peninsula, met generally with the approbation of his Catholic as well as of his non-Catholic subjects; but when it became directed through Sardinia against the temporal dominion of the Holy Father, in accordance with the original programme, as we understood it from the first, it alarmed the French prelates who had hitherto supported him, offended the universal Catholic sentiment, and combined against him nearly the whole Episcopate of France, backed by all that remains of the old Catholic, Bourbon, and Orleans parties. He accordingly directs against the bishops, the apparent leaders in the movement, the stringent measures against the press which they had most cordially approved when directed against their enemies. He strengthens himself against them by gaining over more fully the liberals through some slight concessions to liberty. This is his policy; and, in accordance with this policy, he may have encouraged the publication of the pamphlet before us to operate on the fears of the French Episcopate, and also on Rome, and, through the threat of a schism, to induce both to cease their opposition to his policy. Yet we do not believe he has the slightest intention of carrying the threat into execution. When the pamphlet has effected the purpose of inducing Rome to confirm his appoint-

ments, and the French bishops to withdraw their opposition, it will be forgotten, and the Emperor, by some act really serviceable to Catholic interests, will recover the confidence of the Church party.

The Emperor understands, perhaps better than any man in France, the real French character. He knows that, as long as he does not formally break with Rome, as long as he does not place the Gallican Church in open, avowed schism, he may manage ecclesiastical affairs very much as he pleases, without meeting with any serious opposition from the French people. Yet the French are, after all, tenacious of the name of Catholic, even when they have little faith and less practice; and they know perfectly well that they would forfeit that name were they to cease to be in communion with the Holy See. We do not believe the Emperor could safely break with Rome and, after the example of the old Revolution, establish a new Civil Constitution of the Clergy. His uncle found that he could not govern France separated from the centre of unity, and one of his first acts on acceding to supreme power was to abolish the Civil Constitution of the Clergy the Revolution had imposed, and to re-establish communion with the Holy See. France is more Catholic to-day than she was then, and we believe that the attempt to create and render permanent a religious schism would cost him his throne, and send him to St. Helena to occupy the grave he has there purchased of the British government.

That there is a party in France that thinks with Mr. J. M. Cayla we do not doubt; that that party is not without influence we have just as little doubt; but the Emperor will never suffer it to become predominant if he can help it. Yet even that party is in the main opposed to the Pope on political rather than on religious grounds; for it is indifferent to all religions rather than actively hostile to any. The political reasons which move them are fast disappearing. That non-Catholic communions should regard the pamphlet as a sign, does not surprise us; but the day for states to secede from the communion of the Holy See has gone by, because there no longer exist any powerful political reasons why they should do so, and religious or theological reasons have lost their force. The political power of the Holy See is gone; nations, great or small, are no longer bound by ecclesiastical laws, or by fear of the political hostility of the Pope; and they pursue, undeterred

by threats or excommunications, the policy that they judge best. There is no longer, in fact, any political dependence on Rome, and Napoleon III. is as much master in his own dominions as in theirs are heretical or schismatical sovereigns. There is, then, no motive for seceding. They have already all the real independence they could have by seceding.

The tendency of the modern world is not in the direction the pamphlet suggests. It is not to the concentration of the civil and ecclesiastical power in the same hands, whether the hands of the Pope or of the Emperor, but to the separation of Church and State—to the emancipation of politics, on the one hand, from the control of the spiritual authority, and religion from the authority of the state on the other. The watchword of the day is not, UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE, but RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; and though, in the minds of those who vociferate the words in the loudest tone, religious liberty means little else than the liberty of infidelity, and of making war on the Church of God, there is a logic in the human mind that will ultimately compel it to be understood to mean that conscience is free before the civil law, and accountable to God alone, that all religions not *contra bonos mores*, or incompatible with the public peace, must be alike free before the state. Some rejoice in this tendency; some deplore it. We hold it to be irresistible by any human means, and, therefore, cease to war against it. The policy is carried out in our own country, and we have grown up under it. Finding the Church freer here than anywhere else on the globe, we are not disposed to quarrel with it, and we actually believe Catholic interests are better protected and promoted here than they would be if the clergy had an orthodox Cæsar to bind or gag their adversaries, and to do their work for them. We feel no hostility to it, and personally like it. All we ask of the state is, that it should acknowledge its own incompetency in spirituals, and recognize and protect our equal rights as citizens. If men choose to be Catholics and go to heaven, the state must not hinder them; if they choose to be infidels, heretics, schismatics, and go to the other place, the state must let them go, and leave them to the consequences of their abuse of their freedom.

The aim of Mr. Cayla is not religious liberty, but the usurpation of the spiritual authority by the chief of the state. Thus he says: "Victoria of England is queen and

popess; the King of Prussia is king and pope; the Protestant sovereigns of the German Bund exercise at once religious and political powers; in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway the kings are popes; Alexander II. of Russia is czar and pontiff; Otho of Bavaria is king and pope at Athens. The Sultan of the Turks is emperor and pope. In almost all these states the union of the two powers, especially in England and Prussia, has favored the development of the national instincts and of liberty. . . . What is good and useful with others will be good and useful in our dear France, that land fruitful in grand and generous ideas." (p. 24.) So let Louis Napoleon be recognized as Emperor and Pope, and be for France the supreme head of the Church as well as of the state. Let him break with Rome after the example of Henry VIII. of England, and unite in himself, in their plenitude, both powers.

Our poor author seems not very fruitful in religious ideas, and we have not found in his pamphlet a single moral or religious conception. All his thoughts stop this side the grave, and are of the earth earthy. He seems utterly unconscious of the religious bearing of the question he raises, and, in fact, presents no religious motive for the change he proposes. He is evidently a man without religious convictions, and without religious instruction. He has no conception of religion as law, binding alike on the prince and the subject, and which no one can deliberately violate without sin. God with him is without authority, and man without accountability. He notes no distinction between truth and falsehood, or between right and wrong. The chief of the state is his God, and national prosperity his heaven. His mind is singularly empty of all "grand and generous ideas." "All religions are alike to him, the true and the false, the good and the bad, and he has the simplicity—we can hardly call it the impudence—to hold up Mahometan Turkey as worthy, under her political and religious organization, of the imitation of Catholic France.

It seems never to enter the head of our French pamphleteer that what he proposes is incompatible with the essential constitution of the Church, and he seems to suppose that Catholics may separate the Church in France from the Holy See, unseat the Pope, and put the Emperor in his place without ceasing to be Catholics. We have not found a word in him that indicates the slightest consciousness that he is proposing the abolition of the Catholic re-

ligion, and the resuscitation of defunct heathenism. If he wishes the old Roman Cæsarism, under which Cæsar was at once Imperator, Pontifex Maximus, and God, why can he not say so in so many words, and let his readers know that it is Cæsarism, Gentilism as it existed before the conversion of Constantine, that he demands, and not the Christian religion which combatted and vanquished it? Is it that he is ignorant that one cannot be a double-distilled heathen like himself, and also at the same time a good orthodox Catholic? The Cæsarism which consists in clothing the chief of the state with the two powers in their plenitude cannot be defended by a follower of Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, and who has made the secular subordinate to the spiritual. Under the Christian law the two powers are distinct, and whatever authority the spiritual, as the superior, may exercise over the secular, the secular has no spiritual power, and can exercise no ecclesiastical functions whatever. So at least the Church teaches, as we have learned her teaching; and to deprive the Church of her spiritual head, and to give her a layman for her supreme governor, is simply to destroy her, by converting her from a spiritual to a secular institution.

Under this point of view Mr. Cayla raises no new question. What he proposes is simply that the Emperor should force, if force is necessary, French Catholics to become Protestants, schismatics, or heathens. This is all. If they consent to become such, we shall think they are very silly, very mad, or very wicked, but we cannot help it. They may do so if they choose, as men may lie, steal, commit murder, but they cannot do so without ceasing to be Catholics, without forfeiting their Catholic name, and the sympathies of the whole Catholic world. They would cease to be catholic, and become a sect. So much we wish Mr. Cayla to understand, and those outside the Church not to forget. Whether French Catholics, devoted as they are to their Emperor, and naturally prone to Cæsarism as many of them are, and have lately proved themselves, will consent willingly to the policy recommended, or by any power the Emperor can wield, can, in any considerable numbers, be forced to adopt it, is another matter, with regard to which we feel quite at our ease. Frenchmen have proved more than once, light and frivolous as they may appear, that when occasion calls they can be heroes and martyrs. Better not push them too far. They can not only die, but they

can erect barricades, and understand very well the art of making revolutions.

We, of course, can waste no time in discussing Mr. Cayla's policy from a religious or theological point of view; but as he professes to be something of a statesman, we may consider it for a moment from the point of view of statesmanship. The state is not and cannot be the Church, but still the Church presupposes it and consecrates it. The state is a necessity of natural society, which cannot subsist without government of some sort. The true basis of the state is justice, and its legitimate end is the common good, expressed by the two sacramental words, ORDER and LIBERTY. Order without liberty is despotism, and liberty without order is license. The destruction of either is fatal to the common good, and the legitimate ends of natural society. Where the two powers in their plenitude are united in the chief of the state, however it may be where they are united in the chief of the spiritual society, and the prince is at once Emperor and Pope, there may be order in the sense of despotism, but there is and can be no liberty. There the prince is supreme in both orders—is the living law for both body and soul, and the *dictum* of the Roman jurist, *quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem*, is theoretically and practically true. The prince is absolute, and interprets and applies alike the law of conscience and that of civil prudence without appeal. Where the two powers are separate, each with its own representative, and in its own order independent of the other, civil despotism can be tempered, and to some extent restrained, by spiritual freedom and independence. But where they are both united in and represented by Cæsar, who is at once Imperator and Pontifex Maximus, like the old Roman Cæsars under paganism, there is no guaranty of freedom; the government is an unmitigated despotism; the prince is absolute, and the subject is bound not only hand and foot, but soul and body, and made both morally and physically a slave. The union of the two powers contended for by the author is repugnant to the very end of the state, since incompatible with liberty, essential to the common good.

Now can Mr. Cayla be so charmed with the imperial despotism already existing in his "dear France," as to wish to extend and intensify it by adding to it the most complete and unmitigated spiritual despotism? He approves the revolution of 1789, and in the name of that revolution in-

vokes the Emperor to assume the Papal authority over the Church in his empire. Would he have us believe that this twofold despotism, reducing both body and soul to slavery, is the last word of that revolution, and yet expect us to approve it? Is that despotism what he as a patriot and a statesman desires for his beautiful country? How long does he think France would remain the "land fruitful in grand and generous ideas," if his policy were to prevail? "When the gods reduce a man to slavery," say the ancients, "they take away half of his manhood." Mr. Cayla would go farther and take away the other half also. Even our American slaveholders claim, in theory at least, a right only to the bodily services of their slaves, but he would give to the nephew what his uncle had not, dominion over the very souls of his subjects. He would make the Emperor, as the Grand Turk, the only free man in his empire, and he thinks it a grand and generous idea to reduce all Frenchmen to abject slavery in both soul and body, and that in doing so he is making provision for the growth of "grand and generous ideas." "Grand and generous ideas," where there are only timid, heartless, crouching slaves; where there are no men, no *generosi*! Is the man mad? Is he besotted? Does he think because he has lost his senses, if he ever had any to lose, that all Frenchmen have lost theirs? Is the old Gallic fire extinct, is the old Teutonic sense of individual independence dead, in French bosoms? Does he believe his countrymen the emasculated and abject slaves of the Bas-Empire, that he dares insult them with so base a proposition?

If Mr. Cayla had learned even the first rudiments of statesmanship, he would understand that the true statesman studies to distribute, not to centralize the powers of government. The first grand division is that between the spiritual and the temporal, or Church and state. This division is made under the New Law by God himself, by giving to the Church her own organization independent of that of civil society, and rendering her a complete kingdom or commonwealth in herself. This division of Church and state is not enough to secure full and adequate civil and political freedom, but it is one of its principal conditions. Where the Church is independent of the state, and the clergy hold from an authority independent of the civil, there is a moral and spiritual power ever present that maintains the interior freedom and moral independence of

the subject, and that serves to mitigate the despotism of the political sovereign. Owing to this independence of the Church the bishops and clergy in France are able to offer some resistance to the imperial despotism, and to keep alive in the hearts of Frenchmen the memory of freedom. Reduce the bishops and clergy to servitude, make them dependent on the Emperor as their spiritual superior, and there would be in France no power, body, or corporation resting on a basis of its own, and capable of making a stand for any sort of liberty. The Church would cease to represent the rights and authority of the spiritual order, and become only a part of the machinery of administration, an instrument of the imperial despotism. Grant that the Church in France, holding from the Pope, and to a certain extent independent of the state, is capable of offering resistance to the policy of the Emperor; grant, what we by no means concede, that the prelates as a matter of fact offer an inopportune or unjustifiable opposition, still a wise statesman will not seek to lessen far less to destroy their independence or to prevent the possibility of opposition, for the time may come when that independence and power of opposition may be as necessary to protect the sovereign against his subjects as it is now to protect the subject from the excesses of power—to protect order as it is now to protect liberty.

The evil of the political and civil organization of France, as admitted by her wisest and ablest statesmen, is in the centralization of power, and the absence of independent political powers or bodies in the state, subordinate to the central power indeed, but not created by it, or holding from it. The imminent danger of a dissolution of our Federal Union at the moment we are writing, cannot make us deny that the sovereignty of the Union is derived from the States, or wish to convert the States into prefectures holding from the Federal Union. The exaggeration or abuse of States' Rights threatens the Union to-day, but those rights may be necessary to-morrow to protect the States and through them liberty from the despotism of the Union. In no possible civil constitution can you secure great advantages without greater or less corresponding evils, and no man is less worthy of being called a statesman than he who hopes so to constitute the state as to exclude the possibility of evil. In France there is a complete centralization of power. The departmental and communal governments, if govern-

ments they may be called, do nothing to decentralize it, for they derive from the central power, depend on it, and are only conveniences for local administration. They stand on no bottom of their own. The French noblesse once had a political existence, but they are now a merely titular nobility, without political functions or significance. There are no corporations, institutions, or public bodies in France that have any political rights of their own, or whose consent is necessary to the legality of any measure the Emperor may choose to adopt. We will not pretend to say what the Senate and Legislative Body may in time become, but at present they have no real political power, and can impose no real restraint on the imperial will. They are in reality only instruments of administration, and present only a mockery of representative government. The whole power of the state is in the hands of the Emperor. Now add to his powers as chief of the state the supreme ecclesiastical power in its plenitude, as Mr. Cayla proposes, and tell us what liberty is left either to the nation or to the individual? The Emperor could say then, not only *l'état c'est moi*, but also, *l'Eglise c'est moi*. He would then be himself emancipated from all control, civil and moral, and the French people would be absolutely subjected to him in both spirituals and temporals.

The liberty of the press is null in France. Discussion and publicity are tolerated only so far as pleases his Imperial Majesty, and the means of bringing the intelligence and moral force of the nation to bear in favor of liberty or wise and just government can even now hardly be found, and would be wholly annihilated were the Emperor able to silence the bishops, or to bring them wholly within his power. If he could fill the sees at will with creatures of his own, and suspend or depose any prelate who showed any independence, or who dared give utterance to unpalatable truths, or expression to unwelcome sentiments, there would and could be no free voice in the empire besides that of the Emperor. Intelligence would soon grow feebler and feebler, the mind would stagnate, literature would lose its originality, freshness, and vigor, moral sentiments would languish, and the whole tone of society would become low and servile. Men would disappear, for they would find no exercise for their manhood, and the Emperor would soon find himself the only man in his empire, and having no men to command, no men to reign over, would himself

soon cease to be a man. Is such a state of things what the author would bring about in his *chère France*?

There are no bitterer enemies of the temporal government of the Pope than the class of persons represented by the author. Nothing shocks them more than to find priests exercising political powers; but they see nothing improper in politicians exercising sacerdotal powers. When it is a question of the union of the two powers in the chief of the Church, they are indignant, remind the clergy that their "kingdom is not of this world," and clamor for a separation of Church and state; but when it is a question of the union of the two powers in the chief of the state, they change their tune; they think the union then very reasonable, very just, and adapted to a nation prolific in "grand and generous ideas." Then they demand not the separation of Church and state, but their union. They cannot endure that the Holy Father should have a house of his own, and the temporal government of a small state in Italy with about three millions of subjects; but they would be charmed to see the autocrat of the most powerful state in Europe joining to his power as temporal prince the spiritual supremacy over thirty-six millions of consciences. Now it strikes us that it is wiser, if the two powers must be united in one person, to unite them in the person of the Supreme Pontiff than in the person of the Emperor, for we would rather fall under the political authority of priests than under the ecclesiastical authority of politicians. Priests may sometimes blunder in politics, but statesmen never do otherwise than blunder in spirituals, and as spirituals are much the more important, blunders in them are much more hurtful than blunders in secular matters.

We have here no occasion to discuss the propriety of merging the state in the Church, or aggregating the powers of the state to those of the priesthood, for we said all that is necessary to be said on that point in the article on Separation of Church and State in our last Review. The separation of the two powers does not mean in our mind the aggregation of the powers of the Church to those of the state, or those of the state to those of the Church. In the ordinary sense in which the word is taken, we defend not a theocracy, or the placing of the temporal government in the hands of the priesthood, but we see not what could be gained by placing the government of the Church in the hands of statesmen and laymen. Mr. Cayla and his friends would cry out

against us with all the force of their lungs if we should propose to merge the state in the Church, and make the Sovereign Pontiff supreme in temporals as well as in spirituals ; but are we expected to receive with more favor their proposition to merge the Church in the state, and make the Emperor supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals ? Can they not see that their proposition involves the union of the two powers as much as does that which they oppose ? Do they not see that if in theocracy they lose man, in their *statocracy* they lose God ? if in the former there is a pantheistic tendency, in the latter there is an atheistic tendency ? Is atheism any better than pantheism ? If the Pope would make but a poor Emperor, is it certain that the Emperor would make a good Pope ? Is it certain that the administration of civil government in subordination to spiritual and eternal interests would be a greater evil than the administration of the spiritual government in subordination to purely local and temporary interests ?

The difficulty with these men is that they are political atheists, and believe in no spiritual order. They regard the Church as being in reality no more spiritual than the state. They see in man nothing but the human animal, and in the universe no order but the political. They exclude from their universe the whole order represented by the Church, that is to say, the whole moral order as distinguished from the physical and material. They attempt to found the state without any recognition of moral and religious ideas, on material interests alone. They eliminate the soul, the spirit, the heart, the nobler part of man, on which alone depend all that is great, grand, noble, heroic, or touching in human society or human character, and then labor to establish and maintain government by mere brute force. Reducing men to brutes, they would govern them as brutes. And this is what they call the progress of civilization ! The state proceeding independently of moral and religious ideas and principles is a mere physical machine, and its force is mere brute force. The installation of the chief of the state as Supreme Pontiff is not the elevation of the state to the moral and religious order, but is the suppression of that order, or its depression to a level with the material order, which amounts to the same thing. It would be the materialization of religion, and the substitution of physical force for moral right.

Now we tell Mr. Cayla and his friends that the sup-

pression or subordination of the moral and religious order, or the reduction of man to the mere human animal, puts a people out of the condition of being well governed, or of sustaining a government that can permanently advance or even protect purely material interests themselves. The Emperor of the French is trying the experiment, but when the moral force of the French nation accumulated before his accession to power is spent, he will find himself face to face with a nation of brutes, or with an infuriated mob, and his empire gone. The whole history of the modern world proves, as does the whole history of the ancient Gentile world, that the attempt to maintain society with mere human animals can never be successful. Even the Gentiles had to bring in the gods, and in the absence of religion resort to superstition. The state itself must be founded on moral ideas, or else it has and can have no real, solid, or permanent basis, for Plato proved to you centuries ago, that all reality is in ideas, and that what is not ideal is mutable and transitory. It is, then, an essential requisite of a well-ordered state that it should recognize and respect the freedom and independence of the ideal order, and not attempt to subject to itself the spiritual, the universal, the unchangeable, and the eternal—the only real.

For us Catholics this ideal, spiritual, or moral and religious order, on which all that is permanent, good, or really useful in society or the state depends, is represented by the Church whose supreme governor is called the Pope. To aggregate the functions of the Pope to those of the Emperor or chief of the state is to bring this whole order into subjection to the material. It leaves in the breasts of the subjects of the government only two motives to which it can appeal for support, namely, interest and fear. Where these are the only motives that can be appealed to, or that can have scope for their activity, all the noble sentiments of the heart, tenderness, devotedness, loyalty, heroism, disinterestedness, all that goes to make up the nobility of man, the grandeur and charm of human society would be enfeebled and gradually suppressed, and the nation would become a nation of cold-hearted, cruel, and selfish cowards. The whole mind and soul, the whole activity of the people would be absorbed in worldly pursuits, and nothing would be esteemed that does not directly or indirectly contribute to material development and prosperity. We see it all through the modern world. The sense of morality is weak-

ened, and well nigh extinct, honor or honesty is forgotten, loyalty is despised, treason ceases to be a crime, and there is not public virtue or public spirit enough left to carry on a free government. The only possible remedy is in emancipating the moral order from the control of the state, of leaving the Church free and independent to rehabilitate moral ideas, to develop and strengthen the nobler and more disinterested sentiments of the human heart, to free men's souls from their slavery to things of time and sense, and to infuse into them moral courage, and render them capable of wedding themselves for life or for death to truth, to right, to justice. Self-interest or fear can never produce this moral heroism, and without it you can never have a well-ordered state, that is, a state in which order and liberty are united. This moral heroism is impossible in a state where the moral order is excluded, or the spiritual is subjected to the temporal. The policy Mr. Cayla recommends would then be no less fatal to the state than to the Church.

The instances Mr. Cayla assigns in proof of the secular wisdom of his policy do not, when carefully examined, prove any thing to his purpose. That England has developed her national instincts, whatever that may mean, and under some relations preserved or advanced liberty in spite of her separation from Rome and the subjection of her Church to the royal supremacy, we do not deny; but that her schismatic and royal policy has served the cause of liberty or of national prosperity we cannot admit. The first effect of that policy was to destroy the old English freedom, to reduce to zero the independence of Parliament, and to render the monarch absolute. It is idle to talk of the liberty of Englishmen from the death of Cardinal Wolsey to the summoning of the Long Parliament under Charles I., except their liberty to war against Catholicity and to persecute Catholics. The freedom which Englishmen now boast of enjoying, consists in part of the recovery of the liberty possessed by the nation before the schism, and in part of conquests made since the Great Rebellion in the seventeenth century, and is due to the memory of the past and to the fact that a very considerable portion of the English people never did submit, and never by all the power of the state could be made to submit, to the royal supremacy in matters of religion. The old Puritans had no objection to using the state to impose their religion on those who

would not willingly accept it, but they no more than Catholics admitted the right of the state to judge of religion. The state, they held, was bound to obey the word of God as expounded by godly ministers, and to protect and enforce only the religion enjoined by what they called the Church. The English Puritans, aided by the Scotch who rejected Episcopacy and held the king bound to obey the Kirk instead of governing it, were able to overthrow the royal supremacy in both Church and state, which has never in religion been practically re-established for more than a small fraction of the people subject to the British crown. England owes her present liberty to the Puritans and other dissenters, and to the fact that the Scotch are for the most part Presbyterians, and the great body of the Irish are Catholics. Victoria may be the head of the Anglican Church, but that Church is the Church of only a small minority of those who cheerfully acknowledge and affectionately submit to her as queen.

Prussia has extended her territory by war and conquest, but her progress toward political liberty has been just in proportion to the relaxation of her king in his control of ecclesiastical matters, and to the increase of the number of his subjects who refuse to recognize his popedom. One third of the population of Prussia are Catholics who do not own him for pope; add to these the old Lutherans who stand out against his new-fangled Evangelical Church, and those who recognize no Church, no religion of any sort, and you will find that he is pope for only the smaller number of his subjects. The solidity of Russian progress may be questioned, for like nearly all modern states she is eaten up with corruption. But be this as it may, Russia certainly owes nothing to the usurpation of papal functions by her Emperor. Had she remained in communion with the Holy See she would long ago, we can hardly doubt, have fulfilled her mission of driving out the Turks, restoring the Christian East, and making Constantinople the capital of her empire. The most formidable dangers Russia has to apprehend arise precisely from the subjection of the Church to the state by Ivan the Terrible, and the assumption of the papacy by Peter the Great. The nation then lost its liberties, czarism became established, and the religious innovations introduced by the synod of St. Petersburg acting under the authority of the Emperor have created a formidable schism in the bosom of the empire. The whole Church groans in its bond-

age and sighs for deliverance. The old Russian party which reject the imperial innovations threaten to make common cause with the revolutionary party, much stronger than is commonly supposed, and if they do, the Russian Emperor and the Russian Pope may experience the fate of Louis XVI. of France. As to Turkey, "the sick man," we need not enlarge. Neither the internal nor external condition of that empire says much in favor of the union of the two powers in the chief of the state. It may, however, be taken as a fair example of what France in a couple of generations would become, were the Emperor mad enough to adopt the policy recommended by our author.

Poor Mr. Cayla is as unsuccessful as a historian as he is as a statesman. He supposes the Frank monarchs created the Papacy by creating the Bishop of Rome a temporal prince, and investing him as their vassal with the government of the States of the Church. The Papacy, therefore, grows out of the temporal principality, and the Bishop of Rome is Pope because he is king, not a king because he is Pope. The author could not have made a greater blunder if he had had a schismatic Anglican divine for his teacher. As to the precise date of the origin of the temporal sovereignty, or the precise causes which made the Pope a sovereign prince, we shall say nothing now. It is enough to say that the Pope never was a subject of any temporal prince, and never can be. He represents him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. He is above all earthly monarchs by the law of Christ, and if he ever submits to a temporal sovereign even in temporals, it is as our Lord himself paid tribute to Cæsar, for the sake of peace, and to avoid scandal. The status of prince belongs to him by right of his office as Vicar of Christ, for by that office he is declared independent, and clothed with plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things relating to salvation. He never was the subject of the Roman Emperor, much less the vassal of the Frank monarchs. It was the Pope that made Pepin le Bref King of the Franks, not Pepin that made the Bishop of Rome Pope. It was not Charlemagne that made St. Leo III. Pope, but St. Leo. III. that conferred on Charlemagne the imperial dignity, and made him his coadjutor in the temporal government of the Roman States. The Papacy existed and was acknowledged by Catholics throughout the world, to say the least, long before the accession of the Carlovingians to the Frank monarchy.

The Papacy never depended on the temporal sovereignty, and would exist if the temporal sovereignty were lost. The Bishop of Rome was not made Pope by acquiring the temporal principality, but that principality was acquired by him, or conferred on him, because he was already Pope, that he might be independent in his spiritual government of the Universal Church. Even the temporal power, if such you insist upon calling it, which the Pope so long exercised as the chief of the political as well as of the religious world, did not depend on his temporal sovereignty, nor was it sustained by that sovereignty. He was the arbitrator between sovereign and sovereign, and sovereigns and their subjects, not because he was sovereign of the Roman States, but because he was the Father of Christendom, the supreme representative of God on the earth. Deprive him of his temporal dominion, you would do a great wrong to the Holy See, but you would not deprive him of one particle of his legitimate authority as Pope. They who imagine that the loss of the temporal principality would involve the destruction of the Papacy, and put an end to the Catholic Church, reckon without their host. In the providence of God the Pope has become a temporal prince; in the providence of God he may cease to be a temporal prince; but he will remain what he has been from St. Peter down to Pius IX., now gloriously reigning, the Vicar of Jesus Christ, the Vicegerent of God on earth. The temporal principality gives him no ecclesiastical power or right. As Pope he is all without it, that he is with it. The depriving him of it releases the Catholic from no obligation to be in communion with him, or to obey him as the chief of his religion.

But though the loss of his temporal dominion would not in the least affect the spiritual authority of the Pontiff, who in the Catacombs as in the Vatican or the Quirinal would be equally the Vicar of Jesus Christ and the Vicegerent of God, yet it might have a disastrous effect on his freedom and independence in its exercise; and for this reason Catholics defend it, and the enemies of the Papacy make war against it. What effect it would have in this respect, we will not stop to inquire, for that would lead us into a discussion foreign to our present purpose. But his entire freedom and independence in the exercise of his spiritual sovereignty is the divine right of the Holy Father, and essential to the well-being of the Church. The Church is not simply Presbyterian, or Episcopal, but Apostolic, that is

to say, Papal. Our Lord founded his Church on Peter, and continues the Apostolic power in Peter's successor. The suppression of the Papal authority would be the suppression of the Church herself, or her perversion from the Church into a sect, even though her rites and dogmas should remain unchanged. There may be differences of opinion among Catholics as to the best practical means of securing in the present state of things the Papal independence, but there can be none as to that independence itself, or as to the duty of Catholics to maintain it at all hazards. Never was that independence more seriously threatened than now, since the conversion of the Roman empire. Never was the duty of defending it more urgent, and never was it more necessary that all loyal Catholics should be on the alert to discover and defeat the machinations of the politicians.

Mr. Cayla shows us very clearly, if the same thing were not otherwise shown, that it is idle for Catholics to rely for the freedom and independence of the Church on political power constituted as it now is in France and most other continental states. He says to us, contrary to his intention, "put not your trust in princes." We do not believe the Emperor of the French is in his intentions toward the Church below the average of Catholic sovereigns, and we are far from believing him disposed to adopt the extreme policy Mr. Cayla recommends, but his antecedents, his declarations, his present conduct, all go to prove that he means to be master in his own empire, to subject the clergy to his will, and compel the Pope to submit to his policy. Having defeated Austria who had so long domineered over the Holy Father and subjected the clergy to her police, he is now determined to put France in her place. Without creating or approving a formal schism, he will yet exert all his power, if necessary, to prevent the Pope at Rome, or the bishops and clergy in France, from offering any serious opposition to his secular policy.

This is no more than should have been expected from the first. We know nothing more idle than to look for an orthodox Cæsar who will stand by the Holy Father and maintain the freedom and independence of the Church. Such a Cæsar has never been known. Cæsar may have religious sensibility, he may even understand the necessity of religion to uphold his power and to keep his subjects loyal and submissive; but he can never wish the freedom and independence of the Church in his dominions; for if

free and independent she divides power with him, and he would have no division of power. He would reign supreme and alone, a God on earth. He can tolerate no brother near the throne, and suffer, if he can help it, the Church to exist no farther than he can use her in the interests of his government. This lies in the very nature of Cæsarism, whether called Christian or pagan. Cæsar never can be the supporter of the freedom and independence of the Supreme Pontiff, for that means the freedom and independence of the Church. He never does willingly and never can sustain the Pope any farther than he can use him. Hence the fearful struggles in the Middle Ages between the Pope and the Emperor. The Pope would maintain the freedom and independence of the Church as a spiritual kingdom complete in herself; the Emperor would have no constituted power or body in his empire that was independent of his authority, and which he could not control. The Pope would maintain the Church independent; the Emperor would subject her to the political authority. Hence the struggle. Hence the inveterate hostility in all ages of the Cæsarists to the Papacy.

We can see no way of guarantying the freedom and independence of the Supreme Pontiff, and therefore the freedom and independence of the Church in each state so long as Cæsarism is suffered to stand. The fault is not in the man; it is in the system; and we can never expect Cæsar and Peter to live in peace together. There is no human security for religious freedom, but in making war to the knife on Cæsarism, in whatever form or guise it may show itself. We cannot rely on concordats, for Cæsar will either not keep his word and execute them, or he will struggle to pervert them to instruments of tyranny in regard to his subjects. The parties are not equal; the one is armed, the other is unarmed. The one wields the physical power of the state, the other wields only the power of faith, which in our days is weak. Spiritual censures are despised, and the Popes can no longer combine a political force sufficient to compel the perjured prince to keep his engagements. We can succeed only by limiting the power of government, by establishing a free government, which guaranties the political equality of the citizens, and secures in the general freedom of the citizen the freedom of religion, as is done in our own country. This we believe is the only practicable way of attaining adequate guaranties for the

freedom and independence of the Church. We must labor so to constitute the state that every man shall have recognized by the constitution, as one of the inherent and inalienable rights of the citizen, the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. This right of conscience implies full and entire freedom of the Church in the state, and can be infringed only by those acts which would infringe the recognized rights of all citizens whether Catholic or non-Catholic.

The political liberty we demand is, even in reference to the temporal order itself, a great good and worth struggling for; but at our age, after having fought so many battles for it, undergone so many defeats, encountered so many discouragements, experienced so many disappointments, and seen so many brilliant hopes vanish, we should not continue the struggle were we not profoundly convinced that it is necessary as the condition of securing the freedom and independence of our religion. The body is of little account; it will soon be dust, and whether it suffers a little more or a little less, whether it smarts under the lash of a taskmaster, or wastes away under disease, is a matter in itself worthy of no serious consideration, certainly of no serious struggle to one who, at farthest, must soon bid adieu to this world and all its interests. But the liberty of the mind, the liberty of the soul, the liberty of conscience, the liberty of religion is a good one is never too old to struggle for, and which is cheaply purchased at the expense of the dungeon, the stake, or the scaffold. It is the sum of all liberty, and is a good which one may carry with him into that life which never dies. We ask political freedom, we ask political guaranties of the rights of men, because we ask freedom of conscience and the full freedom and independence of our religion. We ask not freedom to oppress the consciences of others, but freedom to follow our own, and this freedom we think can be secured by founding the state on equal rights, and making the liberty of religion the political right of the citizen.

We know perfectly well that such a *régime* gives the Church no advantage before the state over the sects. She and they will stand on a footing of perfect equality before the civil constitution. She cannot use the state to force them to recognize her authority, and they cannot use it to force her children to renounce their spiritual mother, and accept their heresy. But this is only in accordance with

the general order of Providence. Our Lord proffers his grace to all, but he forces no one to accept it. We arraign not the past; "sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." We pronounce no judgment on the abstract rights either of the Church or of the state. We ask not what has been, nor what would be, if all rights could be practically asserted and carried out. We look only at what is practicable, men being as they are, and the world as it is. Whatever heated disciples, who know not what manner of spirit they are of, or old men, oppressed by their memories, may demand, we are persuaded that we can secure freedom for the Church only by conceding equal freedom to the sects. We can secure liberty for truth only by conceding liberty for error, liberty for good only with liberty for evil. This is all the world will concede, and with this we must be content.

With this we for ourselves are content. We have confidence in truth, and certain of having the truth, we fear nothing from the free and open encounter with error. We do not want the state to bind and gag our adversaries, or to dispatch them for us. We want no advantage over them but what we have in the intrinsic superiority of our religion, and in this we are true to the spirit of our Church, who asks for her celestial Spouse only free and willing servants, who serve him from choice, from love, not from servile fear or compulsion. The officiousness of civil government and half pagan disciples insisting on the legislation of ancient Rome where the two powers were united, not separated as under the Christian law, has always embarrassed her, obscured her spiritual loveliness, and raised her up innumerable enemies. If it had comported with the designs of our Lord to have used force to compress error or to advance truth, it would have cost him nothing to have suppressed at once all error, and left truth no enemy to grapple with. Nay, he could have prevented all error, all sin, all evil. But it pleased him to create man with free will, and it pleases him in his government of man to respect that free will. He leaves man the liberty of error, the liberty of evil, otherwise there would be no error, no evil in the world. The state is bound to suppress and punish violence, and maintain peace and equality of rights, and when it does so much, it probably does all that can be of any real service to the cause of truth and religion. All the Church needs to command intel-

ligence, and to win souls to Christ, is an open field and fair play. If you will neither gag nor bind her, she asks not that you gag or bind her adversaries. Fénelon, when he went on his mission to the Huguenots, stipulated that the dragoons of the king should be withdrawn, and no force be used or displayed. The Church is stronger in her simple vestments, armed only with the sword of the Spirit, than when clad in the armor and armed with the sword and lance of Cæsar. When the stripling David went forth to meet the challenge of Goliath who had defied the armies of Israel, he refused the sword and armor of Saul, and advanced in his simple shepherd's garb, with a shepherd's sling and five smooth stones from the brook; so goes clothed and armed the champion of truth to do battle with the giant Error. He wants not the incumbrance of Saul's armor. He takes nothing from the king. With his sling and smooth stone he smites the giant on his head, and fells him to the earth.

The great fault with us all is our want of confidence in truth. We feel that truth is an infant that cannot stand alone, or a child not to be trusted to itself. We must swathe it, hold it up, and lead it. We fear it cannot sustain itself, much less sustain us. We treat it as if it were error. But we should know that truth, and that only truth can stand alone, and that truth and only truth can sustain itself or sustain us. Truth is great and will prevail. Of all things truth is the most powerful and the most prolific. He who has the truth and dare trust it, dare confide himself without reserve to it, is omnipotent, and no power on earth or in hell can stand against him. Never yet was a true word honestly spoken that fell to the ground and was absorbed as water in the sand. God himself tells us his word shall prosper in the thing whereunto he sends it, for his word is truth. The truth honestly spoken is sure to reach some heart, to germinate, and in its season to bear fruit. Let us then have confidence in truth, and never fear that truth can be put to the worse in a free and open encounter with error. All heaven and all that is good and powerful on earth fight with it, and for it, and render it invincible. If ever truth fails to ride forth conquering and to conquer, it is because she is bound in the house of her friends, or held back by their untimely fears and miserable cowardice.

We have, then, no wish to see our Church using the state

to suppress dissent, and to force a uniformity which has no foundation in conviction and affection. We believe that for the civil government in our days to do more for her than to maintain her simple freedom to teach and govern according to her own doctrines and laws those who are willing members of her communion, would be to do little good and immense harm. Deprive error of all power to use the state against her, and she can well consent to forego all power to use the state against it. Let her and the sects stand on the same footing before the state. Let the state recognize as before herself the equal rights of her and them, and protect those rights simply as included in the equal political rights of the citizen, which are regarded as anterior to the state, and which the state is instituted to protect and defend under the name of liberty. Under such an order the Church can live and flourish, and better than under a government which professes to favor her, and which is sure to demand a liberal cession of her liberty as the price of the favor it extends to her. But this order can be realized only where political liberty is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed. Hence the reason why we wage such unrelenting war against Cæsarism, against all the unmixed forms of government, and contend with what strength and ability God gives us for political liberty, or what in the English-speaking world is called "self-government."

Mr. Cayla's pamphlet shows us the danger the Church always has to apprehend from Cæsarism,—dangers in part averted in the Middle Ages, because the Pope was then the chief of the political world, and could form political combinations sufficient to hold Cæsar in check. But that is now no longer practicable, for no political combinations can now be formed for defending the rights or interests of the Church. We hope the pamphlet will open the eyes of our European *oscurantisti*, and recall the idolaters of Cæsar, or those Catholics who have been so ready to throw both Church and state under his feet, to a sense of their dignity as men, and of their duty as Christians. If it have such a tendency, it will have rendered to society civil and religious far greater service than the author dreamed of rendering. There are people who will not regard the good, till alarmed by the evil of its absence. The Spartans taught their sons temperance by exhibiting before them the disgusting spectacle of their drunken slaves. Mr. Cayla's pamphlet may perform a similar service for the incense-burners to Cæsar,

and lead them to appreciate the benefits and necessity of political freedom. If so, the slave will have performed perhaps the best service of which he was capable, and half gain the forgiveness of those whose sense of justice and decency he has outraged.

ART. III.—*Lectures on the Early History of Christianity in England, with Sermons delivered on several occasions.*

By THOMAS WINTHROP CORR, D.D., LL.D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Troy, N. Y. New York : Daniel Dana, Jr. 1859. 12mo. pp. 334.

WE are among those who have always appreciated the difficult position of Episcopalians who may be called upon to defend their religion against keen and pressing opposition. If a Protestant attacks them, they are forced to stand upon Catholic ground or fail to make good their defence ; and if a Catholic attacks them, they are compelled to take Protestant ground in order to meet his objections with any thing like a satisfactory reply. The Catholics of Great Britain have bitter cause to complain of the political and social tyranny under which they have been ground down for three centuries in the name of the established religion, and for the pecuniary benefit of its ministers ; but in this country we have had no reason to accuse the Episcopalians as a body of persecution, nor even of an unkind or unfair spirit, since the epoch of our national independence. Although wealthy, as a general thing their influence has not been lent to the rich against the poor, or to the strong against the weak.

They have not accomplished as much in favor of the arts in their church buildings as might have been expected from their means, but the material effect of their worship, whether in the expensive temples of the large city or in the pleasant little chapels and parsonages of the country town and village, is to promote neatness, comfort, and order. Our priests will be found always willing to bear testimony to the kindness and charity which are so common among the Episcopalians, and those who know them more closely are well aware how many of them lead spotless lives, and are truly pious (we ask pardon for the phrase) in their own way. As a body too they have always pro-

claimed among the Protestant sects the truth of a divinely-established Church, as the Jews proclaimed among all nations the unity of God. For the present they are puzzled to discover where the true Church is, yet they look for it earnestly in every direction except the one in which they would be sure to find it.

Dr. Coit's lectures, which fill half the volume cited at the head of this article, and which we purpose reviewing, were composed to tranquillize the conscience of any members of his church who might feel dissatisfied with their religious condition and look for something better in the direction of Rome. They are manly in their tone, pleasantly written, and must have been quite interesting to a friendly audience when delivered by the living voice. The volume is entirely free from those charges of immorality and corruption which are so painfully frequent in works against the Church, and which lead an observant reader to form a very humble opinion of many of their authors. The lecturer seems to be a man who is innocent in his own thoughts and actions, and is therefore not prone to suspect the conduct of his neighbors. We must say of the Doctor, however, that he has a temper of his own. He does not appear to cherish any unchristian hatred toward the Pope and his friends, but he is nettled and stung by what he is pleased to consider the outrageous pretensions of Rome. He upbraids us with the unaccountable absurdities which have been told we implicitly believe in, he hates despotism, superstition, and treachery, and is so indignant at our supposed love for these things, that he scolds us and calls us names pretty freely all through his book. His error is the old and constantly-recurring one of mistaking for the Church of God the temporal interests and human passions with which her enemies, and sometimes, alas! her friends too, have chosen to identify her.

The pages of the lectures are rich in foot-notes from an immense variety of controversial works, which the student will readily discern are quoted at second, third, and fourth hand. They prove very clearly that our author has studied us only through our enemies, and that although he has read a great deal about "Popery," he knows very little of Catholicity. He calls us to the foot-note in the midst of a grave discussion, and sends us in the most amusing manner for authorities on points of Catholic teaching and history to the Scotch romancer, Bower, *On the Popes*, to Fra Paolo

Sarpi, to notorious Jansenists and radical infidels, to rabid old-fashioned Protestant polemics, including Barlow's *Brutum Fulmen*, Lathbury's *State of Popery and Jesuitism in England*, Trautmansdorf *On Toleration*, and somebody else on *Foxes and Firebrands*.

We shall try to give a brief outline of our author's argument against the Roman Catholic Church in favor of Episcopalianism, disincumbering it of the endless flings at popery, the Jesuits, the Inquisition, John Henry Newman, Romish superstition, &c., in which he indulges as he proceeds on the slightest opportunity, and at the shortest notice.

His object is to establish a bond of union between the Episcopalian denomination in the United States of which he is a minister and the Christian Church founded by our Lord and his Apostles in Jerusalem. He does not limit himself to the assertion of the Apostolic succession of Episcopal ministers, and in fact he lays so little stress upon this consideration that it does not appear whether he deems such succession essential or not.

He endeavors to make out a continuity of inheritance, so to speak, showing that Christianity was introduced into Britain as early as it was into Italy, and there transmitted from father to son, that the later Christian people of Britain received the observances and customs of their religious discipline from the primitive ages, and thus lived on obeying their pastors, worshipping in their temples, and reading their Bibles as Episcopalians do now, until Saxon invaders, Italian monks, and Papal innovations disturbed and finally destroyed the British Church. This continuity of Christian life, gushing forth from the Apostolic era and flowing on in an unbroken stream through long and happy ages to the epoch when it was rudely broken and scattered by Gregory and Augustine, kept on, our author avers, without any assistance from Rome. Any thing like a claim on the part of the Bishop of Rome to supremacy over other Churches was unheard of among the Christians of Britain for ages; when mooted in later times it was at first ignored, and then rejected with scorn and contempt. They were in this respect like the Episcopalians, that they repudiated many things which Roman Catholics believe, but were consistently inflexible above all things in refusing to acknowledge the supremacy of the Papal See. But we must let our author speak for himself:

"Such an episcopacy as the Pope's (an imperial and œcumenical pontificate) when presented to the view of the bishops of the ancient Church of Britain was, as you saw by their reply to Augustine in council, a perfect novelty and a completely inadmissible innovation. They protested against it, and repudiated it with unbending, unconquerable aversion. They disowned it amid anathemas and threats of the direst vengeance, and this may satisfy you that while the ancient British Christians were as decided Episcopalians as ourselves, they were just as decided opponents as ourselves of the monarchical or, rather, imperial episcopacy of the popedom, which makes all authority tend to and end in a single point of concentration. You could not have a more striking proof than this that they were what we now call Protestants; for they dissented, and resisted, and rebelled, and confronted all sorts of curses, the moment that this, which is the very corner-stone of popery, was presented openly to their inspection and urged upon their allowance, nay, forced upon their allegiance.

This supremacy our British forefathers resisted as completely and as energetically as their children of the days of the Reformation. And there, to a theologian, I might leave the subject of the striking unlikeness of the ancient British Church to popery, and popery most loves, most assiduously maintains, most inflexibly forward, as a test, as a rule of ecclesiastical fealty. But such a treatment of a subject will not satisfy a promiscuous audience, and I must therefore go on to show that, not only in the grandest point of all, but in subsidiary ones also, our British forefathers by no means built up their Church after the style of Roman architecture. . . . They," (the historical points dwelt upon by the lecturer,) "show how thoroughly the ancient British Church (so to speak) disresembled the Roman; and what a slavish subjection to itself the Roman Church insisted on even at that comparatively early day."—*Lecture iv.*, pp. 107–111.

We believe that we have stated fairly our author's line of argument, and the conclusion which he desires his hearers to draw from it. In quoting his fourth lecture, we have omitted portions of it in which he labors to prove that the doctrine of the supremacy of the Pope is a cardinal point with Catholic theologians. There is no necessity for insisting upon this, since we fully admit it, and we know of no way in which an Episcopalian can become a Catholic unless he is prepared to believe that the Bishop of Rome is the successor of St. Peter and the Vicar of Jesus Christ upon earth. No one is a Catholic who does not admit his primacy, not of honor merely, but of authority and jurisdiction over the whole Church. We are not bound, however,

by our faith to admit that he has the power to rule mankind in matters of worldly interest which belong purely to the temporal order, and therefore we are falsely accused by Dr. Coit of upholding despotism.

Nor do we maintain that the Pope as visible head of the Church upon earth is ever separated from the Church, or acts outside of her or against her, and we are therefore wrongfully accused of upholding Papal usurpation in matters of a spiritual nature. The Church is a living organism; and we teach that while a body cannot live if it is deprived of its head, so also a head cannot be a living head which has no body attached to it. The promise of our Lord, that he would abide with his Church forever, binds him to take care of its head as well as of its members, and to ensure rightful direction on the one hand and due obedience on the other. We object to the Protestant fashion of making us speak of our Chief Pastor as if he were or could be separated from the Church, or as if his authority were different from or opposed to the authority of the Church. It is the same authority having for its source and guide the Holy Spirit who abides forever with the Church, that is to say, with the head of the Church and with all the members that remain in living communion with their head. We cannot allow the divinely-appointed and commissioned Chief Pastor of the Church to be placed in the position of a mere spokesman or representative; but while we protest against the Church being spoken of as if she were a collection of scattered members without a head, we also object to the Supreme Pontiff being spoken of as if he were an isolated head without members. We can no more see the practical use of a bodiless head than we can of a headless body.

But we must proceed to examine our author's chain of continuity, the links of which begin at Jerusalem and reach, as he fondly supposes, to St. Paul's Protestant Episcopal Church in Troy, of which he is the popular rector.

We meet with a difficulty in Dr. Coit's argument at a very early stage of proceedings. He starts from the Christians of Jerusalem, but he has not remembered to disprove the Catholic article of belief that the Church which made them Christians is, by its very design and institution, a Church having a visible head upon earth. There was no one among the Christians of Jerusalem who was not in-

formed of the fact that our Lord had singled out St. Peter from his other Apostles, had prayed that his faith might not fail, had told him to confirm his brethren, had appointed him the bearer of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and had given him the express power to feed the sheep of the divine fold as well as the lambs. Before speaking of what others received from the Christians of Jerusalem, we must determine what they themselves received from the founders of the first Christian congregation. Among the truths they received was that of the primacy of Peter over the Apostolic College, and over all other Pastors of the Church.

There is another primeval difficulty in the way, furnished by the necessary condition of the Church of Jerusalem on the day when the first Christian was baptized by the Apostles. It is, as Dr. Coit must admit, that the authority of the Church was full and complete although not one word of the New Testament had been written. The believers at Jerusalem were not yet called Christians, but they were Catholics, for the Apostles had taught them to say that they believed the Holy Catholic Church.

Now let us place the Doctor, who glories in being a Protestant, in the presence of the Catholic Church of Jerusalem, and what will he say in defence of his belief that the Scriptures and not the authority of the Church are the Christian rule of faith? We speak of the Gospels of course as the inspired word of God, and not merely as a credible historical account of the life and times of our Lord. People in Jerusalem embraced the faith, lived perfect lives for years, and died martyrs for the faith, who had never read a word of the New Testament. People were born of baptized parents, and grew up to be old men and women, and died before the Gospel of St. John, some of the Epistles, and the Book of Revelations were written.

When the Christian Scriptures were written, they were the work of the Apostles and others whom the Apostles had associated with themselves, such as the Evangelists Luke and Mark. Those who had authority to write had certainly the authority to explain what they had written. The authority of the Church, then, is superior to that of the Testament, which is merely a record—although an inspired one—of what we already knew and believed before it was written. Is Dr. Coit prepared to admit Church authority in this sense, excluding as it does the Protestant right of private judgment in the interpretation of Holy

Writ? If he admits it he is no Protestant, and if he denies it he is no heir to the faith of the Church of Jerusalem.

But let us go on with our author, and, leaving Jerusalem, consider Christianity at a later day, when its light had already become diffused abroad over the East.

We find the Apostles and the Bishops whom they had appointed placed at the head of flourishing Churches. Saul of Tarsus had been converted, and had travelled over Judæa and Greece, leaving everywhere behind him the example of his virtues and the fruits of his Apostolic zeal. The Church had begun to become acquainted with that bitter opposition which was to follow her for long centuries of heroic suffering, during which the blood of martyrs was still the seed of Christians, and the hatred of men called forth the manifestation of unceasing love on the part of her heavenly Spouse. The Christian Scriptures were now all written, and learned and holy men began to study and interpret them for the benefit of the people of God, and the refutation of such as dared to mingle Jewish superstitions or heathenish errors with the traditions first received from the founders of the Church. And yet, while the propagation of the Christian faith and the daily increase of the followers of the Crucified were facts of grand and luminous proportions in the East, the little Patriarchate founded by St. Peter or some one else on the banks of the yellow Tiber was a matter, our author assures us, which but few knew or cared about among the daily-spreading crowds of the faithful. He names various epochs, some very early and others later in Church history, when Christianity may have been introduced into Britain. One fact, however, he insists upon strenuously throughout, namely, that by whomsoever introduced, it certainly came not from Rome, nor through her influence or agency.

It is not our purpose here to prove that Britain owed the faith to Rome, or to settle the time when she first received it. Our author would be willing, we presume, to admit that, at what time soever she became Christian, her faith was the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic faith of the Church which Christ established. This faith, we maintain, was not the same as that now held and professed by the Episcopalians. Christians of the Churches founded by the Apostles believed certain things which the Episcopalians reject, even if they rejected not certain things which the Episcopalians believe. These things, moreover, are matters essential to

salvation: such as dogmas of faith and discipline of Apostolic institution.

But apart from this, why is the author so anxious to show that Britain did not receive its faith from Rome even at that early period? Rome was certainly an Apostolic Church. He does not deny that St. Peter was there, or that St. Paul was there, and there was certainly no corruption as yet in the doctrines or practices of the Roman Church. He evidently feels that if he admits that the faith went from Rome to Britain at any period, he cannot escape the conclusion that the dogma of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff went with it. He does not however avoid the difficulty by merely getting the inheritance of the faith for the Britons from some other geographical point besides Rome. It is easy to establish the fact that the Bishops of Asia, of Gaul, and of Spain, as well as those of Italy, believed in the primacy of St. Peter, as well as in other articles of faith which the Episcopalians deny. We are not writing a treatise on the Primacy, and shall therefore refer our readers to the many works which treat of the subject *ex professo*, and pass on to consider, in connection with it, a single point of historical interest earnestly dwelt upon by our author.

The Greek Church is referred to as being undoubtedly favorable to the position of Episcopalians, and just as undoubtedly opposed to that of the Catholic Church. But history shows that in all cases of inquiry, doubt, or dispute, the doctrine held by the Church of Rome was that which came, sooner or later, to prevail among the majority of Christians. In all cases of solemn and official investigation concerning affairs of the Greek Church, whether that investigation was conducted by a General Council, or by some other synod, the proceedings of which were afterward ratified by the whole Church, the stand previously taken by the Roman Pontiff was found to have been right. He never yielded or changed where doctrine or Apostolic discipline was in question, but all others invariably gave up their opinions or altered them so as to be in harmony with his decision. Any parties opposing such decision came sooner or later to be classed as heretics by the Eastern Church, and fell out of the regular line of inheritance of Apostolic faith and tradition, just as the Episcopalians have done in the face of the Western Church.

The faith received from the Apostles has been preserved

by the Roman Pontiffs faithfully from the beginning both in the East and in the West. We know when opposition to them occurred. We can tell the names of the opponents. We can state the time when they lived, and the novel doctrines which they broached, and the day when they were publicly anathematized by the Church under the guidance of the successors of St. Peter. Before the innovators made their appearance, the Eastern Christians remained in union with the Roman Church on the points contested, and during the excitement of the innovations they continued in the same union and did not follow those who fell away, and after the innovation and the innovators had passed away, the line of tradition was preserved in the East, as in the West, down to the Council of Florence in spite of Photius, and to that of Trent in spite of Luther; and there are still, as there ever have been, Greek bishops, and priests, and churches united to Rome as the common centre of faith and authority.

Dr. Coit unwittingly betrays the weakness of his cause when he exclaims: "If the Protestant East could unite with the Protestant West and utter a harmonious voice, Popery would be left to an insignificance which none would be poor enough to honor." (p. 32.) But this union has never been, nor is it likely to take place, and this, too, while the Catholic East and the Catholic West have been always and are still united under the primacy of the Apostolic See. The only possible endorsement that the East can give Episcopalianism is the names of sectarians condemned as guilty of heresy and schism by the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. In order to illustrate this position more fully, let us for a moment recall the history of the Eastern Councils as the most public occasions of display on the part of Eastern Catholicity, of submission to the Roman Pontiff and harmony of action with him in upholding Catholic doctrine and traditions, and condemning the "Protestantism of the East." We will mention them briefly in the order of time.

1st General Council held at Nice, A. D. 325, presided over by the Legates of Pope Sylvester, the Bishop Osius, and the Priests Vitus and Vincent, who signed before all the Bishops; affirmed that Jesus Christ is God consubstantial with the Father; condemned Arius.

2d General Council held at Constantinople, 381, convened by letters of Pope Damasus, who held a council

at Rome at its close and solemnly ratified its decrees. It defended the Divinity of the Holy Ghost and anathematized the heresy of the Macedonians.

3d General Council at Ephesus, 431, presided over by St. Cyril, as Legate of Pope Celestine, condemned Nestorius, who divided Christ into two persons. It also recognized the blessed Virgin as Mother of God.

4th General Council, at Chalcedon, 451, presided over by Pascasinus, Bishop of Lilybæus, Licentius, Bishop of Ascoli, and Boniface, Priest of Rome, Legates of Pope Leo. Condemned Eutyches, who asserted that, after his resurrection, there was only one nature in Christ. The following sentence of deposition against Dioscurus is taken from the third act or session: "The Most Holy Pope Leo, head of the universal Church, invested with the dignity of the Apostle Peter, who is called the foundation of the Church, the rock of faith, and keeper of the gates of the kingdom of heaven, hath by means of us, his legates, with the consent of this holy synod, deprived Dioscurus of the episcopal dignity, and deposed him from all sacerdotal functions."

5th General Council, at Constantinople, 553, for the adjustment of the controversy about the celebrated Three Chapters. The Council was convoked and presided over by the Patriarch Eutyches, who recognized the right of Pope Vigilius to preside. Vigilius claimed the right, but though present in Constantinople, declined to preside. Vigilius had already condemned the Three Chapters in his famous "Judicatum," and the Council accepted his sentence, re-affirming the decrees of the preceding General Councils. "In the reign of the Emperor Justinian," writes the Greek historian Zonaras, "was convoked the Fifth Council, composed of one hundred and sixty-five bishops, of whom Pope Vigilius was the chief."

The 6th General Council at Constantinople, 680, to condemn the heresy of the Monothelites, who admitted only one will in Christ, was presided over by Peter and George, priests, and John, deacon, Legates of Pope Agatho.

The 7th General Council at Nice, in 784, condemned the Iconoclasts, and re-established the veneration of images. Presided over by Peter, Archpriest, and Peter, Abbot of St. Sabas, Legates of Pope Adrian I.

The 8th General Council at Constantinople, 869, re-established in his See St. Ignatius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and ejected Photius, the Martin Luther of the East. It

was presided over by the Bishops Donatus and Stephen, and the Deacon Marinus, Legates of Pope Adrian II. The following is the style of signature adopted by the first named of these: "I, Donatus, by the grace of God, Bishop of Ostia, representative of our Lord Adrian, Universal Pope, President of this Holy and Ecumenical Council, have promulgated all the things herein written, and have subscribed them with my own hand."

Passing over the Councils of Lateran, the first of Lyons, and that of Vienna, which were held on account of affairs more immediately concerning the Western Church, we will close this sketch by noticing the 2d Council of Lyons, in 1274, under Gregory X., and that of Florence in 1439, under Eugenius IV., in which the Greeks formally acknowledged the supremacy of the Holy See. Those of the Orientals who had been recusant gave in their adhesion, and were solemnly united to the Roman Church. But at all times before and after these Councils, the ancient bond of union had been preserved by many who remained faithful and witnessed against the prevarication of the court and its dignitaries as they fell away, sometimes for one reason and sometimes for another, from the unity of faith and the communion of saints under the guidance of the Chair of St. Peter.

There was no class of Greek Christians among whom one or more rebels against Church authority were not to be found at one period or another, but the novelty of their doctrines was protested against immediately by conservatives of the same class as soon as such novelty was broached, or at least as soon as it was fairly understood. We know that certain Patriarchs of Constantinople attempted to usurp the universal Pontificate, but they were successfully resisted not by Rome alone, but by the Greek Church, too. We know the pretensions of certain of the Eastern emperors in their own behalf, or in that of a national Greek Church, but we find Constantine, Theodosius, Marcian, and even Basil assisting as simple laymen at the Councils, and appending to their signatures the words, "*Non definiens sed suscipiens et consentiens.*" We know that bishops resisted the ordinances of Rome, but we remember also the appeals of many of the great lights of the Eastern Church to the Roman Pontiff, and the readiness with which they obeyed when cited to appear before him. Bishops and even Patriarchs who favored heretics and schismatics, were deposed

by the Pope, and others whom they had deposed were by him restored to their sees.

We shall not insist again here upon the testimony of so many of the Greek fathers who, sometimes as expounders of the texts referring to the primacy of St. Peter, sometimes as chroniclers of the ancient traditions of the East, and sometimes as witnesses of the doctrine and practice of their own age and day, gave evidence of the fact that the Roman Pontiff was and ought to be the visible head of Christ's Church upon earth. We have selected the Councils as elevated and luminous points in the line of Eastern history. They were held on occasions of the greatest possible solemnity, when grave disputes were to be decided, exalted personages in Church and state rebuked and condemned, the claims of rival Prelates or Churches adjusted, and Patriarchs and Bishops instructed in their duty and not unfrequently forced into compliance or chastised for dereliction. And on such great occasions as these the hand that wields supreme power and stamps with approval the legislative acts of the Church of God, is invariably that of the Bishop of Rome or the legate appointed to preside in his name. "The care of all the Churches," says the Greek historian Sozomen, quoted by Fleury, "belongs to him on account of the dignity of his See."—*Sozom.*, l. iii., c. viii. "There is a canon," says the other Greek historian, Socrates, "which forbids the Churches to pass laws without the consent of the Bishop of Rome."—*Socr.*, l. ix., c. viii. Every canonist is familiar with the later aphorism of Gratian, "*Papæ est convocare concilium.*"

We have dwelt particularly on the subject of the Primacy, because our author rightly and wisely gives it prominence; but the same method may be pursued in reference to other dogmas of vital importance. The Episcopalian will find that there is a perpetual succession of witnesses in the Greek Church for over one thousand years who give unhesitating testimony against him, and force him to the painful avowal that the religious communion he belongs to, in spite of its lofty aspirations, cannot rightfully assume the style and title of the Church Catholic, cannot in fact rise above the level of a sectarian institution. In vain, then, does Dr. Coit appeal for aid and comfort to the Eastern Church. Not a single Apostolic See will endorse him. The orthodox Greek Church of olden times and its legitimate heirs of to-day reject his Episcopalianism as unmistakable

heresy, and even the schismatics themselves of Athens and St. Petersburg refuse to accept it as genuine Christianity.

And while there is no real resemblance between Episcopalianism and Eastern Christianity, one cannot enter a Roman Catholic Church without noticing numerous kindred features in doctrine and ancient practice that attest the common origin of the Eastern and Western Churches. We are very far indeed from treating the authority of Greek tradition as foreign or hostile to our communion. The writings of the Greek fathers are preserved among us and read with respect and devotion every day in the offices of our clergy. So true is it that we are willing to confess the obligation we owe to Christianity in the East that Greek ceremonies are preserved among us, Greek ornaments are conspicuous in our churches, Greek names are handed down with jealous care in our Rituals and Pontificals, and no Priest ever celebrates Mass without using in portions of it the very words in the Greek language which the Latin liturgy inherited from the Apostolic Churches of Asia in times long gone by. If parentage is to be traced by similarity of appearance in the offspring, Episcopalianism will certainly have to yield all claims of inheritance from Eastern Christianity to Churches in communion with Rome.

Having discoursed at great length on Christianity in the East, and dwelt upon its ancient grandeur, its noble monuments, and its inspiring recollections, with an admiration and affection which he indignantly denies to the undiminished splendor of the Church founded by St. Peter and St. Paul at Rome, our author now proceeds to argue that a union can be traced between the East and the British isles. He looks for a *point d'appui* between Greece and Britain, and ecclesiastical history readily suggests to him the city of Lyons in Gaul.

"The first Bishop of Lyons was an Oriental, its second Bishop was also an Oriental—the celebrated Irenæus, who was personally familiar with Polycarp, the Angel of the Church of Smyrna and the disciple of St. John. In the latter part of the second century, as we learn from the fifth book of the History of Eusebius, there was a terrible persecution at Lyons and in its vicinity. A long and interesting account of this persecution was transmitted to what we might suppose would be the ecclesiastical head-quarters for Christians of that locality and time. 'Beyond a question,' a Romanist would say; 'and such an epistle, if sent, was of course sent to the palace of his Holiness in the city of seven hills.' But it was not so sent by any

means. The Bishop of Rome was utterly ignored in it, and passed entirely by. It was addressed to 'brethren in Asia and Phrygia, having the same faith and hope,' who (the inference is natural, if not unavoidable,) are thereby designated as fathers in God to the Church of Lyons, and, through Lyons, of all the Churches of France. All this too (the author adds in a note) when Lyons could write a hortatory letter to Rome, and even an objuratory one, to induce it to keep the peace of the Church.—*Eusebius*, bk. v. 3, at end; v. 24, in the middle. For the last statement, *Cardinal Perron* pours abuse upon *Eusebius*. This proves its truth. The Cardinal would *disprove* *Eusebius'* allegation if he could. He cannot, so he slanders him.—*Perron's Reply to King James*, bk. ii., chap. 6.

"The result of all this process undoubtedly is to establish the conclusion that Lyons, and Lyons in direct communication with Oriental Christendom, is the channel through which Christianity penetrated France and the northern circumjacent countries."—pp. 28, 29.

The Doctor's argument is not devoid of ingenuity, and it gracefully conspires to keep up his line of thought in reference to the connection between Episcopalianism and Oriental Christianity. If we allow him to take it for granted that England was evangelized by missionaries sent thither by the Church of Lyons, he will prove to us that the Church of Lyons had nothing in common with the Church of Rome. He has failed, as we have seen, to prove that the Eastern Christians were opposed to Rome or identified with Episcopalianism. But now he brings forward a witness residing in Gaul, and thus invites us to a new field of research. The witness is the great Doctor of the Church, St. Irenæus, certainly the best authority from whom we may learn what the Eastern Church had taught, and what the Church of Lyons had received in regard to the claims, or as our author would phrase it, the "absurd pretensions" of Rome. But this father, in giving an account of the Church of Lyons, "utterly ignores and entirely passes by" the Roman Bishop, and when he does take notice of Rome, it is in "a hortatory and even an objuratory letter," to induce it to keep the peace of the Church.

We will allow the Doctor to be "master of the situation," or, in other words, to arrange the facts to suit himself, and confine ourselves to examining the testimony of Irenæus, which is the root of the whole argument connecting, or seeking to connect, the British Church with the

Church of the East. The "objurgatory" letter of Irenæus was written to Pope Victor I. about the year 196, that Pontiff having threatened to excommunicate the Bishops of Asia Minor because they refused to celebrate Easter along with other Christians on Sunday, but kept it, according to the ancient custom of their Churches, on the fourteenth day of the first lunar month, on whatsoever day of the week it might fall. "Irenæus," says Eusebius, "courteously advised Victor (*decenter admonuit*) not to cut off from fellowship whole Churches, which were observing a custom they had received from their forefathers." Victor plainly feared that the Asiatics shared the views of the Montanists and of Blastus, a Roman priest, who insisted upon it that Christians were obliged, *jure divino*, to keep the Paschal feast with the Jews, and Irenæus, an Asiatic himself, knew that their sole aim was to preserve the ancient customs of their Church. If, as Dr. Coit asserts, neither Irenæus nor the Asiatic Bishops believed that the Pope had any authority over them, why this great anxiety on their part that he should not carry out his threat of excommunicating them? It is clear that they admitted the authority of the Pope, although they showed that there were good reasons why he should not exercise it against them.

Irenæus does not by any means defend the practice of the Asiatics, for he says distinctly in his letter quoted by Eusebius, that "the mystery is to be celebrated only on the day of our Lord's resurrection," but he excuses their motives, which were praiseworthy. A calm and dispassionate examination of the facts will prove quite the reverse from the assertion of Dr. Coit and his favorite author Mosheim, for they show beyond doubt, both that the Pope claimed the authority to pass sentence on the Churches of Asia, and that his claim was admitted and feared.

As to the other letter informing the brethren of Asia and Phrygia of the glorious death of their fellow-countrymen in Gaul, it contains no expressions whatever to show that the Church of Lyons recognized the East for their "head-quarters," or denied the primacy of the See of Rome. It was just such a letter as missionaries write now from China, Tonquin, Corea, or the South Sea Islands, to their brethren in France, informing them of their labors, trials, and success.

St. Irenæus did not certainly "ignore and pass by" the authority of the Holy See when his subject required him

to mention it. We beg to call the attention of any of our Episcopalian friends who may read this article to the following extract from the third book of his work *Adversus Hæreses*. He states that the Apostles certainly delivered the truth and all the mysteries of the faith to their successors the pastors. To these, therefore, we should have recourse to learn them, especially "to the greatest Church, the most ancient and known to all, founded at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, which retains the traditions it received from them, and which is derived through a succession of Bishops down to us. Showing which we confound all who any way out of self-conceit, love of applause, blindness, or false persuasions, embrace what ought not to be advanced; for to this Church (of Rome) on account of its superior Headship, it is necessary that every Church, that is, the faithful everywhere, address themselves, in which Church has been preserved the tradition from the Apostles." To prove this succession in the Roman Church, he reminds his readers of the names of its Bishops, saying that "blessed Peter and Paul chose Linus to govern it after them, who was succeeded by Anacletus, Clemens, Evaristus, Alexander, Sixtus, Telesphorus, Hyginus, Pius, Anicetus, Soter, and Eleutherius who is now the twelfth Bishop of Rome."

It is plainly evident from this passage that if the early British Christians received their Christian education in the school of St. Irenæus, they could not certainly be ignorant of the prerogatives of the Apostolic See.

In the fourth book *Adversus Hæreses* this father sets forth with unmistakable clearness the belief of the Church of his age in other points which Catholics to-day hold to be articles of faith, and Protestants reject as corruptions or innovations. Hear how he speaks of the Mass as a true sacrifice, and of Transubstantiation. "Christ declared the cup to be his blood, and taught the new oblation of the New Testament, which oblation the Church receiving it from the Apostles offers to God over all the earth." And further on: "The offering of the Church, therefore, which the Lord commanded to be made over all the earth, was deemed a pure sacrifice before God and received by Him." And again: "When the mingled chalice and the broken bread receive the Word of God, they *become* the Eucharist of the body and blood of Christ." He testifies that the Church has authority to settle disputes about the meaning

of the written word: "In explaining the Scriptures, Christians are to attend to the pastors of the Church, who by the ordinance of God have received the inheritance of truth with the succession of their sees;" and lest his meaning should not seem clearly enough expressed he adds: "Suppose the Apostles had not left us the Scriptures, ought we not still to have followed the ordinance of Tradition which they consigned to those to whom they committed the Churches? It is this ordinance of Tradition which many nations of barbarians believing in Christ follow without the use of letters or ink." (*Adv. Hær.*, lib. iv.) So speaks the disciple of Polycarp, who was the disciple of St. John the Apostle, on the subject of the Mass, Church authority, and Tradition.

We cannot see any similarity between his teachings and those of the Episcopalians, and we cannot understand what could induce Dr. Coit to select Irenæus for the purpose of bearing up the beautiful chain of succession, the golden links of which began at Jerusalem and are to be properly secured, we are promised, in Protestant England. His witnessing is directly against the purpose for which he was quoted, and in favor of the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church. Let the Episcopalian reflect well upon the position which he occupies when such evidence as that of St. Irenæus is brought forward as the best that can be had to justify his opposition to the Apostolic See.

We must now transfer the arena of our discussion with Dr. Coit to Britain, and examine the argument he brings against Rome from the introduction of Christianity into the island. The Doctor is very indignant against any parties who should so far forget history as to affirm that Christianity was first introduced there by the missionaries of St. Gregory the Great. But although it is certain that there were British Christians from the very beginning of the Christian era, there is no proof that they were converted by Orientals. Pomponia Græcina, the wife of the Proconsul Plautius, and Claudia, mentioned by St. Paul (2 Tim., iv. 21), and married to the Senator Pudens, were probably British ladies, but these names, the earliest British Christian names on record, have nothing to do with the East, and are in fact entirely of Roman connection. Tertullian testifies that Christianity had penetrated to parts of Britain not subject to Rome (*Adv. Jud.*, c. vii., p. 189, ed. Rigalt.); but it could scarcely reach them unless from the

more civilized neighborhoods belonging to the empire. It is true that in the seventh century the Britons did not keep Easter on the same day as Rome, but neither did they keep it with the Orientals, as St. Wilfrid demonstrated before King Oswi, but on a system of their own construction. (Bede, *Hist.*, book iii., c. 25.) But, what is more to the purpose, we are certain that in the beginning of the fourth century they kept it on the same day as the Church of Rome, as appears from Eusebius (*Vit. Con.*, iii. 9), Socrates (*Hist.*, v. 22), and the Council of Arles (Spelman, pp. 40-42).

We shall not stop to sift minutely the history of King Lucius, so as to separate what is legendary matter from the true facts. It is certain however that the missionaries Fugatius and Damianus, or, as they are called by the old Welsh chronicle quoted by Usher, Dwyman and Fagan, preached by authority of Pope Eleutherius, and established the Churches of Britain in harmony with the rules of the Church of Rome. In 314 three British Bishops assisted at the Council of Arles, and were presided over consequently by the legates of Pope Sylvester. (Marchetti, *Crit. de l'Hist. Ecclés. de Fleury*.) The memorable visits of St. Germanus of Auxerre, and St. Lupus of Troyes to Britain, for the suppression of the Pelagian heresy, are quoted, strangely enough, by Dr. Coit to prove that the Britons ignored or despised the authority of Rome, while in reality these two great saints not only were devoted adherents of the Roman See, but they undertook their mission to Britain by the direct appointment of Pope Celestine.

St. Augustine, in 604, held a meeting with the Britons, which has been variously described by different authors, all of whom however have derived their information from Venerable Bede and St. Gildas the Wise. The following brief and straightforward account of the occurrence is taken from Lingard :

“ From the conversion of the Saxons, the zeal of Augustine was directed to the reformation of the Britons. During one hundred and fifty years of unsuccessful warfare, the ancient discipline of the Church had been nearly abolished, and the lives of their clergy were disgraced by vices the most repugnant to their profession. To which of the British sees the archiepiscopal jurisdiction had been originally attached is at present unknown ; but Gregory had written to Augustine that he had subjected all the Bishops of Britain to his authority. The missionary, with the aid of Ethelbert, pre-

vailed on the British Prelates to meet him at a place which has since been called Augustine's Oak, in Worcestershire. After a long and unavailing debate, the conference was adjourned to another day. In the interval, the Britons consulted a neighboring hermit, who advised them to watch the conduct of Augustine, and if he rose to meet them, they were to consider him as a man of unassuming disposition, and to listen to his demands, but if he kept his seat they should condemn him of pride, and reject his authority. With this sapient admonition, which left to accident the decision of the controversy, seven bishops, with Dinoh, Abbot of Bangor, repaired to the place of conference. Augustine happened to be seated, and did not rise at their arrival. Both his reasons and his authority were consequently despised. In points of doctrine there had been no difference between them, and to facilitate their compliance in other matters, the archbishop had reduced his demands to three heads: that they should observe the Catholic computation of Easter, should adopt the Roman rite in the administration of baptism, and should join with the missionaries in preaching to the Saxons. Each of these requests, in obedience to the voice of the hermit, was pertinaciously refused. 'Know then,' exclaimed the missionary, with the tone of a prophet, 'that if you will not assist me in pointing out to the Saxons the way of life, they, by the just judgment of God, will prove to you the ministers of death.' He did not live to see the prediction verified."—*Lingard's Hist.*, vol. i., ch. 2.

It is remarkable that in this controversy no mention is made of any difference between the Britons and the legate of the Roman Church on a single point of doctrine. The discussion was limited to particulars concerning discipline, and the national hatred of the Britons for the Saxons. But how could Augustine ask the former to assist him in converting the latter had there existed any doctrinal difference between the Britons and Rome? It is plain that no such difference can have existed. What, then, does Dr. Coit gain for his cause by sending us to consult the ancient British Church? Were the Britons Episcopalians? Nothing appears to warrant the conclusion that they were. The difficulty St. Augustine had in dealing with them was the fact that he was the friend and the pastor of the Saxons, whom the Britons bitterly hated, and not that the Britons had any objection to the Roman supremacy, which they and other kindred peoples residing in the British isles had long peacefully admitted.

Pope Celestine sent St. Palladius to preach to the Scots, and St. Patrick to convert the Irish; and St. Ninnion or

Nennius, himself a Briton, studied at Rome before he preached in his own country, where he died in 432.

But, aside from a belief in the Primacy, we know what the ancient British, Scottish, and Irish Churches held on other points of Catholic doctrine. Are the Episcopalians, who claim a lineal descent from them, independent of Roman authority, prepared to admit what they admitted and to practise what they practised? Are they willing to accept the celebration of Mass, the administration of Seven Sacraments, prayers to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints, suffrages for the souls in Purgatory, the observance of religious vows in communities like that of Bangor, in short, all "the mummeries and superstitions" in regard to which those ancient Christians agreed, not with the Episcopalians, but with the Catholics of to-day?

We fear that our author will not be found willing to accept the testimony furnished by his own witnesses when it happens to tell against the principles he is eager to establish. We find, in fact, that while he quotes as undoubtedly true the statement that the Britons refused to accept the three propositions of Augustine, he adds to it, on his own responsibility, a portraiture of the characters of the two parties to the discussion. He would have us believe that the British Bishops were plain, good, simple-hearted men, while Augustine was not only grasping, ambitious, a proud Italian Monk, a deceiver and a "Jesuit," but even one who delighted to shed the blood of his brother ecclesiastics when they happened to disagree with his views, or to resist his unjust and unreasonable pretensions.

Gildas and Bede are the authorities we have to depend upon for our facts, and their statement is in direct contradiction to that of Dr. Coit. They bear testimony to the variable meekness and sanctity of Augustine, while both, but Gildas especially, himself a Briton and a contemporary, describe the clergy of their country as a body of men sunk into every shameful and degrading vice.

The question here, however, does not turn upon the personal merit of Augustine or the personal unworthiness of the British Prelates; but the point is to know whether they represented or not two different Churches, and if so, which represented the true Church and which the heretical. Our author disdainfully rejects Augustine although he was consecrated Bishop, according to Bede, by Etherius, Bishop of the very city of Lyons which the Doctor struggled so hard

to make out to be the mother of the British Church. Now, he forgets the importance of Lyons, and appeals from Rome to the *primitive* British Church, "in which Christianity was older than in Rome itself." But this primitive British Church, supposed to be so hostile to Rome, was the true Church of Christ or it was not. If it was not, then its testimony, even if favorable to the Episcopalians, can avail them nothing. If it was the true Church, how came it to die out so soon after the Papal invasion? England, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, however they may have been converted originally, were certainly Roman Catholic for centuries. What is to bridge over what Dr. Coit would consider the dark gulf of Romanism, the years of which rise and fall like inky waves, between the time of Augustine, the first Catholic Archbishop of Canterbury, and his last successor, Cramer, who was also the first anti-Papal Archbishop?

Here we have an invisible Church with a vengeance, nowhere to be seen for centuries. Who took care in the mean time of the Apostolic orders, the sacraments, the doctrines, and the discipline of the Church? Who preserved the writings of the historians, the fathers, nay, the Bible itself, that the Church of England and her daughter, the Episcopal communion of the United States of America, might find them ready at their hand in the day when they might want them? Let the reader answer for himself these important questions; it is our province merely to suggest trains of thought, not to write the religious history of England.

It is idle for Episcopalians to say that it was by force, and fraud, and all the vile means enumerated by Dr. Coit and other partisan writers, that England was led to embrace the Papal supremacy as a dogma of Catholic faith. By whatever arts such a result was brought about, the broad fact stands that the time came when that dogma was acknowledged. Papal England, then, is the source from which Episcopalianism derives its creed and its moral principles, and if the testimony of Papal England is accepted in one particular it cannot be fairly rejected in others of equal or greater importance.

The argument may be extended from England to the whole Church. If the early ages were so indignantly opposed, as it is pretended, to any superior claims of the Roman Bishop, it is impossible to understand how he would advance such claims, and advancing them, how he could succeed in obtaining for them a universal recognition. We cannot ex-

plain to ourselves how our Divine Lord, who promised to be with his Church, and to teach her all truth, and preserve her from all error, could allow her to be so entirely replaced by what our adversaries style Popery. The more reckless, and cruel, and hateful they make this Popery, the more difficult do we find it to understand how it can have prevailed so completely throughout Christendom. Waiving, for the sake of argument, the earlier part of the history of the Church, a time came, as all confess, when this system, alleged to be unauthorized and self-constituted, is found to be commensurate with the institution our Lord had founded. Its power was not accidental, nor did its sway last for a few troubled years.

If we interrogate the Church herself as to the requirements and provisions of her constitution, she avers through her Councils, her Doctors, and her Saints, that it admits and demands the spiritual supremacy of the Pope, not only as co-ordinate and expedient, but as an indispensable and primeval element. If we look at the practical effect of the claim of the Bishop of Rome to a superior authority in spirituals, we find that all nations and governments come finally to accept it, and that it strengthens, and gains, and grows with the growth of the human race from ignorance and barbarism to civilization and social enlightenment. If we investigate the nature of the opposition to this authority, we discover that it comes from good men, who complain of some detail in its practical working, but who either do not question the legitimacy of the power itself, or if they do, are reconciled to it sooner or later.

Otherwise such opposition proceeds from parties who do not attack the spiritual supremacy of the Pope only, but who are opposed to many other dogmas of Catholic truth, refusing him allegiance chiefly because he thwarts their plans of change and innovation. Such opposition as this is invariably silenced after a time, and its authors come to be numbered among the heretics and schismatics whose fame is preserved in history like broken and useless old armor in our museums, as an interesting curiosity of bygone days. While the great and the good have sided with the Papal See, those, with rare exceptions, have been its revilers whose testimony was rendered of no force by the transparent human motives that dictated their policy.

We cannot see how a conscientious man can cherish feelings of hatred against the authority of the Sovereign

Pontiff, unless it is imaged before his mind as a very different object from what well-informed Catholics hold it to be. Our conception of a court requires a judge, and we feel no contempt for a ship because she has a captain, or for an army because it has a commander. Looking from the same point of view upon the Church as an organized body, we do not find it strange or unnatural that she should have a head. Although we know that the Pope is a man, and that consequently he may enjoy no personal immunity from the weaknesses that belong to our common humanity, we reverence his authority because we know that our Lord will not allow him to lead us wrong in matters of faith. The venerable character of our High Priest, the personal virtues and merits of many, nay, of most of those who have occupied the Papal Chair, the fact that the line of Papal succession connects us with the Apostles and with Christ, and the firm belief that whoever may rise or fall, he will always stand safe under the protection of his Divine Master, make us feel a reverence and a love for the Pope that Protestants do not take into account, or can scarcely understand.

Add to this that the Papal office is the bond of unity that keeps all parts of the Church together, or is rather the very rock on which she is built, and you will perceive that we can never bring the Church fairly and fully before our minds, never explain at any length all her goodness and greatness, without assigning a paramount position to the authority of Peter and his successors in the Apostolic See. Nor is this all, for this personage so beneficent, so venerable, so exalted in our eyes, is on all occasions the first to be rudely attacked by all who would rob us of our religion, and turn into a reproach what we regard as our dearest birthright, the glorious faith of our fathers.

This is especially true of the attacks of Protestantism, for which we as Catholics have no reason to nourish any extravagantly warm feelings of gratitude or affection. What is the consequence? Why, that every manly principle of honor, every chivalrous sentiment and generous impulse of our nature is enlisted in behalf of our Holy Father, and we are ready to die in his defence.

Our Protestant friends cannot understand how the person of our religious chief should come to be so dear to us, and we in turn cannot make out where they manage to pick up all the horrible ideas that fill their minds, in connection with his authority. They cannot understand why we are so

proud of him, and so full of devotion to his person, and we cannot see why it is that they should so bitterly hate him. Perhaps after all they only think they hate his spiritual office, and what they object to in reality, is the old European system of secular government with which his cause has been identified in their minds.

The opinion has been expressed in this Review before now, that a community of interests between Papal power and absolute monarchy is not a matter of necessity, and that a separation of the interests of Church and state may occur without causing the destruction of either. We shall pursue the subject no further. The history of the last half of the Nineteenth Century is before us like a scroll, a small portion of which only is revealed to our sight. When the balance comes to be unrolled, and the fate of nations made clearly known, we are perfectly sure that the Spiritual Father of the human race will be safe, and we can only pray that God may grant peace and happiness to Italy and to the world.

J. W. C.

ART. IV—*Vie du R. P. XAVIER DE RAVIGNAN, de la Compagnie de Jésus.* Par le P. A. DE PONTLEVOY, de la même Compagnie. Deuxième édition. Paris : Charles Dou-
niol. 1860. 2 tomes. 8vo.

THERE are probably very few of our readers who have not heard of Father Xavier de Ravignan, though equally few of them know much of him beyond his name. Yet he is a man well worth knowing, a man who has had great influence on his age, and produced effects which will not soon pass away. He had the happiness to see during his lifetime an abundant harvest reaped to the Lord from the seeds of good which he had sown during a long and laborious career; and those seeds still remain fruitful, the leaven he introduced into French life is still working, and the memory of his preaching and of his noble example will for years to come add a new lustre to virtue, a new dignity to the practice of piety. Having made his acquaintance through these two volumes of Father de Pontlevoxy, we now in turn introduce him to our readers.

Gustave-Xavier de Ravignan was born at Bayonne, the

1st of December, 1795, of noble parents. He early showed a seriousness of character and maturity of judgment which distinguished him from other children of his age. His progress at school was rapid, and after the first rudiments learned at Bayonne, he was sent with an older brother to continue his studies at Paris. Here he was placed, at the age of eleven years, at the college most *à la mode* in the *Rue de Matignon*, near the *Champs Elysées*. The first year that he was at this college he obtained the prize for application, and he well deserved it; for the author tells us that besides passing through four classes in one year, in which he was often the first, he also studied "English, German, drawing, music, dancing, fencing, swimming, and riding." How strong a hold religion already had on his mind may be seen by the following extract from a letter to his parents, dated June 9th, 1809: "Yesterday, Thursday, June 8th, I made my first communion and received confirmation. The exhortation which the priest made us before the communion caused me to shed many tears, and at the time when I ought to have read the Acts, I could only get through two lines, I was so overcome. Another person said them for me."

At the close of his collegiate studies, de Ravignan entered a law-school at Paris, to prepare himself for admission to the bar. He had scarcely entered on his peaceful studies before the news of Napoleon's return from Elba reached Paris. Among the many who offered their sword and their life for the defence of royalty, was young de Ravignan, and he was among the very few who were found to appear when their services were needed. During the "Hundred Days" he followed the Duc d'Angoulême, and rose to a lieutenancy in the cavalry. But with the final defeat of Napoleon, despite the brilliant offers of his general, de Ravignan returned to the study of the law. Aided by his own merit and by the favor of others, his rise in his profession was most rapid; there seemed no dignity too high for his ambition to aspire to. In the world of Paris he was well received: noble and dignified in his manners; graceful in his bearing; earnest and frank while lively and entertaining in his conversation; with his motto, *Soyons distingués*, he everywhere attracted attention, followed by esteem and admiration. Still, at the very moment when the world seemed to smile most brightly on him, he is thinking of leaving it, and writes to his brother: "I am

almost decided to enter the Seminary. This idea has been strongly awakened within me for the last six months. I have reflected on it during this time, but have not, as yet, come to any final determination. My mother is worried by it, and she worries me. You may suppose that once my resolution taken, nothing on earth can stop me. I have looked at the project under all points of view. If God calls me, I shall obey."

His mother's opposition still retained him for some time longer in the world. Promotion followed promotion, undesired by him and unenvied by others; he no longer cared for the gayeties and amusements of Paris, but an idle spectator, he moralized on the folly and thoughtlessness of those who, in the pursuit of life, learning, pleasure, or fortune, forgot death and immortality. The world had ceased to attract him: he felt he was not of it, that he was created for something nobler, and he hastened more readily to the bedside of some dying friend, exhorting, consoling, and preparing him to depart to a better world, than to the *salons* of the rich and the great, where he was ever gladly welcomed. Life seemed to him but slow decay and death, and death he viewed as the passage to life.

Thus passed two more years of de Ravignan's life, to him tedious and unsatisfactory; but they were the necessary preparation for the future career of one who was destined in after years to teach so many the emptiness of worldly pleasure, and to console so many kindred souls forced by the exigences of their station to live in a world they despised and to assist in the hollow masquerade of life.

But when this lesson was sufficiently learned, God called de Ravignan to his service. At the end of April, 1822, he went to the Seminary of the Sulpitians, at Issy, just on the outskirts of Paris. Here he made a retreat of eight days, for the purpose of examining his vocation. The letter in which he announces to his mother his decision cannot fail to edify and interest our readers.

"MY DEAREST MOTHER:—God, as you know, has for a long time and on many occasions inspired me with the desire of devoting myself wholly to his service; and his goodness has always protected me.

"The time came when a decision had to be made. I asked the advice of M. Frayssinous, and of other enlightened clergymen, and they all told me to seek in a retreat the light which I wanted. I

came to the country-house of the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice, at Issy. My reception was full of the most Christian kindness. Forgive me, my excellent mother, for hiding from you the cause of my absence; it was necessary for me to do so; I knew too well your extreme affection for the least deserving of your children.

"I shall not recount to you all the strong and consoling impressions made on me, through God's grace, by the consideration of my life and the contemplation of the great truths of religion, under the direction of a humble priest animated with the Spirit of God, and endowed with all the world esteems and with all that it knows not enough how to esteem. My reflections and my fervent prayers were wisely and prudently guided. Believe me, all illusions disappear, at the view of a future so formidable as the life of a priest.

"M. Mollevaut, the Sulpitian of whom I speak, is the man of God whom I needed. M. Frayssinous said to me at Paris when directing me to him: 'When he shall have said what is your vocation, I shall be as easy as though God himself had spoken.'

"God has spoken, my dear mother; I obey with joy. I thank him for drawing me from the world. I thank him from the bottom of my heart for my repentance and for the peaceful life for which, I believe, he destines me. Permit your son to say to you, mother, obey also. Suffer me to believe and to know better than you, that the prayers of a Christian mother have called down on me the special protection of God which I now experience.

"Entirely given to my duties and my sacred occupations, my affection for you will fill a still greater part of my existence: far from the dissipation and tumult of the world and of its affairs, whether near you or far from you, I shall ever bear you in my heart, and shall never cease importuning God with my prayers for that which is my dearest wish, your preservation and your salvation.

"Consecrated also in a special manner to the worship of the most august model of the religious mother, I shall, like a good son, recommend to her my beloved mother, and the blessings of Heaven will fall upon you and the whole family.

"Such, dear mother, is what I had to say to you. All is decided. My resolution rests on God, and nothing can shake it.

"It now only remains for me to accomplish a duty which your kindness and indulgence render a less painful one: it is to humbly beg you to forgive all the sorrows I have caused you by my rudeness, my pride, and my want of respect for you, my kind mother. Forgive and bless me."

Having abruptly separated himself from a world he had long loathed, de Ravignan sought only to widen still more the gulf which parted them. He remained six months in

the Seminary, but the solitude of Issy was not solitary enough; he sought a more entire solitude and a more complete isolation from the world in the novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Montrouge. What were the motives which led the young Seminarian to the religious life we are not clearly told; but we find him visiting every week the Jesuit novitiate, to which he became more and more attached, and the grace of God calling him to this new life, seems to have acted gradually through his affections, until one evening, while reading the life of his patron, St. Francis Xavier, he suddenly announced his determination. Persuaded from this moment that God had called him, he hastened to obey, without any doubt or hesitancy, and never afterwards ceased to feel more and more this conviction of his duty, and to love more and more the Society through whose means he was to arrive at his own and others' sanctification.

Years afterwards Father de Ravignan looked back with regret to the two years of probation spent at Montrouge, which he regarded as the happiest of his life. Here he had at last found the repose he had long desired. Forgetting the world and forgotten by it, he gave himself entirely to the study and practice of the virtues suited to the state of life he had embraced, and if at times his thoughts bore him back to the scenes of past amusements and ambitious struggles, it was only to regret the time so spent, and to renew his heart-felt gratitude to his Creator who had rescued him from the storms and dangers of a life where so many are daily perishing, to bring him into the safe and tranquil haven of religion. How different the calm happiness he now felt from the noisier yet more hollow joys he had once pursued! How unlike the candid criticisms of his fellow-novices, and the flattering congratulations which attended his every effort at the bar! He who had aimed to be distinguished now sought simplicity, and atoned by his excessive poverty and mortification for the worldly advantages he had formerly enjoyed. None now so humble as he, none so ready to perform the most painful and abject services in the community. Dressed in an old threadbare cassock he waits on the others in the refectory, or washes the dishes in the kitchen, blacks his own shoes, makes his own bed, and is his own servant. He arises at four in the morning, and girds an iron chain with long sharp points next his naked body; a cuirass of the same metal passes

round his arms and across his chest, where it marks in letters of blood the name of "Jesus." Thus accoutred he wrestles with his passions in prayer, from one to two hours, in a room where no fire is yet kindled, whatever may be the severity of the weather. Then, having assisted at the Holy Mass, he returns to his room to study the Sacred Scriptures. But soon the signal is given, and two by two the novices walk with downcast eyes and uplifted hearts along the stone-paved corridors to their frugal breakfast. No luxury is there: coarse bread and coffee made of sweet acorns; that is all, save when, four times a year, a slow returning festival shall bring the luxury of a small piece of butter to flavor the last mouthful of bread. Each hurriedly consumes so much as may stay his sharp appetite until another meal. Then with a long apron covering his poor but clean soutane, the once gay frequenter of the *salons* of Paris, who was unrivalled in the skill with which he tied his white cravat, with an almost worn-out broom sweeps from every corner the daily-accumulating dirt; now on his knees in his endeavor to brush away the dust under a bed, now stretching on tiptoe to reach a statue of St. Joseph or an engraving of the Sacred Heart. The bell rings, and you see him now, his apron laid aside and no trace of his late employment about him, march with rapid strides along the garden walk, his half-frozen hands scarce able to hold the book in which his whole attention is absorbed. 'Tis the treatise of Alphonsus Rodriguez on Christian perfection. He began its study at Montrouge, and thirty-five years afterwards he found much in it yet unlearned. Soon the bell sounds again. The novices betake themselves to the hall, where Father Gury, the Master of Novices, instructs them in the rules and spirit of the Society. At times this instruction is eminently practical, and we see the ex-magistrate kneeling with calm humility on the floor, while the novices rise around and name over the breaches of discipline they have remarked in their brother. One accuses him of raising too often his eyes, another that he does not take sufficient notice of what is passing around him; one thinks he assumes too great a part in conversation, another that he is too silent and reserved. The Superior reprimands him, and he kisses the floor and returns to his place, glad that he has been humbled. At dinner he lays aside, in a spirit of self-denial, that portion of his humble fare which seems the least removed from luxury, and listens attentively to some

instructive book which one of the community reads aloud. Then follows a short recreation after a visit to the domestic chapel. Divided into bands of three or four, not as their own choice may direct them, but according as they are named by the one in authority, the novices converse of the subjects of their meditation or their reading. From every rank of society, of almost every age, they are all equals, and *Brother* de Ravignan, as he is now called, sees only brothers in his companions. The late Deputy *Procureur du Roi* listens respectfully to the opinions of an uneducated lay-brother, or patiently hears himself contradicted by some youth of sixteen. The recreation done, we see him again in the garden with his *Rodriguez* in his hand, and again with his long blue apron sweeping a corridor; and thus pass the days at Montrouge, in prayer and pious reading, intermingled with a little recreation and manual labor. We can well imagine that Father de Ravignan in later years looked back on this as the happiest period of his life. Just separated from the world, solitude was all the dearer to him. With calm and leisure he now applied himself to the study of the science of perfection, and the correction of every inordinate inclination. He now had time to study himself, to examine what were the dangerous tendencies of his character, and from what source they sprang. He here overcame the rudeness and severity of his manner, and, without losing any thing of his natural firmness, substituted in their stead a spirit of mildness based on the solid virtues of humility and charity. He believed that there are two qualities necessary in order to please God or be useful to others, a sound judgment and a strong will. He therefore carefully freed himself from all exaggeration of thought and illusion of mind which have rendered so many holy men incapable of right action. He sought to look at things as they are, regardless of the colors cast around them by opinion and prejudice, and acquired a habit of throwing himself entirely out of the question and of judging from a higher and impartial point of view. To this correctness of judgment he joined an extraordinary strength of will, founded on the idea of duty. He was slow in deliberation, sought light from prayer and the advice of others, but once resolved and convinced that it was his duty to act, he was prompt and immovable.

After two years of novitiate followed four years of the study of theology, at the end of which time Father de Ra-

vignan was ordained priest and appointed to teach theology to the younger Jesuits, at first in France and afterward in Switzerland. It was in the latter country that at the end of this time he made the third year of probation prescribed by St. Ignatius previous to the solemn profession in the Society, in order that those who have been occupied in the school of the intellect may complete their studies in what he calls the "school of the heart." Father de Ravignan himself will explain to us the nature and object of this third probation :

"It is the masterpiece of St. Ignatius. The man whom he destines for the Apostolic ministry has passed as a novice two years of silence and meditation ; then came nine years of study, and five or six years of teaching : he has just been ordained a priest, and has not yet exercised the functions of the priesthood ; the most often he is thirty-three years of age, and fifteen or sixteen years have been passed in religion. The religious, the priest returns to the novitiate. He is going again to renounce for the length of one year all study and all intercourse with those without. Great labor has been taken to cultivate his mind ; now, as the last trial, as the last preparation, he must exercise himself, according to the remarkable expression of the Constitutions, in the school of the heart, in *schola affectus*. The word is hard to comprehend ; I required a whole year to realize its meaning, and I shall not here attempt to explain it. I will merely say this,—the religious, the priest may have acquired extensive and varied knowledge ; he may already have given proof of his self-devotion and of his zeal ; in the bosom of solitude, in a life of silence and retreat, in the presence of God and of his own soul, before he is delivered over to others, he must carefully apply himself 'in the school of the heart, to all that can strengthen and advance him in a sincere humility, in a generous denial of his will, and even of his judgment, in a stripping off of the lower propensities of nature, and in a more profound knowledge and a more ardent love of God : in this way, having promoted the growth in his soul of a truly spiritual life, he can the better assist others to advance in the same path, for the glory of God and of our Lord.'*

"This is what is termed in the Society *the third year of probation*, the last year of preparation and trial. This time of holy repose passes quick away, and returns no more. I have enjoyed it, and can never enjoy it again till death ; whatever may be the number of years that God still reserves for me on this sad earth, the year of repose can never return for me.

"The *spiritual exercises* are again performed during thirty days ;

* Const., P. v., c. ii., § 1 ; Ex. Gen., iv., § 16 ; Instit. Soc. J., i., pp. 408 and 848.

prayer and meditation are lengthened; the spirit of the Institute, the conditions of the Apostleship, poverty, suffering, and obedience, and all that constitutes the duty of a religious, are studied anew and examined to the bottom. Catechetical instructions to little children and a few missions in the country alone interrupt the solitude, and serve as preludes to the ministry dearest to the Apostolic heart. I look back with delight, I confess, to that time when I preached the Gospel to the poor people in the mountains. Often have I since regretted those days: often has the preaching in large cities saddened my mind and wearied my heart; and the young men, whom I have the happiness of seeing frequently gathered around the sacred pulpit, will pardon me this memory and this regret, when I assure them, in all the sincerity of my soul, that from them I have always received consolation.

"At the close of the year, the Superiors carefully inquire into the progress made in virtue and learning, and the Father General decides, on the information they send, the degree (*gradus*) of the subject. This degree consists simply in being admitted to pronounce the last vows of *Spiritual Coadjutors*, or those of the *Professed*; for there are only these two classes of religious among us. Both are equal in all things, and there are no privileges or prerogatives pertaining to any one in the Society; the position of Superior is even conferred by preference on the Spiritual Coadjutors, to whom the Professed are usually subject. Still there are some employments, though very few in number, which are reserved especially for the Professed. They alone, with the exception of certain Superiors named in the Rule, have the right to take part in the Provincial or General Congregations of the Order. These assemblies are, however, very rare, and confined to few emergencies.

"Such, then, is the regular gradation: after the two years of the first novitiate come the three vows of religion, simple, but perpetual; after fifteen or seventeen years of trial and of study, and after a third year of novitiate, come the solemn vows of the Professed, or the last vows of the Coadjutor.*

"If any one would take the trouble seriously to reflect on this religious economy of preparatory, trials and labors, and consider this legislation, so strong, so prudent, and so worthy of the Apostolic genius of St. Ignatius, he would picture to himself the holy founder like a workman bending with ardor over his work to shape and perfect it, then trying it, and again returning to give it still further the form and shape he wants, and sending it to its destination only when he has exhausted all the resources of his patient and persevering art.

"The religious of the Society of Jesus is slowly prepared in this way; he is first formed and tried, and then taken and carried back to the source of active force of mind in the workshop of silence

* Exam. i., §§ 7, 8, 9; Const., P. v., c. 1, l. A.; Inst. S. J., i., pp. 340 and 402.

and solitude. But this is not all. Each day of his life, during long hours, he must retire into the interior of his own soul, there to strip himself of all earthly thoughts, all worldly influence, in order to raise himself to the lofty stand-point of faith, the divine compass, with which he may afterward throw himself amid the tossing waves of human passion and error, and stretch forth his hand to the poor shipwrecked persons whom he is endeavoring to lead to the haven of eternal salvation.

"We now see how the religious of the Society of Jesus is formed. No founder of a religious order ever multiplied and prolonged the preparations and the trials so much as the founder of our Society. He seems to have striven carefully to imitate the instinctive education of the bird which soars in the air. He wants his disciples to become strangers to the low regions of terrestrial affections, and to raise themselves in their flight to the steady contemplation of the divine sun of justice, and to learn to renew unceasingly the strength of their soul, and to increase the force of their action, by the life-giving heat of its rays.

"May God's grace carry out in us our father's wish! May we all, by humble and generous endeavors, correspond to the desires of his great soul, and walk in the path he has laid down for us!

"The day of action being at length come, the Jesuit is more than ever indifferent to whatever place, employment, or position may be assigned him for the greater glory of God and the service of his brethren. He rejects with unconquerable repugnance only honors and dignities.* He respects and admires them in others as the summit of self-devotion and of a glorious slavery. He devotes himself, too, but it is always to obey, never to command; it is without reserve, without restriction, and forever. The lowest class in a college, or the painful superintendence by day and night in a school-room or dormitory; China or the Indies; savages or infidels; Arabs or Greeks; republics or monarchies; tropical heat or polar cold; heresy or incredulity; the country or the town; the bloody resistance of the barbarian or the polished struggle of civilization; the mission or the confessional; preaching or studying; the prison or the hospital; the lazaretto or the camp; honor or ignominy; persecution or justice; liberty or chains; favor or martyrdom; all are for the Jesuit matters of equal indifference, so long as Christ is preached, the glory of God is increased, and souls are saved. Such is the man our Constitution sought to produce for the Catholic Apostleship. Beyond all question, we may have reason to lament before God at not having always pursued this end with the persevering courage it demands; but, at least, it must be confessed that this end is not without grandeur, and life perchance acquires some value by being consecrated to it."†

* Const., P. vii., c. ii., § 1, *in fine*, and Const., P. x., § 6, *et alibi passim*.

De l'Existence et de l'Institut des Jésuites, par le R. P. de Ravignan, c. ii., § 8.

Father de Ravignan having passed through all the long and varied preparations prescribed by the Institute may now reap its fruits. Returning from Switzerland he was named minister of the house at Saint-Acheul, and at the same time made his first effort before a large audience. During Lent 1835 he preached a series of conferences in the cathedral of Amiens. These first conferences were a complete success, so much so that Father de Ravignan was requested by many to continue them after Easter. This he did not consent to do; but this first success seems to have determined his superiors to occupy him principally in the pulpit. The following Advent he preached again at Amiens, and the next Lent he appeared at Paris in the church of St. Thomas of Aquin, and the year after (1837) he began his celebrated conferences at Notre-Dame. Bishop Frayssinous had several years before inaugurated at the church of Saint-Sulpice a series of conferences intended principally for that class of men who seldom or never attended church, for the purpose of refuting the various objections brought against Catholicity, and thereby converting them to the faith and practice of the Church. These conferences were succeeded, rather than continued, by Father Lacordaire at the cathedral of Notre-Dame. Father Lacordaire was eminently a man of his age, intrusted by God with a high mission which he fully comprehended. A man of strong character, and of profound judgment, he clothed his thoughts in the most brilliant language, and sent them forth with an eloquence of manner never surpassed. Men who had eyes but refused to see, ears and refused to hear, came to hear the sacred orator as they went to a spectacle; but his eloquence carried conviction to their hearts, and a great number of conversions were the fruits of his zeal.

But Father Lacordaire having gone to Rome, whence he afterward returned to establish the Dominicans in France, no one was thought more capable of supplying his place than Father de Ravignan. The Archbishop of Paris nominated him as the successor of Father Lacordaire, and his superiors commanded him to accept the office, which he continued to fill for ten years, until his sickness in 1846 forced him to abandon, for a time, his labors at Paris. Simultaneously with the opening of his conferences in the church of Notre-Dame, Father de Ravignan established a house of his Order at Bordeaux, of which he was named the first Superior. For five years that he held that office,

he labored with Apostolic zeal in his immediate neighborhood, and only devoted the hot days of midsummer, when all others were seeking repose, to the preparation of his conferences. During the season of rest for every one else Father de Ravignan who had labored hard all the year had no repose, but now began his most serious work, and what he always regarded as the greatest mortification of his whole life, the composition of his sermons. He often said of himself that he was not made for a writer, and that he did not know how to write, and though eloquent in the pulpit, and thoughts then came fast and plentiful, in the solitude of his own room his mind often seemed dried up, he was unable to develop his subject, and he became dejected and discouraged. Then he would write to the General of the Society saying that it was owing to his want of humility that he was placed in a position for which he was entirely unfitted, and were it not for his pride God would have left him in the obscurity he coveted, and given to another more worthy and more capable the task of appearing before the world. But he labored hard and long, he prayed for aid from God, and asked the advice of others, and by his perseverance he triumphed, and by his hard labor he merited the blessing of success.

Adapting himself to his audience Father de Ravignan commenced his conferences by establishing the principles which, refuting the philosophical errors of his hearers, should prepare the way for the refutation of their theological unbelief. He began by a sort of philosophy of the history of the constant war between Catholic truth and the multiplicity of errors, and then by explaining the divine personality and action, the liberty and immortality of the soul, the end of man, and other fundamental dogmas, overthrew the various difficulties arising from the pantheistic, deistic, fatalist, and materialist notions of those whom he addressed. The first years he sowed the seed which grew and fructified in the conferences which followed. The orator was contented to work and wait; he wanted to lay a solid foundation on which a great building might afterward be erected, and did not fear that his labor was lost in preparing the minds of his hearers for the effects he wished afterward to produce in them. Still these first conferences brought him before the eyes of the world. Men of letters and of rank sought his acquaintance, and in private conversation with them Father de Ravignan anticipated the

subject of his future conferences, and was the means of reconciling many with Heaven. Among these first conversions was that of the Vicomte de Chateaubriand, who was induced to make his Easter communion, and before his death in 1848 retracted all that he had written against the faith and doctrine of the Church. The extracts from his correspondence, and especially from his letters to Father Roothan, the General of the Order, which the author has mingled with his biography, relate a very large number of other remarkable conversions, of all which Father de Ravignan speaks with a humility worthy of St. Ignatius himself. When the General congratulating with him on the success of his labors, warns him to give the glory of all to God and beware of vanity or pride, he replies that he has no need to labor for humility, the thought of vain-glory could never enter into his head, the hand of God was too clear in all. And he was right; he had so poor an opinion of himself and so high an idea of the perfection at which he was constantly aiming, that he was beyond all danger from vain-glory, even amid the most flattering success.

After he had delivered his conferences at Notre-Dame for three years, Father de Ravignan conceived the happy idea of uniting with them a retreat to take place during the last week of Lent. It was attended by thousands who were all seen advancing to the altar on Easter morning to make the general communion. This retreat was dearer to the father than the conferences, and when he became unable to continue the latter, he longed to give his "dear" retreat. The effect produced by this retreat was more immediate and sensible than that of the conferences, though most of it was doubtless begun in them. The author devotes a considerable portion of his work to the account of the effects produced by these labors of Father de Ravignan. Every class of men figure there from the highest to the lowest, from the families of kings to theatrical actresses. One of the latter by command of Father de Ravignan has written a short abridgment of her life, which is so charming in French that we fear we shall almost spoil it by attempting to translate it:

"God must help me, my father," she wrote, "or I shall never be able to satisfy you. My mother had been very unfortunate in her management, and at the age of forty years was deserted by her husband who had spent every thing in dissipation. She was

alone in Paris, without money, without friends, and without employment. To make matters worse, she was just on the point of bringing me into the world to increase her misery. My poor mother did not possess that strong religion which makes us patient under all the trials which God sends, but she had a strong faith in Mary. From my earliest infancy she taught me this little prayer which I have never seen in any book: 'My God, I give to thee my body, my soul, my heart, and my life; I give myself wholly to thee. Grant that I may die rather than ever offend thee mortally. Amen.'

"When about five years old, I used to go often with an old woman to hear mass, and to adore Jesus in the sepulchre. I came home weeping at the sight of our Lord dying for us. My mother scolded the old woman for so exciting my sensibility, and positively forbade my going again. I was very proud of being called Mary: they called me Josephine at home; but when any one asked me my name, I immediately answered, 'Mary; I have the same name as the Blessed Virgin.'

"At the age of six years, my mother placed me at the theatre to learn to dance. They begged her to let me play, and she yielded to the temptation. I played, and had a great success. I heard the little girls talk of their first communion, and my mother never spoke to me of it. I wanted very much to make it, but as no priest would admit me, because I was at the theatre, I said to my mother, 'The Roman Church don't want any thing to do with me. Well! I can get along without it; I'll go to the French Church.' I went to see Mr. Châtel; I told him all about myself, and he received me very kindly. I was quite happy; I am going to make my first communion, said I to myself. To tell the truth, I had no idea what that was; but it was all the same, I was happy in the thought. Mr. Châtel baptized a child in my presence. He said, 'I baptize thee in the name of God, and of Christ the Lawgiver.' As soon as we returned to the sacristy I asked him, 'What is a lawgiver?' He told me. 'But don't you, then, believe that Jesus is God?' 'I had the misfortune to go to school, miss, and while there I learned that one and one are two, and one more makes three.' 'But you believe that Mary is a virgin, do you not?' 'No! That was enough; I went away, and my heart almost bursting, I said to my mother, 'Well, God don't want me. I will never receive communion from the hands of a man who makes Jesus a lawgiver and Mary a common woman.'

"I continued to pray, and I worked all the time. When not at the theatre, I made various articles of needlework which I sold. Even the women I loved best were full of vices which I pitied; for my mother had instilled into me principles which no wretchedness could destroy. I was badly clothed and lived on potatoes; but I was happy with my mother. I said to my-

self, God sees me, and I am just as beautiful in his eyes with my ugly hat; he don't insult poor Maria. For people insulted me and said, 'If you please, you can have cashmeres.' 'Yes,' I said, 'but I should kill my mother with grief.' I was one of the first at the theatre, and consequently much admired. I tell you this in order that you may understand how my heavenly Patroness protected me while in the midst of a whirlpool.

"My mother fell sick, and I watched by her all night, for we had no servant. I played and rehearsed in the day time, and had only the night to study my parts by the bedside of my poor mother. Then it was that I felt the goodness, the kindness of God. I had very few appointments, although I was first. Yet, my father, in spite of that, notwithstanding for four months and a half my mother lay in bed spending a great deal of money which I did not have, I got through all without contracting any debts. I wonder I was not sick with fatigue and trouble; but I prayed God, and God helps those who pray to him with their whole heart. The last night that I passed with my mother, I did not yet know what agony was. Her last words as she expired were, 'Maria, I love you.' Oh! my father, what a night was that! I had never left my mother during my whole life, and now at the age of twenty years I was alone, without parents, without friends, without fortune, and without God, for I did not yet possess him. I swore to my mother, over her lifeless body, and over that hand which had blessed me, that I would always remain worthy of her. They tried to take me away, but I would not leave my mother until she was placed in her grave. I had the courage to bury her; and then they took me away, but not forever. One day I shall see her again, shall I not, father? I went every day to the cemetery of Montmartre, and when I came back to my room I knelt before my mother's portrait and a crucifix which had lain on her body. I kissed the portrait, I kissed the crucifix, and my life passed between these two images. Perhaps you may not understand so much love for a creature—you, father, whose life is all in God; but I was always in the habit of looking on my mother as a supernatural being.

"My companions brought me 155 francs; they knew my misery; I did not conceal it, for I could not be ashamed of it. I was often thought for in marriage; I did not consult my heart, but God and my mother, the crucifix and the portrait. I knew then that when I was married I should please God and my mother. At last I came to hear you. You cleared up my confused ideas. I am still very ignorant on matters of religion. I love Jesus and Mary; but why or how I know not: I love them, and that is all I know. Then only did I understand my position. Blessed Virgin, I said, the theatre without thee, or thee without the theatre. My choice is easy made—but how to come to thee. The Sunday of the

Quasimodo I saw you more closely; I was at the foot of the pulpit. I will write to M. de Ravignan, said I; it is impossible but what he will obtain me this favor from the Archbishop: I must make my communion. I wrote you, and you know the rest; but what you do not know is, that the good women whom you made me acquainted with have changed my whole being; my mind and my heart are no longer the same.

"O, thank thee, my God; thank you, reverend father: your zeal has done all. I have made my communion; that is to say, I am the happiest of women, and I am surrounded by Mesdames de Gontaut, Levavasseur, and d'Auberville. Oh! once I thought I loved God; but no, it was God who loved me. I loved Mary, but not with that holy love which she feels for us. I know not what God reserves for me, but if he wishes to make me happy, he may send me all the sorrows he pleases, and I will endeavor to bear them with a heart wholly his. If he will guard me in this faith which he has given me, I can do all things for him. To-day only do I understand the martyrs.

"I beg you to forgive the length of my story, for I am not much used to writing. It is to obey you that I write these details, and speaking of my mother, I should never stop. My first act on quitting the theatre was a communion. God grant that on quitting this life I may be kneeling at the holy table. To God, to Jesus, to Mary, to these ladies, to you, my father, belongs the whole life of

MARIA."

—Tome ii., pp. 43-49.

Father de Ravignan obtained from the Archbishop the permission to administer to her the sacraments so long desired, for he was far from sharing the opinion then almost universal that all dramatic actors were excommunicated. She lived about six years longer, to the edification of all who knew her, and dying, bequeathed to her children in her last will her own veneration and gratitude toward the Jesuit father.

In 1842, Father de Ravignan left Bordeaux, where he had been Superior, to take up his residence permanently at Paris. This change had long been needed in order that the full effect of his conferences might be produced. It was not enough for the preacher to appear during Lent of each year in the pulpit of Notre-Dame, it was also requisite that he should be in Paris throughout the year, to complete in private what he began in public,—that he should be where he could be consulted by those whom he had led to doubt, to explain the truth more fully to those who came to

inquire, to argue against the particular objections of each one, and to persuade those who hesitated.

He arrived in Paris at a time also when his presence was particularly necessary for other purposes. A storm was rising which threatened to drive the Jesuits from France, and the eyes of all his brethren were turned to him for their defence. Ever since the Jesuits first put their foot in France, three hundred years ago, they had been the object of constant hostility on the part of the *University*;—sometimes expelled the country, again returning and apparently triumphant, they never enjoyed but a moment's peace. At this time they were again attacked by their old enemy, though we cannot see as they gave the slightest cause for this renewed hostility. There was but a small number of them,—only two hundred and six priests,—in France; they were living quietly, devoting themselves to the ministry, without meddling with any of the political questions of the time. A number of the bishops, clergy, and laymen of France, without any reference to or understanding with the Jesuits, so far as we can discover, protested against the monopoly of education held by the University, and claimed the right to establish schools independent of that body, and demanded freedom of education. This they had an undoubted right to do, since they demanded no support from the government, and only asked it to leave them alone and suffer them to establish schools at their own expense and under their own control, for the education of the children of those parents who regarded the University education as impious and immoral. M. Guizot, the Minister of Public Instruction, was not unfavorable to their demand, and promised a law on education which should accord all that could be expected, if not all that could be desired. But before this law was presented to the Chambers, almost the whole of the press and of the professors began a furious attack on the Jesuits, instigated by the University. The Jesuits were accused of being the instigators of the bishops in their demand for freedom of education, and the secret authors of the pamphlet by a Canon of Lyons against the University monopoly, which had been one of the principal causes of the present agitation. Eugene Sue's *Wandering Jew* was written; Michelet and Quinet delivered their false and silly lectures against them at the Collège de France; Thiers, longing to get back into the ministry, no matter by what means, took up the cause of the University; public opinion

was excited against them; and France seemed to be as much afraid of two hundred inoffensive priests as though they had had, as Michelet said, forty thousand pulpits and a hundred thousand confessionals.* Old laws against religious orders were invoked against the Jesuits, and the government, edged on by the force of public opinion, had resolved on their proscription. The Jesuits, by the advice of their friends, determined to make a stand for their rights. Father de Ravignan wrote a beautiful essay on "The Existence of the Jesuits, and their Institute," in which he sketches the life of a Jesuit and the character of the Order, and demands that justice be rendered him. He asked for no privilege, for no exemption, but only claimed the liberty of conscience which the fundamental law of France secured.

"When you proclaim that men are free," he says, "and then prohibit them from following interiorly and privately a religious life, you fall into a flagrant contradiction, and strike at all that is sacred in liberty of conscience. Before the state, men, priests, united in common and purely religious habits of life, may not have any of the political and civil rights of a corporation, and we claim them not; but so long as they exercise no exterior functions but such as they, like all other priests, hold from the episcopal jurisdiction, you cannot legally attack them, unless religious liberty is a lie, and the public rights of Frenchmen, the fundamental law itself, a cheat; for these words have then lost their meaning and convey no idea.

"Has the charter proclaimed liberty of conscience, or has it not?"

"Is evangelical perfection a right of conscience, or is it not?"

"The religious life is but the carrying out of evangelical perfection,—the solemn teaching of the Church, as liberty of conscience is the solemn promise of the charter. If, then, I, a Frenchman, wish to become in France a Benedictine, a Dominican, or a Jesuit, by what right do you prevent me? I ask of you neither a public and recognized existence, nor the least fraction of the property of the state. I ask only to breathe, like yourselves, the free air of my country. For the regulation of my private life and of my conscience, I claim the right of making religious vows, and of obeying with my brethren, under the same roof and in common peace, rules which the Catholic Church has approved. In what, I ask you, does this liberty restrict yours? does it restrict the liberty of any one? In England, in Belgium, and in the United States, where liberty of conscience is a reality, the religious orders, Jesuits as well as others, have public colleges and numerous establishments of every kind;

* Michelet, *Des Jésuites*, 6ème Leçon, p. 109.

yet no man imagines that it is just or legal to expel them. Why should it be so in France, where, certainly, they do not enjoy so largely the rights of common law? Happily for the honor of our country, none of the laws now in force can touch them in the sacred rights of personal existence and liberty of conscience. Is it really true that this lawful, simple, peaceful, obscure mode of existence has aroused such a violent storm of public opinion? What have we done? What have we said? Whence this noise? these storms? How have we become anew the object of all this hatred, the butt of all these attacks, the cause of all these fears? You who call down on us, priests, Frenchmen, free and devoted citizens, the whole rigor of proscription, do you know us? have you seen us? have you heard us? What word ever came from our mouth which compromised the public peace or the respect for law? And yet our two hundred voices have sounded in many pulpits from the largest cities to the smallest villages. Where is the civil authority that accuses us? Where the ecclesiastical authority that condemns us? Has a charge ever been made against a single one of our number? Ill-will, susceptibility, and presumption are not enough; they cannot supply the place of facts, of proofs; a society so culpable could only find expression in the faults of its members, to whom belong all action, all crime, and all virtue. Who are these faulty members among us? We live apart from all political action and influence; servants of the Church, we exist but for her, and with her; at all times, in all places, and under every form of government, we carry on the work of the Gospel ministry. You who transform us into enemies of the institutions and liberties of France, what ground have you for so doing? What motive could we have? When we alone are threatened, and we alone are shut out from all the benefits of liberal legislation, it is as absurd as it is unjust to charge us with oppression. A warm dispute has arisen on the freedom of education promised in the charter; we must and do share the unanimous opinion of the French episcopacy and clergy on this subject: what fault can you find in that?"*

Father de Ravignan then explains the nature of the spiritual exercises, the constitutions, doctrines, and missions of the Society, and concludes his treatise with the following passage, not less eloquent yet more pathetic than that which we have just extracted:

"I demand the rehabilitation of my fathers. A son, wounded to my soul by the long sufferings of my family and the unjust sentence weighing upon it, I seek no renown, I bring no talent, I have but an unshakable conviction. I ask only for truth and justice; I

* *De l'Existence et de l'Institut des Jésuites*, pp. 6-8.

need no more. I demand the revision of an unjust sentence: I demand it for my fathers who are no more: I demand it for myself. I feel the most unhesitating consciousness of their innocence, of our own—they were neither tried nor heard: let us at length be heard; let them be tried to-day. . . . I ask it in the name of my country which can no longer look on with indifference while, in open contempt of all laws, the honor of those who have not ceased to be her children is defamed and outraged. I demand it for the millions of Catholics whom they try to insult by giving them a name which is not theirs, but ours, and which ought not now to be an insult. I demand it for all the religious societies which have pitched their tent under the protecting sun of France; and on which falls, in spite of all our exertions, the whole weight of the animosity which persecutes us. I demand it in the name of those venerable Bishops, whose voices were solemnly raised to protest against the unjust proscription of a whole family of religious, who were faithful to God, to the Church, to the laws, and to the country. I demand it in the name of twenty Popes, who all approved, confirmed, praised the proscribed Institute. I demand it in the name of the holy Pontiff who twice blessed the soil of France with his presence, and who, amid the protracted sorrows of his exile, consoled himself with the determination of giving glory to God by restoring the Society of Jesus. Has this venerable old man, who was for us all so mild and intrepid a restorer—has he then lost in his grave all the rights of virtue, and all the authority of his memory? I demand it in the name of the universal Church, which, by the voice of the immortal Council of Trent, pronounced an irrevocable approbation: *pium institutum*. I demand,—and in demanding it, I merely claim for my brethren and myself what belongs to all,—the air of my native land,—the right to live, to work,—the right to devote ourselves,—liberty with order,—liberty with justice.

“And now I have done. I retire in the thought of God and of my country, and I feel in my deepest soul the greatness and the solemnity of what I have done. If I must yield in the struggle, before I shake off on the soil which witnessed my birth, the dust from my feet, I will go for the last time and sit at the foot of the pulpit of Notre-Dame, and there, bearing within myself the imperishable evidence of ignored justice, I will weep over my country, sadly exclaiming, the day was when the truth was told; one voice proclaimed it; but justice was not done, they had not the heart to do it. We leave behind us a violated charter, liberty of conscience destroyed, justice outraged, one great crime more; but it will not avail them. A better day will appear; I read the infallible assurance in my soul, that day is not far off. History will not be silent over the step I have taken; its inexorable sentence will be passed on an unjust age. Thou, O Lord, wilt not suffer iniquity to

triumph forever here; but wilt command the justice of time to precede the justice of eternity."*

There is no attempt made in Father de Ravignan's book to refute the various charges made by Michelet and others against the Order; that he left to Father Cahour, in his book, *Les Jésuites, par un Jésuite*; but he shows the nature of the "Spiritual Exercises," of the Constitutions and Rules, and of the doctrines of the Society, with a brief sketch of its missions, showing an ignorant public the true character of those Jesuits it so greatly feared because it knew them not, with a bold demand for the justice and liberty which the laws of France entitled them to. As an appendix to this appeal appeared a discussion of the laws concerning religious orders in France, by H. de Vatimesnil, one of the ablest lawyers in that country, in which it was conclusively proved that the laws on which the French government relied for the proscription of the Jesuits were of no effect against them, having been repealed by the provisions of the penal code and of the charter.

This bold attitude of Father de Ravignan encouraged the friends of the Jesuits, who felt confident that the government could do nothing against them, unless they themselves should consent to their own destruction. The courts of law, also, jealous of the interference of the administration in a matter which belonged to them, declared that any action on the part of the government would be illegal, since, if the Jesuits were living in France contrary to the law, it belonged to the courts and not to the executive power to decide so. Montalembert, Beugnot, Berryer, Dupanloup, and others, warmly espoused their cause, and the ministry hesitated about proceeding so summarily against them. They then sought to use the Pope. A certain lawyer named Rossi, a renegade Catholic, as Gregory XVI. had called him, was sent by Louis Philippe to that Pontiff to obtain by threats, promises, or intrigues the suppression of the Jesuits in France. The Holy Father assembled a Congregation composed of cardinals to deliberate on the matter, and it was unanimously decided that the Holy See could not and ought not to consent to these demands. This answer was returned to Rossi, and no further communications took place between him and the Holy See. Cardinal Lambruschini, however, in his officious, not his official charac-

* *De l'Existence et de l'Institut des Jésuites*, pp. 115-117.

ter, together with some others, surrounded the General of the Jesuits, and persuaded him that the peace of France, the good of religion, and even the lives of the French Jesuits depended on making concessions to their enemies. Father Roothan, little informed of the true state of things in France, suffered himself to be persuaded, and wrote to the Superiors in France, advising,—for he has not the authority to command in such matters,—the diminution or suppression of their principal houses and of the novitiates. The obedience of Father de Ravignan and the Superiors in France was heroic. What it cost him may be seen by what he wrote to the General: “If any concessions are made to the ministry, I shall no longer dare stay in Paris, or show myself in the presence of any of the peers, deputies, or lawyers who prepared and approved the admirable opinion of my friend de Vatimesnil;” and when the letter of the General was received, advising the suppression of nearly all their houses, he wrote: “All the defenders of the Catholic cause are in consternation. We lift our eyes and hands to God. If I had an opinion to give, I would still repeat, legal resistance in the name of common law and of liberty. But I will bow my head under the yoke in silence, if it must be. My soul is very sad. I scarce know what to think or what to do. I should be very happy if you would send me out of France, or at least, far from Paris, into some quiet retreat for a year or two. But forgive me, whatever my sorrow, I wish now and always to obey.”

So great was his mortification that he was unwilling to continue his conferences at Notre-Dame the following year; but the advice of his friends and of the Archbishop of Paris was that he should continue his ministry as publicly as before. He appeared in the pulpit with greater success than ever; but the effort exhausted him. His health had been undermined by his too great labors, by the long struggle in defence of his Order against the government, and by the sorrow he experienced when the Jesuits were forced to immolate themselves just as victory became certain. He quitted Paris for the south of France, and afterward for Rome. His health improved slowly, and in 1848 he returned to Paris, and was charged with the government of the Professed house in the *Rue de Sévres*. At the same time broke out the French Revolution, which gave to the Church, and especially to the Jesuits, the liberty which the government of Louis Philippe had taken from them. The

question of the freedom of education which had been decided against them, was again raised. Count de Falloux, the Minister of Public Instruction, presented to the National Assembly a law on education which gave all the rights which it was possible to assert with success. It was supported by Montalembert, Dupanloup, and nearly all the principal Catholic members. Father de Ravignan was friendly to the law and to those who favored it; but there was in France and there still exists among the Catholics a party whose only principle seems to be to oppose whatever is attempted by the eminent Catholic statesmen who advocated the law. They denounced Father de Ravignan to his General as a "blind follower and imprudent favorer of a schismatic law, and a cause of division among Catholics and among the members of his Order." These accusations had little weight with the General, though they afflicted Father de Ravignan, without being of any avail to their authors. The law passed in spite of them, and the French Church reaped the advantages of it. Whatever faults were found with it, and they were many, it must be regarded as a great victory gained by the Catholics, and as a noble fruit of the twenty years' labor of Count de Montalembert. Pius IX. himself approved of it. The Jesuits hastened to avail themselves of its provisions, and opened their schools throughout France.

Soon after the settlement of the question of education by the passage of the law of 1850, Father de Ravignan commenced his work in two octavo volumes on "*Clement XIII. and Clement XIV.*" The idea of the work was suggested by Father Roothan, who, like Father de Ravignan, was far from satisfied with what either the friends or the enemies of their Society had written about them. The friends of the Jesuits had attacked Clement XIV. in defending the Society, and the work of Father Theiner, which had lately appeared, was far from doing justice to the Pope, although severe enough on the Jesuits. It was reserved for a Jesuit, one of the body which Clement had suppressed, to write his defence. The work is written in a calm, dignified tone, and in a spirit of charity and kindness; it shows the influences which were brought to bear on the Pope, who might have believed that the suppression of the Jesuits would be for the benefit of religion, when he saw so general an opposition raised against them, and when they had already ceased to exist in nearly every Catholic country except his own tem-

poral dominions. It is not to be wondered at that he yielded : "*Povero Papa*," says St. Liguori, "*che poteva fare ?*"

Before Father de Ravignan had completed his work on the two Clements, the death of the General of the Order called him to Rome to take part in the 22d General Congregation, which elected as his successor Peter Beckx, the present General of the Jesuits. While at Rome the Pope seemed to show a desire to see the man whom his predecessor had styled the *Apostle of Paris*, and Father de Ravignan requested an audience. Our author cites a short extract from a memorandum of the conversation, which we translate :

"*The Sovereign Pontiff*.—' Well, how are matters at Paris now ?'

"*Father de Ravignan*.—' Holy Father, every thing is quiet there.'

"*The Pope*.—' But Paris is the centre of France, and all the priests who are expelled from their dioceses meet there.'

"*Ravignan*.—' I can assure your Holiness that if there are some bad priests in Paris, there is also a multitude of good, and very good, priests. I believe I may safely say that, if the Holy See were attacked, and it made the least appeal to the devotion of the Church of France, however it may be in theory, in practice our country and our nation would still be found the most devoted to your Holiness and to all the rights of the Roman Church.'

"*The Pope*.—' I believe so too. But why such contradictions ? The Theology of Bailly, which is most hostile to the Holy See, was taught in nearly all the seminaries of France. It was I, and I alone, (the Pope emphasized this word) who placed the Theology of Bailly on the *Index*. Then again, in that affair of the *Univers*, they said that I was moved to take part against the Archbishop of Paris in consequence of the letter he wrote me at Gaëta. But those things are not of a nature to remain on the heart of a Pope. He is not Pope for his own amusement, but in order that he may carry his cross after Our Lord and imitate him. Besides, I do not adopt any journal, nor do I defend the *Univers*. They wanted me to condemn it ; I cannot approve of all it has written, but there was not any ground for condemning it. I hear a great deal said on both sides. I take a part and leave a part, according as I judge proper. They have accused me of trying to force on France the Roman Liturgy ; I go no farther than is reasonable ; but I do not wish every Bishop to make a Missal or a Breviary to suit himself. I willingly authorize particular usages. They are still writing me to urge the condemnation of *Traditionalism* ; let them have patience ! *They want no more human reason. But, my God, if this poor human reason is no longer any thing, faith itself will soon be no more. Let each have its due.*'"—T. ii., pp. 248-250.

Returning to Paris, de Ravignan resumed his wonted labors; but they were soon to end; he had run the good race. During twenty years of public ministry he had worked incessantly, save when at rare intervals his health forced him to rest for a short time; he had during those twenty years given to religion and to virtue an impetus such as they had scarce ever before known in the capital of France. Laboriously, and mid sorrows and obstacles arising from every side, he had carried out the mission with which God had entrusted him, and now he looked forward to his end with the calm joy of a well-founded hope. Every time that he had felt his malady approach, he had hoped for death,—this time he knew it was near. Still he worked on, growing feebler and feebler. The last time that he sat in the confessional was on the 3d of December, 1857, the feast of St. Francis Xavier, his patron saint, and the anniversary of his baptism, sixty-two years before. It was in the Chapel of the *Sacred Heart*. The last ties that bound him to earth were on the point of snapping asunder; on the confines of eternity, he addressed his penitents like one who had already passed the barriers which separate death from immortality; he exhorted them to delight in their sorrows and sufferings as the means of uniting them more closely with Christ, assuring them that there alone would they find the silence of the heart, the solitude of the soul, where fleeting things fear to enter, and all fades from the sight save God and conscience. Forced to quit the confessional before his usual time, he walked with difficulty back to the *Rue de Sévres*, and awaited death. During the few hours that he was able to sit up during the day, he arranged his papers, burning those he wished destroyed, and prepared himself then for his long journey. His suffering and weakness daily increased; death was every day nearer; at last it had arrived; the Sacraments had all been administered; the prayers for those in agony were just completed; he kissed the crucifix presented to his lips, raised his eyes to behold for the last time the image of the Saviour, his head bowed, and his soul returned to the bosom of God. Thus passed away from earth one who in our own days has rivalled the heroic deeds of those great men whom the Church offers to our imitation. Whether we regard him in his interior and private character, or consider him as he appeared to the world, we cannot but love him and esteem him. All his actions appear to us regulated by the highest principles of

reason and of the Gospel; we see in him none of those petty weaknesses which ordinarily obscure the character of men placed in prominent positions. His life, his character seem everywhere consistent. In the first years of his religious life, in his novitiate at Montrouge, he had fully imbued his mind with the lofty principles laid down in the Exercises of St. Ignatius, which guided him during his whole after life. Fully convinced, not only in his head, but in his heart too, of the vanity of worldly ambition, he devoted himself, wholly and with all the energy of a strong character, to the true objects for which he lived. With the same energy with which we see men incessantly tending toward some visible object which they are fully determined to reach, Father de Ravignan constantly aimed at the attainment of his end. In this we find the distinguishing trait of Father de Ravignan's character and the cause of all his success: he was in downright earnest. His earnestness is the principal feature in his eloquence, and the means by which he persuaded. The great evil of this age, he said, was clearly marked; it consisted in vagueness of the intellect and languor of the will: against these he fought. His whole appearance was a protest against them; there was a nobility, a manliness in every feature of his countenance; force was seen in his broad high forehead; there was energy in his clear eye, ordinarily mild and attractive, but at times sparkling with the fire within; in the strong-marked lines of his nose, in the close-pressed lips, and in the firm, deep tones of his voice.

Such men are never satisfied with half attaining their object; every thing with them becomes subordinate to their principal aim, to which they tend incessantly. No labor is esteemed sufficient, no rest is possible. Thus the amount of work performed by Father de Ravignan would seem almost incredible; we have spoken of only a few of the more prominent acts of his life; but Father de Pontlevoy represents him to us as travelling from one end of Europe to another; now preaching in Belgium and again at Bordeaux; at one time at London, and another at Nantes; one day at Rome, a few days after at Ajaccio in Corsica, and next at Besançon. During Lent we find him not only delivering his conferences at Notre-Dame in Paris, but at one time he adds to them three *retreats* preached during the same week to three different congregations. We find him giving retreats to the Sisters of the Visitation, the La-

dies of the Sacred Heart, the Carmelites, or the Children of Mary: if any one takes the habit or makes her profession, he is ever ready to assist and to deliver an instruction for the occasion. He preached on Sundays in the Chapel of the Tuileries, and during the week to the beggars supported by the "Little Sisters of the Poor," and quitted the pulpit of Notre-Dame to instruct the orphans of St. Nicholas. If a college of the Society was suppressed by the government, it was he that spoke with the Emperor and obtained permission for its continuance; his assistance was felt in almost every thing that was undertaken for the good of religion; he interested himself greatly in the establishment of the Oratory of the Immaculate Conception, concerning which he had been consulted by Fathers Gratry, de Valroger, and Pététot, and in the foundation of the Monastery of Pierre-qui-Vire. He wrote a series of articles in a religious journal in defence of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception; he drew up a memorial to the government, asking for freedom to preach the Gospel to the Arabs of Algeria, which was refused for reasons of state policy. He took part in several Councils as theologian for different Bishops. His correspondence was enormous; he received letters, which he answered, from every country of Europe, and from every class of persons; to the Duchess of Hamilton alone he wrote as many as two hundred letters in seven years; and nearly all these various letters, written in a few moments which he could get at a time, are in a careful and appropriate style, although his room was almost constantly filled with men who came to consult him on spiritual matters, and the porter was every few moments at his door to announce women who were waiting to see him in the parlor. When, in connection with this variety of labors, we consider the hours he spent in the confessional, and by the bedside of the dying, we must admit that the life of Father de Ravignan was a full one, and although he spent but twenty years in the Apostolic ministry, during that period *explevit tempora multa*. He might well, at the end of this time, look confidently forward to the "crown of life" which had been laid up for him.

His loss was deeply felt at Paris, and by all who knew him throughout France. A sad crowd filled the Church of Saint-Sulpice, where his obsequies were performed, and where the Bishop of Orleans, dressed in mourning, gave vent to his feelings in a burst of eloquence which reminds us of the best efforts of Massillon or Bossuet. *Defunctus adhuc lo-*

quitur, was the well-chosen text of the funeral orator, and it is still true; that which was mortal in De Ravignan has passed away, but his immortal spirit still lives and preaches. In these two volumes of Father de Pontlevoy, we still see the great preacher of Notre-Dame, we feel his presence as that of a living man.

H. F. B.

ART. V. — *Les Moines d'Occident depuis Saint Benoît jusqu'à Saint Bernard.* Par le COMTE MONTALEMBERT. Paris : Lecoffre et Cie. 1860. . Tomes I. et II. 8vo.

COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT is one of those pure and noble characters that go far to redeem and even to give a lustre to an age of weakness and frivolity in which they sometimes make their appearance. He takes life in earnest, and feels that it has serious aims and solemn duties. He believes every man, whatever his rank or condition, has been placed in this world to work, to do and to suffer the will of his Maker, not to fritter away his existence in the frivolous pursuit of pleasure, or the sordid pursuit of gain. Liberally endowed by nature, he has invigorated and enriched his rare gifts by assiduous culture and solid studies. Descended from a noble family with an historical name, heir of a peerage when France had an hereditary peerage, he generously devoted from his youth his name, his rank, his lofty character, his genius, his learning, and his great powers as a writer and an orator, to the defence and promotion of Catholic interests, and for thirty years he has stood first and foremost among laymen as their bold, firm, consistent, and persevering champion.

It is not easy to estimate the value of the services rendered to religion by this eminent layman. Without his free spirit, independent thought, liberal action, and bold and energetic words, always on the side of the right, the wronged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, in the House of Peers, the National Assembly, in books, pamphlets, periodicals, journals, and a world-wide correspondence, few of us would have been what we are. There are few living, acting, earnest men among us who have not been quickened by him. Whoever has labored to promote or secure Catholic interests by calling in the aid of free thought and

free speech, political liberty, social progress, and the rights and independence of nations, has found in him a wise and hearty co-operator, and an intrepid defender: and whoever has seen his hopes in the good cause overclouded, and felt his heart saddened and his arm unnerved by the baseness, treachery, desertion, or cowardice of pretended friends, or by disappointments and unmerited defeats, has found in him a generous sympathizer, and heard from him words that have not only soothed his grief, but revived his hopes, rekindled his ardor, and inspired him with fresh courage and energy to renew the combat. None of us can say how much we owe him, or measure the influence he has exerted for the last thirty years, or is destined hereafter to exert on the Catholic body throughout the world. The influence of such a man is sure ultimately to be felt by the whole human race; and it can die only to live again forever in the bosom of Him from whom it went forth.

There is probably no man among our contemporaries so well fitted to write the history of the labors and influence of the Monks of the West from St. Benedict to St. Bernard, as our illustrious author, who adds to the science, erudition, and literary taste and culture of our times, the faith, the piety, the chivalric sentiments, and the robust character of the great ages of the Church. He is a layman and a secular; he has taken an active and a brilliant part in the political movements in his own country and in Europe; he knows his age; he knows all it knows, can speak its language, and interpret it by his own experience; but he has retired so often to commune with the Fathers of the Desert, and with the Basils, the Chrysostoms, the Benedicts, the Gregories, and the Bernards, has been so charmed with their heroic life, entered so fully into their spirit, and become so imbued with their love of suffering and of sacrifice, that he speaks with their wisdom, power, sweetness, and unction. He is at home with them, knows them, understands them, and is able to interpret them to the understanding, and, we would fain hope, to the admiration and love of the men of our own times, weak, effeminate, frivolous, or sordid, as for the most part we unhappily are.

The author has not designed his work—intended to be completed in six volumes, of which only the first two are as yet published—to be a history of the Monks of the West from the purely ascetic point of view, so much as a history of their labors and influence from St. Benedict to St. Ber-

nard in founding modern civilization, and creating and forming out of the degenerate populations of the old Roman Empire and their Barbarian conquerors, the great civilized nations of the world. The period he has chosen, from the close of the fifth to the middle of the twelfth century, or from the downfall of the Roman Empire of the West to the definitive reconstruction of European society and the formation of the great and leading European nations, is a period that stands nearly alone in the history of our race, and the importance of which neither our ecclesiastical nor our general historians have hitherto even dimly perceived. It was a period of long and painful elaboration. Never were the human race afflicted with greater or more numerous evils. There was an old and worn out population, corrupted, enervated, disheartened, and brutalized by long ages of tyranny and oppression, to rejuvenate, to restore to moral life and vigor; and there were rude, proud, haughty, fierce, and barbarian conquerors, free from some of their vices, and retaining a fresh, vigorous nature indeed, but pagan or heretical, to be converted, civilized, and moulded into a Christian and polished people. Never was there a work for man on earth of greater magnitude, more difficult, more arduous, or to the performance of which wise and prudent, strong and energetic, brave and heroic characters were more absolutely necessary. Yet these characters were found, and the work was done; a new society rose from the ashes of the old, a new and nobler order of civilization took the place of the old Græco-Roman civilization, and Christendom was constituted. By what means, by what agencies was this done?

Certainly no man capable of reasoning on the subject will pretend the work was effected without the supernatural providence of God. It was a work above the forces of ordinary men; it was also above the forces of ordinary Christians, and only by the supernatural intervention of Divine Providence was it possible. But Providence ordinarily intervenes by preparing and using means adapted to its end. Great men, great Christians, great Popes, great prelates, and great statesmen were raised up, but not by a direct and immediate miracle from the bosom of the earth, without antecedents, without preparation, without previous discipline. Where was the laboratory of these great characters, and by what discipline were formed these great men who resisted the tide of evil, rebuked disorder, restored the

empire of law, and impressed their own likeness on their age? Our author shows, and it was his design to show, that the laboratory was the monastery, and the discipline that of the monastic life. He does not overlook the ascetic and purely religious bearings of his subject; he knows, no man better, that men do not and cannot enter the monastery and submit to the monastic discipline for the sake of preparing themselves to labor effectually for the progress of civilization and society; he knows that whoever makes himself a true monk does so because he would detach himself from the world, retire to solitude and prayer, and seek to honor his Lord, and save his soul by the daily and hourly practice of a religion of sacrifice; but he would show that precisely because men enter the monastery for that end, and precisely because its discipline is that which best prepares men for heaven, it is the best fitted to produce those great, strong, energetic, and heroic characters needed to convert and civilize a barbarian, to reform a corrupt, or to rejuvenate an old and effete people,—to reconstruct a fallen society, and to ennoble and advance civilization.

In this the author, it will be perceived, forms a very different estimate of the monastic character from that commonly formed in our times even by people who are not unfriendly to the Religious Orders. He does not regard the true monk as a weak and timid character, without force or courage, driven by despotism or chagrin, disappointment or sorrow, to take refuge in a monastery. Much less does he regard him as one who from indolence, aversion to labor, and love of an easy, idle life, makes himself a religious. Thus he says in his instructive and edifying *Introduction*:—

“Many apologists of the monastic life fall into the strange error of regarding that life as an asylum for sad and wearied souls, who are discontented with their lot in the world, who are unable to keep the place to which they are consigned by society, overcome by their disappointments, or broken with grief. ‘If there are places for the health of the body,’ says Chateaubriand, ‘O permit religion to have hers for the health of the soul, much more subject to disease, and whose maladies are far more painful, lasting, and difficult to cure.’ The thought is poetical and touching, but it lacks truth. Monasteries were by no means intended to collect within their walls the invalids of the world. They were not diseased souls, they were, on the contrary, the most healthy and robust souls of the race that flocked in multitudes to people them. The religious

life instead of being the refuge of the weak, was the arena of the strong.

"It is no doubt true, that sometimes, by one of those strange contrasts which abound in works inspired by religion, this career full of combats and supernatural victories, this life where virtue, where Christian force attained its apogee, was that in which souls naturally infirm, and hearts wounded in the conflicts with a worldly life, sought and found refuge; and since modern civilization by the side of its incontestable benefits has too often for its effect to augment the number and intensity of the maladies of the soul, it might, perhaps, under a purely social point of view, be desirable to provide for such a shelter, and a proper treatment. It is possible that even under this point of view the destruction of the Religious Orders has been a public calamity. It may have been not without influence on the number of suicides, proved by criminal statistics to be yearly increasing. But, in point of fact, we seldom meet, except in romances, vocations to the monastic life produced by disappointments, disgusts, and melancholy. I find no profound or serious traces of them in history,—in the degenerate communities no more than in the heroic ages of their annals. Doubtless there were souls thrown into the cloister by a great misfortune, a striking disgrace, or the loss of some one passionately loved, and I could cite curious and touching instances of the kind, but they are exceedingly rare. To present, in general thesis, the religious life as an asylum for weakness and sadness, as a refuge for melancholy, proscribed and combated in the cloister as a vice under the name of *acedia*, is to run counter to both reason and facts.

"The distinctive character which so brilliantly shines out in all the great monastic creations and existences which I seek to unroll before my readers is force; not indeed that force which men have in common with certain animals; not that material force whose contemptible triumphs throw the world into confusion; not that exterior force of which blinded and cowardly Christians sometimes call in the dangerous aid; not that force which consists in imposing our own convictions or interests on others: but that force which consists in self-discipline, self-restraint, self-government, and in subjecting one's own rebellious nature; that force which is a cardinal virtue, and which governs the world by courage and by sacrifice. I hesitate not to say, that the monks, the true monks of the great ages of the Church, are representatives of manhood in its purest and most energetic forms, of moral and intellectual manhood, of manhood in some sort condensed by celibacy, protesting against all baseness and vulgarity, condemning itself to greater, stronger, and better sustained efforts than any worldly career exacts, and thus succeeding in making earth a stepping-stone to heaven, and life a long series of victories.

"Yes, thanks to the robust constitution which they receive from

their founders, thanks to that incomparable discipline of the soul, which all the monastic legislators knew how to create, the monk drew from solitude a treasure of force which the world has never surpassed, has never equalled. 'Solitude,' says a venerable religious,* 'is the home of the strong, silence is their prayer.' The whole monastic history is only a proof of this truth. How indeed could it have been otherwise? What was the life of the monk but a permanent protestation against human weakness? a reaction daily and hourly renewed against all that debases or enervates man,—a perpetual aspiration to that which hovers above our earthly life and fallen nature? In the monasteries faithful to their primitive constitution the contempt of the world, that secret of heroism, was taught and practised every day, and every moment of the day. The soul by the slightest habits of the daily rule constantly elevated to God, offered him continually the victories of the purest and most generous forces of human nature over the passions and the senses."—*Introduction*, pp. xxix-xxxi.

The whole discipline of the monastery was intended and was admirably adapted to form free and independent, strong and generous characters, the very characters demanded to battle with the evils of the times. Weak and timid characters can effect nothing for society, or for a strong and manly civilization. The man who would fulfil the precept to love his neighbor as himself, or serve his own age or country, must be prepared to battle for the unpopular truth, the depressed virtue, the outraged right against the popular error, the successful vice, the triumphant iniquity. We cannot serve God and our neighbor in our day and generation without disturbing some popular prejudice, offending some self-love, or opposing some selfish interest. God and our neighbor are never on the side that is uppermost; one in serving either has always to stem the popular current, to withstand the intolerance of public opinion, and have his motives impugned, his character traduced, and his very virtues denied or distorted into vices. He has all the passions and interests of the world against him. Respectable men, men of standing, men in place, and clothed with authority, who even sit in Moses' seat and occupy the chief seats in the synagogue will look upon him with distrust, regard him as eccentric, officious, rash, perhaps as mad, and really believe that they are doing God's service in opposing him, circumscribing his influence, silencing his voice, depriving him

* Père de Ravignan.

of freedom, if not of life; for in every age there are those to whom apply those fearful words of our Lord, "Wo unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, that build the tombs of the prophets and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore be ye witnesses against yourselves that ye are the children of them that killed the prophets." The generation of them who kill the prophets or persecute the servants of God, never dies out; and they who in any age can discern the Lord of life in the carpenter's son, or the son of the humble Mary, are the few. The world can be served only by those who are above it, and not of it, and the world loveth only its own. "If ye were of the world," says our Lord to his disciples, "the world would love its own. But ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." The world can love only those who love it, and act from its own principles.

It is impossible, then, that men of the world should serve it, or that men who love their own ease, their own quiet, their own reputation, or even their own lives should be able to lift up a fallen society, or introduce and sustain a new and vigorous civilization in harmony with Christian principles. Only men who are freed from the dominion of the passions and the senses, who have obtained the victory over themselves, and who can rejoice and be exceeding glad when men revile them, persecute them, and say all manner of evil against them falsely for Christ's sake, are prepared to do any great work for God or our neighbor. They must be weaned from the world, and must love suffering, and joy in sacrifice. They must have their moral stand-point above and outside the world, in the love of God. Love joys to suffer for the beloved, and they who really love their Lord count no loss, no suffering, no sacrifice, by which he is served, honored, or glorified. They are ready at any moment to be offered for him; they fear only to lose or not to honor him; they have no other fear; they can meet opposition, calumny, persecution, the dungeon, the scaffold, or the stake, or, what is even worse, the distrust of friends, the contempt of those whom the world honors, and who avoid them as a moral pestilence, with a serene brow and a peaceful heart. If their pulse throbs, it is with joy that they are found worthy to suffer those things for their

Lord, whom they so deeply and tenderly love. These characters, free, pure, noble, disinterested, strong and brave with the strength and heroism of love, while formed for heaven, and incapable of being formed except for the invisible and eternal, are precisely the characters needed to lift up a fallen society, to found and sustain wise and just government and secure the orderly advance of a true civilization. It was precisely to the formation of such characters as these the monastic life and discipline were adapted. In the monastery and under its discipline men in learning to detach themselves from the world and to live and act only with a view to eternal life, acquired the virtues, the force and strength of character which best fitted them to provide for the wants and necessities of the temporal order. Hence the author says, further on—

“That chivalric courage which the monks daily displayed against sin, against their own weakness, animates them at need against princes and potentates who abuse their authority. It is especially with them that we must seek that moral energy which gives man the force and the desire to resist injustice and to protest against the abuses of power, even when the abuses and injustice fall not directly on himself. This energy, without which the guaranties of order, security, and independence invented by statesmen, are illusory, was inherent in the character and profession of the monks. From the earliest times of their history, and in the midst of the baseness and abjectness of the Byzantine court, they were distinguished among all men as those who spoke with the most freedom to kings, and from century to century, so long as they remained sheltered from the corruptions of the temporal power, they retained this glorious privilege. We shall see it at each page of this recital; we shall see the monk armed with an intrepid boldness, an indomitable courage, against oppression, and comprehend what succor innocence and misfortune found with them in those times when no one feared to be without defence so long as he could invoke against the oppressor the malediction of God and that of the hooded friar. At a thousand years' distance we find the same calm and indomitable courage in the reprimand addressed by St. Benedict to Totila, and in the response of the obscure Prior of Solesmes to the Lord de Sablé, against whom he had to uphold the privileges of his Priory. This lord having met him one day on the bridge in his town, said to him, ‘Monk, if I did not fear God, I would cast you into the Sarthe!’ ‘My lord,’ replied the monk, ‘if you feared God, I should have nothing to fear.’

“Thus it was under the dictation of the monks that the Christians who rose against the abuses of power, wrote the civil and po-

litical guaranties which they wrested from unjust masters. It was to the keeping of the monks that they confided these charters of their liberties, and in which were written the conditions of their obedience. It was in the cloisters of the monks that were sought not only the sepulchres for kings, nobles, and conquerors, but those also of the weak and the vanquished. There found a last asylum the victims of tyranny, of injustice, of all the excesses of human power. There slept in peace, in the bosom of perpetual prayer, the exiled, the beheaded, and the proscribed. These admirable verses of Statius, inscribed on the Temple of Clemency at Athens, and which the monks have preserved, were found realized in the bosom of the monastic life :

“ Sic tutum sacrasse loco mortalibus ægris
 Confugium, unde procul starent iræque, minæque,
 Regnaque, et a justis Fortuna recederet aris
 Huc victi bellis, patriaque e sede fugati
 Conveniunt, pacemque rogant”*

“ Never were there men who less feared the strong, or less practised cowardly complaisances towards power. In the bosom of the peace and obedience of the cloister, they daily tempered their hearts against injustice, and formed themselves to be the indomitable champions of right and truth. Great characters, hearts truly independent, are nowhere found in greater abundance than under the frock. There were there, and in multitudes, calm and intrepid, erect and lofty as well as humble and fervent souls,—souls whom Pascal calls *perfectly heroic*. ‘ Liberty,’ says a holy monk of the eighth century, ‘ succumbs not, for humility freely abdicates it;’ and in the depth of the Middle Ages, Peter de Bois, another monk, wrote these noble words, in which are summed up the political code of the epoch and the history of the monastic orders : ‘ There are two things for which every Christian must stand, even unto blood—Liberty and Justice. *Duo sunt, justitia et libertas, pro quibus quisque fidelis usque ad sanguinem stare debet.*’”—*Introduction*, pp. xxxvi-xxxix.

The monastic life was neither intended nor suitable for all men, and no one pretends that none but monks or nuns can enter into the kingdom of heaven. But the author shows, as does Father Hecker, in his excellent work entitled *Questions of the Soul*, that in all ages and nations of the world, choice souls are borne to seek to maintain the combat with sin, and to overcome their weakness in retirement from the world, in solitude and silence, and that from the origin of the Church there have always been those who lived the monastic life, and practised the monastic discipline. It is not absolutely necessary to the existence of the Church, or

* Theb. xii., v. 486.

to the maintenance of the faith, that there should be religious orders distinct from the general ecclesiastical organization, but the virtues, the freedom, the courage, the self-denial, the love of suffering, the moral heroism which is cherished in the bosom of the monastery, and the victory over the senses and the passions the monastic discipline was intended to secure are necessary for all who aim at Christian perfection, or seek to serve God and do good to the world in their own day and generation. The great merit of the monks was that they not only cultivated and possessed these virtues often in an eminent degree in themselves, but that they sustained them in the general Christian community, and kept up the moral tone and vigor of society. No one denies that in the work done in the ages from St. Benedict to St. Bernard, the priority in achievement, as in rank, state, and authority, belonged to the Popes and Bishops. Without them there had been no Church, and the monastic orders would have been no better than those poor imitations of them which we find among the worshippers of Budha or the followers of Mahomet; but we must not forget the greatest and most eminent of the Popes and Bishops, those who most distinctly impressed their image on their age, were monks, or had been formed in the monastic life and by the monastic discipline, as St. Gregory the Great, St. Gregory VII., St. Austin, the Apostle of Anglo-Saxon England, and St. Boniface, the Apostle of Germany.

The reader will find the whole question discussed in the profound and brilliant *Introduction*, filling nearly three hundred pages, which the author has prefixed to his work, and from which our extracts thus far have been made. In it the author gives his views and sentiments in regard to the monastic orders, and the services which they rendered to religion and society. The whole *Introduction* is marked by the peculiar qualities of the author, and is as remarkable for its depth of thought, its comprehensive philosophy, and its far-reaching statesmanlike views, as for its fervid eloquence, simple piety, and earnest faith. In it the author shows us everywhere his unquenchable love of liberty, his knowledge of human nature, and his respect for human reason and manly virtue. The most remarkable chapter is, perhaps, Chapter IX., *On the True and False Middle Age*, which shows that he has thoroughly studied that period, so variously estimated by modern writers, mastered its spirit, and appreciated its real character. He has

seen and is willing to acknowledge its good and its bad,—its faith and its virtues, also its disorders, its vices, and its crimes. We would, had we space, lay the whole chapter before our readers, but must content ourselves with a single extract:—

“The error common both to the admirers and to the detractors of the Middle Ages, is that they see in them the reign and the triumph of theocracy. ‘They are a time,’ Donoso Cortes tells us, ‘forever famous by the manifestation of human impotence, and by the glorious dictatorship of the Church.’

“I deny the dictatorship. I deny still more the human impotence. Never was humanity more prolific, more virile, or more powerful. And as to the Church, never did she find her authority more disputed in practice, even by those who with great docility admitted it in theory.

“What reigned then was unity of faith, as we see reign now in all modern nations the unity of the civil law, or of the national constitution. But do we see that in free nations, as England and the United States, this civil and social unity stifles either individual or corporate vitality, energy, and independence? It was the same with the Catholic unity of the Middle Ages. It nowhere extinguished either intellectual or political life. The uniformity of a worship universally popular, the sincere and affectionate submission of hearts and understandings to revealed truth and to the teachings of the Church, excluded no prepossession, no discussion on the highest and most difficult questions of philosophy and morals. The principle of authority implied no rupture either with the free genius of antiquity, so faithfully, so ardently cultivated, as we shall prove, by the Benedictines in their cloisters, or with the natural and progressive development of the human mind. Is it necessary to recall the immense developments of scholasticism, that gymnastic at once rude and subtle of human intelligence, so propitious, notwithstanding its many undeniable gaps, to the force and suppleness of reasoning? Is it necessary to name those great, numerous, and powerful universities, so living, so free, sometimes so rebellious, in which the masters, whose independence was equalled only by that of the ardent and tumultuous youth who flocked to them, broached every day a thousand questions which would frighten the meticulous orthodoxy of our times? Is it, in fine, necessary to evoke the liberty, the license even of those satires which, in the popular and chivalric poetry, in the *fabliaux* and songs, as well as in the productions of the arts consecrated to religious service, pushed even to excess the right of criticism and public discussion?

“In those times so ridiculously calumniated, souls were inflamed with a devouring passion to know and to act. The heroic and persevering ardor which sent the Marco Polos and the Plancarpins even to the extremities of the known world, athwart distances and

dangers of which our contemporaries have lost the notion, animated travellers no less intrepid in the regions of thought. The human mind with Gerbert and Scotus Erigena exercised itself on problems the most arduous and the most delicate. It recoiled with the most orthodox, such as St. Anselm and St. Thomas, from none of the difficulties of psychology or metaphysics; with some it even ran into theses the most audacious and the most hostile to the spirit of the Church and the Gospel: with nobody, it may be boldly asserted, did it resign itself to the abdication or the sleep of reason.

"We go farther, and ask, if even now, in spite of printing, the happy but insufficient progress of popular education, the apparent vulgarization of the sciences and the arts, it is quite certain that the equilibrium between material pre-occupations and the moral life of the world is better maintained than it was then; if the spiritual element of human nature, if the cultivation of ideas, if moral enthusiasm, if all that which constitutes the noble life of thought is as well represented, as energetically developed, as liberally provided for with us as with our fathers! For myself I doubt it, and I believe, all things considered and well compared, never have men been more richly endowed than in the Middle Ages, or have more ardently cultivated the domain of the soul and the understanding.

"Religion reigned over all, it is true, but it stifled nothing. It was not relegated to a corner of society, nor shut up within the walls of its temples or the individual conscience; on the contrary it was invited to animate, enlighten, and permeate all with its spirit of life, and, after having seated the edifice on an immovable foundation, to crown its summit with its light and its beauty. No one was placed too high to obey it, and no one could fall so low as to escape its consolations and protection. From the king to the hermit, all at certain moments felt the power of its pure and generous inspirations. The memory of the Redemption, of the debt contracted towards God by man ransomed on Calvary, mingled with all, and was found in all institutions, in all monuments, and, at moments, in all souls. The victory of charity over selfishness, of humility over pride, of spirit over matter, of all that which is elevated in our nature over all that which is ignoble and impure, was as frequent as is compatible with human infirmity. Never has this victory been complete here below; but it may be fearlessly asserted that never had it come nearer to being complete. Since the grand defiance given to evil triumphant on earth by the establishment of Christianity, never, perhaps, was the empire of Satan more shaken, or nearer being overthrown.

"But shall we therefore conclude that the Middle Ages constituted a sort of ideal of Christian society? Must we see in them the normal state of the world? God forbid. There never was and there never will be a normal state, or an irreproachable epoch

on the earth. Besides, if that ideal could be realized here below, it certainly was not the Middle Ages that would have attained it. Not without reason have they been called *Ages of Faith*, for faith was more supreme in them than in any other epoch of history. But there we must stop. That says much, and enough for truth. We must not venture the assertion that their virtue and happiness were up to the level of their faith. A thousand unexceptionable witnesses rise up to protest against an assertion so rash,—to recall the general insecurity, the too frequent triumphs of violence, iniquity, cruelty, artifice, and at times of a refined depravity; to demonstrate that the human element, the satanic element even, only too often vindicated its ascendancy over the world. By the side of the open heaven there was always a hell, and by the side of those prodigies of sanctity seldom found elsewhere, were profigate wretches hardly inferior to those Roman Emperors, whom Bossuet calls *moral monsters*.

"The Church, which always undergoes, up to a certain point, the action of contemporary civilization, was familiar then with abuses and scandals the bare thought of which would now fill her children as well as her enemies with horror. They proceeded sometimes from the corruptions inseparable from the exercise of great power and the possession of great riches; sometimes, and oftener, from the invasion of the laical spirit and the secular power. Cupidity, violence, debauchery, often revolted, and with success, against the yoke of the Gospel, even in its own ministers,—and infected the very organs of the law promulgated to repress them. We must confess it; and we may do so without fear, because the evil was almost always overcome by good; because all these excesses were redeemed by miracles of self-denial, penitence, and charity; because by the side of each fall we find an expiation, of each misery an asylum, each iniquity a resistance. Sometimes in the monastic cells, sometimes in the clefts of the rocks; here under the tiara and the mitre, there under the helmet and coat of mail, thousands of souls fought with force and perseverance the battles of the Lord, strengthened the weak by their examples, revived by their fervor the enthusiasm of those even who could not or would not imitate them, and shine above the vices and disorders of the multitude by the splendor of their prodigious austerity, their charitable effusions, and their indomitable love of God. But all this effulgence of virtue and sanctity must not blind us to the real state of things. There were more saints, more monks, and above all more believers than now; but I fear not to say that there were fewer priests,—I mean fewer good priests. The secular clergy of the Middle Ages were less pure, less exemplary than ours; the bishops less respectable, and the spiritual authority of the Holy See much less supreme than to-day. This assertion will perhaps astonish the blind admiration of some, but it is easily proved. The

Pontifical authority has to-day fewer but infinitely more docile subjects, and what it has lost in extent it has more than regained in intensity.

"Besides, the domination of the Church, usurped by some, disputed by others, and balanced by a multitude of rival or vassal authorities, was never omnipotent or uncontested. She saw her laws continually violated, her discipline impaired, her rights trampled on, not only in the temporal order but also in the spiritual, and not as now by avowed enemies, but by her own children, who could, at the demand of pride or interest, brave her thunders with as cool blood as the unbelievers of our own day. Her real grandeur, her real force, her real victory in the Middle Ages was not that she was powerful and rich, that she was loved and protected by princes, but that she was **FREE**. She was free with the general liberty as then understood and practised—with that which belonged to all corporations and proprietors, and freer than any one else because she was at once the largest corporation and the largest proprietor in Europe. This liberty, always the surest guaranty of her majesty, her fecundity, her duration, the first condition of her life, was more fully possessed by her then than at any previous epoch, or than it has been since, unless in those few states which have emancipated liberty from all superannuated shackles. As the rights and destinies of the Church and those of the soul are identical, never was the soul freer than then to do good, to give itself to God, and to immolate itself for mankind. Hence those miracles of self-devotion, charity, and sanctity, which charm and dazzle us.

"But it would be a complete and inexcusable error to represent that liberty as universal and uncontested. It subsisted and triumphed only in the midst of storms. It had to be unceasingly struggled for, and wrested from the grasp of laical rivalries and pretensions,—from the domination of temporal interests. It was, moreover, happily and usefully restrained, as Father Lacordaire has said, 'by the civil liberty which prevented it from becoming a dominating theocracy.' It must, therefore, be admitted that the Church had never and nowhere an absolute and permanent supremacy; that never and nowhere did she see all her adversaries annihilated or bound in chains at her feet; and precisely in that was the pledge of her long and glorious influence, her continued ascendancy, and her blessed action on souls and legislation. Always is it necessary for her to resist, and to re-youth herself by effort. So long as the true Middle Ages remained, so long the Church ceased not for a single day to struggle. She conquered much oftener than she was checked; she never underwent a complete defeat, but never any more was she able to sleep in the pride of a triumph, or in the enervating peace of a dictatorship.

"Nothing then is more false or puerile than the strange pretension of certain late-comers of the Catholic Revival to present us the

Middle Ages as an epoch in which the Church was always victorious, always protected, or as a 'promised land flowing with milk and honey,' governed by kings and nobles piously kneeling before the priest, cultivated by a happy people, silent and docile, quietly extended under the shepherd's crook in the double shade of the throne and the altar, both of which were inviolably respected. Far from it. Never were there more passions, more disorders, more wars, more revolts; but, on the other hand, never were there more virtues, more generous efforts in the service of good. All was war, danger, storm in Church and state; but at the same time all was strong, robust, energetic: all bore the imprint of life and struggle. On the one hand was faith, sincere faith, childlike, simple, vigorous, without hypocrisy as without insolence, without narrowness as without servility, giving daily the imposing spectacle of force in humility; on the other, militant and virile institutions, which by the side of a thousand defects had the admirable virtue of creating men, not pious lackeys or eunuchs, and which condemned all those men to action, to sacrifice, to continual effort. Strong natures everywhere vigorously nourished, nowhere stifled, deadened, or disdained, found there easily and simply their place. Feeble natures with relaxed fibres were there subjected to the regimen best fitted to give them sap and tone. We see not there honest folk resting on a master the care of defending them by gagging or binding their adversaries. We see not Christians like good little lambs devoutly bleating in the midst of wolves, or taking courage only between the legs of the shepherd. We see them, on the contrary, as athletes, as soldiers, engaged each day in fighting for all that is sacred: in a word, as men armed with the most robust personality and an unshackled and inexhaustible individual energy.

"If therefore the Middle Ages deserve admiration, it is precisely for reasons which would lead their recent panegyrists to condemn them if they knew better what their misapplied enthusiasm boasts.

"To those who decry them, I admit those ages must appear frightful in the eyes of those who are smitten, before all things, with a love of order and discipline, only let it be granted that their courage and virtues were heroic. I admit that violence was then almost continual, superstition not unfrequently ridiculous, ignorance quite too general, and iniquity not seldom suffered to go unpunished, only it must be conceded to me that never has the world seen the consciousness of human dignity more vividly or more deeply impressed upon the human heart, or seen reign with less opposition the first of all forces, the only really respectable force, the force of soul."—*Introduction*, pp. ccxli—ccliii.

The extracts we have made, and indeed the whole work, cannot fail to prove that the author loves and admires the strong, the masculine, the energetic, and the heroic virtues,

and that he has a great contempt for those weak and pusillanimous, tame and servile characters formed in our age of relaxed fibre and moral cowardice. Indeed, his contempt for the weak and cowardly, his admiration of the strong and heroic, and his ardent love and untiring defence of liberty, moral, intellectual, political, and religious, have availed him the accusation of rationalism and naturalism from some of the meticulous theologians of his country. This need not surprise us, for in France as well as elsewhere there are men calling themselves theologians, who the moment they hear one mention nature without asserting its corruption, reason without proclaiming its impotence, or liberty without anathematizing it, immediately suspect his orthodoxy, and judge it their duty to decry him as dangerous, and to put the faithful on their guard against him. For them nature is totally corrupt, reason is a false and illusory light, liberty is a temptation and a snare. How, they ask, can he who recognizes nature acknowledge grace? he who respects reason believe in revelation? or he who loves and defends liberty respect and obey authority? We would treat these men with tenderness and consideration, but we must tell them that they are among the worst enemies religion has or can have in our age, for they confirm the unfounded charge so persistently urged against the Church, that she is opposed to nature, contrary to reason, and hostile to liberty. They render well-nigh ineffectual all efforts to refute this charge, and alienate millions from the Catholic communion. They know not what they do. They are so afraid of error that they dare not suffer even the truth to speak. They tremble whenever they hear a free, bold, manly thought uttered, lest it shiver to atoms the very Rock on which the Church is founded. It is precisely to silence these Jansenizing theologians and mole-eyed critics, who detect naturalism and rationalism in that splendid and really erudite work, *The Church and the Empire in the Fourth Century*, by the illustrious Prince de Broglie, and to answer once for all the objection that religion is repugnant to nature, contrary to reason, and hostile to liberty, or that it delights in tame and servile, timid and imbecile characters, opposes the free development and exercise of reason, and condemns the strong, the energetic, and the heroic virtues, that the author has written the very work before us, which proves, beyond the possibility of cavil even, from the sayings and doings, the lives and examples of the old monks and of the great

Popes and Prelates formed under the austere discipline of the monastery, that the precise contrary is the fact.

The illustrious author has, most certainly, a deep sense of the dignity of human nature, and a profound respect for human reason. He believes God made man a rational soul, and that reason is in all men a living and ever-present witness for truth and justice. He loves and defends liberty as a great good both to the Church and to society. But the liberty he loves and defends stands opposed to despotism and slavery, not to authority and obedience. He believes that in order to attain to robust and heroic Christian virtue, a robust and vigorous nature, improved by a strong and masculine culture, is necessary; but he does not believe that any Christian virtue is attainable without the supernatural and supernaturalizing assistance of grace. He needs no one to remind him that Christianity is a divine, a supernatural religion, and that in the monastic life and discipline there was always something more than natural light and strength. He holds that in the heroic virtues of the monk or of the saint there is always a large and vigorous nature, but a nature purified, invigorated, informed by supernatural grace—always a sound and comprehensive reason, but a reason provided with a higher and a broader field of operation by supernatural revelation. Here is no rationalism or naturalism in any objectionable sense.

The great saints of the Church or of the monastery have always been the great men, the master minds of their age. St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Leo I., St. Gregory the Great, St. Gregory VII., St. Anselm, St. Bernard, St. Thomas, stood out from their contemporaries by their robust and vigorous natures, their natural endowments, their strength of reason and will, their learning, their intelligence, their science, their activity, and their noble and generous sentiments. They could not have been what they were without grace, and yet not grace, in the ordinary providence of God, would have made them what they were, had it not found in them a rich and cultivated nature on which to operate. This is what comes out from the history of the Monastic Orders and the Lives of the Saints. Grace supposes nature; it neither creates it nor supersedes it. It exalts and purifies it morally, but it operates on it, with it, and through it, without altering it physically. The freer, richer, nobler the nature, the higher, solidier, and more

generous its cultivation, the stronger, the more energetic will be the Christian virtues, when once grace has converted and elevated the soul to God. In ages or nations where nature retains her vigor, and there is practised a robust and manly discipline, you have great saints, but in ages and nations that have lost their vigor, in which nature has become weak and effeminate, education is low, narrow, and superficial, the mind is frittered away on mere technicalities, and the heart is wasted on mere frivolities, you have, except by a miracle of divine grace, few saints, and no great saints.

From this it is easy to deduce a lesson of great practical importance in our own times, and in our own country. Pelagians, in reality, deny the Divinity of our Lord, Jansenists deny his Humanity, Nestorians deny the union of the Divine and Human natures in the unity of the one Divine Person. These three heresies are rife in our day, and even among men who would be astonished to hear their orthodoxy called in question. The Theandric life of our Lord is the source and model of all Christian life. He was perfect God and perfect man, and from him proceeds a Divine-human life, which all who would be united to him by a real union must live. The perfect type of the Christian life is the life of perfect God and perfect man united in one indissoluble life. To our life in Christ the Divine and the human, the natural and the supernatural are alike essential. The rationalist who would let go the supernatural and live only the natural loses the Christian, and so does the supernaturalist who would let go the natural and live only the supernatural. They who, though recognizing both, yet dissolve them, separate them, and bring them not into living union, equally lose the Christian life. Always, then, is it necessary to seek the union of the two, and to perfect each in harmony with the other, which, expressed in plain language, means in practice the union of natural and spiritual discipline and culture.

Now the lesson we deduce is that where the two are disunited, or either is neglected, both suffer. In what we call the barbarous ages, or the earlier half of the Middle Ages, the great defect was the want of a proper natural culture. In the conquering tribes nature was strong, fresh, vigorous, but rude, violent; while in the conquered populations subjected for ages to the despotism of the Cæsars, or to the tyranny of masters, it was weak, effeminate, effete,

addicted to low vices, and incapable alike of great crimes or of great virtues. The spiritual society directed superhuman energies to supply the existing defects in the natural order, and to place natural discipline and culture in harmony with the spiritual, which it labored still more assiduously to promote. But in the latter half of the Middle Ages there began to be a triumph of the laical spirit, and the natural culture, by the sixteenth century, was sundered from the spiritual. In our age, the defect is in the almost total neglect of spiritual culture and discipline, and the exclusive devotion to the natural. The effect is the loss not only of the supernatural virtues without which the rewards of heaven cannot be secured, but also the loss of the natural virtues without which it is impossible to maintain even natural society.

Our age wants manliness, earnestness, robustness, energy. There is a terrible lack of moral courage, devotion to principle, power of sacrifice. Men are afraid to suffer for truth or justice, and proceed as if the loss of social position, money, place, or reputation were complete ruin, the loss of all good. We shrink from physical pain, revolt at the thought of inflicting it even on criminals, and are shocked at the mortifications practised by the saints. We turn away with horror, perhaps we should say with loathing and disgust, from the austerities of a St. Francis of Assisium, a St. Catharine of Sienna, a St. Rose of Lima. The ordinary discipline of the monastery, so necessary in the warfare against the flesh, and without which it is in vain to expect a victory over the passions and the senses, is repulsive to our feelings, shocks our nerves, and excites our bitter resentment against the Church that exacts or that even tolerates it. We cherish the body, and feel that when that is provided for it is enough,—the soul, if soul there be, may shift for itself. Hence our age has no appreciation of moral heroism. Moral principle is resolved into simple utility or bald expediency. The professed followers of Him who went about doing good, when he had not where to lay his head, who to redeem the poor made himself poor, to ransom the slave made himself a slave, and to save the dying and give life to the dead died himself on the cross, are satisfied with mere external decency, or a few outward observances, and are the first to damp the courage, to cool the zeal of the young athlete aspiring to wrestle manfully for his Lord against the powers of darkness.

We see but too clearly in our own country, if country we

still have, the sad consequences, even in the temporal order, of this fatal neglect of spiritual discipline and culture. The great majority of the American people have from the first discarded the religion of sacrifice, rejected the "errors and superstitions of Rome," and devised for themselves an easy sort of religion, which they could put on and off with their go-to-meeting dress, and which imposed upon them no disagreeable duty, no painful self-denial. For their religion they have had an open field and fair play. They have had all the civil and political freedom they could ask, a territory of almost boundless extent, embracing almost every variety of soil, climate, and production, and a material growth and prosperity unexampled in the world's history. Yet what are we now in our first hour of serious trial? The land swarms with traitors, the Union is rent asunder, the flag of the republic is insulted, our arsenals are seized, our fortresses are taken without resistance, the Federal laws are trampled under foot, and our very existence as a nation is gravely menaced. We have looked in vain for the public virtue, the public spirit, or the manliness necessary to make even a stand for public authority. We find ourselves without loyalty, without patriotism, without principle, without national life. We have, by our easy-going religion, our ultra democracy, our worship of the mob, and our devotion to material goods, undermined the individual, undermined the family, discarded the household virtues, destroyed the homestead, and trusted to interest, pride, passion, commerce and manufactures, railways and lightning telegraphs, and we now find that we have undermined public virtue and society itself. Our whole system has collapsed, and the republic is falling to pieces from its own rottenness. We are paralyzed by cotton and negroes at the South, and by trade and demagogues at the North. The Union is to be destroyed, and a great nation is to be broken into fragments and to become a byword in all the earth, in a time of profound peace, in the hour of unexampled material prosperity, and without any external enemy or any external cause. Is there in this no instructive commentary on the system we have pursued, and on our neglect of moral culture and religious discipline?

In vain do we look to the government or to our public men for relief. The government and our public men have been accomplices in the social crimes committed. For three years, at least, the government has conspired against itself, and labored assiduously for its own destruction. Congress

for the same period has been intent chiefly on corrupting itself and plundering the country, and even the judiciary has lent itself to a political faction. Scarcely a man acts under a sense of individual and personal responsibility, and no party dares take the responsibility of being loyal to the Union, lest it lose all chance of retaining or of acceding to power. It is in vain we appeal to the people, for the people have chosen the very men who are the organs of the evil, and are fitly represented by them. The people are no better, and are not one whit more loyal than their representatives in the Federal government and the several state governments, and the condemnation to lasting disgrace of James Buchanan is that he has proved himself no wiser or better than the people who elected him. There may be in the country individuals who are superior to Mr. Buchanan and to the mass of the people, but as they would not be fair representatives of the people, universal suffrage can never, except by some accident, raise them to power or place. The people choose men of their own stamp, and the men chosen are always, where universal suffrage has been long in operation, a sure index to the real character of the people. The people are responsible for the conduct of their representatives, and to be able to choose wiser and better men they must be wiser and better themselves.

It is well known to our Northern and Southern readers that we are no friends to slavery in whatever form or guise it may come, and that we are and always have been attached to the Union. As long as the flag of the Union floats to the breeze we shall be loyal to it, and be ready to fight to the death to save its honor. But, though holding secession to be only another name for revolution, we cannot hold the South as alone responsible for the present deplorable condition of the Union. The seceding states have only carried out the revolutionary principles embraced by nearly the whole country,—principles which have been defended in season and out of season by the whole American press, by the Republican press no less than by the so-called Democratic press. The *New York Tribune*, in relation to Federal policy, adopts the just motto, No compromise with traitors, and yet it is the American organ, or one of the American organs, of the revolutionary party of Europe,—of Kossuth, Mazzini, and Garibaldi; and whenever it finds in the Old World a popular or demagogic insurrection or movement against law and order, or against existing authorities, it gives it its most

hearty sympathy. Nearly the same may be said of the whole American press, certainly of every Republican press. For these thirty years, revolutionary doctrines, doctrines incompatible with all regular authority, with all loyalty, and which render such a crime as treason impossible, have been inculcated by all the influential organs of public opinion, and the American mind has become thoroughly imbued with them. People-king, people-god, the sovereignty of the mob, the infallibility of democracy, have become American "institutions." What wonder, then, that the people of the South should attempt to carry out against the North the principles which the whole North avows and insists upon? What wonder that, finding Republicans acceding to power, they should ask something more than their word as a guaranty that they will administer the government according to the Constitution, and respect the constitutional rights of Southern interests? No doubt the Southern doctrine of the divine right of slavery is bad, but is the Northern doctrine of the divine right of the mob any better?

The present deplorable state of the Union springs from no local cause, and has a deeper origin than the dispute between the North and the South about negro slavery. That dispute is but an incident. The cause is in the moral and political corruption of the American people, whether North or South. The Union is threatened by the internal rottenness of the body politic, not from the simple desire to retain or to abolish slavery. There is not virtue enough left in the people, we fear, to sustain a Federal government. Both the head and the heart are corrupt. We have abused our privileges, and turned the blessings of Heaven into curses. We have turned a deaf ear to the counsels of Divine wisdom, and have made material prosperity our God, and supposed that grasping selfishness, without intelligence, without probity, without public spirit, without patriotism, without loyalty, without any of the generous, self-denying or heroic virtues would suffice to save the Union and secure wise and just government. Here is the fact, disguise it as we may. The new President, who we trust will be inaugurated before what we are writing issues from the press, is, we believe, an honest man, a man of ability, patriotic, and determined to do right, but he is inexperienced, and can hardly hope to surround himself with men equal to the emergency. He can expect little support from the slaveholding states, whether in or out of the Union, and can

hardly count on the efficient support of the free states, corrupted as they are by the corner-grocery democracy, and fearful of losing a market for their produce or their manufactures.

But whatever may be the measures or the temporary success of the new administration, we fear the Union is virtually dissolved, not to be re-formed till after years of conflict and suffering. Our experiment, for the present at least, has failed, and as the attempt to repeat it will be made by pushing still further the democratic principle which has caused its failure, we fear it will turn out to have failed for good. The failure is due neither to Southern slavery nor to Northern abolitionism, but to democracy expressed by universal suffrage. The present state of the Union proves that with universal suffrage as the basis of the political order and sectarianism for the religious order, a free government is impracticable, because there cannot be secured wisdom and virtue enough in the people to sustain it, as we have for seventeen years steadily maintained in the pages of this Review. On this point the South is sharper-sighted and politically wiser than the North. It separates from the North on this very question of universal suffrage, and founds the republic on slavery as did pagan Greece and Rome. It fears the universal-suffrage of the North, because universal suffrage mocks at constitutional rights, and can be stayed by no constitutional barriers. It fears not Mr. Lincoln, it fears not the Chicago platform; but it fears democracy, real, genuine, universal-suffrage democracy, that prevails in the free states, and for the first time comes into power in the Federal government. Against that democracy the South feels it has and can have no guaranty, not even in states' rights, and therefore it secedes.

This aspect of the question has been overlooked by our politicians. The Republican party, as to its avowed policy, is in the main constitutional and unobjectionable, but in order to rise to power it has been obliged to appeal to the most ultra democratic sentiment of the country; it has outbid the so-called Democratic party in its democracy, and can continue in power only by exaggerating the popular power. Its first serious attempt to be conservative and to emancipate itself from the mob, will insure its permanent defeat. To remain in power, it must carry into its Federal policy the radical democracy which has already triumphed in the free states, and so must any party that henceforth

would gain the suffrages of the people of these states. Here is the grave evil, which no possible statesmanship can avert. We cannot abolish universal suffrage and introduce a restricted suffrage, because men will not vote to disfranchise themselves, and because the general equality or non-distinction of classes in the free states deprives us of all intelligible ground or reason for restricting it. Yet with universal suffrage, and without a permanent aristocratic element limiting the democratic element, experience proves that a free yet efficient government in either state or nation is impracticable. In the seceding states there is an aristocratic element politically available, and these states are in a better condition, so far as the white man is concerned, to maintain government, than the great democratic states of the North and the North-west. With or without permanent secession, it is evident to the clear-sighted statesman that our democratic system has virtually exploded, and that ere long we shall be forced to resort to a military despotism to save us from absolute anarchy.

Yet we do not absolutely despair of the republic. We had hoped that the breaking up of our system could be staved off till the influence of religion could be brought to bear in creating the virtues and forming the characters necessary to save and carry on political society, and thus be prevented altogether. In this hope we own we have been disappointed. Thus far democracy has had more influence in corrupting our Catholic population than Catholicity has had in forming the people to sentiments and habits of virtue. It has come too late to prevent the catastrophe. But it is here, and through it there is hope of redemption. We have fallen low, but we have not fallen lower than Europe was at the overthrow of the Western Roman Empire, and the work of redemption and regeneration is not greater or more difficult than that which was effected from St. Benedict to St. Bernard by the old Monks of the West and the great Popes and Prelates formed under the austere discipline of the monastery. Our hope is under God in the new Monks of the West.

The work necessary to be done cannot be done by statesmen, for they can operate only with the people as they are, the materials existing to their hand. The proper materials are wanting. The people themselves are corrupt. We must begin at the bottom and provide for the production of a higher order of virtue than they now aspire to. There

is hope for us only in moral courage, love of truth and justice, detachment from the world, self-denial, and the power of sacrifice—virtues which can be learned only in the school of Christ, and from professors who have themselves acquired them, whose own lives prove that they live above the world, and have through grace obtained the victory over the passions and the senses. Hitherto we have ridiculed such professors, and regarded the school of Christ as the school of folly and superstition. The great mass of us will continue to do the same for some time to come; but the inevitable consequences of our errors now staring us in the face, and the chastisements of a wise and good God now beginning will ultimately it is to be hoped bring us to our senses.

The destruction of our commerce and manufactures, the decay of our towns and cities, the violence and anarchy, the general poverty and untold miseries which are sure to follow the breaking up of the Union and our present system of public and private economy, will gradually humble our pride, disabuse us of old prejudices, destroy our confidence in the popular idols we have hitherto worshipped, convince us that the Lord God omnipotent reigneth, dispose us to listen to the words of truth and wisdom, and to submit to the moral and spiritual discipline necessary to prepare us alike for earth or heaven. We have been ruined by our prosperity, and till our material prosperity is clean gone we cannot be made to respect and obey religion. Men will not, as a general rule, turn to heaven till they begin to despair of the earth. But when we become deeply impressed with the instability and transitoriness of all earthly goods, we are prepared to have our minds and hearts directed to those heavenly goods which are unchangeable, unfailing, and eternal.

We see the effects of neglecting spiritual discipline and culture; the effects of neglecting natural discipline and culture are not quite so bad, but they are bad enough. A pious but ignorant people is to be preferred to a highly polished and educated people without religion; but neither is what the Christian desires. Where the natural discipline and culture are neglected, piety is apt to degenerate into mere sensible emotion or outward observance, faith into credulity and superstition, and morality into weakness, tameness, and servility, as we see in all those countries where the secular power will not suffer the people to be educated, and confines the ministers of religion to the ad-

ministration of the Sacraments, or where the clergy, through indolence, false theories on the subject, or real inability, suffer the populations to remain age after age in secular ignorance. Those populations are usually found to be tame and feeble, wanting in all the strong and masculine virtues, incapable of resisting the tyrant, or making an effective stand either for their rights or their religion.

Yet let it not be supposed that we are demanding the Gentile virtues instead of the Christian. We deny that the tame, weak, timid, imbecile, lack-a-daisical character has any affinity with the Christian character; we demand, after our author, the strong, noble, energetic, masculine, and heroic virtues, but these virtues are founded in humility, and spring from love. The stoical virtues are built on pride, and the Stoic faces danger or scorns praise because he has a lofty opinion of himself, and holds that it would be beneath him to do otherwise. Yet he has no true moral courage, and in the moment of real trial, when a real sacrifice is to be made, his heart fails him, and he takes his own life—the act of supreme cowardice. He has only his own strength, and can go only its length; when that fails him, all fails him. Not so with the Christian. His virtues spring not from his lofty opinion of himself and confidence in his own strength, but from his love of God and forgetfulness of self. Of all the forces of nature love is the strongest. We see it in the love of the wife for her husband, of the mother for her child, of the lover for the mistress of his heart. It pauses before no obstacles, recoils from no dangers, shrinks from no suffering, and is invincible and irresistible. No man who has never truly loved has any conception of human power.

Now direct the natural power of love to God, exalt, purify, and invigorate it by supernatural grace, and you have the love of the saint—a love that overcometh the world, and gives to feeble man the strength and energy of heaven. Nothing can overcome it. It is proof against all trial, and easily triumphs over the wrath of men and the rage of hell. It fears only to lose the beloved. Whatever is pleasing to the beloved, it is its pleasure to do. The more it can do, the more it can suffer for the beloved, the greater its joy, and never is its joy more complete than when it can make a complete sacrifice of itself to the beloved one. Hence the invincible power and heroic character of all really Christian virtue. Understand now that the

Christian sees God, the Beloved, in his neighbor, in his country, in the poor, the needy, wherever there is a truth to be asserted, a right to be defended, a wrong to be redressed, a moral good to be obtained, and you will see wherefore the Christian virtues are as necessary and as effectual in making society what it should be, as in endearing us to God, and securing us the beatitude of heaven. These virtues we as a people have lacked; these virtues the age generally has lacked; and these virtues, though they may be attained to by people in the world, yet in the ordinary providence of God cannot be diffused and sustained in a nation without a discipline and culture of which we find the best specimens in the monastery.

But we must bring our remarks to a close. We have done very inadequate justice to the masterly volumes before us. We have hardly given our readers a taste of the rich instruction to be derived from them; but we trust we shall be able to return to them soon. In the mean time we thank the author for the portion of the work he has already published, and earnestly pray God that his life may be spared, and that he may have the health and strength to complete it. It will be a noble monument to his genius and faith, to his science and his piety. It will prove that in defending the cause of the monks, he has not been defending a "desperate cause."

ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Negroes and Negro Slavery; the First an Inferior Race, and the Latter its Normal Condition.* By J. H. VAN EVRIE, M.D. New York: Van Evrie, Horton & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 339.

THE design of this book is to prove that negroes are a distinct and inferior race, and a race designed by the Creator to be the slaves of the white race. Whether the author regards them as human or as purely animal, as created with souls and redeemed by our Lord or not, we are unable to say. If they are men they are of the same race, genus, or species as the whites; if they are not men their nature was not assumed by the Word in the womb of the Virgin, and they have no direct part or lot in the Redemption, and it would be as absurd to preach the Gospel to them as to an ox or a horse, a monkey or an orang-outang. Difficulties of this sort, however, weigh not with Dr. Evrie, who seems destitute of the slightest belief in Christianity.

The theory, however, of the author is the only one on which he can justify negro slavery, and we are not surprised that it should find advocates among the sciolists who wish to make it appear that slavery is a divine institution. It is no part of our present purpose to refute the theory, or to examine the alleged scientific facts which go to prove it. These facts, so far as facts they are, admit a different explanation, and in no sense warrant the author's induction. The ancients defined man to be a rational animal, and reason taken in the sense of intellect and will, or the faculty of apprehending and acting in reference to moral truth or moral obligation, is, to speak scholastically, the *differentia* or characteristic of man. This capacity the negroes have, and therefore they are men, with human reason and human affections. So much is certain against all the *scidotti* or half learned who babble nonsense about their being of an inferior race. They are human, and therefore are of the same genus and species with white men, whether we are able to account for their variations from white men or not. Actually inferior as a class to the whites they certainly are, but he must know more of history than we do, who can assert that they always were or always will be inferior. We have known some white men far inferior to some black men we have also known. They are capable of intelligence, of intellectual and moral improvement, and Senator Mallory gravely informed us that the planters took care to prevent their slaves from learning to read lest they should become intelligent, for if they should become intelligent the right to hold them in slavery would lapse. Who can say what they would become, if proper measures were taken to elevate them, by intellectual, moral, and religious discipline to prepare them for freedom?

We know just now, as an offset to those who denounce slavery as *malum in se*, and in no case excusable, it is fashionable to maintain that slavery is a divine institution, and attempt to prove that negroes are not human. We defend neither extreme. Religion disapproves of slavery, and throws all her influence on the side of its gradual and peaceful abolition, but it does not absolutely prohibit it in all cases and in all circumstances. It never regards it as the normal condition of any portion of the human race, and it never will be so regarded by any one who has a Christian conscience. The South have no doubt a right to hold their slaves, but at the same time they are bound in conscience to treat them with humanity, to respect their moral freedom, to respect in their behalf the laws, precepts, and institutions of Christianity, and to look to their ultimate elevation to the rank of free men, and the final extinction of slavery. But this, politically considered, is their business, not ours.

We would not if we could use the Federal government either to abolish slavery where it now has, or to extend it to territory where it has not a legal existence. Our observation has satisfied us that chattel slavery is an evil, and a greater evil to the slaveholding population than to the slaves themselves. But at the same time we do not believe it the only evil in the country, nor perhaps the greatest evil. We are no more satisfied with the constitution of society at the North than we are with its constitution at the South. We voted at the last election with the Republican party, but not with it as an abolition party, and we have no sympathy with that wing of the party which hails its success only as a means of abolishing slavery.

We voted for it chiefly because we were satisfied that the Democratic party was rotten inside and out, as recent developments have proved, and because the North had submitted long enough to the disunion threats of the South. The real curse of the country is in its sectarianism and its democracy. We believe universal suffrage one of the best hits the devil has ever made, and that any people who attempt to make it the basis of their institutions are sure to go to destruction. We think it a real gain that we have got rid of the name *democrat*, and have got in place a party under another name, and a better name. We wish, however, to see the party in place assuming the good old name of Federal, as far as the Union is concerned, and laboring to restrain as far as possible the democratic tendency in the states themselves.

We have little hope in politics, but we would urge upon the new Administration a Union policy, and to cut itself loose from the abolition and ultra democratic section of the party that has elected it. We care nothing for Chicago platforms or any other platforms except the Constitution. We shall deeply regret to see the Administration favor slavery, and no less to see it favoring abolitionism. If it is to save the country at all, it must do so by planting itself on broad conservative principles, and place the Union, the wise, just, firm, and economical administration of the government, above all questions relating to slavery either for or against it. Its first step must be to disavow in its acts and measures the democracy that is ruining us, to disavow the revolutionary doctrines and principles defended by the American press generally, to assert the authority of the government, and prove that it respects itself and can make itself respected. It must arrest the revolution, it must vindicate the insulted flag of the Union, and assert the majesty of law. If to do this it must suppress armed insurrections and hang traitors, let it do so, or else let it abdicate itself. If civil war is the consequence, let civil war come, for civil war cannot be worse than no government. Let it be just, let it be forbearing, but let it perform its constitutional duty and its whole constitutional duty. It must not be frightened by the words "coercion" and "invasion," neither of which probably will be necessary if the government shows firmness and resolution, and a determination to abide by the Constitution. In this way it is perhaps possible to arrest the evil; but no measures looking to the protection or abolition of slavery, and no policy that turns on the slave question will save us from utter ruin.

That the Administration will be able to carry out the policy we suggest, we think extremely doubtful, because we fear that there is neither wisdom nor virtue enough in the American people to sustain it. We know not where the elements of a true and sound Federal party are to be found. They are in a minority at the North, and a minority at the South, and we fear so in the great Central and Western states. Democracy has perverted the whole American mind and heart, and we hardly know a single state, with the exception of the state of New Jersey, in which the mob is not supreme. Yet we may take too gloomy a view, and there may yet remain amongst us something of our old traditional respect for law, and something of the patriotism and good sense that won our independence and formed the Federal Constitution. Time will soon show,

for events travel fast. The new Administration has a difficult task before it, and we dare hardly hope for its success. But let it do its duty, and leave the result to Providence.

2. *Charity and Truth ; or, Catholics not Uncharitable in Saying that None can be Saved out of the Catholic Church.* By Rev. Dr. EDWARD HAWARDEN. Philadelphia: Cunningham. 1860. 12mo. pp. 263.

THIS we believe is the first American edition of a very able work by an English Catholic divine of the last century, proving that there is no lack of charity in maintaining that there is no salvation out of the Catholic Church. The question is treated with great fairness and candor, with learning and ability, and we must add that in our judgment the author's argument proves even more than he pretends. The author lays down the doctrine that "it is the *general* rule that there is no salvation out of the Catholic communion," but not the universal rule. He admits exceptions, and allows that some may be saved although not in that communion. We do not understand these exceptions, and the authorities the author cites prove, if any thing, that the rule is universal. To suppose that the rule admits any exception, is, in our judgment, either to quibble on the expression, *in the Catholic Church*, or to make the whole Catholic religion a mere sham. We know very well that a man is never to blame for not doing what it is impossible for him to do, and that invincible ignorance excuses one of sin in that thing whereof he is invincibly ignorant; but that is something very different from saying a man can be saved without being a Catholic or having and conforming to the Catholic faith.

There is but one religion, there never has been, and there never will be but one religion, and that is the Catholic or Christian religion; there never was, there is, and there never will be but one way of salvation, and that is through union by faith and love with the Word made flesh. Either this is true, or the Catholic Church is no better than Episcopalianism or any other *ism*. There is and can be but one right way, and out of that right way there is no Christ, no Saviour, no salvation. If we have ever understood any thing of Catholicity, there is no Christianity distinguishable from the Catholic Church or communion. Christianity is not a naked idea, an abstract doctrine, but is the living truth concentered in the Church, and making the Church not a mere aggregation or organization, but a living organism, and to be saved by it we must be assimilated to this organism as the material particles are assimilated to the organism we call our body. Christianity is concentered in the Church, and in the Church and the Church only is the principle of life and salvation, and therefore the Church and the Church only is the medium of our real though mystic union with Christ our life. To say then that there are exceptions and some can be saved out of the Church, would be to say no less than that there are exceptions to salvation by Christ our Lord, and giving the lie to the Apostle when he says there is none other name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved. If a single soul can get to heaven without the Catholic Church, it can get there

without Christ, and the Incarnation is not necessary in the economy of salvation.

It is time that Catholics at least should stop treating Catholicity as a sect, or as one religion among many. If we believe in religion at all as taught us by the Church, we must believe that Christianity is the only religion, and Catholicity the only Christianity. No exception is admissible or possible. He that has not the Church for his mother cannot have God for his father; all that were out of the ark perished in the deluge. We have learned no other Catholicity, and we could accept no other without stultifying our common sense. The exceptions then that Dr. Hawarden contends for, if admissible, are and can be no real exceptions, exceptions only in appearance, merely technical exceptions, or exceptions made such by our inaccurate definitions. We say not that all who appear to us to be in heretical or schismatical associations will be damned, but if not, it is because they in reality belong to the Catholic communion, or will be brought into that communion before they die. How many such there are, or whether there are any such, it is not for us to judge; but this much we will say, that all who remain in those associations from indifference to truth, from hatred or prejudice against the Spouse of Christ, or by a false persuasion that they can be saved out of the Catholic communion, are not united to Christ by faith and love, and have no ground of hope.

There is no lack of charity in this. We have not made the law, and we can see no lack of charity in telling any one, if you obey not the law, the law will not approve, but condemn you. The lack of charity would be in leaving people to believe the contrary, in making no efforts to undeceive them, in doing and saying nothing to bring them into the way of salvation. The weakness of many Catholics, or their false liberality which makes them refrain from asserting the plain truth, is most deplorable, dishonorable to God, and fatal to immortal souls redeemed with the precious blood of our Lord. On this branch of the subject, the main topic of the book, Dr. Hawarden is able and conclusive, and his work may be read with profit.

What we have complained of in too many of our Catholic controversialists is not their rigid adherence to Catholic dogma, nor their uncompromising assertion of no salvation out of the Catholic communion, but their neglect to master the errors they undertake to refute, and to distinguish in them the truth for the sake of which they are embraced, and to explain to their adherents how they can hold the truth without the falsehood mixed up with it. We complain that they are frequently unjust to those outside, and proceed against them precisely as if they held the error for the sake of the falsehood, not for the sake of the truth they mix up with it, and condemn in good set phrase, when they should explain. Catholicity embraces all truth, has a right to claim all truth, all truth in its unity and integrity, and has no need to deny that those out of her communion have many fragments of truth. They have no truth which she has not, no truth that makes any thing against her, but yet they are not wholly destitute of truth, nor wholly destitute of the love of truth. Instead of beginning by denouncing them, and holding up their errors before them, we should direct their attention specially to

the truth they retain, and aid them to separate it from the error they mix up with it. This were real charity.

3. *Rosemary; or, Life in Death.* By J. VINCENT HUNTINGTON. Illustrated by Geo. G. White. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 522.

WE are pleased to learn that this work of rare excellence has reached in a very brief period a second edition, notwithstanding the state of the nation and of the business world. It proves that the work has uncommon merit, and justifies the judgment we expressed of it when noticing the first edition. Popular literature to be successful must be national in spirit and tone, must express the peculiar modes of thought and feeling of the people, so to speak, the idiosyncrasies of the national life. This is exceedingly difficult in the case of a Catholic author in this country. No foreigner can do it; and no native can do it, because his Catholicity separates his life to a great extent from American habits and feelings, and his American nationality separates him from the mass of his Catholic brethren, who necessarily retain the nationality of the countries from which they have sprung. It will be a long time, therefore, before a Catholic literary man, whatever his merits, can expect a distinguished literary success in these—shall we say it?—United States. This implies no blame to any party, but is an inevitable consequence of the present state of the Catholic population and of the country.

Dr. Huntington in the work before us—which the unfavorable reports of his health make us fear will be his last work—has done all that man can do to surmount the difficulties of his position, and to touch the hearts of the public he addresses. His good characters are with scarcely an exception foreigners, French or Irish, or their children, and all the villains and rascals are his own countrymen. He celebrates no virtue not of Celtic or Gallic origin, and finds real vice, crime, and iniquity only in those like him and us of Yankee origin. This as it does not disturb us, ought to please our English-speaking Catholic public. It offends not our patriotism, and should gratify theirs. Moreover it should please all classes by its gorgeous descriptions of the princely wealth, aristocratic splendor, and unbounded luxury of our New York mercantile and fashionable community; while it carries along with it an admirable moral, and to those who reflect discloses the secret of the present deplorable condition of American politics and of American society. There is more in the book than the superficial reader is likely to discover, and to those who know how to read it, it is instructive, and as edifying as amusing. We again heartily commend it to the reading public.

4. *Memoirs of the Right Reverend Simon William Gabriel Brutté, D.D., First Bishop of Vincennes; with Sketches describing his Recollections of Scenes connected with the French Revolution, and Ex-*

tracts from his Journal. By JAMES ROOSEVELT BAILEY, D.D., Bishop of Newark. New York: Sadlier & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 223.

BISHOP BRUTE will live forever in the memory of the Church in the United States, and may always be pointed to as proving the debt of gratitude due from us to foreign-born and educated priests. Few men have rendered more important services to religion in our country. The Memoirs are little more than a sketch of his life and labors, but they will be read with interest. We say no more of the work at present, for we wish to make it the occasion of some remarks on the early history of Catholicity in the United States, and of the labors of the holy missionary priests and bishops which have prepared the way for our present prosperous condition.

5. *Immacolata, the Convent Flower. A Catholic Tale.* London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. 1860. 16mo. pp. 262.

THIS is a very edifying and interesting religious story, written with much feeling, and has the air of being a true relation, under feigned names, of the author's own experience. The heroine of the story by her prayers and good example makes converts of all with whom she comes into relation, thus proving that the edifying life of a Catholic is the strongest argument in favor of his religion. Mere reasoning may convince, but it can never make a convert, for conversion is the work of grace; but the heart of the unbeliever when touched by the purity and beauty of the Catholic life, is in the best possible disposition for the reception of this grace. We are not all expected to be heroes or heroines, but we might all learn from the example of *Immacolata*, to exert a beneficial influence on those around us.

6. *Memorials of the Blessed: a Series of Short Lives of the Saints.* By CHARLES B. FAIRBANKS, Acolyte of the Holy Roman Church. Permissu Superiorum. Boston: Patrick Donahoe. 1860. 12mo. pp. 303.

MR. FAIRBANKS wrote these *Memorials of the Blessed* for the columns of the Boston Pilot, with which he was connected for some time. They are now republished in a handsome volume, preceded by a short sketch of the author. They are piously and carefully written, and well deserve to be collected into a more permanent form than the columns of a newspaper. The death of Mr. Fairbanks, which occurred in Paris in 1859, deprived the Catholic literature of this country of one who had already attained considerable excellence and given promise of becoming one of its brightest ornaments.

7. *The Two Bishops. A Tale of the Nineteenth Century.* London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. 1860. 16mo. pp. 136.

THE *Two Bishops* is written in an easy and practised style, and marks sincerity and earnestness. As a story, however, it has not great merit; no interest is created in the characters. A Catholic rejoices at the conversions, but it is from a general motive of charity, not any affection for the individuals themselves. The author is capable of much more than he has here done.

8. *An Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul. and of the Catholic Epistles; consisting of an Introduction to each Epistle, an Analysis of each Chapter, a Paraphrase of the Sacred Text, and a Commentary, embracing Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Dogmatical, interspersed with Moral Reflections.* By the Right Rev. JOHN MACEVILLY, D.D., Bishop of Galway. Second edition, enlarged. Dublin: James Duffy. 1860. 2 vols. 8vo.

THIS is the second edition slightly enlarged of a work published in 1856, whilst its author was President of St. Jarlath's College, Tuam, and is the condensation of lectures delivered by Dr. MacEvilly when Professor of Sacred Scripture. We hail with pleasure every work of Biblical commentary which issues from the Catholic press; for we English-speaking Catholics are shockingly poor in this department of literature. This *triple exposition* is one of the most convenient forms in which the commentaries can be used in seminaries, as is proved by the great use made of Picquigny's similar exposition, from which the plan as well as a great portion of the substance of the present work is taken. The text of the Epistles is taken from Coyne's edition of 1829, which is followed throughout with but a few trifling exceptions. The author refers us to three places in which he has noticed or corrected its deviation from the Latin Vulgate: 1 Cor. vii. 7, xiv. 4, and 1 Tim. vi. 6. In the first of these passages our revised version reads, *I would all men were even as myself*, following the Greek. Dr. MacEvilly has, *I would that all you were as myself*, after the Vulgate. In the second instance, the author says in a note, "*edifieth the Church*." The Vulgate has *ecclesiam Dei ædificat, edifies the Church of God*. How the words 'of God' came to be omitted in our English Catholic version is not clearly seen." It is much more difficult to see how they came to be adopted in the Latin Vulgate: we have not found them in any English version from that of 1526 down to the present time, and they are also wanting in the Greek version. The third text to which the author calls attention is, *But godliness with sufficiency is great gain*, where the word *sufficiency* is substituted for *contentment*, without improving either the style or the sense. Contentment is the proper translation here of the Greek *ἀνταρκεία*, which the Latin translation rendered *sufficiētia* for want of a better term. If the author had wished to improve the usually received version, there was ample room for him to do so, but in the few instances where he has attempted it, we do not see as he has succeeded. These are very small matters it

is true, and we should not have mentioned them, had not the author seen fit to call attention to them in his preface.

In the paraphrase and commentary, we find the usual moral and dogmatic explanations of the Epistles clearly written, and well condensed. At times the author strikes us as giving an explanation of a passage as far from the true meaning of the writer as from the literal sense of the words, as in 1 Cor. xv. 44-51. Aside however from these points, with regard to which Dr. MacEvilly's work still leaves something to desire, it is a useful and valuable compend of the commentaries on the Canonical Epistles.

9. *Notice sur la Collection des Documents relatifs à la Définition du Dogme de l'Immaculée Conception de la Très-Sainte Vierge, qui sont conservés dans la Basilique de Notre-Dame du Puy.* Le Puy : M. P. Marchesson. 1860. 8vo. pp. 128.

On the festival of the Nativity of our Lady, 1860, was consecrated at Puy-en-Velay (Haute-Loire), in France, the statue of the Mother of God, called *Notre-Dame de France*. The statue, cast from the cannons of Sebastopol, is nearly eighty feet high, and is placed on an immense rock overlooking the city, rising to the height of four hundred and twenty-five feet above the lower town. The Bishop of Puy at the same time wished to erect another monument to the honor of the Immaculate Virgin—a complete history of the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Rev. D. Sire, of the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, Paris, has been laboring for six years to collect every thing written on the subject. This *Notice* contains a list of all the papers yet collected, from which the history will be compiled. Any documents on this subject sent to Rev. S. Ferté, of St. Mary's College, Baltimore, will be forwarded by him to the compiler in Paris.

10. *A Manual of Roman Chant; Compiled from Authentic Roman Sources, for the Use of Ecclesiastical Seminaries, Religious Communities, and Churches.* By a PRIEST OF THE CONGREGATION OF THE MOST HOLY REDEEMER. Baltimore: Kelly, Hedian, and Piet. 1860. 8vo. pp. 232.

DURING the last few years several works treating more or less fully of Roman chant have been issued from the American press, but none of them are so complete or so clear as this *Manual* by a Redemptorist Father. The author is, we believe, a doctor in music; at any rate, he understands his subject well, and has explained in a manner that every one can understand, the nature and the principles of the chant of the Church. The *Manual* contains the entire office of the Church, several Masses, and the different hymns of the Roman Breviary. We know of no work more suitable as a handbook for seminaries where the Gregorian chant is a branch of education, and it is a most useful book for the clergy and choir in every church.

11. *On Charity in Conversation. From the French of Rev. P. HUGUET, Marist.* By a MISSIONARY APOSTOLIC. London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1860. 16mo. pp. 218.

VERY few works intended solely for the moral improvement of their readers are written in a style so well adapted to the end in view, and with so little tediousness or dryness as this excellent book of Father Huguet. Its subject is taken in its broadest sense, so as to include all the virtues which enter into our social relations, and to treat of all the vices which too often usurp their place. Could it be so largely circulated throughout the country that a copy of it should be in the hands of every person, it would have the effect of rendering society not only more Christian and virtuous, but also more polished, more interesting, and more productive of relaxation and pleasure. The author had previously published a valuable book on the *Art of Conversation*, which has never, we believe, been translated into English, but which we recommend to the translator of the present volume, who is so competent to render it into good English.

12. *Month of St. Joseph: for the Children of Mary. Extracted from the "Grandeurs de Saint Joseph."* By Rev. Father HUGUET, of the Society of Mary, Author of "The Glories, the Virtues, and the Power of St. Joseph." Philadelphia: Peter F. Cunningham. 1860. 12mo. pp. 139.

THIS is another book by Father Huguet, a writer whom one always enjoys reading, and whose piety is cheerful and happy, and based on reason and faith, not on mere sentiment. The translator has not done his part with any great merit. There are marks of carelessness, such as "pious children of Mary, thank Joseph with *thy* whole heart, &c." (p. 40.) Occasionally, too, French proper names like *Thébaïde* (p. 78) are used instead of English, and the *Premonstrants* or *White Canons* he calls the *Prémontrés*. Still, regarding the publication of this book as a sign of the increase of devotion to St. Joseph in this country, we sincerely rejoice at its appearance. There is no more profitable devotion than the veneration of the husband of the Virgin Mary. Ever since the days of St. Theresa, who chose him for her special patron and that of her Carmelites, this devotion has been on the increase in Europe. In France, the "Month of St. Joseph" is observed in many of the churches in the same manner as the "Month of Mary;" and shrines and pilgrimages in his honor are spread over that country. We hope we are not wrong in believing that this devotion is increasing here also. There is no subject of meditation more consoling, no object of imitation more suitable than the life of St. Joseph. What merits could not those persons acquire whose days are spent in manual labor like his, if with him for their model they sought that interior union with God, which made St. Joseph one of the greatest of the Saints, whilst his external actions seemed undistinguishable from those of other men!

13. *The Vision of Old Andrew, the Weaver.* Baltimore: Kelly, Hedian, and Piet. 1860. 16mo.

THIS is a reprint of an English book, or at least of a book written in England. We judge, from various indications in the work itself, that the author is a gentleman of education; if so, there is no excuse for such words as "old gent, seraphims, cherubims, &c.," none of which is English. Apart from faults of style, the book is exceedingly edifying, Catholic in its tone, interesting, and at times even humorous, as in the game of foot-ball played by the ghosts of the damned.

14. 1. *The Pearl of the Chepe; or, the Haberdasher's Daughter. A Tale of Old London.*—2. *Lady Amabel and the Shepherd Boy; or, the Recluse of Byland Forest.*—3. *The Little Wanderers. A Swiss Tale.* By Miss E. M. STEWART. London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. 1860. 16mo.

THESE little stories are very interestingly told. The heroes all live in poverty and a humble station until they reach the romantic age of sixteen or eighteen, distinguishing themselves by the exhibition of all physical and mental perfections, and then return to the rank of their parents from which nurse or uncle had withdrawn them from considerations of personal safety. Miss Stewart has considerable ability for the delineation of character, and throws a romantic interest around all that she describes, which will make her stories great favorites with all who read them.

15. *The Theory of Arithmetic.* By a LATE PROFESSOR OF ST. GREGORY'S COLLEGE, DOWNSIDE. Edited with additions, by one of his Pupils. London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. 1860. 16mo. pp. 111.

THIS little treatise on the philosophy of numbers seems intended as a book to prepare candidates for their examination for degrees at the London University. Its explanation of the origin of numbers is rather ingenious, but possible only on the supposition that men originally were irrational creatures. On page 80, treating of stocks, the author tells us that if the 3 per cents. are worth 98 $\frac{1}{2}$, the 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cents must be worth 114 $\frac{1}{2}$, which would be true enough were there nothing to be considered but the income or annual interest; but suppose the government should prefer redeeming its 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cents. about this time at par, as it retains the option to do?

16. From Cassell, Petter, & Galpin, London and New York, we have received, 1, one of the parts of *Cassell's Illustrated Bible*, now in course of publication in numbers, handsomely printed and extensively illustrated. We cannot, however, recommend any one to buy it or to read it, for we hold it to be a false version of the Holy

Scriptures, inasmuch as the text is that of the well-known Protestant translation.—2. *Cassell's Illustrated History of England*. The text by WM. HOWITT. Parts IX.—XII. It is written in an interesting style, which together with its illustrations will undoubtedly render it a most popular work. We should not regret the extensive sale it is likely to meet with, had the author written a true history and not a mere romance. The stories told on pages 67 and 68 of Volume II. are so absurd that we only wonder at the fertility of the imagination which invented them. The time has passed away when it was regarded as in good taste, or necessary for the sale of a book, to slander the Church or its members.—3. *Cassell's Popular Natural History*, by the same publishers, is an exceedingly interesting and well illustrated work. It is written in a language intelligible to everybody, being intended to be read by everybody. Technical terms are good in their place, but ordinary readers are best pleased when they hear a monkey called monkey, and a pig pig. The paper, letter-press, and engraving are all in the best style, and are highly creditable to the publishers.

17. *The Atlantic Monthly, devoted to Literature, Arts, and Politics*. Boston: Ticknor & Fields.

THIS magazine now in its fourth year has sustained throughout the high reputation acquired at its commencement, and now has a fixed character. It is no longer a stranger, but an old friend whom we know well enough to judge beforehand pretty nearly what we may expect. At its birth almost all the older monthly magazines in the United States were just dying out, and it now remains about the only monthly American literary periodical. It is beyond all question the most interesting and the most ably written, as well as the most American that there is; its literary and scientific essays are many and valuable; its reviews of books are fair, and though sometimes severe, never harshly or unduly so; its stories are lively and entertaining, now humorous, now pathetic, and at times both; and many of the best of the smaller pieces of Longfellow and our other poets first appear in its pages. We feel an interest in its success, as the only attempt in our country to rival the European magazines which have so long been superior to our own.

18. *La Verdad Católica. Periódico Religioso dedicado á Maria Santísima en el Misterio de su Inmaculada Concepcion. Publicado con Aprobacion y Censura Eclesiásticas*. Habana: Imprenta del Tiempo. 1858-1861. Tomos I—VI.

THIS very excellent periodical published on the first and third Sundays of each month deserves the attention of those of our readers who understand Spanish. It is earnest and Catholic in its tone, and varied and interesting in its matter. Most of the articles are original and written with ability, but there are also translations from the

writers of other countries, such as the admirable Conferences of Father Felix, the recent work of Father Lacordaire on *St. Mary Magdalene*, &c. A new life has of late years been infused into the people of Spain and her colonies, and the increase of the religious spirit among that people has been far from inconsiderable: these causes have produced their natural effect on Spanish Catholic literature. Nothing could more aid this movement than a periodical like the *Verdad Católica*, which aims at applying the doctrines of *Catholic Truth* to the great questions of the day.

19. *The Lamp. An Illustrated Magazine of Instruction and Entertainment.* Edited by JAMES BURKE, A.B., Barrister-at-Law. London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. Baltimore: John Murphy & Co.

THE *Lamp* is a well illustrated periodical, partaking of the character of a newspaper and of a monthly magazine. It is published by Murphy & Co., of Baltimore, in monthly parts only. The editor, James Burke, Esq., is well known by his different contributions to our literature, and he has succeeded in giving the public a very interesting Catholic magazine.

20. *The Catholic Youth's Magazine.* Baltimore: John Murphy & Co.

A very entertaining and instructive little publication for the young folk, just suited to their tastes and wants.

21. *Relazione delle Osservazioni fatte in Spagna, durante l'Eclisse Totale del 18 Luglio, 1860.* Dal P. ANGELO SECCHI, D.C.D.G., Direttore dell' Osservatorio del Collegio Romano. Roma: Tipografia delle Belle Arti. 1860. 8vo. pp. 48.

FATHER SECCHI was sent by the Papal Government to observe the total eclipse in Spain last year; other persons were also there from France, England, and Germany, but the results of their observations have not yet been sufficiently collated. The Spanish Government and the directors of the Madrid Observatory gave the Jesuit Father all the aid he desired, and the circumstances were, on the whole, more than usually favorable. While Father Secchi was occupied in optical observations, the rest of the party succeeded in obtaining five photographs of the total eclipse and fourteen of the partial eclipses of large dimensions. From these observations, Father Secchi concludes that the solar diameter is much larger than is observed with common instruments; that the protuberances are neither lunar mountains nor an optical illusion, but belong to the sun itself, and are a part of its atmosphere of a nature analogous to our clouds, and that the luminous circle around the sun is really formed of the solar atmosphere, as is necessary in order to support

the red clouds. The author regrets the want of a previous understanding among the various observers, and recommends on another occasion a congress of them all both before and after their observations.

22. *The New York Tablet. A Family Journal.* New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1858-1860.

THE publishers have sent us these bound volumes of the *Tablet*, and we have been quite surprised to find what a great amount of interesting matter is contained in a volume of a weekly newspaper. Several books, such as *Rosemary, The Confederate Chieftains, The Spanish Cavaliers, &c.*, have been republished from its pages. The views of different questions taken by the editor are more independent than is the case with most of our Catholic papers, and they seem rather intended to lead than to follow the opinions of its readers. Of course, it is an ungrateful task for a journal to oppose the prejudices or opinions of its readers, and hence all non-Catholic papers follow public opinion and make that the standard of their doctrines. Catholic newspapers are equally in danger of being swayed by those whom they seek to instruct, and it requires some moral courage, some devotion to truth and principle for the publishers and editors of a periodical to continue boldly on in spite of the oft-recurring "Stop my paper." Those editors who write Catholic papers with no other motive than the desire to make their living by such an occupation, will always follow the wishes of their readers, but such editors are not fit to write at all, and had much better seek some other profession.

23. *The Historical Magazine, and Notes and Queries concerning the Antiquities, History, and Biography of America.* New York : Charles B. Richardson & Co. 1861.

BESIDES the usual amount of historical matter, the February issue of this magazine has a more than usually important bibliographical account of the Voyages of Columbus.

24. *History of the Bible, for the Use of Schools. Translated and Compiled from the Works of the most celebrated German Writers.* By Rev. THEO. NOETHEN. Albany : Weed, Parsons & Co. 1860. 12mo. pp. 160.

CATHOLICS in New York, as well as elsewhere, have long complained that unfair and anti-Catholic text-books were used in our Common Schools, and have been repeatedly asked to correct them, or else write others that should be unobjectionable. Mr. Noethen, of Albany, has here undertaken such a work with the intention of having it used as the text-book in Bible History.

25. *The Spanish Cavaliers. A Tale of the Moorish Wars in Spain. Translated from the French.* By MRS. J. SADLER. New York : D. & J. Sadler & Co. 12mo. pp. 203.

THOSE who object to love stories will be much pleased with the *Cavaliers*. It has no heroine at all, unless it be the wife of an old renegade who is married to him long before the story opens. It is not, however, any the less interesting for that; in fact, one would hardly notice this unusual omission until after the book was read through.

26. *Eulogy on Rev. Dr. Ryder, S. J., delivered before the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College, D. C.* By JAMES F. MACLAUGHLIN. Washington : William H. Moore, Printer. 1860. 8vo. pp. 21.

27. *Theses ex Universa Theologia, quas, Præside R. P. Angelo Matthys, Societatis Jesu, Studiorum Præfecto, et Collegii Societatis Jesu Lovaniensis Rectore, defendet, P. HENRICUS MATAGNE, ejusdem Societatis, Lovanii, in Collegio Societatis Jesu, die 10 Julii, 1860, hora nona ante, et tertia post meridiem.* 8vo. pp. 23.

28. *A Treatise on Catechism. Translated from the French of Rev. Mr. HAMON, of the Congregation of St. Sulpice, Paris.* By MISS MARY F. SNOWDEN, of New Orleans, La. Cincinnati : John P. Walsh. 1861. 16mo. pp. 167.

THIS is an admirable little treatise on the manner of explaining the Catechism, and is very well translated.

29. *Life of Blessed Paul of the Cross, Founder of the Congregation of the Clerics of the Most Holy Cross and Passion of Jesus Christ.* Boston : Patrick Donahoe. 1860. 12mo. pp. 333.

THIS is a very edifying life of the founder of the Passionists, a Congregation first introduced into this country by the late Bishop of Pittsburgh.

30. *New Lights and True Lights on the Revolution in Italy in 1860.* By CAJETANO SORRENTINI, Roman Citizen, Apostolic Missionary in the United States. Published with the approbation of the Right Reverend Bishop of Philadelphia. 1860. 8vo. pp. 32.

THIS short pamphlet does not give too favorable an account of Italians and their doings in Italy. The author is one who ought to know them well, and we are not disposed to question his statements.

31. 1. *Sermone predicato nella Chiesa di San Carlo, il giorno 16 Giugno 1860, in Occasione di solenne Triduo, per le Pubbliche Vicende, alla B. Vergine sotto el titolo Aurilium Christianorum.* Da Monsignor G. BEDINI, Arcivescovo di Tebe. Roma: Stabilimento Tipografico Aurelj & C. 1860. 8vo. pp. 24.—2. *Raggionamento dell' Accademico G. Arcivescovo di Tebe, quando nel dì 1 d Aprile, 1860, solennizzavasi dagli Accademici Tiberini in Roma la dolorosa Memoria della Passione del Nazzareno Signore.* Roma: 1860. 8vo. pp. 20.

THESE two occasional discourses by Archbishop Bedini are marked by great beauty of language and oratorical strength. They relate to the recent sufferings of the Church in Italy.

32. *The Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope, with Relation to the State of Italy; a Lecture delivered in St. Andrew's Catholic Church, Ottawa; with Additional Facts and Observations.* By the Rev. ÆN. M. D. DAWSON. London: Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company. 1860. 12mo. pp. 227.

ANOTHER pamphlet on Italian affairs. The ink that has been consumed on the Italian question would be sufficient to drown Cavour and Garibaldi, and perhaps Victor Emanuel too; and it would no doubt appear less difficult to the Red Republican chief to annex the rest of Italy than to read all that has been written on that subject during the last year.

33. *Lanigan Testimonial Memoir, in aid of the Funds now being raised in Ireland to rescue, by a suitable Monument, the long-neglected Remains of a great Scholar, Divine, Historian, and Patriot from their present ignominious State; inscribed respectfully and gratefully to the Memory of the late Dr. Kelly, of Maynooth, Originator of the Movement, to Eugene Curry, Esq., M.R.I.A., Professor of Archaeology in the Irish Catholic University, and to the Rev. John O'Hanlon, C. C., Hon. Secretaries.* By JOHN H. GREENE, Author of "A Catechism of Irish Geography." Stereotyped edition. Cincinnati: M. H. Bird, and J. J. Keatinge. 1860. 8vo. pp. 16.

THE title sufficiently shows the nature of this *Memoir* by John H. Greene, the profits derived from the sale of which are devoted by the author to the erection of a suitable monument to the memory of his cousin Dr. John Lanigan, a name well known to Irish antiquarians.

34. *Le Paradis Terrestre.* Par FERDINAND EENENS. Bruxelles: Chez tous les Libraires. 1860. 12mo. pp. 287.

THIS is an attempt to prove that Christianity is false and impossible, the devil a myth, and the government of the world by God an unfounded assumption. It is as full of blasphemies as might be an-

ticipated from its object, and has not even the merit of ability to recommend it.

35. *Christ Our Life. The Scriptural Argument for Immortality through Christ Alone.* By C. F. HUDSON, Author of "Debt and Grace, as Related to the Doctrine of a Future Life." Boston: John P. Jewett & Company. 1860. 12mo. pp. 160.
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36. *A General View of the Rise, Progress, and Corruptions of Christianity.* By the Most Rev. RICHARD WHATELY, Archbishop of Dublin. With a Sketch of the Life of the Author, and a Catalogue of his Writings. New York: William Gowans. 1860. 12mo. pp. 288.
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37. *The Holy Week: Containing the Offices of Holy Week, from the Roman Breviary and Missal, with the Chants in Modern Notation.* With the approbation of the Most Reverend the Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore: John Murphy and Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 182.

THIS book contains the office for Holy Week, with the music in a form more convenient than has generally been used. Mr. Murphy has also, we believe, published an edition of this book with the Gregorian notation, or square notes, for those who are more accustomed to them.

38. *A Manual of the Catholic Religion, for Catechists, Teachers, and Self-Instruction.* By the Rev. Father F. X. WENINGER, D.D., Missionary of the Society of Jesus. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1861. 12mo. pp. 410.
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39. *Delicias de la Piedad. Tratado sobre el culto de la Santísima Virgen, por el M. R. P. VENTURA DE RAULICA.* Traducido por R. A. O. Habana. 1860. 16mo. pp. 186.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1861.

ART. I.—*Della Filosofia della Rivelazione di* VINCENZO GIOBERTI. *Pubblicata per Cura di* GIUSEPPE MASSARI. Turin and Paris. 1856.

THE work the title of which we cite above, is the Second Volume of the Posthumous Works of the late Abbate Gioberti, collected and published under the editorial care of his friend and disciple, Joseph Massari. It has been placed in our hands by a venerable Italian priest, who has been for years a professor of philosophy and theology, and who to a certain extent at least accepts Gioberti's philosophical views. He has placed it in our hands with the remark, that as we seem to have made some advances toward the philosophical and theological system of which it gives the principles and method, we probably should find pleasure in reading it. Whether he gave it to us with a wish that it should be to us a guide or a beacon we are unable to say. We have a high opinion of the genius, the learning, and philosophical ability of its author, and we have accepted and defended some parts of his philosophy; but neither in philosophy nor in theology are we disposed to take him for our master or our guide. We think he had opinions that we do not hold, and purposes with which, as we at present understand them, we do not sympathize. We set up in our youth and inexperience to be a reformer, and to recast the world in our own image; we met with no great or marked success, and we think it is well that we did not, for we have no reason to believe that the world recast in

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our image would be any better than it is now. We did not come into the Catholic Church to turn Catholic reformer, to reform Catholic faith, Catholic theology, or Catholic discipline; we try to learn and hold Catholic faith as the Church believes and teaches it, and to make the best use of reason in our power in defending it against the various classes of adversaries it at present encounters. Further than this no man and no set of men can count on us.

The work now before us is unfinished, and in fact is little more than notes jotted down to be afterward worked up, or bald statement of principles to be afterward developed and applied. It does no credit to the author as a writer, but it does credit to him as a varied, profound, and fertile thinker. It is only the outlines of a treatise, a rude sketch, but it could have been the production only of philosophical and theological genius of the first order. Signor Massari says it is scrupulously orthodox, which no doubt is much, but would be more, if we were assured that his own orthodoxy is above suspicion. But whether really orthodox or not, the work, which the editor rightly calls *Fragments*, is one, like Dr. Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, the principle of which it adopts and defends, that will be variously judged according to the taste, the temper, the understanding, or the prejudices of the reader. It is not a work to be judged by sciolists, favorably or unfavorably. The work is a serious work, an earnest work, we doubt not an honest work, and on subjects of the highest and to all thinking men of the most pressing interest, and only those who are familiar with the higher branches of thought, and have done something more than hastily run through Bouvier's *Philosophy and Theology*, or even studied St. Thomas or Duns Scotus are competent to pass judgment on its merits. It can be brought within none of the approved formulas of the schools, and tested by none of the rules ordinarily adopted by schoolmen, for it rises above all those formulas and rules, and seeks either to make way with them or to elevate and expand them by showing the higher reason in which they are founded.

There is, even in the case of those who by their natural genius and studies are not wholly incompetent to judge of works of this sort, an evident difficulty in appreciating these *Fragments* of an unfinished work in which the author was engaged when death overtook him, in the fact that the author cannot be looked upon as free from suspicion. All

his works, published during his lifetime, are on the *Index*, and though it may be that they were placed there for political reasons, or for various other reasons than philosophical or theological unsoundness, yet the fact itself can hardly fail to excite in loyal Catholic hearts some degree of distrust. He refused, if we have not been misinformed, to follow the example of Rosmini and Padre Ventura, and make the retraction required by the Holy See, and he died suddenly at Paris, as our Parisian friends say, without being visibly reconciled to the Church. He openly departs from the theology of the scholastics, and makes war to the knife on the Jesuits, and contends that the theology taught by them since the General Aquaviva is unchristian. Indeed, he accuses them of introducing another Gospel than that of our Lord, and he holds that the definitions of popes and councils are to be taken only as true in general, but not in particular. He shows in his writings hardly ever any sympathy with the great doctors, writers, and saints of the Church, at least since the earliest ages, and reserves his esteem and affection for the Arnoldis, Rienzi, Machiavellis, Alfieris, and Leopardis, who have done their best to repaganize Italy, and through Italy Christendom; and although some of these things may possibly admit an explanation, they have a tendency to create in honest Catholic minds a prejudice against him.

We are by no means disposed to defend the analytic method of the scholastics, nor are we disposed to maintain that our modern theologians have always been St. Augustines, St. Basils, or able to compete successfully with the great Fathers of the early ages. We do not always sympathize with the meticulous orthodoxy of our age, or hold ourselves bound as a Catholic to defend through thick and thin even the administration of ecclesiastical affairs in our own or in any other country, much less the secular politics of all Catholics, whether priests or laymen. In matters of simple human prudence we believe Catholic laymen, Catholic priests and bishops, even popes and cardinals may make mistakes, and commit great blunders from which religion and society suffer. We have shown time and again what we dare in relation to the scholastic philosophy and that generally taught in Catholic schools at the present day. We have proved that we respect liberty in all its forms, are not afraid on all proper occasions to assert the rights of the temporal, as well as of the spiritual. We are

even now suffering much opprobrium because we have fearlessly vindicated the province of reason, and in the name of religion herself protested against the doctrine that we must demolish reason to make way for faith, or surrender our manhood in order to be faithful and acceptable servants of God. But, if we were required to believe that the scholastics have essentially erred in their theology, and that the Jesuits for two hundred and fifty years have introduced a false theology, nay, another Gospel, and have been unchristian in their teaching, we should cease to profess ourselves Catholics, and should look upon the Church as having failed as the teacher of truth. The Church teaches through her doctors, and if these have failed, as failed they have, if the scholastics and Jesuits have introduced a false and corrupt theology, she has failed in her mission to teach. The Jesuits are the last men in the Church Gioberti should complain of, for from the origin of the Society it has been their study to show the harmonious relations between reason and faith, nature and grace, liberty and authority, the very thing he himself professes to be aiming to effect, and he knows perfectly well, that the great standing charge against them is that they have yielded too much to reason, nature, and human liberty; and if he had descended for a moment from his synthetic altitude and analyzed his objections, he would have found that he was really objecting to them only what he was himself professing to do. His attacks upon them strike us as at least ungrateful, and such as we should expect from no man not deeply imbued with Lutheran and Jansenistic heresy. We are not the special apologists of the Jesuits, but we have seldom, if ever, found them as a body strongly opposed to a man whose Catholic loyalty or orthodoxy there were no good reasons for suspecting.

We have not become an old gray-headed man without knowing that a man may be unjustly suspected, that no man can do boldly and energetically the precise work demanded in his day and generation in church or state without making many enemies, without offending the honest people who get great gain by making shrines for the goddess Diana, raising a clamor against him, and perhaps going to the grave with his motives misconceived, and his words and deeds misconstrued. Even great and good men may and often do misinterpret and do no little wrong to great and good men. Did not the chief priests, the scribes, and the pharisees conspire to raise up the mob

against our Lord himself, and persuade them to cry out, *Crucifige eum, crucifige eum?* Was it not by his own people, the people he had brought up out of Egyptian bondage, led through the wilderness to a land flowing with milk and honey, and whom he had loaded with privileges, and whose national constitution and existence were founded on faith in him, who rejected him, and crucified him by the hands of an alien? If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more them of his household? The Christian Church is the Synagogue continued and fulfilled, but men in the one and the other have the same nature, the same appetites, passions, senses, principles, and motives of action, and to some extent at least there will always be reproduced in the Church what was produced in the Synagogue, for Christianity is not and cannot be severed from Judaism. Our Lord came not to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil. Christian history is recorded in the Old Testament as well as in the New. We know also that modern orthodoxy is timid, and its defenders are more ready to denounce, to place upon the *Index*, or to pillory a man's writings than to refute them, to silence by authority than to convince by reason; we know, furthermore, that in these revolutionary times, when every thing is loosened from its old moorings, and is afloat on a tumultuous sea of wild and lawless speculations, when nothing is sacred from the hand of the profane, and the whole world seems breaking up and hastening to universal ruin, men are bewildered, and hardly know whom to distrust or in whom to confide, or to tell their friends from their enemies. But recalling all this, and making all the allowances demanded, we confess we cannot approach a work of Gioberti without feeling that the presumption, as they say in law, is against him, and that he is put upon his defence. He cannot claim the benefit of presumed innocence, and therefore that all should be interpreted in his favor, not clearly and undeniably against him. We say not that he is guilty, but that he is reasonably suspected, and that his friends are called upon to free him from suspicion before calling upon us to acquit him. We say not that he is heterodox, but we do say his orthodoxy is not to be presumed, is not to be taken for granted, and his writings in doubtful cases to receive an orthodox sense. His orthodoxy, not his heterodoxy, is to be proved, for it is a question in his case not of condemning but of acquitting and approving, whether we shall confirm

the judgment rendered against him, or reverse it, and present him as a man who has suffered wrong, been unjustly condemned.

The difficulty of settling the question whether Gioberti is to be censured as heterodox or acquitted as orthodox, is the greater from the fact that he departs from the usual method and language of the schools. The schools, since St. Anselm, if not since St. John of Damascus, have followed in the construction and exposition of theology as well as of philosophy the method of analysis. Our whole theological science is cast in analytic moulds, and expressed in analytic language. Gioberti censures and rejects this method, adopts the synthetic method, attempts to cast both philosophy and theology in a synthetic mould, and to express them in the language of synthesis, which in modern times at least is unfamiliar even to scholars and men of science. It is not easy always to say whether the doctrine he sets forth in its synthetic form is an old acquaintance or a total stranger. He has certainly made great changes in the human and variable element of theology, but has he not proposed also changes in the divine and invariable element? In varying the forms in which theologians have hitherto arranged and expressed divine revelation to the scientific understanding, does he not vary revelation itself? Does he leave revelation intact, in its unity and integrity? Human science may vary from age to age, because it is imperfect, and can never become perfect; but the revealed truth, faith never varies, never has varied from the beginning, and never can vary till swallowed up in vision.

But as faith is the word of God revealed to the human understanding through the medium of human language, the dogma, or authoritative expression of faith, necessarily contracts up to a certain point a human element. There is in the dogma of faith, as believed by the human mind, or as defined by the Church, a human element. And this human element may vary its form without losing its truth, or affecting the truth of the dogma. The Church for instance has defined that the soul is the form of the body, *forma corporis*, and that the change in the Eucharistic elements is well expressed by the word *Transubstantiation*. In both cases the dogma is true, and the Church gives an infallible definition, but only when the words *forma* and *transubstantiatio* are taken in the scholastic sense, and in giving her definition the Church had no intention of endorsing the

scholastic doctrine of forms and substances. Now were we to say that in the blessed Eucharist there is no change of substance, we should appear to deny the dogma of the Real Presence, and yet we could say so and be strictly orthodox. The scholastics take the word *substance* in the sense of essence, as that which in the conception of a thing is ultimate, the intelligible as distinguished from the visible, what Gioberti calls the superintelligible. The essence of the bread and the wine is changed, but as Theodoret argues against the Eutychians, their nature and substance remain unchanged, though confessedly converted into the body and blood of our Lord. Here is a difference of philosophy, or of the human element, inducing a change in the form of the statement, but no change in the essential dogma itself. We accept, of course, the dogma as defined, but we accept the word transubstantiation only in the scholastic sense, not in the sense of our own philosophy, for were we to do so we should be obliged to deny to the species after consecration all the natural properties of bread and wine, which would be contrary to fact, and indirectly, we apprehend, favor the error of the Eutychians, if not of the Docetæ. The difficult point to determine is whether the changes introduced into the human element from time to time imply any change in the divine element or not. If they do, they cannot be entertained; if they do not, so far as the dogma is concerned, they are admissible.

We are not ourselves disposed to find fault with Gioberti for rejecting the analytic method and adopting the synthetic. The change, in our judgment, was much needed. Analysis is anatomy, and operates only on the dead subject. As our old Transcendentalist friends were accustomed to say, "In analysis we murder to dissect." The analytic method presents us truth in detail, in abstract forms, which are dead and incapable of imparting life and vigor to the mind. It treats truth as the wicked Typhon and his associates in Egyptian fable treated the good Osiris—hews it in pieces, and deprives it of life and fecundity. It gives us for the full, roundly moulded, symmetrical and living body of truth, only *dissecta membra*, which the weeping Isis seeks in vain to recover and re-endow with life and reproductive energy. It is this fact that for centuries has rendered scholastic theology so barren of grand results, and diverted from itself minds naturally the most vigorous and prolific; that has rendered it weak and inefficient in face of modern

heresies, incapable of grappling successfully with the subtler errors of the day. The public opinion of the world condemns it, and it ceases to be able to attract to itself the intelligence of the age. It wants vitality, the warmth and feeling of life, and repulses young and ardent souls as a corpse or a charnel-house. It is a valley of dry bones, and all the life we find in it is the life the student has obtained elsewhere and brings with him to its study. We accept in the main Gioberti's criticism of scholastic theology. It, he says, "is particularism, whence its defects and weakness before rationalism. 1. It defends miracles as isolated facts, and therefore they appear arbitrary, fortuitous, and sometimes mean, little worthy of God. 2. It does the same with prophecy. 3. It admits the inspiration of the Scriptures in a purely particular sense, and thus imposes on theology the obligation of defending every passage, every anomaly, &c. 4. It adopts the same method with regard to passages cited in the New Testament from the Old. 5. It does the same with regard to angelology and demonology. 6. Finally, in it the whole Catholic doctrine is taken piecemeal and broken in the definitions of the Church. In all these methods analysis predominates, and the synthesis which follows gives only a *sum*—is only a summing up of particulars."—pp. 63, 64.

No man who has studied scholastic theology, how much soever he may have admired the acuteness, the subtlety, the masterly analytic power of the schoolmen who astonish us every moment with further distinctions and abstractions—but has felt the justice of this criticism. The schoolmen give us truth in detail, not as an organic whole, and they seldom if ever show us the definitions of the Church in their synthetic relations. Yet Catholic doctrine in itself and in the mind of the Church is a synthesis, the synthesis of all the relations of Creator and creature, of the Redeemer and the redeemed, of God and the universe, of Being and existence, of men with one another and with their Maker and Saviour. All the definitions of the Church are determined by this sublime synthesis, and find in it their unity and their integrity. It is only in scholastic theology which presents truth only in detached views, or gives us a *summa* instead of an organic whole, that they appear isolated, arbitrary, and without a general reason, or reason in the general constitution of things natural or supernatural. No doubt the scholastic theologians suppose back of

their analytic presentations a grand doctrine, which embraces these presentations in their synthetic unity, in which they are all integrated and become one, but their method breaks it and prevents them from setting it forth. Nobody pretends that they deny its reality, but they do not seize it, and present their particular doctrines as integral parts of one living whole. Hence it is not the living truth but its dead carcass our theologians depict and work up into their systems, for all life, as Gioberti would say, is dialectic, is in relation, or in the union and joint action of opposing forces, the great law of all life, which we set forth in a letter to the late Dr. Channing, *On the Mediatorial Life of Jesus*, published in June, 1842. To hope to form a conception of the living body of truth, or of truth as a whole, by analysis, seems to us no wiser than to attempt to form a conception of the earth's surface, and of the relations of the several countries on its surface to one another by studying a series of detached maps, presenting in detail only one city, town, or country each. So far as the rejection of the analytic method is concerned, and the adoption of the synthetic, Gioberti in our judgment is deserving of commendation, not censure, and has given an impulse to both theological and philosophical science of great importance.

We cannot, however, say that Gioberti has been the first in modern times to adopt and apply the synthetic method. Leibnitz and Malebranche, Gerdil and Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, and even Kant, in what he calls the practical reason as distinguished from the speculative reason, make decided approaches to it, while the schools of Schelling and Hegel, in Germany, avowedly adopt it, though they are unhappy in its application. Cousin mistook it, and ran off into the eclectic method, which in practice became the syncritic; but his great opponent, Pierre Leroux, however he may have erred in his principles, adopted the method as decidedly as Gioberti, and with as full an understanding of its application and value. We are well aware of the repute in which Leroux is held; we are well aware of the charges made against him; but, though full of errors and treated always with contempt by Gioberti, we dare be known to hold him entitled to the first rank among the philosophers of France, and there is far more affinity between his philosophy and Gioberti's, as we find it in these Fragments before us, than the haughty Italian was ever willing to acknowledge. Indeed all great thinkers in

our age, whether in theology or philosophy, have abandoned the analytic method, and adopted the synthetic, and commenced studying the objects of intelligence, whether made known to us by natural reason or by divine revelation, in their mutual relations as parts of one organic whole. The fact is worthy of consideration as a proof that we have reached our lowest point, that the mind is recovering its energy, and will attain to a more vigorous growth in the future.

We must remark, however, if Gioberti adopts the synthetic method in common with many others, he differs from the German and French synthesists in one very important respect. They in philosophizing take up the question of method before the question of principle. Method belongs to the order of reflection; principles belong to the order of intuition, and are given in the creative act. Principles are given, not found or obtained by the action of the mind itself; for the mind can neither exist nor act without principles. They must, then, not only be given, but given in the very act of God that creates the mind or human subject. They are intuitive, and intuition is an original, immanent fact, constitutive of the human intelligence and furnishing it the principles of all science as well as of all reality. The formula of intuition is, therefore, well expressed by Gioberti, *Ens creat existentias*, or, Being creates existences. This formula includes *omne reale et omne scibile*; for all the real must be being, the act of being, or the product of that act, and only that which is real can be an object of knowledge, since what is not is not intelligible or cognoscible. But principles must be received as well as given, for there is and can be no act of human knowledge without the act of the human subject. In all human science it is the human subject that knows, and hence all human science is subjective as well as objective. The fact of human knowledge is therefore a twofold fact, the resultant of two factors, subject and object. The creative act of God in presenting the principles of science creates the mind, and the mind, the instant it is created, receives or apprehends them. Hence the *primum philosophicum* must be a synthesis of the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*, and is at once ideal and empirical.

The principle of all science is intuitive, but the actual development of science is reflective. Method therefore pertains to the reflective order and is determined by the

principles intuitively given. It must always recognize and preserve the synthesis or union of the ideal and empyrical. Reflection uses for its instruments contemplation and reasoning. The reasoning makes use of language or sensible signs which represent more or less perfectly the reality given in intuition. The error of philosophers is in attempting to determine the method before having ascertained what are the principles of science. The defect of the modern methods of philosophy is in their starting from a mutilated formula; either in taking the *primum ontologicum* or the *primum psychologicum* alone as the *primum philosophicum*. In the first case all science is rendered ideal, which was the error of Malebranche; in the second case it is purely empyrical, the error of the sensists and the psychologists generally, both of which errors Gioberti happily avoids.

The design of Gioberti in the work which he did not live to complete is one which all must approve. It was the full and triumphant defence of the Catholic religion against all classes of adversaries, but more especially against modern rationalists. Persons not familiar with modern rationalism, especially as we find it in Germany, will find much difficulty in appreciating either this or any other of the philosophical or theological works of Gioberti. His aim in all of them is to present truth as a whole, in its unity and its integrity, and to show that the truth as known by natural reason and the truth known by immediate divine revelation are but parts of one whole, that God, in the natural order and in the supernatural, is but carrying out one and the same grand design, and acting to one and the same glorious end. The natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, nature and grace, he maintains, are not opposed one to another, are not essentially unrelated, but are parts of one and the same universal plan and harmonize in their origin, in their principle of operation, and in their final cause. He maintains that the supernatural excludes no natural truth, no natural good, and he thus recognizes or accepts all the affirmations of rationalists while laboring to show the absurdity of their denials. He holds, with Leibnitz, that all sects, parties, and schools are right in what they affirm, and wrong only in what they deny. In this he is undoubtedly right, since, as St. Thomas maintains, the intellect cannot be false, and truth alone is the object of the intellect. Error is not in apprehension but

in non-apprehension. The mind errs, not in regard to what it perceives, but in regard to what it does not perceive. The intelligible is always true, and the untrue and the unintelligible are convertible terms. All sects, schools, parties, creeds, doctrines are true in what they contain that is positive and intelligible, and are false only for the reason that they embrace not the whole truth, but take mere partial views or accept only some fragments of it; that is, for the reason that they do not hold truth in its unity and integrity. Yet it is the truth held by the sects which sanctifies to their own minds the errors they mix up with it. In order to refute them, it is not necessary simply to point out their errors, but to present them a doctrine which integrates the several fragments or portions of truth they hold in a higher and more comprehensive unity. This is what Gioberti attempts. He starts from a formula which embraces all truth in its unity and integrity, and which enables him to express all truth, whether of the natural or supernatural order, in its dialectic harmony. He finds the principle of this dialectic harmony in the creative act which serves as the middle term between the extremes. Thus by the creative act existences are united and harmonized with Being, and in the creative act the natural and supernatural are identified.

The great point to be remarked in Gioberti's method is, that while he holds the natural and the supernatural are distinguishable, he maintains that they are inseparable. According to him, whatever is done immediately by God is supernatural; the natural is that which is done mediately through second causes, or the action of natural agencies. The natural is explicable by cosmic laws; and whatever is not so explicable is supernatural. All origination is supernatural; thus the creative act is a supernatural act, and the cosmos as to its origin is supernatural. Christianity, inasmuch as it is the immediate and direct act of God, is also supernatural. Reason is natural, revelation supernatural, because in reason there is the action of a second cause, and in revelation only the immediate act of God. Reason does not include revelation analytically, but reason and revelation are never in point of fact separated. Christianity and cosmogony are synthetically one and inseparable, hence the author denies not only the fact but the possibility of what theologians call pure nature, or the *status naturæ puræ*. The following extract will show his doctrine on this point:

"The perfection of all orders of the cosmos, physical, æsthetic, moral, religious, &c., is in the fulness of the creative act, as absolute perfection is in the creative Being. The first creative cycle contains the principles and origin of things, the second the laws of their development, progress, and end. Genesis is the book of the first cycle; the Apocalypse of the second; Genesis is the book of the creation; the Apocalypse of the palingenesis.

"The creative act extrinsecated is the methexis.* The methexis is the methexis, that is the participation of Idea, inasmuch as that act itself is one in potential unity (initial methexis) or in actual unity (final methexis.) But such unity is always actually finite, and therefore, being limited, includes virtual or actual multiplicity. In the methexis, as one and the image of the creative act externated in it, all is one as in the creative act, although there is already there the germ or the act (initial or final methexis) of multiplicity and distinction. Thus grace and nature, supernatural and natural, religion and civilization, are all one in the methexis. In the methexis there is only dialectic distinction and harmony, potential in the initial methexis, and actual in the final. Hence to seize the excellence of the various created orders, we must not consider them as isolated from one another, for, to see the worth of a thing, we must take it in its real relations—that is, as it actually subsists. Now, created things have no isolated subsistence, unless in our abstract conceptions or imagination. No wonder, then, if taken out of their natural relations, they appear crude, defective, and unworthy of God. The defects which are attributed to Providence and to revelation proceed solely from their being so considered. Analysis leads to atheism, rationalism, pessimism, for it disfigures, despoils, and disjoins objects by abstraction. Synthesis alone conducts to ideal cognition, because it takes things as they are in their entirety. 'Creatures are stairs to the Creator,' says Petrarca, but only by him 'who rightly esteems them,' that is, who regards them directly in front, not in profile. As for example, the permission of error and evil is irreconcilable with Providence, if taken alone, but reconcilable, if regarded as a preparation for truth and goodness. *Oportet hæreses esse. O felix culpa!*

"The created, in that it is mimetic,† or sensible, is in time; but in that it is methexic, it is out of time. Therefore, facts and events which are mimetically successive and separated by time are simultaneous in the methexis; therefore, again, the internal life of every force is out of time. This explains the supernatural in religion. Methexically it is identical with the creative act and with the palingenetic act; mimetically it is a reminiscence of the premundane order, and an anticipation of the ultramundane. The unity of the

* From μετέχω, habeo cum alio, participo cum, to participate.

† From μιμητικός, μίμησις, μιμέομαι.

supernatural with the natural is in the creative act (*Idea creative*), and in the immanent methexis. So in this respect the transfiguration of Christ was a partial or momentary raising of the mimesis which covered the methexis. Christ, as methexic, was already glorious; only his mortal body was mimetic. The Docetæ and other heretics had a confused view of this, but they erred in denying the reality of the mimetic state. Thus methexically the particular judgment and the universal are identical.

"Earth is mimetically opposed to heaven, not as part to part, but as the part to the whole: for according to the Copernican system the earth even is in heaven. Heaven and earth may be considered both mimetically and methexically. The real contrariety is between earth as mimesis and heaven as methexis, of which it is the symbol. Therefore, the methexic heaven is the earth as mimesis. Their contrariety is mimetic. Indeed there is no contrariety in the methexis, but distinction and harmony alone. As heaven is beyond earth in space, so the celestial and palingenesiac epoch is beyond the earth in time. But as methexically heaven is in the earth, so the palingenesiac future is methexically in the present, the continuous in the discrete. Therefore, methexically the kingdom of the heavens is the earth—*intra vos est*—in respect to both space and time. The future life is present in the same sense. Hence we see how a miracle, a methexic and superintelligible fact, is numerically identical with the future facts of the palingenesiac cosmos, and subjected only in the mimetic covering to the laws of time."—pp. 39-41.

And also from this further extract, which we take from the Section on *The Supernatural*:

"The creative act is the dialectic union of the natural and the supernatural. But in what do the two things differ, since the nature of the creative act is the same in both cases? They differ in principle and end. 1. In principle, because in the supernatural the creative act is immediate, and in nature mediate. 2. In the end, because nature refers to time, the finite, the earth; the supernatural to heaven, the eternal, the infinite. The supernatural is nature raised to infinite power, that is, nature passed from the state of mimesis to that of methexis. Thus the Church and the human race, inspiration and cognition, grace and free will are all one in their nature; but Church, inspiration (*θεόπνευστία*), grace are free will, cognition, the human race raised to the infinite.

"The natural and the supernatural, as all contraries, coincide in the creative act, the dialectic conciliator, *par excellence*. Divided in their course, they are united in their destiny, and as they are united in their origin so they meet together in their end, that is, in the palingenesia. The opposition between them, therefore, has place only in the medium, that is, only in the interval which sepa-

rates cosmogony from palingenesia. Rationalists and supernaturalists fight each other because they do not rise to the principle of their conceptions. There they would see that they are both right and both wrong. Rationalists abase the supernatural to the natural; vulgar supernaturalists raise the natural to the supernatural. The point in which nature and the supernatural meet is the creative act. By means of that the two notions stand either for the other,—*si reciprocano insieme*.

"The mimesis is either external or internal, subjective or objective, fantastic or cosmic and natural. The external is sensible, the internal is affective and imaginative. Miracle is the mimesis of the supernatural; the methexis of the supernatural is the creative act. The mimesis of the supernatural may be either external (facts) or internal, (myths), whence thaumatology and mythology.

* * * * *

"Every force is supernatural in respect to specifically different and inferior forces. Civilization is supernatural in respect to the barbarian. If beasts could understand, man would be for them supernatural, as to man are angels. In proof of this, you see that all barbarians attribute to supernatural beings, demons, genii, giants, the Fates, Solomon, Alexander, that is, to divine men believed endowed with talismanic or magic force, the ruins of the civilization they do not possess and which they find in their countries.

"The supernatural is in the natural as the individual without the species, an act without the potential, a fact without law. It is therefore an isolated phenomenon. But an isolated phenomenon cannot be unless as a reminiscence or a presentiment; it must pertain either to the past or to the future; because there can be nothing really isolated in nature, an act without the potential, or an individual without the species. The supernatural, therefore, is a bit (*brano*) of a premundane or an ultramundane order, or rather of both, and is cosmogonic and palingenesiac. Every act, every fact, must have its law, for it expresses an idea. Therefore the supernatural also must have its law, its genus.

"The natural and the supernatural are identified in the creative act. The natural is the imperfect intervention of the creative act; the supernatural its complete intervention. Hence the supernatural is the summit, the end, the complement of nature and the creative act (hence also its principle). This is seen in Christianity, which is supernatural because it is morally, theologically, and civilly perfect religion. But it is natural because the form of the perfection being possible, it must have place. Thus Christ is God-man because he is perfect man, which supposes in him the complete incidence of the creative act. This incidence is the theandria. Vulgar theologians make of the supernatural a sophistical opposite (exclusive) and not dialectic of nature, and thus distort it and render its maintenance impossible. Thus they say Christi-

anity being supernatural cannot be natural, and it would be contradictory to assert it as such. Wherefore? Because it is more perfect than all other religions. But see they not that the more perfect is as natural as the less perfect? that the one must be as natural as the other?

"The supernatural is not isolated in history, nor does it pertain alone to religion; for there are in history as in nature a multitude of facts that are more or less inexplicable and therefore hold more or less from the supernatural. It is a case of words which, expressing the want of a known law, denote the supernatural. There are various grades of the inexplicable, and therefore of the supernatural. In respect to God there is no supernatural, for every one of his actions is law. His creative act is idea, and hence a law to itself. *The supernatural, therefore, is simply relative to our cognition*, and must change as this changes. In proportion as new laws become known, the supernatural recedes."—pp. 46-49.

There is no doubt that existences receive in the creative act two motions founding two cycles, the one their procession by way of creation,—not emanation, formation, or generation,—from God as first cause, and the other their return without absorption in him or loss of their own substantial or individual existence to God as their final cause. All things are created by him and for him,—are from him, to him, and for him. But when the author calls the second cycle the palingenesia or regeneration, that is, as we understand it, the Christian order of life, he appears to us to assume that the natural has its complement only in the supernatural. This, taken as a fact, may be accepted, but not if assumed to be necessary. That cosmogony has its completion or fulfilment only in palingenesia is in the present order of Providence perhaps true, but this is so from the divine free-will, not because necessarily implied in the creative act. We are aware of no reason *à priori* why the cosmos should not have its fulfilment in its own order. The cosmos is the world, the *mundus* of the Latins, the natural universe bound together, informed, and governed by the inherent laws of beauty and harmony. It is the created universe, and is rightly represented as having two motions, a motion from God as first cause and a motion to God as final cause. Both motions are given in the creative act, and are necessary to its completion. To call the second cycle palingenesia must imply either that the cosmos is merely potential, or initial in its own order, and is fulfilled only in another order, or that the palingenesia is itself cos-

mic, and therefore natural. The former cannot be said, because it denies that the cosmos has two cycles, and in fact denies the very existence of the cosmos itself; for the final cause is as essential to all created existence as the first cause. A potential cosmos is simply a divine idea, a cosmos which God may, if he chooses, create, but which he has not yet created. The latter implies a contradiction in terms. The natural return, or return by their natural powers, in the natural order, of existences to God as their final cause, is no palingenesia, for there is no new birth, regeneration, or restoration even necessary. The return is only the fulfilment of their nature. The author gains nothing under this point of view by his distinction between the methexis, *participation*, and mimesis, *imitation*. The methexis he defines to be the creative act extrinsecated, and is, we suppose, what is usually called genera and species, imitated, mimicked or symbolized in the mimesis or action of second causes; for, though all creation is by genera and species, the determination, actualization, fulfilment, or individuation is in the order of its genus or species, and belongs to cosmogony, not to palingenesia, to the first cause, not to the second. The production of genera and species, the methexis, may be initial creation, but it is not complete cosmogony, or the whole of the first cycle, and the determination, actualization, or individuation of the genus or species is not what is meant by the return of existences to God as their final cause, and is only their completion in the first cycle. It is only actual or complete cosmogony; that is, it simply completes the procession, by way of creation of existences from God, and is not even the beginning of their return to him as final cause, or end for which they were created.

The author would have us understand cosmogony is completed in palingenesia, or that Christianity is the actualization and completion of what is potential, generic, or initial in cosmogony, and is therefore included in cosmos. Thus he says, "Grace and nature, supernatural and natural, religion and civilization are one in the methexis," or generic cosmos. Christianity completed is completed cosmogony. He allows us never to consider nature and grace, natural and supernatural, religion and civilization, as generically separated or isolated. Their separation or isolation is only mimetic, not methexic, because all separation is sophistical, and the sophistical is never in the methexis, in which there

can only be dialectic distinction and harmony; that is to say, generically the two orders are identical, and are distinguishable only as the initial and final. By this he denies, first, what theologians call the state of pure nature, and second, all real distinction between the order of nature and the order of grace—between the natural and the supernatural, reducing both orders under one and the same cosmic law. Their separation, he says, is sophistical, which in his language implies that it is not real, but simply mimetic, or a passing of the initial to its complement. It is also sophistical, because then they are not subject and predicate of the same judgment, or are two extremes without a middle, for *argumentum a genere ad genus non valet*, and if admitted the author would lose his synthesis, or the completion and sufficiency of the ideal formula. But is he at liberty to deny the state of pure nature? It seems to us that every theologian must admit its possibility, and presuppose it possible, in all his reasoning. He cannot assume that man was created with only a palingenesiac destiny, for the Council of Trent, in its decree touching the subject, struck out the word *conditus*, and inserted the word *constitutus*, and defined not that man was *created*, but that he was *established* in grace or original justice, and theologians have maintained—and without censure—that Adam remained some time in a state of nature before he was elevated by grace to the plain of a supernatural destiny, from which in original sin he fell. Neither as he was before the fall, nor as he is now born, can man claim as due to his nature the palingenesia. The redemption by the Word made flesh, and the final Beatitude promised by the Gospel, are of grace not debt, and were in no sense initial in cosmogony, and to be completed in the palingenesia. Man is now born in a state of nature, and has no claim by nature to the palingenesia, and can merit it condignly or congruously by no natural act he can perform. No one is entitled to it, or can enter into its order till born again, till a new life is begotten in him by the grace of regeneration communicated in the sacrament of Baptism, as is certain from the decision of the Church that unbaptized infants dying in infancy go *in infernos*, and can never see God and enjoy the beatitude of heaven. It is not true then to say that the palingenesia is in the order of the cosmos, and only completes or fulfils what is initial or potential in cosmogony, for we cannot enter it by generation. Nor can we

maintain on the other hand that man was created without a natural destiny. Nearly all theologians, not the Jesuits only, teach that, though infants dying in infancy unbaptized lose the beatific vision, and suffer the *pœna damni*, and will never see God as he is in himself, yet they will be gainers by their existence, and enjoy forever some sort of natural beatitude. Cardinal Sfrondata in a work published in the seventeenth century, maintains that even adults of the class termed by theologians negative unbelievers—that is, persons who do not reject Christ, but simply lack faith in him—dying free from actual sin and subject only to original sin, the penalty of which is the loss of the beatific vision, will receive a natural beatitude superior, perhaps, to the happiness of this life; and the Holy See, though earnestly solicited by Bossuet and other bishops, refused to condemn the doctrine. So it would seem that the author is not free to deny either natural or supernatural beatitude. Indeed the author himself appears to admit both, for in treating of the eternal punishment of the wicked he says:

“Hell is the perpetuity of the state of fallen earth, that is, to speak theologically, of man in the state of original sin. Now original sin is nothing else than the fall of man from the supernatural state (inseparable from the perfection of his nature) into a natural state. Therefore hell is the perpetual exclusion of man from the supernatural state; it is the endless degradation of man in an inferior and therefore finite state of nature, as paradise is the exaltation, the raising to a higher state. In saying state, I say genus; whence the glorified is a trans-humanized man, as the reprobate is a dis-humanized man. One touches the angel, the other the brute. Hell therefore does not consist in the eternity of evil, as the scholastics believed. The only thing eternal is the exclusion from the supernatural good.”—p. 357.

Whether the doctrine of this extract is orthodox or not we shall hereafter examine. It suffices for the present to say that the author does here recognize a natural good, since he maintains that the reprobate do not suffer eternal evil, but are simply excluded from supernatural good. If the state of the reprobate is not evil, it must be good, for between evil and good there is no medium. As this good is declared to be not supernatural, it must be natural; but there can be no natural good for man unless he has a natural destiny, since all good or beatitude consists in attaining to one's destiny. The fact that this natural good is

inferior to supernatural good, or that the condition of the reprobate is inferior to the glorified, makes nothing against this conclusion. The author must then admit that man has a beatitude in the order of nature, although it may be far inferior to a supernatural beatitude.

Nevertheless the author seems to us to confound the natural and the supernatural. He makes the supernatural supernatural only in relation to our cognition, and virtually identical with the superintelligible, since he formally identifies it with the inexplicable. In his *Introduction to the Study of Philosophy*, and especially in his Letters on the *Errors of Rosmini*, he declares positively that he does not understand by the supernatural the superintelligible, and he takes Rosmini roundly to task for accusing him of doing so. But what is the difference between the superintelligible and the inexplicable. The superintelligible is superintelligible only in relation to our cognition, and he himself maintains that it diminishes in proportion to the progress of our knowledge, "Il sovrintelligibile, scema col progresso e si accosta all'intelligibile secondo il corso metessico della scienza. Il mistero tende a diventare assioma."^a He says the same of the supernatural. The supernatural is supernatural only because we are unable to explain it, that is, are ignorant of its law. But in proportion as we get the better of this ignorance, and are able to reduce the supernatural under law it ceases to be supernatural. The supernatural exists only in our ignorance, and the superintelligible only in our impotence to know; but both are alike relative to us, and both disappear in proportion as our knowledge increases. This is not Catholic doctrine as we have learned it. "Christianity," the author says, "is supernatural because it is morally, theologically, and civilly perfect religion; but it is also natural." It is in the same order as imperfect religion, and he permits those who deny it to be natural, to do so only because it is more perfect than all other religions. It is evident, then, that the author holds that in the real order, the natural and the supernatural are one and the same, and that they differ only in their representation to our intelligence. Now we hold Christianity to be supernatural not solely because it contains mysteries inexplicable by natural reason, not solely because it is a revealed religion, nor solely because it is more perfect than all other religions, but because, though

^a Pp. 59, 60.

it presupposes nature, it is not included in nature but is an order above it. We do not know by what authority, or for what reason the author says nature has reference only "to time, to the finite, to the earth," and not "to heaven, to the eternal, the infinite." The existence of God and the immateriality and therefore indissolubility of the soul, free will, moral accountability are, if revealed truths, also truths of reason and provable by it. All creatures are made by God and for him, and therefore refer to him for their final cause as well as for their first cause. There is a natural religion, for there is a natural bond, to wit, the creative act, between man and God, and man is bound by the natural law, as well as the revealed law, to worship God, and therefore to refer all his acts to him as his final cause, and their ultimate end; and we need not say that whatever is referred to God is referred to heaven [natural beatitude], the eternal, the infinite. Either then there is another sense in which the supernatural is referred to heaven, the eternal, the infinite, or there is no real distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and no reason why Christianity should be called supernatural rather than natural.

The author, we know, professes to distinguish between the supernatural and the natural, and would have us understand that what he denies is not that they are distinguishable, but that they are separable in point of fact, and we think with him that in treating both philosophy and theology they should be taken as forming parts of one whole. To rightly understand the works of Divine Providence, we must regard from first to last the natural and supernatural as coexisting, and co-operating to one and the same ultimate end. Man finds his ultimate destiny in the union or synthesis of the two orders. In point of fact nature is never left without grace, or reason without revelation. In creating man, in the very act by which he creates him, God gives to him the principles of all science, and he made to the first man a revelation of his will. The intuition of the principles is common to and immanent in all men, and the tradition of the primitive revelation has never been wholly interrupted, but in a more or less perfect state has been preserved by all nations down to us. Never has the human race been without the aid of the supernatural revelation or the assistance of divine grace. The reason, common sense, and conscience of mankind are formed by the joint operation of the natural and supernatural. So far

as Gioberti seeks to bring out this fact and establish it as the basis of his explanation and defence of the Catholic religion, we of course agree with him and regard his labors not only as proper but as exceedingly valuable. But he seems to us not only to deny the separability of the two orders, but all real distinction between them. He says indeed, the supernatural is distinguished from the natural in the respect, that it is that which is done immediately by God, while the natural is that done mediately through the agency of second causes, and that it has reference to heaven, to eternity, to the infinite, while nature has reference only to time, to the earth, the finite.

But these distinctions amount to nothing, for nature is the immediate work of God, and therefore is itself supernatural, as the author expressly asserts, and we have shown that nature, or the cosmos, must refer to God as its final cause; therefore to heaven, to eternity, the infinite no less than the palingenesia. He tells us himself that they are both one in the methexis, and differ only in the mimesis, or the sensible representation. We see not, therefore, how he can assert any real distinction between them. Indeed, he himself says that Christianity is supernatural, but that it is also natural, and he nowhere shows wherein it is to be distinguished from nature.

Now, we have been accustomed to regard Christianity as a supernatural order or a real order of life, above even our natural, moral, and spiritual life, into which order no one can enter without being born again, regenerated, made through grace a new creature. Indeed, Gioberti himself frequently calls the palingenesia a new creation. It is not then in the cosmos, is neither in the first cycle nor the second cycle, if we take the word cosmos in its proper sense. It includes the cosmos, if you will, for all nature was redeemed by the Word made flesh, and is glorified in the glorification of Christ, but is itself super-cosmic, super-mundane. Certainly the supernatural has God for its first and last cause, and therefore, like the cosmos or natural order, a motion from God as its first cause, and a motion to him as its final cause; but the creative act on which it depends is distinguishable from the creative act on which nature or the cosmos depends. We know God is one, and all his acts intrinsically considered, or considered in relation to their origin in his own unity, are one; but extrinsically considered, as acts extrinsecated, that is, in what the author

calls the methexis, or as placing genera and species, they are not necessarily one, and may be distinguished with something more than dialectical distinction, or *distinctio rationis*. No doubt, when God decreed to create man, he decreed also to found the order of grace, because as regards himself there is no chronological priority or subsequence; but not therefore are we to conclude that the Incarnation of the Word was decreed in the decree to create man, or to create the cosmos. Indeed, theologians are not agreed as to the question whether if man had not sinned—and he need not have sinned—the Word would have become Incarnate or not. The Word is eternal, begotten before all worlds; but our Lord or the Word made flesh is only “the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.” The Incarnation in the Divine mind would then seem to be logically subsequent to creation.

What we call the supernatural is the new order which springs from God made man, from the Incarnation, and of which our Lord is the progenitor, as Adam was the progenitor of the human race in the natural order. Our Lord is the second Adam, and stands to the palingenesiac order as the first Adam to the genesiac or cosmic. Adam is the first parent in the order of generation, and Jesus Christ in the order of regeneration, which is the order of grace. The two orders, then, differ with all the difference between the first Adam and the second. This, according to the author, is only the difference between initial and completed creation. He says, as we have seen, that “Christ is God-Man, because he is perfect man, which supposes the complete insidence of the creative act. This insidence [*insidenza*] is Theandria.” He says again (p. 307): “Man is made in the image of God, and is a God that begins, an inchoate God, because methexical and crescent to infinity.” If this means any thing, it means that man perfected, completed, or brought to the term of his progress, is God, or that man grows into God; that is, again, creation completed, fulfilled, is God—a doctrine which the Transcendentalists had made us quite familiar with long before the name of Gioberti ever reached our ears. Yet this doctrine cannot, so far as we can see, be reconciled with the Catholic dogma, which the author professes to hold; for the god thus attained to would be after all only a created god, and instead of embracing and uniting the two extremes of the formula, *l'Ente* and *l'esistente*, would fall under the head of *l'esistente*,

—the contingent, and united with *l'Ente*, or Being, only by the creative act, like every other creature. Christ, then, would be Theandric only in a secondary sense—only in the sense in which every other man is Theandric. The difference between him and other men would be a difference only in degree—a difference of more or less. Hence, in his *Gesuita Moderno*, the author places Christ in the same category with Moses, David, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Confucius, and other extraordinary men; and, therefore, places him in the line of what Pierre Leroux calls “providential men.” The author does well to say (p. 311), his view of the Incarnation differs from the scholastic view. It differs not only from scholasticism, but, as we understand it, from the Fathers and from the Church.

Christ, we must take the liberty to say, is not God-Man, because perfect man, that is, because he is man completed, whether completed by the mediate or immediate act of God; for he is at once both perfect God and perfect man—two natures hypostatically united in the unity of the Divine Person. The God that thus unites human nature to himself, and makes it his own human nature, is not the creative act perfected, nor God *mediante* the creative act, for the Word was begotten not made,—*genitum non factum*,—but the infinite and eternal God in the fulness of his own real and necessary being. The Apostle does not say* that in him was the complete incidence of the creative act, or that in him the creative act had reached its summit, its apex, but “in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.”

This Divine fulness is not the fulness of the creative act, or the creative act fulfilled, but the fulness of Being. Hence God with whom the human nature of Christ is hypostatically united is not creation nor the creative act, but is literally, in the fullest, and the highest sense of the term, God himself in his own Divine nature. The author, we fear, in his desire to find the law of the Incarnation, and to understand it generically, has missed the dogma, the real mystery of the Word made flesh, and resolved it into the mystery of flesh made Word, man made God. Thus he writes:

“The theory of the Incarnation is the complement of the theory of Creation. In Christ are united the human and the Divine na-

* Col. ii. 9.

tures in the Divine Hypostasis. Now human nature is the universal methexis of the human species, joined, as the species to the genus, to the methexis of the Universe. *The Divine Hypostasis is the creative act.* Therefore the Incarnation is the union of Being and Existence, *dell' Ente e dell' esistente*, in the subsistence, *nella subsistenza*, of the creative act, that is, Christ. It is the ideal formula completed, individuated. Thus are explained the effects of the Incarnation, as redemption, infinite merit, expiation, &c., *for these spring from the Divine creative act united to the created.* Thus is explained the communication of idioms. This theory of the Incarnation is dialectically midway between pantheism and dualism, and contains the truth of both systems free from their errors. Dialecticism is expressed by the Catholic formula: Union not separation of natures, the unity of person against Nestorius; distinction not confusion of natures against Eutychius and the Monothelites. Here we see the distinction and harmony of the two extremes proper to the Ideal formula—*l'Ente crea l'esistente*. This theory of the Incarnation is as far from scholasticism as from rationalism. The Scholastics consider in the Incarnation only the individual element and assert a supernaturalism built in the air, ultramysterious, inefficacious in practice, and inconceivable in speculation. Rationalism considers only the general without the particular, and takes from Christianity its historical efficacy and significance, and induces superficialism. Our theory, (scented by Nicholas of Cusa,) avoids both extremes, conjoins the general (potential and generic incarnation of universal existence) with the particular (actual and individual incarnation only in Christ), mystery with evidence, and makes of the Incarnation at the same time a philosophical and a theological theorem. Redemption is the exaltation of creation to infinite power. It is the complement of the second creative cycle,—the teleology of the palingenesis of the created. It consists of two parts: Incarnation and Glorification. The Incarnation is the creative act (*the Word*) individuated in Christ; Glorification is the creative act concentered in the species. Christianity, therefore, pertains to the teleology and the palingenesis of the world, of which it is the principle, the potentiality, the effort, the preparation, and the anticipation. On this rock rationalism always splits, severing from Christianity its divinity, or confounding it with other worships, taking it as a simple symbol of the general, despoiling it of all supernatural and creative individuality. It denies the teleology of the world, as through the medium it denies its cosmogony. Pantheism denies creation and palingenesis, and is consistent with itself. Rationalism, unless pantheistic, admits creation, and denies palingenesis, and is illogical."—pp. 310–312.

We think we understand this theory of the Incarnation,

and, if we mistake not, it is substantially the theory we ourselves broached, though we did not develop it, in the Letter to the late Dr. Channing already referred to. The aim of Gioberti, as was ours, is to bring the Incarnation within the general law of cosmic life, and to make of it both a philosophical and a theological theorem, so as to reduce all orders of our knowledge to the scientific unity or synthesis rather of the formula. We attempted it in what we called *Life*, he attempts it in what he calls the *creative act*, the sole copula between Being and existences. With us Christ was the Life, or union without confusion of the two opposites or extremes, and therefore universal mediator and conciliator. Christ was again, the union of the natural and supernatural, because living immediately the life of God in conjunction with the life of the creature, and therefore a theandric life. But the difficulty is that the Incarnation cannot be brought under the general law of cosmic life. It is its own law, and the law, as it is the beginning, middle, and end, of the palingenesia. The humanity in Christ, distinctly taken, is under the universal law of created life, but neither the Divinity nor the hypostatic Union. The act of God assuming human nature to be his own nature is not the creative act which creates human nature itself, nor is the hypostatic union the copula of the ideal formula or ideal judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, for that would identify Incarnation and creation, and all life would be the participation of Being and existences hypostatically united, which would imply, if not pantheism, dualism, which is no better. The hypostatical Union is the union of two logically pre-existing terms, and therefore can not be the creative act which does not presuppose two terms, but produces by the first term, the second term from nothing. We know not, of course, the precise nature of the union, but we do know that it is not the union expressed by the copula, nor the completion or fulfilment of that union, for that is fulfilled in genesis or the cosmos. The creative act is an act, actual, not power or potential only. The return of existences to God as their final cause is not the completion or fulfilment of genesis or the act of creation, but the completion or fulfilment of the Divine purpose in that act; cosmogony is the complete production of existences.

"The Hypostasis," the author says, "is the creative act," "the creative act is the Word, Verbum." The Word is

the second Hypostasis or Person of the Godhead: if that be creative act, what are the Hypostasis called the Father, and the Hypostasis called the Holy Ghost? If hypostasis is creative act, it must be so in each of the Divine Persons, and then we lose the distinction of persons and therefore the Trinity. That there is a procession in the Divine Being, whence the distinction of persons, we of course hold, but we have never supposed this procession is the creative act, or that the distinction of persons is the distinction between Being and its creative act. Neoplatonism or the Alexandrian school did not fall as low as that. The distinction of Persons (the generation of the word and the procession of the Holy Ghost) is *ad intra*, eternal, and necessary; the creative act is *ad extra*, a free act, contingent on the will of God. God is free to create or not, as Gioberti himself maintains, but he is not free to be or not to be three co-equal and eternal Persons in one Divine, eternal, and immutable being or essence; for, though there are not three Gods, but one God only, each of the three Persons or Hypostases is God in the fullest and highest sense of the term. We cannot then call the creative act the Word, or make it a Divine Person, Hypostasis, or subsistence, without falling undeniably into pantheism. The creative act regarded in God and not externated is the Divine power to create, and identical with the being or essence of God, that is, God himself. Regarded as externated, it is what the author calls initial methexis, that is, in the language of mortals, genera and species, not yet individuated, or as that which in individuals is determined, individuated, or concreted. The methexis is participated idea, the Universal of the schoolmen, which cannot be identified with the Word, because *Verbum genitum non factum*, is generated not created, and participated idea, genera, species, universals, are existences, and are God only *mediante* his creative act. Were we so to identify it, we should be obliged to regard the Word, since the Word is God, as the potential or initial creation, and creation or the cosmos as the completion, fulfilment or actualization of God, an Hegelian error and the seminal error of Buddhism, if not indeed of Brahminism. It is the basis of the doctrine of Pierre Leroux in his *Humanité*. The Word is not the creative act, but the creator, "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing that was made."

Moreover, if the Hypostasis be taken as the creative act, its assumption of flesh can mean only the creation of man, and the life of Christ would be theandric only in the sense in which all human life is theandric. The human nature, like all created nature, would be united to God only *mediante* the creative act; that is, only as the creature of God, not immediately as in the hypostatic union. Christ then would be man, but not God. He might be the most perfect of creatures, but he would be a creature and a creature only. We can conceive, then, no sense in which the author's doctrine can be so explained as to recognize the God-Man of Christian theology. Indeed, his whole system, as far as we can collect it, seems to exclude the orthodox Christology, and to require him to deny that Christ is God-Man, or any thing more than a divinely created man. We agree with him that Christ, the Author and Finisher of our faith, is the beginning and end of the palingenesia, which includes Incarnation and Glorification; but as he makes the palingenesia the second cycle of the cosmos, he can include in it only what was potential and initial in cosmogony. The principle and type, then, of the Incarnation must be in the cosmogony, and consequently the Incarnation can only complete the first cycle of the cosmos, as Glorification completes the second. Hence he makes the Incarnation the complete actualization or perfection of the initial creative act, as Glorification is the complete, perfect actualization of the final creative act. In all creatures, then, in that they are creatures, must be the type and beginning of all that is actual and complete in Glorification; so that Glorification is the perfect actualization of the potentiality of the Divine creative act. There must be, in every man, the type and beginning of the Incarnation, and our Lord can be Theandria only in the same sense, as we have already said, that every other man is theandria, and can differ from other men only in degree, only in the fact that in him is actually completed, perfected, or fulfilled, what is potential, inchoate, or incomplete in them. This is all he can say on his system. To make Christ any thing more, would be to make the Incarnation, and therefore palingenesia, not cosmic but supernatural; to withdraw it from the universal law of cosmic life, and declare it, as we do, supernatural, and supercosmic not only in relation to our own cognition, but supernatural in the order of reality. This shows wherefore we so earnestly object to

the position that palingenesia is the second cycle of the cosmos.

It is very true, that carelessly following Gioberti, we have in this Review occasionally spoken of the palingenesia as the second cosmic cycle, but it was only because the final Christian end, to which through God's grace we aspire, is supernatural and not in the plane of the natural. We have called the second cycle palingenesia, not because we have denied the possibility of a natural beatitude, but because God through the Incarnation, enables us to aspire to a supernatural destiny, in which the natural destiny is absorbed in some sense, as the personality of the human nature assumed by our Lord was absorbed by the Divine personality. In the human nature assumed, the human personality remains virtual in the Divine which takes its place; so the natural beatitude is virtual in the supernatural which is provided in its stead. In this sense palingenesia may be termed the second cycle of the cosmos, not as something having its type and beginning in cosmogony, but as superadded, in which the cosmic may not only be completed in regard to its end, but more than completed, elevated to a higher plane, above the cosmic line. In this sense, in which we supposed Gioberti himself was to be understood till reading the volume before us, we spoke. But Gioberti does not mean that man, in fact, has his natural only in his supernatural destiny, thus simply denying the *status naturæ puræ*, which he pronounces an untenable fiction; but he means that cosmogony can be completed, fulfilled, actualized only in palingenesia, and that the palingenesia is natural or supernatural according as it is or is not explicable by our cognition. In this sense we have never used the expression, and as it may be taken in this sense, the expression is not exact and ought not to be used.

Nothing here said, it will be perceived, militates in the least against the validity or comprehensiveness of the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, as we have heretofore understood and defended it; for, as we have shown, all reality is reducible to one or another of the terms of the judgment, and is either subject, or predicate, or copula. But we deny that it follows from this that the union of God with created existence in the Incarnation is that expressed by the copula, for that is immediate union with human nature already existing; otherwise our Lord could not have been called the Son of Mary, nor Mary Deipara, or mother of

God. The existence assumed, in relation to the assumption, was already created, for human nature was created and existed before its assumption, and therefore was not created by the assumption. All existences are united to God by the creative act. All union between God and man presupposes that act; but it does not, therefore, follow that all union between God and man is expressed by that act. The formula may be true, and yet God may sustain another than a creative union with creature, and we know from revelation that he does, namely, the hypostatic union. The error of the author is not in the assertion of the formula as the *primum philosophicum*, but in assuming that all truth is philosophical, or that every one of the mysteries is reducible to a philosophical theorem; or in denying the real distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The cosmos proceeds from God as first cause, and has a motion of return to him as final cause. God *mediante* the creative act is the principle and end of the cosmos. So also is God *mediante* his creative act the principle and end of the palingenesia; but in the palingenesia it is the God-Man, God Incarnate, that is Creator, Author, and Finisher. As the Incarnation or hypostatic Union is not by virtue of the creative act, it is not natural but supernatural. The supernaturality is not in the fact that this union is a mystery inexplicable to our cognition, for that may be said of creation; nor in the fact that it is immediately revealed by God himself, but in the fact that it is a supercosmic union—a supercreative union of two forever distinct natures in one Divine Person, as all Catholic theology teaches. The palingenesia having its first and last cause, as palingenesia, in the Incarnation is strictly supercosmic, supernatural, though it presupposes the natural, and like the cosmos has God for its first and last cause.

The point we insist on is that cosmogony is not potential, or initial palingenesia, or that palingenesia is the completion, fulfilment, or actualization of cosmogony, for palingenesia and cosmogony are not of the same genus. The type palingenesia actualizes is a new type, a new generic principle not found initially or finally in the cosmos. This new principle—new as a generic principle—is the theandric principle originating in the Incarnation, and becoming the generic principle, so to speak, of a new mankind, the elect mankind, of a new life, into which individuals enter by the rebirth, or birth of grace, as they enter into the cosmic life

by genesis or natural generation, as the author himself seems to us to teach in Chapter III. of his *Introduzione*. We admit, if you will, that cosmogony, as a fact, is completed in palingenesis, but there is more in palingenesis than the fulfilment or completion of the cosmic type. There is superadded the fulfilment, actualization, or completion of the theandric type, which has its archetype only in the Incarnation. Gioberti makes man a God that begins, *che incomincia*, an inchoate God, because capable of infinite growth—*perehè è metessico e crescente all' infinito*. Finished, fulfilled, or completed, then, man is God. This completion may be successive or simultaneous, mediate or immediate, the completion is as to itself the same; so that it is man that becomes God by the complete fulfilment of his generic principle. Therefore says the author, *l'apice dell'atto creativo è la teandria*. But this implies that in the Incarnation it is the human that assumes the Divine, man that becomes God, not the Divine that descends to man—the precise contrary of what we have understood to be the teaching of the Church:—"The Word was made flesh." It is not man that is incarnated, but God. The Incarnation is not, strictly speaking, the deification of human nature, nor its exaltation to infinite power; but it is God who condescends to take upon himself our infirm and finite nature, —*semetipsum exinanivit*. The type, then, of the palingenesiac life—if the Incarnation means any thing, since it is conceded to be the principle and end of the palingenesiac life—is not in cosmogony, and therefore palingenesis is not the second cycle of the cosmos, completing cosmogony, but a super-cosmic order, differing generically from the natural order.

Asserting the palingenesis as the completion of cosmogony, or the fulfilment of the first cycle of the cosmos, or the actualization of the potentiality of the cosmos, the realization of what is generic in the natural order, the author is unable to retain the dogma of original sin, and seems to us to favor the error on this point of Luther, Calvin, Baius, and Jansenius, by resolving it into the simple degeneracy of the human race, or positive corruption of human nature, as we think will be evident from what he says on the subject. We translate entire his section on *Original Sin*, in which we remark, however, the reader will find much worthy of his serious consideration, and not to be hastily rejected:

"Adam innocent is the primitive type of man, as Eden is the primitive type of pure earth. Eden is the methexic earth according to the grade of inchoate perfection. Christianity, that is, redemption, is the restoration of the primitive type in the case of man, and its fulfilment in the final type. The difference between the primitive and final types is the difference between the ovary and the fruit in plants. The union of the two types in the immanence with the whole successive series of their progress, is the non-temporal type, that is, the methexis fulfilled. Botany and all natural history prove original sin. Isolation in the order of reality as in that of the cognoscible disfigures, impairs, disfigures, slays, and annuls things, for truth and life consist in relation. Physical, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual evil, nullity is the defect of relation. Would you destroy a thing, annihilate it? Take from it all relation with other things, completely isolate it. Existence in universal is relation (absolute isolation is a nullity); it combines with the identity of being and creation, since creation is relation. The isolation of the living from nature is death; communion with nature (of the individual with the species, the mimesis with the methexis) is life. This denies not that life is internal, for the internal also is in the relation which constitutes the essence and marrow of things. It reconciles the conflicting theories of the Hippocratists and the Brunonians. Isolation is sophistical, for the sophistical is the tendency of opposites to destroy each other, and to impede the union, the concord, the relation of dialecticism. Dialectics is relation. In the ideal orders isolation is the false. Hence the great guilt of heresy and schism in religion, and the high significance of unity in the dogma and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Would you render false the truest opinion? Separate it from others. It will at first become exaggerated, for exaggeration is precisely isolation; it will then become exclusive, and lose its essence which consists in relation. For this reason analysis alone is a falsifying chemistry, a false method; because it disjoins objects without reuniting them, and does not consider their relations. Sophistry, negative criticism, all systems of misbelief consist in taking truths out of their natural relations, by isolating them from one another. And what wonder that truth consists in relation, since it is solely in virtue of this that partial truths are united together, and make one only truth, responding to the objective unity of the Logos?

"The theory of relations explains original sin; for the great difficulty which militates against original sin is, (setting aside the pre-existence of souls, which, understood as it necessarily would be as a perfect and personal existence, is too foreign from the analogy of nature to be maintained,) how can each one of us participate in a fall which occurred before we existed? But assumed that relation is not something abstract and mental, but a concrete thing, real and substantial, the difficulty vanishes, and it is impossible to

deny an intimate relation between the trunk of the human race and all its branches, whatever the interval of time and space that divides them.

"Original sin is simply the degeneracy of the human stock, originating in a dialectic defect. Man may degenerate as plants, as animals, as every thing finite. Degeneracy usually originates in the refusal of matter to respond to the intention of the artist. In man, therefore, it is the effect of the finite will. The formation of degenerate stocks (*stirpi*), as the Yellow, the Ethiopian (native Indian), the Malayan, the Finnic, and the Ethiopian, gives us five examples of a degeneracy gradually descending till reaching its lowest point in the Negro. Now original sin is for the soul what physical degeneracy is for bodies. Nay, the physiological degeneration of the body, implying corresponding defects in the spiritual faculties (wherefore the more degenerate stocks are the more ferocious, voluptuous, and less apt to civilization), is only an effect of original sin. Whence in this respect original sin, essentially one in all men, varies in its accidents according to zones and countries. In this accidental respect the least infected race is the White, the most is the Negro. Now what is this degeneracy but a defect of logic? Therefore even geographically, the further a stock is removed from the telluric medium, and extends toward the extremes, the more it departs from the temperate zones and approaches the excessive, the further does it deviate from the original type. Thus Europe and that part of Asia corresponding to it are peopled by Whites; the Negroes have Africa, the least metehxic region of the globe; the Finns and Negroes, the two most degenerate lineages, divide between them the two extremes, the Arctic and the Equator. America and Oceania, inferior to Europe and Asia, are inhabited by reddish and bronzed families, inferior to the White and the Yellow. The geography of human degeneracy, that is, of original sin, would be very curious.

"It is necessary to distinguish in the original corruption of our nature, the fault from its development. The fault (*colpa*) is a certain morbid force which is the same in all men, and in all times; the development depends on external and physical conditions, and must vary from man to man, and from age to age. There is, therefore, in the process of corruption, as in every dynamic principle, an exterior progress or regress which should engage the attention of the philosopher of history. That process regards not alone the morality of man, although it resides essentially in that, but all the parts of human nature, as those in which it is more or less reflected or reproduced. Indeed, error in science, bad taste in art and literature, diseases of the body, barbarism in society, &c., are only branches of original sin in its development. A *history, therefore, of original sin* is a most essential part of the history of human nature.

"Original sin and redemption respond to the two dialectic moments of the battle of opposites, and of their harmony. They are, therefore, supremely rational, and express a cosmic law. Their mysterious element is founded in reason. It is born from the methexis. The transmission of sin in all men is by virtue of the methexis unity of the species. The redemption of all by way of Christ is an effect of a like unity. In both intervenes a supernatural element; in original sin satanophany, and in redemption theandria. But even here there is analogy with reason, for satanophany and theandria represent the two extreme links of creation. In satanophany the human race touches the lowest grade, moral nullity, fallen beings, degraded (Satan) from an anterior cosmos (the angelic). In theandria the human race communicates with beings of the highest grade, with God, with Being itself, with the future cosmogony, with the palingenesia, with the methexis completed, with the Idea.

"The individual participates of nature, that is, the species, but does not contain it, for it is contained in it. In the human species only two individuals have contained the species, Adam and Christ; the one as the beginning, the other as the summit; the one as protological and cosmogonic, the other as teleologic and palingenesiac. This explains original sin and redemption.

"Original sin and the Incarnation are the two extremes; the one is the greatest discord of opposites, the other their greatest concord. By the former man is sequestered from God (in which consists moral evil) and the infinite, in the latter he is personified in God and joined in the greatest possible intimacy to the infinite. Original sin is the initial disorder of the species, of the potential which is badly actualized; the Incarnation is its most perfect and most excellent actualization. The former pertains to the mimesis, the latter to the methexis.

"The sin of the first man, as that of the angels, was pride. Pride is the effort of a finite being to become infinite. All sin is such, having its root in pride. All sin is the attempt of the finite to usurp the throne of the Infinite; *eritis sicut dii*. All sin is, therefore, pantheistic in its essence, as is all error. The effort of the finite to become the infinite is not in itself culpable, for it originates in the instinct of the creature panting to join itself with the Creator as its last end, and to fulfil the second creative cycle. Mimesis tends naturally to become methexis. The methexis is the finite reduced to pure mentality and thence conjoined to the infinite. Hence we gather that the essence of sin consists alone in the base application of a natural principle. The union of the finite with the infinite, the transformation of mimesis into methexis is in itself naturally good. It is not by itself sinful, but is even the essence of virtue, and its fulfilment *mediante* beatitude. In what then consists the evil? Precisely in willing to obtain the end in

an undue mode; in willing to attain to it before the time, without merits, and by one's own strength; in confounding the reasons of time with those of eternity, the mundane state of probation with the ultramundane state of reward. Moral evil is always the good misplaced, thrown out of order, out of place. All action is good if apropos. The desire of Lucifer and Adam to be like God, and to know good and evil, was excellent; the evil was in willing to satisfy it unseasonably and by inopportune means. Errors, as moral evils, are pantheistic, and pantheism is the principle of creation abused and misapplied.

"The original fall, the formation of races, the division of languages, and the dispersion of the human family, are the first four sophistical and logical facts of human history. They are sophistical in themselves and as a transient mode; logical as they open the way to ulterior harmony. In each of these facts the potential unity branches out into a multiplicity, more or less actual, of opposites, disputing among themselves.

"Such branching out is both sophistical and logical. The original fall has for its logical elements: 1, the use of reason (knowledge of good and evil), the opposites are good and evil, the true and the false, &c., which man knows only on arriving at the use of reason; 2, sexual love, generation, &c. . . . the opposites are the two sexes and their offspring, Cain and Abel, families, tribes, nations, &c.; 3, the introduction of civilization, that is, the first actualization of human power, the invention of sciences, foundation of the primitive arts, and the building of cities—Enochia, Jubal, Tubal Cain; the agriculture of Cain, the pasturage of Abel. The ancients with the fable of Prometheus, and among the moderns Rousseau and Leopardi, are therefore right in attributing the origin of culture to a primitive fault; but this fault was also a virtue (*felix culpa*); and it is as a virtue, not as a fault, that it produces civilization.

"The sophistical elements of the original fall are the excesses which occasionally perfect and accompany the logical elements. The knowledge of good and evil produces sin, of truth and falsehood sophistry and error. Civilization gives place to a thousand disorders, &c. Original actualization or puberty was therefore, in some respects a virtue, in others a fault; under one aspect a rise, under another a fall. The three divisive facts, that is, the division of races, languages, nations (all related in Genesis), were virtues or faults; a rise or a fall, amelioration or the reverse, sophistry or logic, according to the respect in which they are taken. Thus considered original sin is a profoundly philosophical truth, evident, and connected with the universal order."—pp. 278-285.

To be consistent with himself the author should not say the knowledge of good and evil produces sin, but that sin gives the knowledge of good and evil; not that the knowl-

edge of truth and error leads to error, but that error leads to the knowledge of truth and error. That is, sin is the road to good and error to truth; or, as we used to express it in our rough way when before our conversion we held the author's doctrine, the road to heaven runs through the devil's territory, and to serve God we must begin by serving Satan. In this case sin is a necessity in God's universe, and Satan a loyal servant of God, and the true friend of man, as sings in more than tolerable verse the author of *Festus*. It is so the author understands the *O Felix Culpa* which the Church sings in her exultation on Holy Saturday. We in our stupidity had not so understood the words in which she breaks forth with almost wild joy in view of the approaching dawn when her Lord shall rise again, triumphant over sin, death, and hell. We had not understood her to exclaim, O happy fault! to call the sin of Adam a *felix culpa* because it brings man to the use of reason, by its own virtue introduces art and science, builds cities, and founds civilization, and prepares the human race to rise to the completion of its creation; but because exulting in the wondrous wisdom and mercy of God, which by providing such and so great a Redeemer, has made it the occasion of a greater and more glorious destiny. *O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!* It was not a happy fault in itself, it was not a happy fault in its natural consequences, but was made so by the love and mercy of God that in so great and so glorious a manner redeemed it and overcame it with good. It is not the sin, but the grace and bounty of God, so great that it covers over the sinfulness of sin, or wrests from sin its victory, in which she exulta, and goes almost wild with her gratitude and joy.

The author rightly places the root of all sin in pride, and rightly defines pride to be the effort of the finite to usurp the throne of the infinite. "Ye shall be as gods," was the temptation. But when, in order to bring out the logical side of pride and to defend it, he makes pride essentially the instinctive desire of the finite to unite itself with the infinite, or to attain to God as its complement and final cause, he is in another order of ideas, and is speaking not of pride, but of love, in fact of humility, the root of all love in the creature, for all love in the creature originates in the sense of its own insufficiency and the worth of the beloved. Pride seeks to be as God, love seeks to be united

to God, and to lose itself in God. Pride would be God, love would be God's, and have God all in all. The author, when he says pride would usurp the throne of the infinite, gives its true nature; but when he says it is essentially the aspiration of the finite to the infinite as its complement, or as its final cause, he changes its nature and confounds it with love or humility, the root of all virtue. We cannot then agree that original sin originated in the desire of fulfilling our destiny, and of attaining to God as our last end, as our supreme Good, as well as the supreme Good in itself, and that its sinfulness or fault consists only in willing it unseasonably and malapropos, before its time, and out of its place. We prefer rather to say, with all our theologians, that sin is an abuse of free will, and consists in turning from God to the creature, and seeking our beatitude in the created instead of the Creator. The desire of Adam could not have been the knowledge of good and evil, for he already had that knowledge or he could not have sinned, but to know good and evil independently, or from himself as God knows them, not as taught them in the law of a superior, or as learning them from a master. It was the master that he would get rid of, and it was the law imposed by a superior from which he would emancipate himself.

The author says, "Original sin is nothing else than the degeneracy of the race." We should call the degeneracy of the race the effect and penalty of original sin, rather than original sin itself. No doubt man by the fall became deteriorated in both body and mind. The author explains very well the principle on which original sin is propagated or transmitted to all the posterity of Adam, namely, the unity of the race, the methexic or generic identity of all men, and the life of individuals by commerce with the species, a principle which is denied by the Conceptualists and Nominalists. But he does not explain to us in what original sin consisted, or what it was from which man in it fell. "Adam innocent was the type of the primitive man." This, if it means anything, means not that Adam was the primitive man, but that he was man in the primitive state of human nature. Now it is precisely that primitive state we would have defined. The Council of Trent says, man lost by original sin the justice and sanctity in which he was constituted, and became deteriorated in both mind and body. Was that original righteousness in the order of na-

ture, and was the fall, the deterioration, the corruption, or the loss of our natural spiritual faculties to attain to or to live it? So say Luther, Calvin, Baius, and the Jansenists, and so the author himself would seem to say, for though he admits the supernatural, it is only as to the means, not as to the principle or end. Satanic intervention is admitted as tempting man to sin, and the intervention of Christ is also admitted, but only to redeem from sin, and both satanophany and theandria are resolved into rational truths, the one into the culmination of discord, the other into the culmination of concord. Original sin, then, can be only a simple degeneracy or corruption of human nature, which, as we understand it, is by implication condemned in the condemnation of the 55th proposition of Baius: "God could not have created man from the first such as he is now born,"—the fundamental proposition of the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jansenists. According to the doctrine of Catholic theologians, as we had supposed of the Catholic Church herself, original sin consists essentially in the loss of original righteousness, in which man before his fall was constituted, and certain gifts or endowments which, though in the natural order, and essential to what is called integral nature, are not essential or due to pure nature, and are therefore called *indebita*. The consequences of the fall consist in being despoiled of the original righteousness, and stript of these gifts or *indebita*. The original righteousness is not in the natural but in the supernatural, and man being constituted in it was raised to the plane of a destiny that could not be attained to by the full and normal development and use of his natural faculties, and hence constituted in that state his nature is called elevated nature—*natura elevata*. Adam by his prevarication was despoiled of this original supernatural righteousness, and, as he was both the generic and federal head in the order of genesis of mankind, all men were despoiled of it in him. The deterioration of nature which followed the loss of the supernatural righteousness was the loss of integral nature, or the *indebita*; that is, of the complete subjection of the body to the mind, the inferior soul to the higher, the appetites, passions, and senses to reason, and reason to the law of God, and exemption from pain, sickness, and death of the body, whence follow all the moral and physical diseases and disorders which afflict our race, and under which the creation groaneth in pain, sighing for deliver-

ance. This is Catholic doctrine as it has been taught to us. According to this the loss by original sin was the loss of supernatural justice and holiness, together with integral nature, and only a negative deterioration of nature regarded as pure nature. But the author makes no account of this original justice, denies by implication that man either had in innocence supernatural righteousness, or by sin lost any righteousness above nature, and defines original sin to be nothing else than a degeneracy of human nature. As he makes redemption the simple restoration of man to integral nature, theandria the simple fulfilment of his nature, it is clear that he recognizes no real distinction of orders between the natural and supernatural. The supernatural is simply in our ignorance, as the superintelligible is in our impotence to know. If this is not pure naturalism and rationalism we know not what would be.

We are by no means satisfied with the author's doctrine as to the dialectic character of original sin. Dialectics or logic, according to the author, has its type and model in the ideal judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, in which the creative act is the copula or middle term uniting the two extremes, *ens* and *existentia*. The archetype or prototype is in the Holy Trinity, whence the *Verbum* or Word is the copula or middle term uniting the two extremes, Father and Holy Ghost, asserted in the *Filioque*, or the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, or as the Greeks perhaps with more philosophical precision express it, "from the Father through the Son," meaning thereby to deny what they supposed the Latins asserted, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from two principles, and to assert that he proceeds from one principle only, which is true, if we understand by principle as the Greeks do, principle in its strict sense, as primordial or first principle. But this placing the prototype of logic in the union of the three Persons of the Godhead through the medium of the Logos or second term is going beyond the sphere of our investigation, and plunging deeper into the superintelligible essence of God than we dare venture. Logic is undoubtedly derived from Logos (λόγος), and is in some way connected with the Logos or the second Person in the Trinity, we concede, for the Logos is the true light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world. That the archetype of all creation is in the Divine Being, which is essential unity in three Persons, we firmly hold, but that the Logos

is the creative act, and the middle term uniting two extremes, whence logic or dialectics, is more than we are prepared to assert, for as we have shown the distinction between the Divine Essence and the creative act is not the distinction or principle of the distinction of Persons in the Godhead. In creation, the whole Trinity acts in the unity of essence, as is asserted in the ideal formula. That God is, as St. Thomas says, *similitudo rerum omnium*, we hold, and must hold, so long as we maintain that in him is the *idea exemplaris* of every thing he creates, but at the same time we do not feel ourselves able to trace the similitude in all things.

Leaving all speculations in this superintelligible region, we are willing to take the ideal formula as the universal dialectic type. But in this formula the copula does not simply unite the two extremes, is not the middle term bringing two opposites or contraries into harmony, and it is not just to say that God and existences are two extremes, or two opposites united, conciliated, and brought into harmony by the creative act, as we told the author some years ago, during his lifetime, for the *ens* by the creative act places *existentia*, and so far from the creative act bringing existences into harmony and union with *ens*, they are themselves that act itself in its extrinsic terminus. Gioberti himself defines in a previous work existence or creation "the extrinsecation of the creative act." The creative act does not simply unite the predicate to the subject, but by it the subject produces the predicate. The author falls, we fear, in applying his formula, into the very pantheism the formula itself refutes. Indeed in this posthumous work he half frightens us. Identifying as he does the creative act with the Word or Hypostasis, thus making it immanent in the divine Essence, and asserting it as the middle term uniting being and existences as two extremes, as two opposites, or contraries, we see not how it is possible for him to escape the pantheism charged against him; for if the act is immanent in being so must be the effect, and then the procession of existences is in being, not from being, and the opposites reconciled are the contrarieties of being itself. So interpreted the Jesuit fathers at Rome have been right in rejecting his formula as pantheistic. The archetype of the creative act is immanent in God as are all archetypes, but not the act, for if it were the distinction between being and existences would be the immanent distinction or pro-

cession of persons in the Godhead. The author should have studied Schleiermacher and the Orientals less, and St. Augustine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, and the definitions of the Church more.

If we take the ideal formula as the model of the logical judgment, we must understand that the subject creates or produces the predicate either really in the order of being, or intelligibly in the order of science. We cannot say then with the author that truth and life are in relation—*la verità e la vita versano nella relazione*, that is, the reality is in the relation, not in the related,—a doctrine we thought he had forever exploded in his *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, especially in his *Degli Errori di Rosmini*. Indeed, if we are to take the volume before us as an authentic statement of his doctrine, we have been most egregiously deceived, and have given him credit for a philosophy which he has never defended, and which was ours rather than his. He speaks in this volume of concrete, real, substantial relations, and resolves the essence of being into relation. If the essence of things be relation, pray, tell us what is related? Being is not relation, for it is independent, self-existent, real, necessary, absolute, as Gioberti has maintained in his criticism on the *ens in genere* of Rosmini. There are real relations in the sense that real things are really related, but the relation considered in itself, as pre-scinded from the *related*, is a mere abstraction and therefore a nullity. Things are really related to God their Creator, and are nothing out of that relation, that is, out of or severed from the creative act that produces them, but the contrary is not true. God is not only in relation to creatures, or only in relation to his creative act. He was under no necessity, external or internal to create, and creation produces no change in him. To be is not in to do, as our old Transcendentalist friends maintained, nor is God being only in creating, nor does he actualize his possibility in creating existences. Creation is not infinite abyss or void become *pleroma* or *plenum*, God is not possible being, but actual being; *actus purissimus*, as say the schoolmen after Aristotle.

According to the author's doctrine *ens simpliciter* would be the most sophistical of all possible conceptions, and yet he had in a former work told us *l'Ente* can stand alone, and that *l'Ente è*, Being is, is a true judgment. The sophistical is taking the extremes without their middle term, out

of their relations. If all truth and life are in relation, how can being is be a true judgment, since being is, says no more nor less than *ens simpliciter*, at least expresses no relation, for *ens* and *est* are identical? Hence, God reveals his name to Moses, as I AM, SUM QUI SUM. The relation between being and existence is not reciprocal or mutual. To conceive of God as existing apart from his works, or as not creator, would be sophistical, and consequently false. Therefore we must conceive of him as necessarily creator, and therefore of creation as necessary, which conducts us to pantheism.

But in the application of dialectics, the author forgets that the type of dialectics is in the ideal formula, according to which the subject produces the predicate. The *medius terminus* unites the subject and predicate not as two extremes and two opposites, for the opposite of being is not existence, but nothing, which since it is nothing cannot be united, and the author is not to be followed when he defines existence the union of being and nothing, *mediante* the creative act, or the medium between being and nothing, for between being and nothing there is no medium, and existence in that it is something is not nothing. But in his application he conceives the subject not as creating the predicate, but the subject and predicate as the two opposites or extremes. Thus the Negroes and Finns or Lapps are sophistical because they dwell at the two extremes, one at the extreme north the other at the equator. Africa is the most sophistical quarter of the globe, because it is the most exposed to the extreme heat. The white races are the most dialectic, the most logical, because they inhabit the medium, the temperate zones. Hence we suppose is to be explained the fact that in our country the extreme abolitionists are at the extreme north, and the extreme fire-eaters are at the extreme south. As our continent is less methexic, less dialectic than Europe and Asia, though we see not why, since it lies within the same zones, the Europeans settled here will in time fall below the white races of Europe and Asia, below the yellow race, Chinese and Tartars, and become of a reddish and bronzed complexion like the aborigines.

The dialectic effects of original sin, we cannot accept. One of these the author tells us is the use of reason or knowledge of good and evil; but how can a man who has not arrived at the use of reason, and who does not in-

herit sin, commit sin? If Adam, before he sinned, had not the use of reason, knew not good and evil, how was it possible for him to sin? Moreover, to suppose it, would be to suppose he was created an infant, not an adult man, contrary to common sense, contrary to the teaching of the theologians, and contrary to what the author himself says, who makes Adam one of the two individuals in which the human species is completely actualized and individuated. What is his middle term uniting these two extremes or opposites? That sin, in the providence of God, is overruled and made the occasion of good, we do not deny; but we do deny that the good is ever the product of the sin, sin original or actual is always sophistical, always evil, and in no sense can error be dialectical and good. The good either exists in spite of it, or is due to the operation of another cause than the sin itself. We shall therefore never admit that original sin under any aspect, or in any respect, is logical, in accordance with the logic of things, or a profoundly philosophical truth, evident, connected with the universal order of things. It is a fact to which all nature and all history bear witness, we grant and deplore, but it is not a truth, but like all sin a falsehood in the intellectual and an evil in the moral order.

It is thus we understand Gioberti's doctrine as contained in the extracts we have made, and it seems to us to be their plain, natural, and obvious sense. It is possible, however, that his friends may insist that his language admits of a different interpretation, one, if not in consonance with scholastic theology, at least in consonance with Catholic faith. We by no means pretend that it is necessary to preserve in all things the form of scholastic theology, or that every departure from it is a departure from orthodoxy. We have given as far as we have gone Gioberti's doctrine as we understand it, and we have offered such criticisms on the propositions cited as have seemed to us just and called for. We however have not yet done with the author; for the present we break off, but with our exposition incomplete. We have much more to say, and something to say in his favor as well as against him. We have thus far done little more than point out what we regard as his errors; we intend in one or two future articles to indicate his truth and to develop the real contributions he has made to theological and philosophical science. But the present article, though incomplete, and doing but scant justice to the work

before us, is perhaps enough for our readers, and more than they will be willing to read and inwardly digest during these hot summer days, and in these times when their minds are engrossed with the deplorable condition of the country and the horrors of civil war.

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- ART. II.—1. *Life of ST. CATHARINE OF SIENNA*, by the BLESSED RAYMOND OF CAPUA. Translated from the French by the LADIES OF THE SACRED HEART. Philadelphia. Cunningham, 1860. 12mo. pp. 432.
2. *Historie de la Papauté pendant le XIV^e Siècle, avec des Notes et des Pièces Justificatives*. Par l'Abbé J. B. CHRISTOPHE. Paris, 1853. 3 Tomes. 8vo.
3. *Storia di Bonifazio VIII, e de' suoi Tempi, divisa in Libri sei*. Per D. LUIGI TOSTI. Monte Cassino. 1846. 2 vols., 8vo.
4. *Storia del Concilio di Costanza divisa in Libri cinque con Documenti*. Per D. LUIGI TOSTI. Napoli, 1853. 2 vols., 8vo.

THERE have been many dark days in the history of the Church. The sunless heaven that hung over the Cross of the dead Christ on Calvary was the precursor of a thousand eclipses of faith and love in the hearts of Christ's followers. The separation of his soul and body seems to have had a counterpart in the history of the Church. There have been times when she appeared to the eye of the world as a corpse. Virtue seemed to have gone out of her and forever; and not only from the hem of her garment, from the lowly and uninfluential of her children, but from her very head, the princes of her hierarchy. Then again faint pulsations of life stirred the corpse; the Bride of Christ arose and walked the earth, with the trembling gait of age or sickness, with widow weeds and hollow cheeks and drooping eyes. Her enemies predicted that her race was run, that the foot which had once trodden to the ground sceptres and diadems was lingering on the brink of the grave.

It was a dark day for the Church when she was compelled to exchange the freedom of the Catacombs for the gilded slavery of the court, the altar-tombs of her martyrs for the throne of the Cæsars. It was a dark day for

her when the high places of the empire were lavished on her children, when gold and fame and favor corrupted souls who despised the edge of the steel and the sting of disgrace. It was a dark day for her when the pitiless storm of Decian persecution came down in fury on the white-sailed barks of worldly Christianity in Northern Africa. Not more disastrous the Mediterranean hurricane than was that spiritual tempest, not more thickly strewn the Mediterranean shores with wrecks than were the dioceses of Africa with stranded broken souls. Bitter were the tears which Cyprian, the saintly Archbishop of Carthage, shed over the *lapsi*; the grief of the heart of the Church was like that of the Heart of Jesus when Judas betrayed him.

It was a dark day for the Church when the Barbarian battle-cry rang through her sanctuaries and jarred discordant with the sweet-toned voice of prayer, when the Barbarian battle-axe hewed down the throne and the altar, and the red hand of Barbarian sacrilege was on her consecrated priests and virgins. It was a dark day for her when her bishops and clergy blasphemed, in hundreds, with Arius, the Divinity of the Word, when the whole world groaned to find itself Arian. It was a dark day for her when from the patriarchal throne of Constantinople and from patriarchal lips foul dishonor was offered to God's blessed Mother. It was a dark day for her when middle-age baronial and imperial tyranny violated her liberties and exiled her pontiffs. The night of the Dark Ages thickened and deepened until the blackness became Egyptian-like. Dark, utterly, almost hopelessly dark were the days when the Counts of Tusculum dominated over the Papacy, when the Holy of Holies was entered by simony and incontinence, when the High Priest's mitre became the football of contending factions and the reward of the highest bidder. Well might the Church, in the year 1000, look out for the Son of Man coming to judge the guilty world, for the memory of his doctrine and morality had well nigh perished from among men. It is to the contemplation of one of the very darkest of all these dark epochs of the Church that we wish to direct the attention of our readers.

The Church is never more sublime, more godlike, than in the midst of wars, whether of the sword or tongue. She is never more triumphant than when defeated; never more lovely, though it be with the loveliness of divine woe, than when the hands of her children are rending the seamless.

robe of Christ from her shoulders and plunging the matricidal dagger into her heart. The chronicle of the Great Schism of the West is one of the grandest monuments that history has ever reared to the perpetuity and holiness of the Church. "Where Peter is, there is the Church," is the watchword of the Catholic in every age and country. But when councils and cardinals, universities and bishops, doctors and saints, are at a loss to determine where Peter is, the case would be up with the Church were there not a Divine Hand, more powerful than that of Peter, buoying her up amid the waves.

Never, since the days of Nimrod, the stout hunter before the Lord, the founder of the oldest empire in the world, has there been a princely line more illustrious for genius and virtue, for public ability and private worth, than the dynasty of the *Petridæ*, the Sovereign Pontiffs of Rome. Of the two hundred and fifty odd who have occupied the See, more than seventy have exchanged the mitre of the bishop and the tiara of the prince for the aureola of the canonized saint. But even in this most royal of all royal races, some tower head and shoulders above their brethren, like Saul among his people. Their Pontificates are landmarks in the domain of history. Such were St. Peter and St. Leo, St. Gregory I. and his sainted namesake, the seventh Gregory, Innocent III. and Boniface VIII. It was at the end of the thirteenth century that Cardinal Cajetan ascended the papal throne, and took the name of Boniface VIII. It would be foreign to our purpose to enter into the details of his contest with Philip IV., surnamed the Fair, of France; a contest similar to that waged by Gregory VII. against Henry IV. of Germany, and by Innocent III. against John Lackland of England; a contest which was the first chapter in the sad chronicle of the nepotism and nationality of the Avignon residence, of the scandal of the Schism, and the apostacy of the Reformation. Its immediate result was the formation of a French party in the Church, even in the College of Cardinals. Then, as ever, there were prelates for whom the court had more charms than the sanctuary—who were ready to barter the liberties of the Church for the smiles and the gold of a prince. These reverend and right reverend traitors raised a hue and cry against Pope Boniface. They denounced his apostolic firmness as obstinacy, and his bulls against Philip the Fair as the decrees of an ecclesiastical despot. They began to talk of national Churches

and Gallican liberties. They got their wish. Their national church took root and flourished, and culminated in Jansenism and the apotheosis of a nude goddess on the bloody altars of the French Revolution; and their Gallican liberties were strangled in the tight embrace of royal and imperial tyranny.

Pope Boniface died in 1303, in the undaunted discharge of his duty, with the fortitude of a martyr and the broken heart of a father. Philip the Fair survived, but God's curse was on him. The money-clipper, the oppressor of the Jews, the robber of ecclesiastical property, was compelled to preside, in full parliament, at the trial of his three daughters-in-law, charged with crimes the most disgraceful that can be brought against a woman and a mother. The veil of privacy was rudely drawn aside by the hand of public scandal and legal justice from the unholy scenes of royal licentiousness. The mark of infamy was impressed on the daughters of Philip, and, on his death, the reign of his three sons became the history of but fourteen months. They died without male offspring, and the Salic law transferred the sceptre of St. Louis to the posterity of Charles of Valois, the captain general of Boniface VIII.

Benedict XI., a saintly pontiff whom the Church now venerates on her altars, succeeded Boniface, but within nine months after his elevation, the College of Cardinals was called on to choose a new Pope. Nearly a year passed without an election. French interest was all powerful in the conclave, and French gold sought to buy the tiara of St. Peter. Philip prevailed. The choice fell upon one of his own subjects, Bertrand de Gott, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who took the name of Clement V. This was in 1305. John Villani, the Florentine chronicler, attributes the elevation of Pope Clement to a simoniacal bargain with King Philip. The Archbishop promised his sovereign to grant him the ecclesiastical tithes of France for five years, to anathematize the memory of Pope Boniface, to restore the two Colonnas to the cardinalatial dignity which they had justly forfeited by their treason in the reign of Boniface, and to invest with the Roman purple the nominees of the schismatical king. These charges are based on the sole authority of Villani, who, as an Italian, especially a Florentine Italian, was the bitter enemy and, in some cases, the unscrupulous calumniator of the Avignon Popes. There are four contemporaneous lives of Clement V., in none of

which a word is said of the infamous contract described by the chronicler of Florence. National animosity between Italy and France, and between the different sections of the ill-fated peninsula itself, was at its spring-tide during the period between the Avignon Residence and the Reformation; but amid all the charges of tyranny and corruption brought by Italian writers against the papal court during the fourteenth century, John Villani of Florence is the only one who assigns the election of Clement V. to any other cause than the free choice of the Sacred College. The accusation has been repeated down to our own day, but only by those who have trusted the *fides Græca* of the Italian chronicler.

The election took place in Perugia, in 1305, and, if the testimony of the cardinals who composed the conclave is to be regarded, the forms of the Sacred Canons were strictly observed, and, whether influenced by the agents of the French king or not, the cardinals enjoyed all the freedom necessary to the validity of an election. The official act, subscribed by seventeen cardinals, is dated the 5th of June, 1305, and was immediately sent to the Archbishop of Bordeaux. This prelate, Bertrand de Gott, was a member of the old Gascon nobility. By birth, education, and feeling, he was a Frenchman, and the very first act of his pontificate shows that he was disposed to go to the very farthest limit that conscience would allow to please his sovereign. He owed his bishopric of Cominges and afterward the archiepiscopal See of Bordeaux, to Pope Boniface VIII. His life was exemplary, in an age when the average of clerical learning and piety was beneath the standard of the early centuries, and of the period which has elapsed since the Council of Trent. The new Pope, in spite of the urgent request of the cardinals to hasten his departure for Italy, delayed from day to day, and finally commanded the Sacred College to meet him in Lyons, for his coronation. "Behold," exclaimed with bitterness the Cardinal Dean, when the order arrived—"behold what we have come to. The Papacy has crossed the mountains. We shall soon see the Rhone, but, take my word for it—I know these Gascons well—it will be long before the Tiber will again see the Popes." The old cardinal was right. With Clement V. began the seventy years' exile of the Church. By the waters of the Rhone, on the sunny plains of Languedoc and Provence, the Bride of Christ sat forlorn, and wept when she remembered Rome. "If I forget thee, city of St. Peter,"

was her lament, "may my right hand be forgotten. Let my tongue cleave to my jaws, if I do not remember thee—if I make thee not the beginning of my joy."

Soon after his coronation, Clement held a consistory at Lyons, in which he created nine cardinals, all of whom, with the exception of Thomas de Jorz, the provincial of the English Dominicans, were Frenchmen. From this time to the Schism the College of Cardinals was little more than a close French corporation. The revocation of the bull *Clericis laicos* of Boniface VIII., and the declaration that the bull *Unam Sanctam* in no way affected the rights and privileges of the French monarchs, proved that Clement, whether from fear or a sense of duty, had no wish to continue the contest bequeathed to him by his two predecessors. Philip availed himself of this favorable disposition of the Pope to urge him to condemn by solemn sentence the memory of the intrepid Boniface. But Clement had gone as far as a Christian and a Pontiff could go, and refused. The king pressed his suit, but invariably met with repulses and evasions. To rid himself of these importunities, Clement proposed that the political life of Boniface should be referred to the judgment of a general council. Philip was fain to acquiesce. The council assembled at Vienne in 1309, and triumphantly vindicated the memory of one of the most illustrious of the successors of St. Peter.

On the Rhone, sixty miles from its mouth, in a district rich in Greek and Roman antiquities, where nature scatters her blessings with open hand, there is a quaint city of the middle ages, with narrow streets and high palaces, a city immortalized by the sonnets of Petrarca, and the captivity of Colo di Rienzi. The neighboring county of Venaissin had been given to the Holy See by Philip III. in 1273, and Avignon was, in 1308, when Clement V. there closed his three years' pilgrimages through the south of France, the property of the Counts of Provence. In 1348, Joanna, a princess of the Provençal family and queen of Naples, sold the city and seigniorship of the county to Clement VI. The murder of her husband, King Andrew, had drawn down upon her the indignation of her brother-in-law, Louis of Hungary. He charged her with being accessory to the crime, and backed his accusation by the invasion of Naples. Distrustful of the fidelity of her subjects, or urged by the fears of a guilty conscience, Joanna fled to Provence. The tide of fortune turned. The plague decimated the Hun-

garian army, and the queen resolved by one bold stroke to recover for her second husband, Louis of Tarentum, the dominions of the murdered Andrew. But her coffers were empty, and to raise the necessary funds she parted with Avignon for the sum of seventy-two thousand livres. The emperor, Charles IV., confirmed the sale, for Avignon was an imperial fief, and relinquished his feudal rights. From that time Avignon continued, with but few interruptions, in possession of the Holy See until the French Revolution, when it shared the fate of the ecclesiastical property of France. Cardinal Consalvi, the minister of Pius VII., at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, urged its restitution to the Church, but Metternich, Castlereagh, and their compeers thought proper that justice should yield to expediency, and politely requested the Pope not to allow the loss of a distant province to interrupt the *Te Deums* he was singing for the recovery of his Italian possessions.

Seven popes reigned at Avignon, from Clement V. in 1308, to Gregory XI., in 1378. They were all natives of France, and, with the exception of charges of nepotism brought against some of them, men of spotless lives. The Italian writers, particularly the Brothers Villani, do not spare the persons of the Popes in their sweeping denunciations of the Court of Avignon; but while history bears witness to the avarice and immorality of too many of the prelates of that court, she presents us with no evidence but the bare assertion of the Florentine chroniclers, of the unworthiness of the Sovereign Pontiffs. These Avignon Popes were all men of more than ordinary ability. John XXII., second on the list, justly deserves to be ranked with the most illustrious of the successors of St. Peter. The aggressions of Louis of Bavaria, the rise of Rienzi the last of the Tribunes, the disputes among the Franciscans on the nature of the vow of poverty, and on the Beatific Vision; the firmness and prudence that marked the Pope's conduct in these delicate conjunctures, make his reign one of the most remarkable in church history.

That the Court of Avignon was thoroughly corrupt it would be difficult to prove. Yet the almost unanimous testimony of the writers of that day, the memorials presented by some of the bishops of France at the Council of Vienne, calling for reform, and the bulls of the Popes themselves, disclose a state of things that might well draw tears from the saints of the time, Catharine of Sienna,

Bridget of Sweden, Vincent Ferrer, and Peter of Aragon. The lust of money and of pleasure had invaded the sanctuary and the cloister, the law of residence was neglected by beneficiaries, the inferior clergy complained of the exactions of their prelates, and these in turn murmured at the taxes imposed on their dioceses for the support of the Papal Court. The Popes were compelled to resort to extraordinary measures to supply the deficiencies in their revenue occasioned by the irregularity of their Italian income. Italy was cursed of God. Every man's hand was against his neighbor, and the olive-yards and vine-yards of the hapless land were drenched with blood. The Guelphs and Ghibellines raged with the fury of wild beasts. Thus torn with civil war and deprived of its Chief Pastor, with not a few of its dioceses under interdict, baronial Italy laid the iron hand of rapine and war on the property of the Church. No alternative was left to the Papal Court but to starve or draw from France what Italy could no longer give. The satiric muse of Petrarca has shed a midnight blackness over a scene already far too dark. Petrarca was a poet, and used to the full the poet's license of drawing largely on his imagination. He was as careless of truth as he was of morality, and though an ecclesiastic himself, satirized in his brethren the sins which stained his own soul. An Italian by birth, he was intensely Italian in feeling. The Alps were to him the boundary of the civilized world, and the French and Germans were foreign barbarians. He spent much of his life in Avignon, and left it with one half of his heart full of hatred of every thing French, and the other half full of unholy love for Laura. Yet Petrarca was a genuine papist, and while shooting his poetic shafts well dipped in gall among the courtly train that surrounded the Papal throne, that throne and its occupant he held inviolably sacred. The letters that he wrote to John XXII., and Urban V., urging their return to Rome, disclose through the veil of graceful allegory a soul that loved the seven-hilled city more ardently for being the See of Peter, than because it was the theatre of his friend Rienzi's brief career, and of his own triumph when in its Capitol, with the royal robe of Robert of Naples on his shoulder, he was crowned, by the Senator, king of Italian song.

Making due allowance for the poetic liberties and national prejudices of Petrarca, the sad truth still stares us in the face that Avignon, instead of being redolent with the

perfume of paradise, was loathsome with the stench of hell. This is the startling expression of St. Catharine of Sienna. This holy Italian virgin did for the Church, in the fourteenth century, what Joan D'Arc accomplished for France in the succeeding age. The Maid of Orleans restored the crownless Charles VII. to the throne of St. Louis; the Maid of Sienna brought back the exiled Church to the tomb of her first Apostle and Pontiff. The Florentines had rebelled against Gregory XI., the last of the Avignon line. As temporal prince he revenged the insult by the swords of his troops, under Robert of Geneva; as sovereign Pontiff he punished the spiritual rebellion of the Florentines by an ecclesiastical interdict. Threatened by the victorious Papal army without, and torn by factions within, the city sought to appease the justly irritated Gregory. She turned to the Saint of Sienna, the fame of whose holiness and success in diplomacy was spread from one end of the Peninsula to the other. Catharine had chosen the better part, with Mary, but the voice of God called her to do the work of Martha. She was busy during the latter years of her life with much serving, yet she was ever sitting, with Mary, at the feet of him who had espoused her in mystic nuptials. She left God for God; she left him in the cloister to find him in the world; she left him in the court of the Sanctuary to find him in the courts of Popes and princes. A woman and a saint went to Avignon as the ambassadress of the iron-clad, fox-hearted barons and burghers of Florence. She stood before Pope Gregory XI. as Moses before the Lord, the saint pleading for a sinful city, the spouse of Christ interceding with the Vicar of Christ. But if she bowed before the infallibility of the Pontiff, she recoiled from the immorality of his court. She complained to Gregory of the noisome stench that steamed up from Avignon. "For the honor of the All-powerful God, I dare say it, Holy Father," exclaimed the intrepid Saint, "that while yet in my native city the infection of the Avignon court was wafted to my nostrils." The Pope bowed in silence before the oracle of heaven, and Catharine withdrew to weep and pray. The Florentines were forgiven, but the bow of God's anger still remained bent against the degenerate cardinals. The arrow soon sped on its mission of vengeance, and the schism of the West visited the sins of the pastors on the flock.

The evils of the Avignon residence were manifold. The

See of Peter is the world, but Rome is the spiritual centre of the world. To Rome were the promises left on the death of Peter, and under the Vatican Hill lies Peter the Rock on which the Church is built. To Rome turn the hearts of Catholics as naturally as the magnet to the pole, and when the Popes left it for seventy years, they left, it is true, the theatre of a daily wearisome struggle, but the theatre also of their most splendid victories. Yet, the Roman people deserved the punishment. From the days of Constantine they had been noted for their capricious turbulence. For them and their Italian countrymen, loyalty was an unmeaning word. The Pope who was hailed with shouts of joy to-day, might be pelted with stones to-morrow. The lives of many of the Pontiffs of the middle ages were a series of processions from the pageantry of the Lateran and Vatican Basilicas to the grim fastness of the Castle of St. Angelo, from security and power in Rome, to danger and exile in Naples or the Marches. St. Bernard, writing to his former disciple Pope Eugenius III., draws to the life Roman character in the twelfth century. It was then what it is now, and the words that express it are, fickleness and perfidy. The yoke of the Goth and the Vandal, the Hun and the Lombard, of the Hohenstaufen emperors of Germany, and the Norman kings of Naples, galled by turns the neck of Rome, until the loyalty of freemen died in the hearts of her people, and the frank, true speech of freemen was never heard from their lips. They were equally ready to shout for Guelph or Ghibelline, and like their ancestors of imperial times, their cry was *panem et circenses*. Fun and food were their *ne plus ultra* of happiness. The absence of the Popes taught the fickle and haughty populace the lesson, that the Papacy made Rome a city; deprived of it she was gradually dwindling down to a second rate Italian town. But the lesson was soon forgotten. Gregory XI. had scarcely set foot within the walls when the Romans sent word to the Florentines, that they were ready to join in a league against a Pope whose return they had besought with tears, and whose arrival they had hailed with frantic joy.

Italy was cursed with a medley of heterogeneous elements. Its history in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was a repetition of the history of the early Republican days of Rome. Samonites and Sabines, Latins and Etruscans warred with one another, but with the instinct of self-preservation

combined against the growing power of Rome. Interest preserved a league which sectional prejudices would never have sanctioned. There never was an Italian nation. As long as republican and imperial Rome attracted to itself, like a vast central sun, the many independent municipalities of Italy, the Peninsula might be called an historical as it was a geographical unity. Rome and its attendant Italian satellites made one political system. But when the war-clouds of Barbarian invasion swept over and forever eclipsed that Roman sun which had by turns scorched and fertilized the planets of its system, the centrifugal force was nowhere more apparent than in Italy. Old antipathies revived, and from the days of Romulus Augustulus, the last of the Cæsars, to the time of which we write, Naples and Lombardy, Rome and Florence fought and made peace, fought and made peace again, keeping all Italy one huge battle-field. When Clement V. was elected Pope, the Orsini and Colonnas were cutting each other's throats in the streets of Rome; the Bear was laboring to undermine the Column, and the Column threatened to crush the Bear in its fall. When the Cardinals invited the Pontiff elect to Italy he hesitated to entrust his life and the honor of the Holy See to the keeping of the robber barons of the Roman States.

The condition of Italy extenuates the blame of the Avignon residence, but the nationalizing of the Sacred College by the incorporation of almost exclusively French subjects was a measure which we cannot but regret as the proximate cause of the Great Schism. We have seen that, in the first promotion made by Clement V., of ten new cardinals nine were natives of France, and the tenth an Englishman. Gregory XI., the last of the Avignon line, made, in a consistory in 1371, twelve, of whom ten were French, one an Italian, and the other a Spaniard; in another consistory, held in 1375, of nine creations, one was an Italian, the other a Spaniard, the remaining seven French. The vast preponderance of French interests in the Sacred College led to the most serious results. The cardinals, as a body, preferred the majestic Rhone to the sluggish Tiber, the security of Avignon to the turbulence of Rome. France was their first love, the Church their second. Each successive pontiff of the Avignon line seems, judging from the frequent wishes they expressed of returning to Italy, to have beheld the vision and heard the voice that rebuked St.

Peter when he was fleeing from Rome and martyrdom. Christ appeared to him carrying the cross and journeying to the gate through which Peter had just passed. "*Domine, quo vadis?*" Lord, whither goest Thou?" exclaimed the astonished Apostle. "To Rome," replied his Master, "to suffer in thy stead." The Avignon Popes felt that they were imitating the cowardice of Peter; that while Jesus was being crucified on the Vatican, they had fled with the Prince of the Apostles instead of standing beneath his cross with the beloved John. The French cardinals made it their business to cross the wishes of the Popes and to thwart all attempts at return. Urban V., the predecessor of Gregory XI., carried out in 1367 his long cherished project of restoring the exiled See to its old home; but scarcely had a few months passed when, contrary to the advice of his best friends and the warnings of St. Bridget of Sweden, he again turned his back on the Eternal City. He reached Avignon only to fulfil the prophecy of the holy widow of Sweden. He died as he had lived, a saint, regretting to his last breath his abandonment of Rome, and though a Frenchman and dying in France, he still died a foreigner and an exile, for his home and his heart were at the tomb of St. Peter.

A crisis arrived in 1376. In the August of that year the Romans sent an embassy to Avignon, threatening to set up an Antipope, in the person of the Abbot of Monte Cassino, if Gregory XI. any longer delayed to fulfil the promises of a return so often held out by himself and his predecessors. The Pope no longer hesitated. The danger of a schism and the advice of the holiest and most learned in the Church, especially St. Catharine of Sienna, determined him to assent to the wishes of the people of Rome. Charles V. of France, the cardinals, the father, brother, and nephews of the Pope tried in vain to shake his resolution. The 18th of September, 1376, was a day forever memorable in the history of the Church. It closed the seventy years' exile of the Popes, and never again were the banks of the Rhone trodden by the feet of St. Peter's successors until the days of Pius VI., an exile, a prisoner, and a martyr for the liberties of the Holy See. The Avignon residence entailed a curse upon the world. It inaugurated a schism which destroyed naught of the power but much of the prestige of the Papacy. It was one of the many causes of the Reformation; and Gallican liberties, Jansenism and the Revolution

of 1789 were the legitimate offspring of the tyranny of Philip the Fair, and the immorality and nationalism of the Avignon cardinals. Gregory XI. entered Rome on the 17th of January, 1377. He too, like Urban V., resolved to return to Avignon, but death freed him, on the 27th of March, 1378, from his present perplexities, his hopes and fears for the future. Gregory was a good man, but he would have been a better Pope had he been less of a Frenchman.

The College of Cardinals consisted, at the time of Gregory's death, of twenty-three members. Six were at Avignon, one at Florence, negotiating a peace between that city and the Holy See; the remaining sixteen were in Rome. They were divided into three factions, the French cardinals proper, the Limousins, and the Italians. Party spirit ran high, and there was but little hope of a speedy election. Each of the three factions wished to elect a Pope of its own nation. The Limousins and the French were unanimous in their determination of removing the Papal residence beyond the Alps, while the Italians were as firmly resolved that the new Pontiff should live and reign where his predecessors had lived and reigned for thirteen hundred years. While the cardinals were still at St. Mary Major's, celebrating the funeral obsequies of the dead Gregory, a deputation arrived from the city demanding the election of an Italian. They replied that the election, to be valid, must be left entirely free. Rome was in a ferment when the Sacred College assembled in the Vatican. Cries and threats resounded in the streets and squares, and the guards informed the conclave that they would be unable to defend the palace in case of an attack from the mob. The night wore away in fear and suspense. When day dawned the more timorous proposed to make a mock election, and then, escaping from the city, to hold another conclave. The proposal was rejected, and a majority of votes was finally concentrated on Bartholomew de Prignano, a Neapolitan, Archbishop of Bari, who took the title of Urban VI. He was about sixty years of age, tall, stately, and of a robust constitution. In an age when the abomination of desolation polluted the Sanctuary and the Altar, he was pure in heart and hand. He trampled underfoot, with all the disdain of an honest man and a Christian bishop, the gold of simony; and by prayer and fasting steeled his soul against the blandishments of pleasure. Prignano was not a mere contemplative. His familiarity with canon law was not

confined to a knowledge of books; he had ably and successfully applied its principles in the many important trusts with which he had been honored by the Avignon Popes. As Archbishop of Cirenza, afterward of Bari, and Chancellor of the Holy See, he had recommended himself to the gratitude of the Pontiff and the admiration of Italy. His virtues and talents pointed him out as eminently fitted for the highest ecclesiastical preferment. There was no man, it has been said, more worthy of being Pope had he never been elected; while after election few have proved more unfortunate in their administration than he. The great flaw in Urban's character was his injudicious severity. Never sparing himself he never spared others; to the high standard of disinterestedness and purity which he had set up for his own life, he rigorously insisted on others conforming. His character, while it had some of the wisdom of the serpent, lacked entirely the simplicity of the dove; and into the bleeding wounds of the Church he poured more wine than oil. To the boldness of the reformer he added the intemperate zeal which frequently marks the reformer's measures. He had the high sense of duty and uncompromising firmness of a conscientious ruler, but sadly needed the gentleness and love of a father. He was ready to draw the sword with Peter against evil doers, but not to offer to erring cardinals and prelates the kiss of peace and words of friendship which Christ bestowed upon his traitor Apostle. He knew not how to temporize.

St. Catharine of Sienna understood the character of the new Pope and warned him, by letter, against the dangers of a hasty and overzealous policy. "The Church," she says, "must be reformed, the Bride of Christ must remain a leper no longer. To the work then, Holy Father, to the work, with courage, but also with humility, secrecy, and moderation. Keep your heart in peace and let it overflow with good will towards all men. Turn not a deaf ear to faithful counsellors, and rebuke not the tongue that tells you of the faults of those who surround your person. Repress, I beg of you, for the love of Christ crucified, the impetuous sallies of an ardent temperament; let grace correct the defects of nature." Thus spoke the Spirit of God by the pen of St. Catharine, and well would it have been for Pope Urban had he followed her advice. We can not take leave of the Holy Virgin of Sienna without adoring the mysterious Providence which, when the columns

of the Church were crumbling into ruin, called a tender maiden to bear the burden whose weight had crushed the princes of the sanctuary in the dust. She was a Sampson in spiritual strength, another Debora, in whose regard the Sovereign Pontiff himself seemed to act the part of Barac. She had the fortitude of a martyr, the patience of a confessor, the wisdom of a doctor. Permeating and humanizing, as it were, these sublime prerogatives of grace, all the gentleness and purity, all the tenderness and love of a true woman dwelt in her heart.

The irritability of the Pope soon showed itself. The life of the Roman court was a copy of that of Avignon. Evils existed that imperiously demanded reform, but, against reform, many of the cardinals had resolutely set their faces. The impetuosity of Urban at once boiled over. The French cardinals requested him immediately after his election to return to Avignon. He replied with a decided negative. A day or two after his coronation he held a Papal chapel in which, at the close of vespers, he astonished the bishops assisting at the throne by calling them perjurers who had foresworn themselves by abandoning their dioceses to live at court. Martin di Silva, bishop of Pampeluna, repelled the charge with warmth. He was in Rome, he said, on the business of the Church, and his Holiness had but to free him from that business to see him return with a light step and a lighter heart to his own diocese.

He inveighed, in consistory, against the cardinals in language which embittered their feelings without reforming their lives. John de la Grange, Cardinal of Amiens, he charged with avarice and perfidy, and fomenting the war which had, with slight interruptions, been raging for a quarter of a century between France and England. The disturbances of Castile, Aragon and Navarre were all laid at the door of the luckless cardinal, and Urban wound up his harangue by saying that there was no evil in the world which his Eminence of Amiens had not caused. Stung to the quick, De la Grange arose and, with the bold words, "As Archbishop of Bari, thou liest," rushed from the Pontifical presence. The insult was ominous of the gathering storm. It betrayed the intrigue that was on foot to deny to Bartholemew de Prignano the title of Urban VI., to acknowledge him only as Archbishop of Bari.

The French cardinals and the Aragonese Peter de Luna retired to Anagni. It was a fit place for a new act of per-

fidy, for there, nearly a century before, Boniface VIII. had been insulted and imprisoned by the emissaries of Philip the Fair of France. The mask was not cast off at once. Urban was still acknowledged as lawful Pope; petitions for favors were addressed to him by the cardinals, and his name was daily inserted in the Canon of the Mass. In July, 1378, Urban himself set out for Anagni, accompanied by the four Italian cardinals who had remained with him in Rome. He went no farther than Tivoli, for there the rumor reached him of the plot that was hatching. The cardinals of France wrote to their Italian brethren, protesting against the validity of Urban's election and inviting them to a conference to deliberate on the remedies to be applied to the evils of the Church. It would have been well for them and the poor Church, toward which they were so profuse in their professions of love, if they had followed the advice of St. Catharine of Sienna. "The columns of the Church," wrote the saint to some of their number, "ought to be based on humility and the love of God." But these were scarce commodities in the cabal at Anagni. The Italian cardinals remained faithful to the Pope. The seceders complained to Charles V. of France of the intimidation under which they had elected the Archbishop of Bari, and to win the king they held out the contested Papacy as a bribe, for Charles was a widower. The monarch suggested a General Council as the only arbiter of the dispute. Urban declared his willingness to abide by its decision, but the cardinals rejected the proposal. St. Catharine stood in the breach that was daily widening between the Pope and the Sacred College, but her prayers and warnings were uttered to the winds. The ambitious intriguers despised the words of a woman, particularly as she was the avowed adherent of Urban. She had not spared, as we have seen, the faults of the Pope, but she was too good a theologian not to be able to distinguish between the man and the pontiff, between the harshness and ill humor of Bartholomew Prignano and the sovereign jurisdiction of Pope Urban VI.

The die was cast; the cardinals at Anagni inaugurated the schism. They issued a proclamation in which they declared Urban VI. an intruder, and cited him and the Italian cardinals to appear before them. They backed their appeal to the judgment of the Christian world by calling to their aid a troop of Gascons and Bretons, whom Cardinal Robert

of Geneva had led into Italy. The sword is the first and last resort of a bad cause. Urban was now abandoned by his handful of Italian cardinals. Each had been confidentially promised the tiara by the French plotters. Fidelity and conscience kicked the beam when the glittering prize was thrown into the opposite scale. The cabal retired from Anagni to Fondi, in the kingdom of Naples, and there, on the 20th of September, 1378, fifteen cardinals went through the farce of a new election. The choice had been made before the conclave, and so, without more ado, Cardinal Robert of Geneva was elected under the title of Clement VII. He had the infamous distinction of opening the list of intruders into the Chair of Peter, who brought disgrace upon France and woe upon the whole Christian world. The Antipope was allied to the noblest families of Europe. Active, eloquent, and intrepid, one of the best diplomatists of the time, in the full maturity of his powers—he was but thirty-six years of age—Robert of Geneva was just the man to make or mar the fortunes of any cause in which he embarked. He was born to be a leader, to be a saint or a demagogue. He chose the latter part, and, on the 20th of September, 1378, the Schism was accomplished.

Who was the lawful Pope, was the great question of the day. The Catholic world agreed in acknowledging the successor of St. Peter to be the Vicar of Christ, the head of his Church on earth. The question of right was clear enough, the question of fact, as to which of the two claimants inherited the prerogatives of Peter, was so involved in the mists of national prejudice and personal animosity that even saints were at a loss to decide. The Church venerates with equal honor upon her altars St. Vincent Ferrer, the Confessor of Benedict XIII., one of the Antipopes, and St. Catharine of Sienna, the champion of Urban VI. Near five hundred years have gone by since those sad days. The unholy passions and party prejudices of the time exist for us only in the pages of history. The accuser and the accused, the popes and the antipopes, French intriguers and Italian patriots, saints and sinners, all have gone, centuries ago, to the judgment seat, and upon the conscientious student of history the light of truth beams now with clear and steady ray. Urban VI. was the true Pope, the legitimate successor of Gregory XI. and of St. Peter. We have already briefly described the election of Urban. Popular commotions preceded and followed that event, and five

months after, the French cardinals, piqued by the blunt reproaches of the new Pontiff, suddenly discovered that those commotions had invalidated the election. The choice had been made, they asserted, under the influence of fear, and as such was null both in law and conscience. Do the facts of the case bear them out in this assertion?

On the death of Gregory XI., the cardinals could not agree, in the canvass that preceded the conclave, on any member of their own body to succeed the deceased Pope. All eyes were turned at once to Bartholomew de Prignagno, Archbishop of Bari. Marinus, Archbishop of Brindisi, relates, in his book *De Schismate*, that before the conclave he asked of Robert of Geneva, his intimate friend, the name of the most prominent candidate for the Papacy. "A majority of the cardinals coincide in opinion with me," was the reply of the future Antipope. "By the holy Gospels contained in this book," he continued, taking up his breviary, "we will have either the Archbishop of Bari or another whose name I am not now at liberty to declare." The Limousin faction, seeing little probability of electing one of themselves or any other native of France, had also resolved before the conclave to cast their votes in favor of Prignagno. So testify Robert Straton, Auditor of the Sacred Palace, and the Cardinal of St. Peter, Francesco Tiberghini.

The conclave met. A deputation was sent from the Banerets of the Roman regions, insisting on the election of a Roman. The city feared that the elevation of a Frenchman, or even of a prelate from any other part of Italy, would be the signal for the return of the Papal court to Avignon. For seventy years, Rome had been abandoned by her Chief Pastor. Desolation reigned in her sanctuaries, and her streets were purpled with the blood of her children. She could bear her widowhood no longer. The Spouse must abide with her or she would choose another. The cardinals protested against this interference with the liberty of the election. "Give us a Roman," was the stern reply, "or we shall give you something more than words." The deputation withdrew, and the conclave elected, not a Roman, but a Neapolitan, Bartholomew de Prignagno. The vote was unanimous. Robert of Geneva and Peter de Luna, future Antipopes, cast their suffrages in his favor before even the Italian cardinals. The work was done and then fear seized the hearts of the workers. They prevailed on

the Cardinal of St. Peter, a Roman, to personate the Pontiff elect until the popular effervescence should subside. The people grumbled, but the resolution which Urban publicly declared of not returning to Avignon soon satisfied them. Calm was restored. The frightened cardinals returned to the city, crowned the Pope, and for nearly five months showed every mark of deference. They wrote an account of the conclave and of the election of Urban VI. to their brethren who had remained at Avignon. These approved the proceedings and gave in their adhesion to the new Pontiff.

There can be no shadow of doubt concerning the validity of the election. The cardinals had resolved on their choice before the conclave; threats did not induce them to assent to the wishes of the Romans, demanding a fellow-countryman; they elected their own nominee, Bartholomew de Prignano, Archbishop of Bari; they crowned him, attended his court, acknowledged him in all official documents, and only after he had cut to the quick, by his bitter reproaches, the unworthy wearer of the Roman purple, did they bring forward the flimsy pretext of a coerced election to screen the cravings of lawless ambition, and the revengeful spite of wounded pride and national prejudice. A calm review of the case will bear us out, we think, in specifying as the causes of the Schism: 1. The Avignon residence; 2. The French cardinals, who loved their country more than they did the Church; 3. The imprudent and bitter zeal of Pope Urban VI.

The Catholic world was in a ferment. Men the most distinguished in science and sanctity ranged themselves under opposite banners. Their faith was one; they all held to the Primacy of Peter, but upon whom had the mantle of the Apostle fallen? Urban VI. at Rome, and Clement VII. at Avignon, anathematized each other, and they who alone could solve the question, the Cardinals, had forfeited all claim to belief. For five months they had published to the world that Urban VI. was the legitimate Pope, and then affixed to the Sacred College, by withdrawing their first testimony, the disgrace of deliberate falsehood. Reproaches and recriminations were bandied from side to side; and while over this field of internecine strife angels wept and demons laughed, the spirit of God brooded, as over the primal chaos of the universe, until from the ship-

wreck of her fortunes and the stormy waves, the Spouse of Christ rose anew in the full flush of her eternal beauty.

Many of the states of the German Empire, England, Brittany, Flanders, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, and nearly all Italy, adhered to Urban VI. France, Scotland, Naples, most of Spain, Cyprus, Rhodes, Genoa, Lorraine, Savoy, and Geneva, acknowledged his rival. The parties were called the "Two Obediences." The University of Paris, which played a prominent part all through the history of the Schism, was at first inclined to neutrality, but finally, in imitation of the French sovereign, Charles V., adopted the cause of Clement VII. The Antipope established his court at Avignon. The old grievances of the former Residence revived in greater number and force. The Church of France was oppressed with taxes for the support of Clement's court, and policy and interest compelled him to secure and maintain the friendship of the monarchs who acknowledged his jurisdiction by concessions which violated the immunities of the Church, and impaired the purity of her discipline. So true is it that between filial obedience to the See of Rome and slavery to the state there lies no middle course for a national Church. Break the golden chain that unites Catholic faith and love and liberty to the Rock of Peter, and you forge fetters of adamant that bind the Church a helpless captive to the prince's throne.

The Schism, like all great convulsions, brought into strong relief the greatness and the meanness, the goodness and the wickedness of the age. The country that produced Peter de Luna, called Benedict XIII., the ablest and the most obstinate of the Antipopes, gave birth to Vincent Ferrer, the inheritor of the spirit of St. Dominic. The immorality that stared him in the face and sickened his heart was more corrupting, if not as gross, as that of the Albigenses, against which his religious father, St. Dominic, preached and prayed. It was what Jansenism became three centuries later, a disease in the body of the Church, a subtle poison which, mingling with the blood of Christ, flowed through the veins of his mystic body. The evils of the time foreboded, St. Vincent thought, more terrible evils to come; and so this holy Spanish Dominican went about the world, in the spirit of Elias, preaching the second Advent of the Son of Man. His missionary pilgrimages extended through nearly every country in Europe. Multitudes accompanied

him from place to place as the Jews did our Lord, and when he crossed the seas fleets followed in the wake of his humble bark. So great was his fame that the Moorish king of Granada sent him a courteous request to visit his court and preach in his dominions. Benedict XIII., his countryman, the successor of Clement VII. on the throne of Avignon, made him his confessor and master of his palace. Vincent accepted the charge, but finding his spiritual advice slighted, and all his efforts to bring about a union defeated by the craft and ambition of the Antipope, he resigned an office in which he could do no good, in which he became witness of scenes that his conscience condemned. He was too much of a man to be a courtier, and too much of a Christian to sell his soul for an Antipope's smiles or a cardinal's hat. He left Avignon in disgust, and used his influence with the courts of Europe to hasten the convocation of a General Council.

There was, in the reign of Clement VII., another saint in the court of Avignon, Peter of Luxemburg, Cardinal Bishop of Metz. His family was princely, but the lustre which sanctity sheds on an ancient and illustrious name exceeds that which flashes from the soldier's sword and plays around the statesman's pen. Peter was made bishop by the Antipope when yet a youth of fifteen pursuing his studies in the University of Paris. But neither the mitre of Metz nor the hat of the Sacred College could dazzle the fancy or shake the humility of the boy saint. For a corrupt age and a schismatical court he lived like an angel. His pure spirit was called home in his nineteenth year, because in a short time he had fulfilled many years. Avignon still honors St. Peter of Luxemburg as one of her patrons.

Each succeeding year widened the breach between the two claimants. Opposition made Urban more obstinate, and Clement more diplomatic. The imperiousness of the true Pope threw a shadow over his many virtues, while his attachment to his worthless nephew, Francis Prignano, who had forcibly abducted a nun of St. Clare from a convent in Naples, embittered his latter years, and involved him in endless broils with the Neapolitan court. Conspiracies were formed against him by his cardinals, but he punished them with a rigor that showed he was not a man to be trifled with, and that he had not forgotten, in his character of Spiritual Father, the sovereign right of life and death over his own subjects as Temporal Prince.

Urban and Clement died ; the former in 1389, the latter in 1394. Few tears were shed over the tombs of either. The friends of peace now entertained hopes of ending the Schism, but those hopes were blighted in the bud. The Cardinals of both Obediences proceeded to a new election. Boniface IX. succeeded Urban VI., and Peter de Luna, of Aragon, continued the Schism of Avignon under the title of Benedict XIII. Boniface was a man of fair abilities and unspotted life, and he had what his predecessor so sadly lacked, that *savoir faire* and amenity which win the affections of men while they command their respect. The Antipope De Luna had been created cardinal by Gregory XI., and accompanied that Pontiff on his return to Rome in 1378. He soon became a great favorite with the Romans, and some authors of the time relate that, after the Conclave which resulted in the choice of Urban VI., while the other cardinals fled to preserve their lives, De Luna was carried by the people, amid enthusiastic acclamations, to his own residence. He was a man of commanding genius ; his eloquence was irresistible, and his skill in diplomacy made him the most accomplished statesman in the Sacred College. His influence and talents perpetuated the Schism, and his name stands recorded in the annals of the Church as that of a great man who gave his genius, his ability, and his firmness, to the support of a bad cause.

The University of Paris labored strenuously for the restoration of peace. With the royal permission it took a vote on the means of attaining this end. Ten thousand suffrages were cast, and three expedients suggested : 1, the abdication of both claimants ; 2, a compromise to be arranged by a board of arbiters ; 3, the convocation of a General Council. The report of the proceedings of the University was drawn up by Nicholas Clemengis ; the Chancellor Gerson and D'Ailly were the leading spirits of the University. Peter d'Ailly was born at Compiègne in 1350. He became successively doctor of the Sorbonne, chancellor of the University, confessor and almoner of Charles VI. of France, and bishop of Puy and Cambray. He undertook several journeys to Rome and Avignon to effect a compromise between the rival Pontiffs ; but his efforts, like those of St. Vincent Ferrer, were futile. John XXIII., the representative of the Pisan faction, raised him to the cardinalate. The Council of Constance afforded a splendid theatre for the display of his eloquence ; and though the opinions which

he and his friend and countryman, Gerson, advanced, in that assembly, concerning the superiority of a General Council over the Pope, contained the germs of the celebrated Gallican Declaration of 1682, truth and charity attribute their errors to the anomalous state in which the Church was placed, and their desire for the extinction of the Schism at any cost, rather than to a false theory on the Primacy. D'Ailly, in his *Treatise on the Reform of the Church*, writes with a moderation which some of his contemporaries would have done well to imitate. He laments the evils of the Church but spares the persons of her Prelates. His zeal was not bitter, and while he wept for the sins of his spiritual fathers, his filial piety drew over them the mantle of respect and charity.

Gerson is better known in Ecclesiastical literature. His family name was Charlier. He was born in the village of Gerson, in the diocese of Rheims, in 1365. He was the theological pupil and successor of D'Ailly in the chancellorship of the University, and zealously labored with him to effect a union between the contending factions. He incurred the enmity of the Duke of Burgundy by condemning the murder of the Duke of Orleans which the former peer had ordered. He fled from Paris, and after wandering as a pilgrim in Germany settled at Lyons, in the convent of the Celestines. There he spent his time in exercises of piety and in teaching catechism to children. His book on Christian Education may rank with that of St. Augustine, *De Catechizandis Rudibus*. The children loved him as a father, and when he was dying they flocked to the Churches to say the prayer he had taught them: "Dear Lord! have mercy on the soul of poor John Gerson." The authorship of the *Imitation of Christ* has sometimes been attributed to him, but without sufficient evidence.

The three expedients proposed by the University were rejected by Benedict; in despair that body proposed the withdrawal of obedience from both parties. The measure was discussed and accepted by the Royal Council of France. A deputation went to the court of Benedict and called on him to abdicate. He refused; the decree of withdrawal of obedience was published, and a French army entered Avignon. The Antipope fortified his palace and resolutely defended it against his enemies. But a reaction soon followed. The Catholics of France repented at seeing one whom they had long regarded as the head of the Church

reduced to such extremities. Religion suffered. The withdrawal of obedience had thrown the spiritual jurisdiction into the hands of the secular power. All ecclesiastical acts were in the royal name, and the king declared himself the interpreter of the decree of withdrawal. It was better, argued the friends of the Church, to obey a Pope whose claim was doubtful than to subject the spiritual to the temporal. Their argument prevailed. A new decree was published, revoking the former, and putting the kingdom once more under the authority of Benedict XIII. Active operations against him ceased, and his opponents were content with keeping him a close prisoner in his palace.

The Roman Pontiff, Boniface IX., died in October, 1404, and was succeeded by Innocent VII., and he, in turn, after a two years' reign, by Cardinal Corrario, a Venetian, who took the name of Gregory XII. The new Pope first accepted and then declined a conference at Savona, to which his rival invited him. Benedict turned the refusal to his own advantage; he threw the blame of the continuance of the Schism on Gregory, and left Avignon for Savona with the magnanimous resolve, he declared, of resigning, if his rival would do the same. The promise cost him nothing, for Gregory, he knew, would not waive his right.

The King of France and the cardinals, resolved to take the matter into their own hands, and to cut the knot which they could not untie. A deputation from the colleges of both obediences met at Leghorn, and agreed to reject the authority of both claimants. A general council was summoned to meet at Pisa, on the Feast of the Annunciation, 1409, to which Gregory and Benedict were invited. The former complained that the cardinals had transgressed their powers in this proceeding, but consented to send his agents to the council.

Discussions immediately arose about the legitimacy of such a council. It was argued on one hand that as the cardinals had the right of electing the Pope, they had the right also of deciding in cases of doubtful election. The opponents of this view maintained, and with truth, that the election, either of Urban VI. or of Clement VII., was certainly valid, that consequently there was a true Pope, that no general council was canonical without him, and that no power on earth could remove him. Gerson and D'Ailly took the lead in the discussions. The former published a treatise *De Auferibilitate Papæ*, in which he argued from

the analogies of a husband divorcing his wife, and a nation deposing its ruler. Gerson forgot that in the cases alleged, neither the husband nor the nation, but a power superior to both, the Church, is the judge of the question of right. But who is to judge the highest power in the Church herself? Who is to judge him who has no earthly superior? The whole question hinged on the election of Urban VI. in 1378. The cardinals were the only witnesses of that fact, and at their doors lies the guilt of the Schism.

The council which began its sessions at Pisa on the 25th of March, 1409, was one of the most splendid in the history of the Church. Twenty-three cardinals, ninety-two prelates of different rank, patriarchs, archbishops and bishops, one hundred and two delegates from absent bishops, eighty-seven abbots, two hundred delegates from religious orders, the generals of the four mendicant orders, one hundred and twenty masters of theology, three hundred doctors and licentiates of theology, and the ambassadors of the European courts composed the brilliant assembly. The opponents of the council were numerous and powerful, including Spain, Scotland, Naples, Hungary, and the Emperor Robert of Bavaria. The council declared itself œcumenical, and summoned the two competitors for the Papacy to appear. Gregory and Benedict refused. The council declared them guilty of schism and heresy, and deposed them. The conclave proceeded to a new election. D'Ailly remonstrated against the imprudent hastiness of the step, as no measures had been taken to sound the feelings of the faithful or secure the support of the European Powers. His warning was unheeded; and foreseeing the evils that were to follow, he abruptly left the council and retired to Genoa.

The conclave resulted in the choice of Peter Philaret, Cardinal of Milan, who took the name of Alexander V. He was a Candiate foundling, but the mystery and obscurity of his birth were forgotten in the distinguished success which marked his career in the universities of Paris and Oxford. He rose gradually through the various clerical grades and dignities to the rank of cardinal, and now, in 1409, had the equivocal honor of being the elected Pontiff of a schismatical assembly. The fathers of Pisa defeated their own end; they added new fuel to the flame of discord, and the old dispute on legitimacy, of which the world was tiring, was opened afresh. The astonished

Church saw three Popes, Gregory XII., Benedict XIII., and Alexander V., claiming her obedience. What wonder if many believed with St. Vincent Ferrer that they had fallen on the latter days of the world, when false prophets and false Christs were to arise, to deceive for a time the very elect. Alexander's honors were short-lived. He died at Bologna in 1410, eleven months after his election. Cardinal Baltassar Cossa, the ablest as well as the most unprincipled of the Pisan cardinals, secured a majority of votes in the conclave and continued the Schism under the title of John XXIII. Ladislas of Naples, who had hitherto supported the cause of Gregory, deserted him for his new rival. Gregory fled to Rimini, where Charles Malatesta, the lord of the territory, received him with open arms, and pledged him his services in heart and hand.

One of the great objects of the council of Pisa, the reformation of abuses and the establishment of a uniform system of discipline, remained unaccomplished. The fathers of that assembly had resolved to hold another within three years, and, in accordance with their decree, John summoned the bishops of the Catholic world to meet him at Rome in 1412. His enemies accused him of insincerity, and of collusion with the king of Naples, to prevent the meeting of the Council. It never met, and when Ladislas deserted John as he had deserted Gregory, the Antipope fled to the Emperor Sigismund. That prince insisted on a General Council. John, foreseeing the storm that was about to burst on his head, endeavored by embassies, letters, and personal interviews, to evade the demand. Sigismund was inflexible, and John, yielding to the pleasure of his imperious patron, published the bull of convocation.

The council which met at Constance in November, 1414, far surpassed in splendor the brilliant assembly of Pisa. Eighteen thousand ecclesiastics attended, and a hundred thousand visitors thronged the city. The magnificence and power of Europe were concentrated at the fountain head of the Rhine, in the old Swiss city. Emperor and prince, cardinal and bishop, soldier and civilian, flocked to witness the death struggle between schism and authority. The nuncio of Gregory XII. came too, and put up the arms of his master over the door of his hotel. A riot ensued during the night, and the insignia were torn down. The affair was discussed in the preparatory congregations, and it was decided that, as John XXIII. had convoked the council, no

other claimant could parade his arms unless personally present in the city. The legates of Gregory and Benedict were, however, allowed to take their places among the cardinals, and all the rights and insignia of their dignity were granted to them. The council adopted a measure, proposed by D'Ailly, which neutralized the influence which John had among the high dignitaries of the assembly. A vote was granted to all the ecclesiastics present, and to the ambassadors of the great Powers. The final vote was to be taken by nations, of which the four represented in the Council were Italy, France, England and Germany. Spain was added afterward. Here, too, John's interests suffered, for only on Italy could he rely.

About the middle of January, 1415, the opinion rapidly gained ground that the resignation of the three claimants could alone give peace to the Church. John indignantly rejected a proposal to that effect. The council persisted in its sentiment, and on the 13th of February he was officially requested to resign. His resolution wavered. Anonymous writings were put in circulation, charging him with immorality; and whether it was that he dreaded an investigation or that he was heartily sick of his thorny tiara, he consented to abdicate. He sang a solemn Pontifical Mass on the 2d of March, and then swore, at the altar, to lay down the dignity which he accepted for the good of the Church. Her interests now required his abdication, and he was not a man to stick at a sacrifice which conscience commanded. A storm of applause shook the hall. John was the hero of the day, the martyr of the Union. The Emperor Sigismund left his throne, and prostrating, kissed the feet of the magnanimous Pontiff. Then came the sober second thought. John repented of his act, and tightened his grasp on power as he saw it slipping from him. Frederic of Austria, his patron, arrived at this conjuncture, and, with his assistance, John escaped on the 21st of March to Schaffhausen. His flight fell like a clap of thunder on the fathers of the council. Some maintained that it was dissolved because it had lost its head. D'Ailly, Gerson, and the Emperor, remonstrated, and prevailed on the council to continue its sessions. From Schaffhausen John published a manifesto and summoned his court to come to him. He alleged the indignities which he suffered at Constance as the cause of his flight, though afterward to the deputies of the council he assigned feeble health and a desire of greater

freedom in drawing up his act of abdication. Some of the cardinals obeyed his summons, others remained in the council. Previous to the fourth session, a decree containing the assertion of a General Council's supremacy over the Pope was drawn up and presented for acceptance to the Sacred College. A flat refusal was the first reply, but eventually a compromise was effected.

The clause claiming the supremacy of a council *in reformatione ecclesie in capite et membris* was struck out of the decree. Thus modified, it was read and confirmed in the fourth session, on the 30th of March, 1415. The majority was still unsatisfied, and resolved to restore the rejected clause. The cardinals and the ambassadors of France refused to attend the approaching session. Policy and interest overcame their resolution, and, after making a secret protest, they took part in the fifth session, on the 5th of April. The schismatical decree was confirmed. Peter D'Ailly and three others were inflexible, and refused to sanction by their presence a session which taught a doctrine contrary to the belief and practice of fourteen hundred years.

John XXIII. retired meanwhile farther down the Rhine, and carried on a war of protests against the council. That assembly sent him a formula of abdication which he was requested to sign within two days. The Antipope demurred, but the defeat of his patron, Frederic of Austria by the Emperor, broke his spirit, and, after stipulating for honorable treatment, he put his name to the paper. But the council was not satisfied, and cited John to stand his trial. The anonymous writings before alluded to supplied materials for a long catalogue of charges. When a copy of the indictment was presented to John, he made an unqualified submission, and threw himself on the mercy of the council. The hand of misfortune was now heavy on the once magnificent and idolized Cardinal Baltassar Cossa. No mercy was shown him, and sentence of deposition was passed on the 29th of May. With dignified humility John bowed to the storm, and swore never to oppose the decrees of the Constantian Council. The Papal insignia were removed from his apartments, and he was consigned to a rigorous captivity under the wardenship of the Emperor Sigismund. Four long weary years of disgrace and imprisonment rolled away, and when next we see John XXIII., it is at the feet of Pope Martin V. The Pontiff received

the prodigal kindly, and made him dean of the Sacred College. He died in 1419.

On the 15th of June, 1415, arrived at Constance Charles Malatesta, of Rimini, a man universally esteemed for his rank and virtues. He came with full powers from Pope Gregory XII., to abdicate in his name, provided the council would acknowledge his legitimacy by dissolving and reassembling at his call. The envoy and his proposal met with a hearty reception. In the tenth session, held on the 4th of July, 1415, the cardinal president left his place, which was temporarily occupied by the Emperor. Two bulls of Gregory XII. were then read, by the first of which he appointed Malatesta his proxy, and by the second convoked the Council of Constance. Cardinal Ragusa, the Pope's legate, declared the Council opened, and, amid the death-like stillness of the assembled thousands, the Lord of Rimini rose from his seat, and resigned, in the name of Gregory XII., the Papal authority. The Pope confirmed the act of his representative, and resigned the tiara for the red hat of Cardinal Legate of Ancona.

The case of the Antipope, Peter de Luna, called Benedict XIII., still remained to be settled. The wily Prelate proposed his favorite method of an amicable discussion, but only to have it rejected. He went a step farther; he agreed to abdicate on condition of being allowed to nominate a successor. The patience of the deputies sent by the council to consult with him gave out, and they fixed on the 3d of October for a final answer. On that day a grand audience was held. Benedict harangued in his usual style, declared that he only was the lawful Pope, and that he could not, in conscience, abandon the helm of Peter's bark, now that the storm was raging fiercely. His rhetoric was thrown away on the commissioners, who immediately broke up the conference, and returned to Constance. The king of Aragon, the sole remaining patron of De Luna, renounced the ecclesiastical obedience he had hitherto paid him. On the 26th of July, 1417, sentence of deposition was pronounced against Peter de Luna, falsely called Benedict XIII., as an usurper of the Papacy and a disturber of the peace of the Church.

The field was now clear; the true Pope had resigned, and his rivals had been deposed. Still the unfortunate result of the Council of Pisa in 1409 made the Fathers of Constance cautious in proceeding to a new election. A re-

action was apprehended in Spain in favor of De Luna, and not until the attachment of that country and the other great European powers had been obtained was it deemed prudent to convene the conclave. It met in November, 1417, and consisted of twenty-three cardinals and thirty deputies from the nations. Sectional prejudices threatened to mar the work on the verge of its successful termination. The Papacy was an apple of discord among Germans, Gauls, and Italians, but God had mercy on the bleeding Church, and moulded the hearts of men to his own wishes. First the Germans, then the French, yielded their claim, and on the 11th of November, 1417, the unanimous vote of the conclave fell on Cardinal Ottavio Colonna, who, in honor of the saint of the day, took the name of Martin V.

The long agony was over; the Schism of forty years was healed, but the poison it had infused still remained in the veins of society. History works out its results with stern, inexorable logic. The Schism of the West was one of the premises of the Reformation; the degradation of the Church in France, Spain, and Germany, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the consequence and punishment of the spirit engendered and fostered by the Schism, a spirit whose watchword was, "Salvation is of the Franks," which regarded France as identical with Christianity, and the Pope as the honorary primate of the Christian Gauls. Philip the Fair was the precursor of Napoleon; the French cardinals and prelates of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries find their counterparts in Maury, Feesch, Talleyrand, Gregoire, and Lomenie de Brienne of our own age; and then, as now, the censer-bearers of the demigod Cæsar were the betrayers of the Church's liberties.

Martin V. dissolved the Council of Constance on the 26th of April, 1418. The Council was œcumenical and canonical only after its convocation by the legates of Gregory XII., the legitimate Pope. The decree of the fifth session asserting the supremacy of a council over the successor of St. Peter was passed before that convocation, and referred exclusively to the case of the Schism. The Church was in an anomalous condition. Catholics knew not where to look for the personal centre of power. It was, all admitted, in the Papacy, but where was the Papacy? In their perplexity they took refuge in a General Council. But the decree in question was false in matter and uncanonical in form. It gives the body jurisdiction over the head, and it was

passed before the assembly at Constance became a council. Martin V. approved of what had been done *conciliariter*, that is, canonically, after the manner of a legitimate council, convened by the Pope and presided over by his legates. The fifth session was held, and its decrees passed *extra-conciliariter*. Those decrees were the opinions of prelates and theologians, whose zeal ran ahead of their judgment, who would heal a schism by teaching a heresy.

The cause of the Church is identified with the life of no individual and no community within her pale. She is infallible, but her subjects are not impeccable. She cannot err in her teaching, but Catholics high and low, in the sanctuary and in the world, may err in their lives. Scandals must come, schism must rend the robe of Christ. If you prove that the scandals and the schisms are the results of the Church's doctrines; that the lives of her children are lax because her teaching is lax, then have you at once and forever destroyed her claims to sanctity and divinity. But if the case is directly the reverse, if the theory and practice are in bold public antagonism, then condemn, if you will, the bad Catholic, the schismatical cardinal, the courtier prelate, the demoralized clergy, but let not the breath of falsehood and blasphemy tarnish the fair fame of the Church.

When the shadows of the Passion were gathering thick and dark around our Lord, a friend and apostle betrayed him. So was it in the passion of the Church during the Great Schism, so is it now. The kiss of betrayal is daily impressed on the pale lips of this suffering mother by her own children. But oh, Spouse of Christ! though the crown of thorns is around thy brows, and thy beautiful eyes seem glassy in the agony of death—though the rich red blood is pouring from thy heart through wounds made by those whom thou hast suckled at thy breast, yet art thou all fair and beautiful, stainless and spotless in the sight of earth and heaven, for the eternal splendor of God is thine.

W. J. B.

ART. III.—*Christ our Life. The Scriptural Argument for Immortality through Christ alone.* By C. F. HUDSON. Boston: Jewett & Co. 12mo.

At another time we might be disposed to give the work, the title of which we have cited, a thorough examination; for though its general doctrine is unsound, its author is a man of no mean ability, and, what is more, a man who ventures to think for himself, and really attains to some glimpses of truth. It is a work which cannot be uninteresting or uninformative to those who wish to study the varying phases of thought among non-Catholics, or the struggles of a mind brought up in either old-fashioned Protestantism or modern Socinianism to obtain a doctrine which may at least be consistent with itself. But our present purpose is different. We have selected the title of Mr. Hudson's book as a text, or an apology for a text, for some remarks of our own, having only an indirect and remote connection with the subject he treats.

Mr. Hudson's book proves that the old forms of thought in the non-Catholic world no longer satisfy, if they ever satisfied, the non-Catholic intelligence. The active and vigorous minds outside of the Church can no longer rest in the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, or even of Socinus and Gentilis. They are seeking earnestly for some solid ground on which they can stand, and for doctrines which they can reconcile with their own reason and understanding. They seek everywhere for truth but where truth may be found. We Catholics know perfectly well that Catholicity embraces all truth, and that out of the Church there is no truth in its unity and integrity. We know perfectly well that it is only in the doctrines of our Church that the truth they want can be found. Yet our Church is the very last place in which they are willing to seek it, and perhaps many of them, even were they to seek it there, would not find it. Hundreds and thousands of men read Catholic books of theology where the very questions they want treated are discussed with great learning and ability, with clearness, depth, and sincerity, without finding in them anything but unmeaning words, dry technicalities, or antiquated formulas. Why is this so? Is it not because our Catholic writers fail to address themselves to the forms of modern thought, to the idiosyncracies, so to speak, of the age?

May it not be the fact that our words and formulas do not convey to those outside the truth they have for us? May it not also be that we Catholics identify, in some sort, the truth itself with the scholastic forms under which we have received it, and that we should fail to perceive it ourselves if expressed in other forms?

It is true the Apostle admonishes us to "beware of profane novelties," and to "hold fast the form of sound words," but at the same time he tells us he became "all things to all men, that he might gain some," and it is clear that he never designed us to be wedded to the mere symbol, without regard to the thing symbolized. Truth is that which is needed, and he who has the truth has all that he needs. Truth never varies. It is the same in all ages and in all nations. But its expression may vary, and must in some degree vary, in order to meet the peculiar wants of time and place. It would be of little use to speak in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, to a man who understood only French, German, or English. If the truth is to reach the mind, it must be spoken in a language and expressed in a form that is intelligible to it. The truth *spoken* is measured by the mind of the hearer, not by the mind of the speaker. No matter how much truth we have in our minds, we tell only so much truth as the mind we address can take in. When we speak we use words, and words are symbols or sensible signs. Whatever meaning we may give them, they have for those to whom we speak only the meaning which their minds give them. The meaning conveyed or the truth symbolized depends on their understanding, not on ours. Is it not the neglect of this great fact that prevents our theological works from having their proper effect on the minds of unbelievers? May it not be that we too often speak without considering whether what is clear and evident to us may not be obscure and unmeaning to them? Is it true that their failure to apprehend, embrace, and follow the truth which we set forth is entirely their fault, the effect of their perverse will?

We have no disposition to apologize for unbelievers and rejecters of the truth; yet, we confess, we cannot wholly approve a widely prevailing notion, that all error presupposes malice, and that all who remain outside of the Church do so through hatred of the truth and love of iniquity. Any man who has once been a Protestant and subsequently reconciled to the Church, knows well that his

greatest difficulty in the way of accepting Catholic truth was in understanding it. He will tell you, and tell you truly, that in proportion as he ascertained the real meaning of the Church he was prepared to accept it, and that he wanted no argument to prove it after he had clearly seen it. The Church to be loved needs but to be seen as she is; the truth to be believed needs but to be presented to the mind as it is in its real relations. This follows from the common doctrine of the scholastics that the object of the will is *GOOD*, and that the object of the intellect is *TRUTH*; as also from the doctrine of St. Thomas that all sin originates in ignorance. To convert a man it is necessary to enlighten him, and all theologians teach us that the grace which converts illustrates the understanding at the same time that it assists the will. Men reject or refuse to believe our doctrines because they do not understand them, that is, do not understand them in their relations with their own intuitions or rational convictions, which, it seems to them, they cannot give up without a total abandonment of reason common to all men. May not, then, our failure to convert them, be, in great part, owing to the fact that we fail so to present them, that is, fail to present them so that they appear to them consistent with the dictates of reason and common sense? Must there not, then, be fault on our side as well as on theirs?

But here is our difficulty. It seems to be very generally understood in the Catholic community here and elsewhere, that the Catholic controversialist must never concede that Catholics can possibly err in their apprehension of Catholic truth, or in their mode of presenting it; that every Catholic writer or publicist must always proceed on the assumption that, as between them and their opponents, all Catholics are infallible and impeccable, and as wise as serpents and as harmless as doves; that to vary a single word or form of expression adopted by scholastic theologians would be to betray the Catholic cause; and that every attempt to present Catholic truth in a manner to be apprehensible by our age, and to remove the objections to it in the minds of non-Catholics by exhibiting it in a new light, or under new forms, would indicate a restless, uneasy, discontented, and querulous spirit, if not absolute disloyalty to the Spouse of Christ. We are told on every side by those who affect to give tone and direction to Catholic thought and action, that it is our duty as Catholic publicists to defend things as we

find them; to raise no question which may excite controversy among ourselves; to enter into no philosophical or theological discussions not acceptable to all Catholics, whether learned or unlearned; never to criticise the doings or the sayings of our predecessors among Catholic polemics; never to take any deeper, broader, or loftier views than are taken by the most ignorant or uncultivated of Catholic believers; never to strike out any new lines of argument or to shift the ground of controversy with our opponents. We are required to follow tradition, not only in what is of faith, but in what pertains to the theological expression of revealed truth, and to the mode or manner of defending it. If we would be accounted orthodox, or stand well with the pretended exponents of Catholic public opinion, we must explain the causes of the Protestant rebellion according to the traditions of Catholics, and never deviate from that tradition in our manner of explaining and refuting its errors. We must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, the misreading of the Fathers, or a doubtful interpretation of the Sacred Text. We are permitted to make no account of the researches of the moderns in the physical sciences, in history, natural or civil, in literary criticism, or Biblical literature; to pay no attention to the present state of the controversy between Catholics and non-Catholics, to the new questions which have arisen, to the new ground that has been taken, or to the new modes of warfare adopted by the rejecters of Catholic truth. We are required to take it for granted that all our controversy must be with Lutherans, Calvinists, or Anglicans, on the ground, we suppose, that error is as invariable as truth. We do not, of course, mean to say that there is any Catholic, cleric or laic, who would expressly maintain this; but this much we do mean to say, that any one who does not conform to the rule here laid down will find that he has severer controversies to maintain with his own brethren than with the avowed enemies of the Church, and there are few men who can maintain their credit for orthodoxy when a considerable number of their own brethren, and especially those who give tone and direction to Catholic action, are opposed to them. No men are more readily distrusted, no men are looked upon with more horror by Catholics than they who become the occasion of domestic controversy. The rule adopted seems to

be not that which was laid down by the Apostle, "Follow after the things that *make* for peace," but follow after peace, or seek peace at any price.

Whoever is in the habit of reading the Catholic journals of this or any other country will bear witness that we do not state the case too strongly. The only men who have a prescriptive right to find fault with their brethren without having their orthodoxy, their zeal, or their charity questioned, are the *oscurantisti*, the men who praise the past, *laudatores acti*, who stoutly maintain all antiquated formulas, hold fast to old abuses, repress all generous aspirations, and anathematize all efforts for progress. These men may be as severe against their brethren as they please, denounce them, vituperate them, vilify them to their hearts' content, and yet gain credit for their disinterestedness, their zeal, and their love of God and our neighbor. Whatever they say is true; whatever they do is right; whatever controversies they excite, whatever intestine divisions they create, are all to be accounted necessary. They may, without censure, alienate half the world from the Church, or throw insurmountable obstacles in the way of the return of those who are already alienated, pursue a policy which renders the Church in her action on the world offensive to the purest and noblest instincts of human nature, without doing any thing for which any Catholic shall have the right to censure them, or to find the least fault with them. The public opinion of the Catholic world sustains them, lauds their wisdom and virtue, and condemns only those rash or froward spirits who venture to question the wisdom of their action, or to deny its salutary influence. Here is the great difficulty under which labor all men who understand their age, and would do something, however little, for the promotion of the Catholic cause. They are at once cried down as the disturbers of Catholic peace, and it is only against the weight of almost universal Catholic public opinion that they can present Catholic truth so as to be understood and appreciated by the non-Catholic world. This is a great discouragement; it takes the life out of a man, deprives him of all strength, energy, zeal, or heart to attempt anything in the cause of God and our neighbor. Something of this has, no doubt, been experienced in all ages, and is inseparable from human frailty; but we doubt if the evil complained of, for evil it is, was ever greater or more depressing than in our own times. No man in our

times is so much feared as the man who is really a living man, whose thought pierces the symbol and takes hold of the truth symbolized, who is really in earnest to enlist intelligence, science, and learning, on the side of the Church, and to recover for her the direction of the intellectual movements of the age.

In our historical reading we have found no epoch in which the directors of the Catholic world seem to have had so great a dread of intellect as our own. There seems to be almost universally the conviction expressed by Rousseau, that "the man who thinks is a depraved animal." There is a wide-spread fear that he who thinks will think heretically. The study, therefore, of our times is to keep men orthodox by cultivating their pious affections with as little exercise of intelligence as possible. There is no doubt that for the last hundred years the intelligence, at least what is regarded as the intelligence, of the world, has been divorced from orthodoxy. During this period the most successful cultivators of science, of history, literature, and art, have not been Catholics, or, if nominally Catholics, with little understanding of the teaching, or devotion to the practice, of the Church. The natural sciences, zoölogy, geology, chemistry, natural history, ethnography, metaphysics, and to some extent history itself, have been anti-Catholic, while the popular literature, that which takes hold of the heart and forms the taste, the mind, and the morals of a nation, has been decidedly hostile to the Church. It is very likely this fact that has created the aversion in Catholic minds to free and independent thought, and driven them into the extreme that we complain of. They see how un-Catholic is thought in its modern forms and developments; they see how rapidly and how rashly the world rushes into the most fatal errors; and therefore they fear to trust thought, and consequently seek to restrain it. This is their excuse. Yet it is no full justification. The true policy, in our judgment, would be not to yield up thought and intelligence to Satan, but to redouble our efforts to bring them back to the side of the Church, so as to restore her to her rightful spiritual and intellectual supremacy. Instead of foregoing thought and intelligence, and contenting ourselves with pious affection which, when divorced from thought, becomes a mere weak and watery sentimentality, we should grapple with them, master the age precisely in that in which it regards itself as strongest, increase our ef-

forts to enlighten the people, and gain for them the superiority not merely in faith and piety, but in secular knowledge and science. Intelligence can be mastered only by intelligence, thought can be overcome only by thought.

There has never been an epoch in the world's history when the policy now generally pursued could have been more unwise, or likely to be more fatal, than the present. Now less than ever can we keep people in the faith by mere ignorance and prejudice, or even by early association and affection. We cannot keep our people ignorant of error if we would, and do what we will we cannot prevent them from being more or less affected by the spirit of the age. In no country have we an orthodox Cæsar to protect the flock with his armed legions, or to keep down error by civil pains and penalties, even were that desirable. The civil government nowhere protects the Church, any farther than it hopes to use her for its own purposes. There is no longer any reliance to be placed upon the civil power, however deeply some may regret it. The Church is obliged to fall back on her own resources as a spiritual kingdom, and the last vestige of the old union of Church and state, will ere long be everywhere effaced. The most the Church can hope from the state hereafter is to be let alone, and it will be much if Catholics are allowed to be free in the general freedom of the citizen. Respect for authority is gone, or at least greatly weakened, among Catholics no less than among non-Catholics. Clerical admonitions and prohibitions have not the weight they once had, and men every day grow less and less submissive to their pastors; loyalty to the state has ceased to be regarded as a virtue; and filial obedience to the Church is every day growing weaker and weaker. All the old external bulwarks and defences of faith and piety, are broken down. All things are questioned. Nothing is too sacred to be examined. The authority of the Church, the divine institution of the clergy, the truth of the sacred mysteries of religion, nay, the very providence and even existence of God, are brought into public discussion. Doubts on all points are entertained and boldly uttered. Nothing is regarded as fixed and certain. Now this state of things must be met, and met effectually. But how can we meet it, if thought is discouraged, free discussion prohibited, and our people kept as far as possible in ignorance of all not absolutely necessary to salvation?

We are very far from pretending that the changes which have taken place in society, in men's convictions and affections, are for the better, or not to be deeply deplored. The state of things which has passed away, and in reference to which most of our clergy have been educated, may have been far better than that which now obtains; it may be that we have fallen on evil times—worse times than the Church has ever before seen—but the changes have taken place, and we have to meet things as they are, not as they were. It is idle to attempt to recall the past, to reëstablish that which has passed away. We must always take things as we find them, avail ourselves of the present good, and war against present evils. The Church is placed in the world to teach and to govern it; but she has her human side, and on her human side she is affected by all the changes which go on around her. Her principles are invariable and eternal, but her modes or methods of acting on the world must be adapted to its ever-varying wants. The Church cannot, any more than the state, be unvarying in her external policy, because she has not unvarying circumstances or an unvarying world to meet. At every moment she must deal with the world as it is, not as it has been or as we may wish it to be. What she has now to meet are the peculiar evils of our own times; she has to meet the existing state of things. This we, her children, should understand, and we are wanting in our fidelity to her if, governed by old associations and inveterate habits, we throw obstacles in her way, and labor, intentionally or unintentionally, to hinder her from doing it.

The existing state of things is not met by a mere negative policy, or by a so-called safeguard system. No amount of pious training or pious culture will protect the faithful, or preserve them from the contamination of the age, if they are left inferior to non-Catholics in secular learning and intellectual development. The faithful must be guarded and protected by being trained and disciplined to grapple with the errors and false systems of the age. They must be not only more religiously, but also more intellectually educated. They must be better armed than their opponents,—surpass them in the strength and vigor of their minds, and in the extent and variety of their knowledge. They must, on all occasions and against all adversaries, be ready to give a reason for the hope that is in them. They must be better scholars, more learned men, profounder phi-

losophers, better versed in the sciences, more thorough masters of history, abler and more attractive writers and orators, and prove themselves in every respect the *élite* of the race. It is in vain in our times to attempt to preserve them in their loyalty to the Church by the force of simple external authority, or even by their reverence for the prelates whom the Holy Ghost has placed over them. Both for those within and for those without, authority must vindicate itself,—must show that it is not merely a positive and arbitrary authority, but that it is authority in the reason and nature of things, intrinsic as well as extrinsic. Minds in our day are to be governed by respecting their freedom, not by restraining it, and men in authority must be more ready to convince than to command. Blind obedience is out of the question; submission to *men* is contrary to the spirit of the age; and the prelate must, if he would be obeyed, show that obedience to him is real, not reputed, obedience to God. There must be no shams, there must be no make-believes, but there must be everywhere the REAL PRESENCE.

We say not that it is not to be deplored that such is the case. We write not to vindicate the age, but to present it as it is. We say not but it would be far better if there were everywhere to be met only simple, unquestioning obedience; we say not that there is not something of impiety even in this questioning spirit of our times, which demands a reason even for obeying God, still more for obeying his ministers; we express, as we feel, no sympathy with this spirit; but it is the spirit that now reigns in Catholic populations hardly less than in non-Catholic populations. It is an evil that we must meet and overcome the best way we can, and the best, indeed the only way to overcome it known to us is by answering its demands. God himself condescends to reason with men, and does not disdain to submit even his own providence to the judgment of reason. Our Lord reasoned with the Jews; the Apostles reasoned with the people to whom they were sent; and the greatest Popes and Prelates of the Church have shown themselves, at all times, more studious to convince the understanding than to overcome the will.

No doubt this policy which we recommend imposes far greater labor on the ministers of our holy religion than the one we oppose, and that it is a policy that will never be acceptable to any who are not willing to spend and be

spent in the service of God. Men who love their ease, who think only of performing a certain round of prescribed duties with as little trouble to themselves as possible, and feel not deeply the worth of human souls, cannot be expected to approve it. It can be adopted only by men who are in earnest, who take life seriously, and count no labors, no sacrifices in the service of their Lord. It is not a policy for amateurs and dilitanti. It is a policy only for strong men; men with robust souls, intrepid hearts, and indomitable love; men who feel that religion embraces all truth, and is the condition of all good; men who are above the world, whose affections are placed on things eternal, and whose conversation is in heaven. It will not meet the approbation of men who recognize only the *opus operatum*, and forget that men may be instrumental in the salvation of their brethren. But for those who understand that God works through means and carries on his designs by human agencies, and that men are in some sense responsible one for another, it will be an acceptable policy. These will not shrink from, but will joy to meet and perform the labors it requires. They will enter with alacrity upon the work, engage in it with their whole souls, with all the energy and strength God gives them. Heroic souls shrink not from difficulties; their courage rises with the danger, and their strength grows with the magnitude of the work before them.

Now if we look at the work that is to be done in our day and generation, we ask, how is it possible to do it, if we are to be tied down to old forms and old methods; if we are to be deterred by fear of disturbing the equanimity or self-complacency of narrow-minded and uninstructed publicists who are not aware that there have been any changes in the world for the last four hundred years? How are we to do it, if we are to open no discussions, enter upon no line of argument, offer no explanations, attempt no solutions of difficulties which are not already familiar to the age? How are we to do it, if we are allowed to engage in no controversy, to correct no error, to disturb no prejudice, to stir no thought? How are we to do it, if all that is permitted us is to repeat what we may find set down in our older and superannuated polemical works? How are we to do it, if we are only to follow servilely those who wrote before they could have any knowledge of the peculiar errors and peculiar wants of our times? How are we to do

it, if we are bound to take the public opinions of Catholics in this or that locality instead of Catholic truth itself for our guide?

We find no fault with the great men, the great controversialists of other times. They did their work and they did it well; they vindicated nobly, heroically, and successfully, the truth for their age; answered conclusively the objections which they had to answer, and in the form and way most intelligible to those who urged them. It is no reproach to them to say that they have not fully answered objections which were not raised in their time. What we ask is, that Catholic controversialists be allowed to follow their example, and that we be as free to grapple with the errors and speculations of our age as they were to grapple with the errors and speculations of theirs. They were free to do their work; let us be free to do ours. He who knows the age knows that there are objections to the Church which are peculiar to our times, and to which no formal answer was or could have been given by our predecessors. Neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas, neither Bellarmine nor Bossuet, had to meet objections of precisely the same sort as those we have to meet. Many things could be taken by them for granted which we are obliged to prove. Many things are denied now that nobody then questioned. Though error, in substance, may always be the same, it is continually varying its forms, and it appears now under forms under which it never before appeared. Shall we be permitted to meet these new forms in the only way in which they can be effectually met, or shall we be told that we must let them alone, say nothing about them, and take all possible precautions to prevent the faithful from knowing of their existence?

The times in which we live are peculiar, and it ought not to be accounted strange or matter of astonishment that even men placed high in authority and with the best intentions in the world, should not always understand them, or at once seize and apply the best methods of dealing with their peculiar errors. The clergy are, to a great extent, trained in ignorance of the world and in special reference to a state of things which has passed away, very likely never to return. Our seminaries train the young Levites to the work to be done in old Catholic countries, where all things are settled and the priest has little to do except to administer the Sacraments and cultivate the piety and love

of the people of his charge. They instruct him, no doubt, in regard to past heresies, and teach him the answers to the well-known objections to our faith urged by the older heretics. He learns the answer to the Arians, the Nestorians, the Eutychians, the Pelagians, the Lutherans, the Calvinists, and the Jansenists, and perhaps to the Deists and older school of German Rationalists. But he learns little of the doctrines and speculations of the more recent rationalists of Germany, who are now the only formidable enemies to our holy religion, and from whom proceed the only really weighty objections which the Catholic controversialist has now to refute. What wonder then that our clergy should, in some respects, mistake the work now especially necessary to be done, or misconstrue the labors and tendencies of those who have made it their especial study to comprehend those objections and insist on answering them in their own way?

The difficulty is not that Catholics do not know the positive doctrines of their Church, but that they are not fully instructed in regard to the errors and speculations now dominant in the non-Catholic world. Our Catholic community, taken at large, not only do not understand them, but are not sufficiently instructed to understand their refutation when given. Publicists, who are as innocent of any knowledge of them as the child unborn, clamor against him who really refutes them, get up an excitement against him, and cause all the lovers of peace to look upon him as a dangerous and pestilent fellow; for usually the friends of peace blame the party in the right, rarely the party in the wrong. He who departs from routine is set down at once as guilty, and they who misunderstand, misrepresent, and denounce him, are regarded as praiseworthy. The local authorities of the Church, having little time or disposition to look into the merits of the question, take it for granted that he is the offending party, and either labor to circumscribe his influence or to silence his voice. These things may be inevitable considering the frailty of human nature, but we cannot believe them advantageous to the interest of the Church. Just now popular opinion among Catholics, as among non-Catholics, identifies Catholicity and despotism, and the controversialist who seeks to prove that the Catholic religion has no natural association with despotism but is favorable to liberty and the inherent rights of man, runs the risk of being denounced on all hands as a bad

Catholic. The really formidable war waged upon the Church is waged by the cultivators of science and the German Rationalists. Yet he who should endeavor by his explanations of Catholic theology, though adhering firmly to the Catholic faith, to disarm them of their hostility and to show the perfect harmony of science and reason with Catholicity, would most likely be accused by his own brethren of the very errors he labors to refute.

The reason of this is in the fact that one cannot meet these classes of enemies without modifying many things which have been currently held by Catholics, without modifying, not Catholic tradition, but various traditions of Catholics. Whoever has studied their objections knows perfectly well that many of them cannot be answered without rejecting many notions popular among Catholics, or without important modifications of the philosophy and theology of the schools. But these modifications we are not permitted by our meticulous theologians and our philosophical professors to make; for any modifications in either seem to them to be a modification of faith itself. Moreover, having received the faith as scholastically expressed and learned to defend it under scholastic forms, these theologians and professors feel that they would not know how to defend it if expressed under any other forms. He who modifies the philosophy or theology of the schools is looked upon as an innovator in matters in which it is not lawful to innovate; he loses or he fails to acquire the confidence of his own friends, who are sure to open a fire on him in the rear while he is engaged in doing battle with his and their enemies in front. Not because they do not love the truth, not because they do not wish to see it prevail, but because they see not the propriety, the necessity, or even the lawfulness of the modifications he proposes.

This grows out of the fact that Catholics do not carefully distinguish between faith and theology, between what is human and what is divine in the dogma, or, as we frequently express it, between the Catholic tradition and the traditions of Catholics. Faith, objectively considered, is divine, the revealed word of God, the truth invariable as God himself. It is and must be the same in all ages, in all places, and for all intelligences. There is in it no change, no progress, no development; it is and must be the same whether men believe it or whether they deny it. But theology is human, the work of the human reason opera-

ting on the revealed *data*, the form in which the human understanding draws out and expresses in their mutual relations the contents of the revealed word. The *data* on which it operates are divine truth and invariable, but the form in which they are drawn out and expressed by the understanding is human, and variable as is everything human. The revelation cannot vary because it is the word of God, who is perfect; but the human form may vary because the human mind is imperfect, and the imperfect can never give to that which is perfect an adequate form or expression. The human element of faith or theology is therefore variable as the human mind itself; the dogma, in so far as divine, is invariable; but even in the dogma there is a human element, because the human mind, in receiving the revelation, necessarily receives it through the medium of language or sensible form, which symbolizes it. The symbol does not interpret itself, and its significance is necessarily determined by the mind to which it is addressed. This is evident from the fact that divine revelation can be made only to intelligences or rational existences. God can make no revelation of spiritual truth to an ox, a horse, or a dog, because in these there is no intelligence to receive it, no reason to interpret the sign or symbol, that is, the language through which it is made. The Church, indeed, is infallible in her definitions. But what is it that she defines? She defines the language, that is, the symbol. But the language or symbol means for the mind only what it interprets it to mean, and this interpretation will vary as varies the understanding of the interpreter. Unity of faith, therefore, depends on the unity of reason, or rather on the unity of the race. Faith, objectively taken, is always infallible, but it can be subjectively infallible only on condition of an infallible creditive subject. But the creditive subject is not infallible, and though illustrated and elevated by the grace of faith, *donum fidei*, it never becomes infallible, otherwise error on the part of the subject in matters of Catholic faith would be absolutely impossible, which we know is not the fact. Consequently the human element of the dogma itself may vary and be susceptible of progress or development, which, perhaps, is the fact which Dr. Newman intended to bring out in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. Due consideration of these facts would remove that fear which so many Catholics have that any change, progress, or develop-

ment in scholastic theology must necessarily bring about a change in faith, or be a change, progress, or development in divine revelation itself.

In fact, we know that theology has changed more than once with the changes of time and place. Nothing human remains or can remain always the same. The human mind is imperfect and cannot take in all truth at one glance; it goes on from age to age changing or modifying its views of truth, sometimes taking in more, sometimes less. The same words do not always have for it the same sense. Its interpretation of the symbol is more or less perfect according to its own point of view, or the stage of its progressive development. Hence it is that from the beginning the Church has been obliged to make new definitions of the symbol. Continually are new definitions called for. At first it sufficed to say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord." This symbol was then sufficient to convey to the mind of the hearer the truth contained in these two articles of the Creed. But when men began to refine on the words *heaven* and *earth*, it became necessary to give them a further definition, and define that by them is meant all things visible and invisible, that is to say, all things sensible and intelligible, in order to exclude the doctrine of the *Demiourgos*, and the Gnostic fancies of uncreated *Eons*. It was sufficient for the primitive Christians to say, "Jesus Christ is the Son of God," because *son* is always consubstantial with *father*. But when speculation had obscured this truth, and had led to the denial of the proper Divinity of the Son, and his Eternal Generation, it became necessary, in order to save the revealed truth, to give further and fuller definitions as we have them in the Nicene Creed. When the Patripassians, losing sight of the proper distinction of the three Persons in the Godhead, represented the Father as dying on the cross, it became necessary to assert more clearly that distinction, and to define that it was the Word, the Second Person, not the Father distinctively taken, that was incarnate. When Arius made the distinction between the Father and Son a distinction, not merely of Persons, but of nature or substance, the Church, in order to save the symbol, was obliged to define anew the Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, as subsequently she was obliged to assert in clearer and more distinct terms the proper Personality of the Holy

Ghost against the Macedonians. When Nestorius, confounding the distinction of Persons with the distinction of substances, and knowing that the Divinity is one and Being Eternal cannot be born of woman, denied the union of the two natures, the human and Divine, in the one Divine Person of Christ, and therefore denied that Mary is the mother of God, the Church condemned him and asserted the unity of the Person of our Lord. When, from the unity of the Person, the Eutychians concluded the unity of the two natures in Christ after the Resurrection, the Church added to her definition of unity of Person the perpetual distinction of the two natures, as subsequently against the Monophysites she asserted the distinction of the two Wills. When Pelagius loses sight of the fact that man has his destiny in the supernatural order, and exaggerates nature and free will, the Church asserts more distinctly the necessity of grace, and the impotence of man by nature alone to attain to a supernatural end. When speculators taking occasion from the condemnation of Pelagius to run into the opposite extreme, and make grace operate without nature, the Church reasserts against them free will and the coöperation of nature with grace. So of all the other definitions which the Church has from time to time made. All these definitions have grown out of the changes made by the human mind in what we call the human element of the dogma, that is to say, in the interpretation the human mind in its own operations gives to the sacred and infallible words of the Church. These definitions do not change faith or in any sense modify it; their aim and their direct tendency are to preserve it in its unity and integrity. But they all involve to a greater or less extent a modification of previous theological forms and modes of expression. There is a great difference in form between the theology of the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene, and between the ante-Tridentine and the post-Tridentine Fathers. A theologian would be justly suspected of heresy to-day were he to use expressions which were used by many of the greatest and most orthodox of the ante-Nicene writers. The mediæval writers, though they retain the faith, often depart widely from the theology of the Fathers of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. Numerous modifications were rendered necessary by the definitions of the Council of Trent, and still greater have been introduced by the controversies raised up by Baius and Jansenius and the Papal constitutions against Jansenism.

It is contrary to the whole history of the past to suppose that no new modifications can be called for or admitted. There are numerous questions that remain yet undefined, and there are numerous opinions floating about amongst Catholics, and often supposed to be Catholic doctrine, that have not yet been defined, and against which most of the objections to Catholicity in our day are urged. Whoever reads the book before us will see that the author's great difficulty is with the common doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked, or that the torments of hell are vindictive and endless. He cannot understand how the wicked can with justice be endlessly punished, except on the ground that they continue forever sinning. Now what is Catholic doctrine on this subject? Does the Church teach that the punishment of the wicked in hell is vindictive or simply expiative? Does she teach that the punishment is everlasting because the reprobate continue everlastingly to sin?

Certainly the Church teaches that they who die unregenerate shall never see God in the beatific vision, that is, be united with God by the *ens supernaturale*. This loss or deprivation of heaven is a penalty of sin, and is undoubtedly everlasting. But has she defined that the wicked in hell are continually committing new sin, that they continue through eternity uttering new blasphemies against God, which call down upon them new showers of Divine wrath? Are their hearts devoured by a literal worm that never dies? Are they subjected to a material fire that is never quenched? Are they doomed to those sensible tortures which the imaginations of our preachers so often attempt to depict? If they continue to commit sin, how can we say that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works? If their punishment is purely vindictive, not expiative, how can you reconcile it with the love, the mercy, or the goodness of God? Would the worst man that ever lived, animated by the most vindictive passions that ever raged in the human breast, not recoil from inflicting anything like so severe suffering upon his most bitter and most hated enemies? Is there not here a point in which popular belief needs to be modified? Can the everlasting existence of evil be by any means reconciled with the universal dominion of good? Has the Church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe that any thing is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked except their exclusion from supernatural be-

attitude? May we not hope that the sins of this life may in some sense be expiated, and that the reprobate, though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesis, may yet find their sufferings gradually diminishing, and themselves attaining to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude? We know nothing in the definitions of the Church opposed to this, and therefore, though only the elect can be saved, we know no authority for denying that all men may not attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature. If this view may be taken, or if this theological explanation of the Catholic doctrine of hell is admissible, many of the most serious objections urged by thinking men against the Church would be removed. Are we or are we not at liberty to take this view and offer this explanation? Can we hold and defend this view compatibly with our faith as a Catholic?

There are also various questions with regard to the Holy Scriptures which seem to us as yet unsettled, and which may be settled somewhat differently from the solutions which they receive in popular theology. That the Holy Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament are given by divine inspiration and contain the written word of God, is unquestionably of faith and can be doubted by no Catholic. But in what sense is this to be understood? Is it that the inspired writers were merely passive under divine inspiration, and that in writing they exercised no reason or volition of their own? Are we bound to believe that every word was dictated by the Holy Ghost, and that theology must defend every form of expression, every particular fact or statement that may be found in the Scriptures, and as given us in the Latin version called the Vulgate? Must we believe that St. Jerome had in all cases the correct and authentic reading of the original Hebrew, Chaldaic, or Greek, and that he never mistook in a single instance the true sense of a single term he translates, or the Latin word by which he translates it? Or, are we free to hold that only the doctrines or principles of our faith were given by direct inspiration, and that the writers followed their own reason, judgment, and taste, in their forms of expression, in the selection of the imagery and illustrations they adopt, and in the arguments which they use or put forth in defence of the truth revealed? Is there any room left for Biblical criticism, for the collation of manuscripts, the comparison of recensions, and corrections

of the text? Is it necessary to our orthodoxy that we defend every historical statement as strictly exact, interpret literally every reference to science, to natural history, to geography, to geology, to chemistry, or to astronomy? Must we, in addition, follow in all cases the traditionary interpretation or application of texts? Must we believe the Fathers, or even Popes and Councils, have always been infallibly guided and assisted by the Holy Ghost in the applications they have made of sacred texts, and that any different interpretation or application would be heretical or rash, although apparently demanded by the obvious sense of the words themselves? These are questions of no little importance, at least in the present state of Biblical literature and Hermeneutics.

Then, again, how are we to understand the Mosaic Cosmogony, the Account of the Creation of Man given in Genesis, the Garden of Eden, the Seduction of the Woman by the Serpent, the Fall of our First Parents, the Longevity of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, and the Deluge? Are we to take all this as so much literal history, as a simple narration of facts, or are we at liberty to take these first chapters of Genesis in an allegorical or philosophical sense, as, according to Josephus, did the Jews, and as was done by St. Augustine and others of the Fathers? If not, how will you meet the objections drawn from geology and other sciences against what is written? Have we as yet answered those objections on the view taken by the scholastics? Are we able to do it? If not, how are we to defend our religion against its scientific opposers, and win back to it the science and intelligence of the age; or how can we say there is no discrepancy between faith and science?

Finally, there are questions in regard to the mutual relations of the natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, science and faith, nature and grace, that require to be examined anew and answered differently from what they appear to be answered, if answered at all, in scholastic theology. To the mass of men outside of the Church, in our times, the natural and supernatural, as represented by scholastic theology, appear as contradictories, and as mutually destructive one of the other. The supernatural appears to them arbitrary, isolated, without reason, necessity, or utility, in the general constitution of things. They see not why the Creator could not in the beginning have created nature with all the powers and faculties necessary to

attain to the good he designed it. In nature, so far as submitted to their inspection, he works by laws uniform and invariable, and accomplishes his purposes by a fixed system of means adapted to ends. They see no necessity for any arbitrary intervention of Providence, no good to be accomplished by it, no reason for it. Such intervention seems to them to derogate from his wisdom, to imply a vacillation in his purposes, and to mar the symmetry and beauty of the world. All the presumptions drawn from their knowledge of nature are against the supernatural. They look upon miracles as improbable *a priori*, nay, as incapable of being proved by any possible amount of testimony. In their view natural reason and man's natural strength are sufficient, and they treat all pretences to miracles and the supernatural as superstitious and unworthy of respect. Hence the non-Catholic thought of the age is rationalistic and tends to pure naturalism. It rejects the supernatural in all its forms as superstition. Such we well know is the fact. Now, how, with our scholastic theology, are we to meet this fact? How, if we regard, as do the scholastics, the supernatural as isolated and arbitrary, are we to prove to the rationalists and naturalists of our times the fact of the supernatural, or to convince them that there is in our religion a class of facts really supernatural in their origin and character? How can we do this with the philosophy or theology in which we are brought up? There is here a real difficulty which every Catholic polemic feels the moment he begins to reason with candid, intelligent, and philosophic unbelievers.

But this is not all. Among Catholics themselves we find no little confusion on these points. On one side we find men in their effort to save nature and reason running into Pelagianism, which is virtually denying the supernatural, or the Divinity of Christ; on another side, we find others, wishing to save the supernatural, running into Jansenism and virtually denying the natural, or the Humanity of Christ. Again, we find persons who admit the natural and supernatural, but as disconnected, as severed one from the other,—analogous to the error of Nestorius that dissolves Jesus Christ, and denies the union of the two natures in one Divine Person; in contrast with these, we find also others who run to the opposite extreme, deny the distinction between the natural and supernatural, and fall into the Eutychian heresy, which denies that the human and Divine natures in our Lord are

forever distinct. Everywhere we hear men extolling nature at the expense of grace, or decrying reason in order to exalt faith; nowhere do we find amongst our theologians the distinction and union of the natural and supernatural, of which the type is presented in the Mystery of the Incarnation. The consequence is that we are unable to meet the wants of cultivated intelligence, and to bring back to the Church the learned and scientific among her opposers.

We know these statements will not be received with favor, but we are sure that they are true; not true, indeed, as against Catholic faith, against the revelation of God which the Church has received and maintains in its unity and integrity, but true, undeniably true, as against our modern manner of setting forth, explaining, and defending, in our human systems, that revelation. If, then, we are to carry on successfully our war against the enemies of the Church, convince the unbelieving, subdue the rebellious, recover the alienated, and prepare the way for new and more glorious victories for our religion, we must be allowed to make those modifications in the human elements of the beliefs and doctrines of Catholics which the present state of non-Catholic thought and intelligence render necessary; we must be permitted to show the harmony between rationalism and traditionalism, between the natural and the supernatural, between nature and grace, without separating them, or confounding them, or sacrificing the one to the other. We must rise in our philosophy to the point where in principle they are one, and while we scrupulously maintain their distinction we must take care that we never separate them. We must show that the supernatural, as well as the natural, originates in the creative act of God, and constitutes an order as regular, as uniform, and invariable in its kind as the natural order itself; that miracles, in relation to the supernatural order, are no more isolated or arbitrary than the phenomena of reproduction or growth in the natural; that each order has its own generic principles, its own laws of operation consistent with each other, proceeding alike from God as first cause and tending to God as final cause; that in fact the natural and supernatural, reason and revelation, nature and grace, do constitute but parts of one synthetic whole. They are distinguishable, but not separable. The natural is not contained in the supernatural, nor the supernatural in the natural, but both are contained in the creative act of God, the common link that

unites them. Neither has its reason in the other, but both have their reason in Divine Providence.

When we have found a philosophical or theological doctrine that enables us to show this clearly and satisfactorily to human reason, we shall have removed from the supernatural all character of arbitrariness or isolation, and vindicated for it a generic order of its own; we have thus removed the presumption against it, and rendered miracles as probable and as provable as any facts of the natural order; we have thus brought all of our religion that needs proving within the order of facts provable by testimony, and thus answered all the *a priori* objections of non-Catholics, the only objections that have not hitherto been sufficiently answered. The rest of the work for the Catholic polemic is either already done or capable of being done without much difficulty. Now what we ask is not so much that Catholic controversialists should undertake to do this work, as that Catholic public opinion should permit them to do it and sustain them in doing it, provided they attempt it in a proper spirit, with loyal intentions, and without lesion to Catholic faith. It is not liberty to depart from the faith or to construct a faith for one's self that we demand, but liberty to defend the faith "once delivered to the saints," without restraint from mere human traditions, or philosophical, or theological opinions, which it is not necessary to faith that we should respect.

This liberty may be denied; the demand for it may be treated as an indication of a disloyal temper; the exercise of it may be denounced as smacking of Protestantism; but whoever knows the spirit of the age in which we live, the nature of the objections we have to meet, the controversies we have to carry on in the higher regions of intelligence, knows, as well as any thing of the sort can be known, that, without it, it is idle to attempt any thing in the way of convincing or converting unbelievers, that Catholic polemics are entirely useless, and that there remains nothing for us but to fold our hands, close our mouths, and wait in inaction and silence the miraculous intervention of Divine Providence to save the Catholic world from being reduced to a mere handful of women and children. We may boast our present numbers and flatter ourselves that we are making progress, but perhaps it would be difficult to name an epoch, since St. Peter erected his Chair in the city of Rome, when the Church had suffered greater losses than in

that of the last ten years. We are in a crisis or a transition state, and the difficulty is that few among us seem to appreciate the fact, or, if appreciating it, have the nerve to look it boldly in the face. For the most part, we are unable to persuade ourselves that we cannot arrest the present tendency of things, and restore and re-establish that which is past or passing away. Hence our impotence.

We ask no concession to the spirit of our times that may not be lawfully made; we ask no surrender of faith or of sound doctrine; we ask no compromise with error, no abandonment of any claim ever made by the Church under her supreme Pastor as the kingdom of God on earth; we ask no sacrifice of principle to popularity, no alliance of the Church with temporary excitements or popular movements. We seek not popularity even in the state, far less would we seek it in the Church; we are willing to suffer the reproach of our Lord, and we love our Church all the more when she is in affliction, when her enemies everywhere rise up against her, and the wicked seem to triumph over her. Dearest to us is our Lord when nailed to the cross, and crying out, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?" It is not to render the Church popular, to gain for her the applause of the wisdom of this world, or the shouts of the mob, but it is that we may reach understandings, move wills, and gain souls, that we thus speak. God forgive us if we have spoken harshly, falsely, uncharitably, or unnecessarily. But here is a world lying in error and unbelief around us. The great majority, not only of our own countrymen, but of the human race, are living and dying without any true belief in Christ, or any well-grounded hope of entering with him into his kingdom and sharing his glory. And what are they, to whom the word of God and the means of life are committed, doing for their conversion? Where do we see the deep consciousness of the fact that God works by means, makes man responsible for man, and man an instrument in the salvation of man? To us Catholics seem to have lost the sense of their mission, to have become indifferent to the great work of saving souls which God has committed to them, to have become solicitous chiefly about the things of this world, about amassing or retaining earthly goods, laying up treasures on the earth, while suffering souls to perish for the lack of that bread which God has given them to dispense. So thinking and so feeling, what wonder if we,

in some sense, forget ourselves, and use language which would be more appropriate from the anointed priest of God or authorized teacher in Israel, than from one who has no claim to be regarded as pertaining to the tribe of Levi? We speak as we do because it seems to us there are few left who will speak the word the age needs. We speak not in wrath, not in pride, not in disdain or contempt of others, but because our heart is full, and the words will out. Restrain them we cannot. If they are presumptuous we deeply regret it, and hope there is yet in the world Christian charity enough to take what we say in the sense and spirit in which it is intended.

ART. IV.—*Political Remarks.* By "N." Numbers I—XI.
Charleston: 1861. 8vo.

IN the *Review* for April last, we took a gloomy and somewhat desponding view of the present crisis in the affairs of our country. At the time we were writing the Administration was still in the hands of Mr. Buchanan; the party that had managed to bring the country to the brink of ruin, was still in place; the Republicans, who had triumphed in the election of Mr. Lincoln, were apparently divided among themselves as to the course the new Government should take; there seemed nowhere, either North or South, any decided attachment to the Union; and rebellion was as openly avowed, and almost as fiercely defended in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, as in Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans; there was a general distrust of the officers of the Army and Navy; traitors were everywhere; wisdom, energy, patriotism, nowhere. The Gulf States pretended to have seceded, and had formed a provisional government under the name of the "Confederate States of America." North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, if not Kentucky and Tennessee, it was known were ready to withdraw from the Union the moment that it was clearly ascertained that they could no longer effectually serve the cause of rebellion by remaining in it. Arkansas was pledged to the Confederacy, and there was a strong Secession party in Missouri. A Confederate army was organized, and the Rebels had plenty of arms, taken from the

forts and arsenals of the United States. The Treasury was empty; the credit of the Government was low; and the feeble Federal Army and Navy was so dispersed as to require months to concentrate them, or to render them of any efficiency in supporting the Union. A long peace and a general belief that wars on this continent were no longer to be apprehended, had left our militia without effective organization, and, for the most part, nothing more than the mere raw material of soldiers. The great bulk of the people seemed to be wholly engrossed in trade and speculation, selfish, and incapable of any disinterested, heroic, or patriotic effort. What wonder, then, that we wrote in despondency, without hope for the future?

But since then the whole aspect of affairs has changed, and we are obliged to confess that we had underrated the patriotism and attachment to the Union of the people of the non-Slaveholding States. The Administration has been able to replenish, not on very unreasonable terms, the exhausted Treasury, and the call of the President for seventy-five thousand volunteers to save the National Capital and stay the tide of rebellion, was within three weeks responded to from the several Free States, it is said, with an offer of the services of more than half a million of men. States and municipalities, within the same period, voted, as a free gift to the Government for arming, equipping, and training volunteers or supporting their families, over twenty-three millions of dollars. Party lines were obliterated, divisions were healed, and there was an outburst of patriotism such as the world has rarely, if ever, witnessed, from twenty millions of freemen. The star-spangled banner was thrown to the breeze from every public edifice, from every church steeple, and almost from every house; and from the mighty heart of all the Free States rung out the battle-cry, "The Union must and shall be preserved." Since the fall of Sumter on the 14th of April, up to the 1st of June, an efficient land force of not less, it is said, than a hundred and fifty thousand men has been organized, armed, and equipped, and is either on the frontiers or drilling in the different camps in the several States. Another levy of a hundred thousand men, if made, would be cheerfully responded to, as indeed would be a levy of twice that number. The only embarrassment of the Government thus far has grown out of its inability to accept the numbers of volunteers offering. Ships-of-war have been recalled, a powerful

fleet fitted out, and nearly all the ports of the States in which rebellion is rampant, are effectually blockaded. Nearly all the strategic points are guarded, the advance of the Rebels effectually checked, the posts in the rebellious States that continued in the possession of the Government effectually reinforced, and a forward movement commenced. All this has been done in six weeks. The simple enumeration of these facts proves that we, as well as others, had wronged our countrymen, and that our fears for the safety of the Union were uncalled for.

We do not believe that the history of the world presents an instance of so much having been done and in so short a time by any people. The uprising of the Free States in defence of their government and flag is unprecedented, and proves that however the American people may have degenerated during fifty years of peace and unbounded prosperity, they are still a people who have a future and are far from having fallen into the past; that they are full of life and energy, of ardor and hope, and have a long and, if they choose, a glorious career before them. As to the military spirit of our people, we have never doubted it. We have said on more occasions than one, that give the American people a cause, an occasion, a battle field, and they would prove themselves the first military nation in the world. They have in their composition the activity of the Frenchman, the reckless daring of the Irishman, the steadiness of the German, and the pluck of the Englishman; they have combined in them in admirable proportions the peculiar military virtues of the several nations of Europe. But we had feared that, made up to a great extent as they are from all the various populations of Europe, and possessing a sort of cosmopolitan character, they would be found in the hour of trial deficient in patriotism, especially in loyalty to the Government of the Union. We think the events of the last six weeks ought to dissipate all fears of this sort, at least so far as the real American people, the people of the non-Slaveholding States are concerned. We feel for ourselves that we still have a country, and, whatever may be the future, we are proud of our countrymen, and still glory in being an American.

It is too late to discuss the merits of the controversy between the United States and the Rebels now in arms against the Government. Our views with regard to that controversy are well known to our readers. No man in the

Union, according to his ability, and sphere of influence, has done more to prevent the spread of Abolitionism, or to defend against fanatics of either section of the Union the constitutional rights of the South or Slaveholding States. From 1828 down to the present moment, the Editor of this Review has never faltered or wavered in his defence of State Rights, or in his opposition to centralism or consolidation. He was, as is well known, the personal and political friend of John C. Calhoun, and for a time defended even his doctrine of Nullification. His sympathies have always been with the South, and his warmest personal and political friends have been in that section of the country. But he owes it to himself to say that he has always been attached to the Union of these States, and felt that his loyalty as a citizen was due to the Federal government. He has always looked upon the several States as integral parts of one common country, and whether in Wisconsin or Michigan, in Ohio or Indiana, Illinois or Missouri, Kentucky or Tennessee, Louisiana or Alabama, South Carolina or Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania, New York or Connecticut, Rhode Island or Massachusetts, Maine or Vermont, he was still in his own country, on his own native soil, among his own countrymen and fellow-citizens. Patriotism, with him, has always meant love to the whole country under the jurisdiction of the Federal government. He has never understood it to be restricted to his native State, or to the State of which, for the time being, he might be a citizen. In his patriotism he has known no North, no South, no East, no West. For him every man was his countryman who was born under the flag of the Union. He has always regarded the Federal government, though a government of express and delegated powers, as possessing, within the sphere of its constitutional powers, the character of a real government, vested with true sovereignty. Though formed by sovereign States, by mutual compact, he has never held it, when formed, to be a simple league or confederation of states, but a proper national government, and entitled to the allegiance of every American citizen. He has never admitted the actual right of any State to secede from the Union, and the doctrine of Nullification which he at one time held he had disavowed in these pages so long ago as in 1847.

We owe it furthermore to ourselves to say that though opposed to the Abolition party movement, we have never

approved of slavery. Regarding slavery as a local institution existing only by municipal law or usage, we have always treated it as a subject over which the Union had, in the ordinary exercise of its powers, no authority, and as lying in our political system wholly within the jurisdiction of the State in which it is established. In our political action we have insisted on leaving it to the Slaveholding States themselves, to be disposed of as they should judge proper. But as a man, as a philosopher, as a Christian, and as a statesman, we have always been opposed to it. We have regarded it as a flagrant violation of those fundamental rights of man on which our Republic professes to be founded, no less than of that brotherhood of the human race asserted by the Gospel. We have believed it wrong in principle, mischievous in practice, a grave evil to the slave, and a graver evil to the master. We have always believed it a grievous moral, social, and political evil, and hence we have always been opposed to the extension of its area. Our policy has always been to circumscribe it within the narrowest limits that we could constitutionally. We have believed it more important to maintain the Union of these States under the existing Constitution, and more in the interest of liberty, than to seek the extinction of slavery by unconstitutional action, or by the political interference of the citizens of one State with the institutions, domestic or social, of another. As far as slavery could extend itself legally under the existing Constitution, we have always deemed it our duty to refrain from interfering with it. But we have never contemplated with any degree of satisfaction to ourselves the probability, or even the possibility, of the permanent existence of negro slavery in any part of the American Republic. We have always held it to be the duty of the Slaveholding States to take at the earliest moment the most efficient measures in their power for educating and preparing their slaves for freedom and the final extinction of slavery. Such have been our views ever since we have been old enough to reflect and form opinions on the subject, and such have been and are the views of the great majority of the people of the non-Slaveholding States. The great majority of us have always detested slavery, and deeply regretted its existence within the limits of the United States, but we have always been willing to discharge to the letter all our constitutional duties towards the slaveholding communities of the South, and notwithstanding all

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the provocation and insults heaped upon us by our Southern brethren, we are still prepared to discharge faithfully all the duties in regard to slavery that any fair and honest interpretation of the Constitution imposes upon us. Here is what we said on this subject, January, 1857 :—

“Our readers know that we are no abolitionists, and no one can suspect us of any sympathy with them. We say distinctly that we are strongly opposed to all efforts made in the non-Slaveholding States to abolish slavery where it now exists. We have no right or wish to interfere with it in the Slave States. It is, in those States, an affair of their own, and to their disposition of it we feel ourselves bound to leave it. We always have defended, and always shall scrupulously defend, to the best of our feebleabilities, all the constitutional rights of slaveholders as well as of non-slaveholders; we will not interfere with the free development and expansion of slavery within its legal limits; but we are not and never have been the champion of slavery; we have never been and never expect to be captivated by its beauties; and, in common with the great body of the people of the Free States, we are personally opposed to its extension beyond the limits of the States in which it now legally exists, and we cannot condemn those who believe themselves bound to use all their constitutional rights to resist its further extension. We will scrupulously respect all the rights of the Slave States, but we expect them to respect equally all the rights of the Free States, and we are unable to see why it is not as honorable and as chivalric to labor to extend the area of freedom as it is to labor to extend the area of slavery.”—*Brownson's Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1857, pp. 96, 97.

If the Slaveholding States had been satisfied with this view, and asked nothing more of us in the Free States than the simple discharge of our constitutional duties, or if they had been content with the simple legal rights of slavery, there would have been no collision between the two Sections of the country. The cause of the Southern rebellion is not in the aggressions of the North, nor in the movements of Northern abolitionists. We must seek it in the fact that the Slaveholding States wished through the slave interest, or the interest of capital invested in slaves, to control the policy of the country and administer the Government in their own favor, and in the farther fact that they felt they could have no adequate security for the capital so invested while the wealthier and more populous Section of the Union entertained opinions and convictions hostile to slavery. No modification of the Constitution, however favor-

able to slavery, would have satisfied them so long as they felt themselves the weaker party. Nothing would satisfy them but the conversion of the North to their views of slavery. They knew perfectly well that slavery could not long exist in a country unless it were its controlling interest. It can flourish only so long as it governs, and must die out when the supremacy passes from its hands. Hence these States made at first a desperate struggle through the Northern Democracy, which almost from the origin of the Government had been allied with them, to retain their supremacy. They made afterwards a still more desperate struggle to change the opinions of the North with regard to slavery itself. But, failing in both attempts, and seeing that power must pass from their hands, and henceforth be wielded by a party that would not consent to be governed by the interests of the capital invested in slaves, they felt that their only security lay in breaking up the Union, and forming a separate Confederacy of their own, based on slavery as its corner-stone. They would, whatever they pretended, accept no compromise, and the Free States had no option but to submit to their dictation, abdicate their own rights in the Union, and recognize slavery as a Christian institution, as existing by divine right, and as forming the basis of our Republic, or to assert their own manhood, their equal rights as members of the Union, form a really constitutional party, carry the elections, and administer the Government for the common interests of the whole country, and not for the special interest of a particular section, and that the slaveholding section. This they did in the last Presidential election. No intelligent man at the South believed that the success of the Republican party threatened directly the institution of slavery; but the whole South saw in it the fact that the political control of the Union had passed from Southern hands, and that henceforth the Slaveholding States would be obliged to be contented to stand on a footing of equality with the non-Slaveholding States. There was no fear that the slave interest would be deprived of any of its legal rights, but there was a certainty that henceforth it would not be supreme in the councils of the Union; that, however scrupulously it might be respected within the Slaveholding States themselves, the extension of slavery into new territory where it had no legal existence, would be effectually checked; that no more territory could be acquired and annexed to the Union in the interest of slavery;

that the flag of the Union would be no longer permitted to cover the piratical slave-trade, and that all hopes of reopening the African slave-trade must be abandoned. Here, in our judgment, is, in brief, the real cause of the present collision between the United States and the Southern Rebels. The cause, we repeat, is not in Northern aggression, but in Northern emancipation from Southern domination. We told the South in 1857 what would be the consequence if she persisted in seeking to make the Union the mere instrument of advancing the interest of capital vested in slaves, of her attempting to convert the Democratic party into a party for slavery-propagandism, and of her attempt to establish the doctrine that the Constitution carries with it slavery wherever it goes. We make here another extract from the article already referred to :

“The admirers of slavery, whether Northern or Southern, must know that they stand very much alone, and that it is too late to attempt to make converts to the slave system. Say what we will, slavery is regarded by the civilized world as an odious institution, as well as by the great mass of the people of the Free States; and even the people of the Slave States themselves are very far from being unanimous in their admiration of it. We have found as much genuine, honest abolition sentiment in the Slave States as we have ever found in the Free States, and the Southern politicians, who talk so violently against the Northern Yankees, know very well that it requires the most strenuous efforts on their part to retain their hold on their constituents. Most of their declamation is intended for effect at home rather than abroad. For ourselves personally, we would not emancipate the slave population at the South if we had the power, not, indeed, because we like slavery, but because, with all the study we have been able to give to the subject, we can discover no condition possible *at present* for the mass of that population superior to that in which they now are. Humanity towards that population, if nothing else, would prevent us from being an abolitionist. But the South cannot be ignorant that she has the civilized world against her, and, if she seeks in earnest to foist her domestic institutions on territory under the Constitution now free, she will meet in the Free States a resistance, which even her chivalry will not be able to withstand. The Free States are determined that there shall be no further extension of slave territory to the North or to the South, and the immense pluralities in the late election for Colonel Fremont prove that their resolution in this respect is not to be despised; and yet Colonel Fremont himself did not command the full vote of the party opposed to slavery extension. If his election had turned on

that question alone, he would have swept by overwhelming majorities every non-Slaveholding State in the Union, and perhaps have carried two or three even of the Slave States. This should admonish the incoming administration that no strengthening and consolidating of the slave interest beyond its strict constitutional rights, can be prudently attempted. The Free States will not consent to be governed by that interest. Southern politicians and Southern journals may threaten secession, may talk disunion, may advocate a Southern slaveholding confederacy, but it will not move the mass of the people in the Free States. If the controversy proceeds to blows, they will give as well as receive, and perhaps not be the first to yield. If worst comes to worst, the old battle of the Puritans and the Cavaliers will be fought over again, and the party opposed to slavery extension will then, in spite of all that can be said, be an abolition party, and the cry will be 'freedom to the slave,' instead of the old cry of 'a godly reformation of the Church and State.' The South cannot afford to provoke such a conflict, for in it the moral sense of the civilized world would be with the North, who would be cheered on as the champions of freedom."—*Ibid*, pp. 101, 102.

Well, it has come to this. The South has appealed from ballots to bullets, and forced upon the North an issue which the people of the Free States could not refuse to accept without abdicating their manhood, and standing branded in history as the most miserable cravens and dastards that the world has ever known. The war has come, and come none too soon. The issue had to be tried, whether the New World was to be a land of freedom, sacred to free institutions and self-government, or whether it was to be a land of slavery, where man was to be treated no longer as man, but as a mere chattel, with no soul, no reason, no conscience, no immortality. It has come, we say, none too soon, for already were we beginning to lose our freedom of speech even in the Free States, and there was growing up everywhere a fear to speak out the great truths of religion and morality, of philosophy and political science, lest, forsooth, we might irritate our Southern brethren and endanger the trade between the North and South. When we wrote our articles on slavery in January and April, 1857, a committee from highly respectable and most influential gentlemen in this city was sent to remonstrate with us, and to urge us either to retract what we had said or carefully refrain for the future from alluding to the subject of slavery in our pages. It was hazardous to our reputation with our own

Northern fellow-citizens to publish on the question of slavery what has always been the doctrine of the Church, that all men by nature are free, that man has received from his Maker no dominion over man, and that slavery can lawfully exist only as a penalty or a discipline. Slavery was penetrating everywhere, and we were fast becoming slaves, even while boasting our freedom. Thank God, we are now emancipated, our lips are unsealed, and we are no longer debarred from speaking the language of reason and common sense for fear of irritating some Southern slaveholder or trafficker in human flesh. The shots that struck Sumter knocked off our chains, and enabled us of the North to spring to our feet as freemen, and to feel for the first time in our history as a nation, that we are really free and no longer under Southern tutelage. It was this sense of freedom, this sense of their emancipation, the assurance that henceforth they had no terms to keep with slave-drivers or slaveholders, that called forth that universal burst of enthusiasm, that unanimous response to the call of the Government for volunteers, that has surprised ourselves, and called forth the admiration of the civilized world. Whatever be the result of the present struggle, one thing is certain, Southern domination is gone and gone forever, and with it Northern servility and Northern cowardice. If in this struggle we secure not the freedom of the negro population of the South, we shall at least secure our own.

The war now raging is no doubt to be deeply deplored, or rather the causes which have led to it; but in this war the United States are in the right and the Southern Rebels wholly in the wrong. The Rebels, by aid of their Democratic friends in the non-Slaveholding States, have had the administration of the Government, have shaped its general policy at home and abroad, and wielded its patronage, with hardly an interval of time, since the inauguration of Mr. Jefferson in 1801. They have had almost every thing their own way. The South have had no wrongs from the Government, and no grievances from the North to complain of. The Federal government has, from the first, faithfully performed all its duties with regard to the question of slavery. It has fully protected the rights of the slave-owner, and has enacted and executed the most stringent and offensive laws in his favor. The Southern section of the Union has had far more than its share of officers in the Army and Navy, as well as of the Diplomatic representatives of the

country. Of the two foreign wars in which we have been engaged since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the first was forced upon us by the South for the purpose of ruining the commerce and influence of the Northern and Eastern States; and the second, that against Mexico, was undertaken wholly in the slaveholding interest of the South. Though more than three-fourths of the revenues of the Federal government have been collected in the ports of the Free States, nearly two-thirds have been expended in and for the Slaveholding States, and these States have held their slave property in security and been protected in their peculiar institutions, solely because they were regarded by foreign nations and by the citizens of the Free States as integral parts of the great American Republic. No portion of the United States have received so great and so many benefits from the Federal Union. Of what, then, do they complain? What grievance have they had, not of their own creating? Some of our journals, indeed, in all sections of the country say "the South has had wrongs," but we confess we do not know what those wrongs have been. For over thirty years we of the North have been obliged to vote under threats of a dissolution of the Union by Southern politicians, if we did not vote to please them. Since the Missouri Compromise in 1820, there has been on our part but one continued series of concessions to the slaveholding South. If the Free States showed any disposition to adopt a governmental policy not likely to strengthen and consolidate the slave power and to render it permanent, they were branded as "sectional," denounced as "aggressive," as trampling on the "compromises of the Constitution," and met with loud and angry threats of secession. If any party, then, could complain of wrongs, it is not the South, but the North.

We have carefully read the public declarations of the Rebel governments, and, we confess, we have been able to find, even in their one-sided representations, no serious grievances enumerated. They speak of protective Tariffs: but they forget that the Tariff policy was originated by Southern statesmen, or rendered necessary by Southern policy. The capitalists of the North were forced to engage in manufactures by the war of 1812,—a Southern measure intended to destroy the commerce of New England. The first Tariff for protecting these manufactures, introduced at the close of the war, was introduced, or at least supported

by the Hon. John C. Calhoun, subsequently the great Free-trade and Nullification leader of South Carolina; the most strenuous, energetic, and successful advocate of the policy was the Hon. Henry Clay, a slaveholder and the Representative of a Slaveholding State; and a majority of the votes of the New England States was never given for any Tariff Bill in Congress prior to that of 1842. Whether, then, the Protective policy be favorable to the North and oppressive to the South or not, the South is at least as deeply implicated in its adoption as any other section of the Union.

These Governments also complain of the Personal Liberty Bills passed by some of the Free States: but they should remember that these bills were passed chiefly in retaliation for laws enacted in the Slaveholding States, imprisoning free citizens of the North acting as sailors on ships trading to Southern ports during the period of their remaining in port, and authorizing them to be sold into slavery for the expenses of their imprisonment; and also to protect their own citizens from being arrested and carried away into slavery by Southern kidnappers. They should also bear in mind that these Personal Liberty Laws have never prevented the return of fugitive slaves. No State is bound by its own officers or action to return fugitive slaves on claim of their owner; this duty the Supreme Court, as well as Congress, has decided devolves on the Federal government, and the Federal government has never failed to discharge it.

A careful reading of these official declarations, in connection with well-known facts, proves that the only grievance the South has to complain of in us of the non-Slaveholding States is, that we are not charmed with the beauties of the slave system; that we do not regard slavery as a Christian institution existing by divine right; that in fact we dislike slavery, that we detest it and take the liberty to say so. Here is the head and front of our offending. But even in this respect we only retain and express the views and feelings entertained and expressed, till quite recently, by the prominent statesmen and leading men of the Slaveholding States themselves. It amounts, then, to this, that the people of the Slaveholding States have rebelled against the Federal government because the majority of the people of the non-Slaveholding States differ with them in opinion on the subject of slavery, and insist upon treat-

ing black men, as well as white men, as belonging to the human family, in a word, as men created with rational and immortal souls and redeemed by the Passion and Death of our Lord ;—because, in fact, we include them in the great brotherhood of humanity. This is their grievance for which they have seen proper to rebel against the Federal government, and attempt to efface from the map of the world the great Republic of the United States.

The Federal government is manifestly in the right; for whether the Federal government derives its powers by delegation from sovereign States, or directly from the people politically divided into States, it is, within its constitutional sphere, a government with all the rights and immunities of government, and, like every government, must have that first of all rights, the right of self-preservation. The question as to the source of its powers is and can be of no practical importance, when once its powers are ascertained and defined. The people of the United States, in forming the Federal Union, did not form a mere league or confederacy of sovereigns; they formed a government, a government with limited powers indeed, but still a government, supreme, sovereign within its constitutional limits. They formed a union and not a confederacy. From this union no State, any more than an individual, has the right to secede; for they expressly ordain that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." There is no getting over this: the Federal government, within its constitutional limits, is the supreme government of the land, and paramount to all State constitutions, authorities, or laws. Any act of secession by a State is an act of rebellion, and therefore null and void, not only as against the Union, but in relation to its own citizens; and the attempt of the people, or any portion of the people of any State by force of arms to carry such an act into effect, is manifestly a levying of war against the United States, and therefore an act of treason. Even if it were conceded that the sovereignty theoretically still vests in the States, its exercise within certain limits is delegated to the Union and incapable of being revoked without a mani-

fest breach of faith. Say that the Union is a "constitutional compact," it is one of those compacts in which all the parties are bound to each and each to all. Such a compact can be dissolved only by the unanimous consent of all the contracting parties, while from its very nature the parties remaining faithful to it must necessarily have the right to enforce its observance upon any party seeking to evade its provisions. So, whether we take the Northern or the Southern view of the Federal Union, secession is illegal, is in violation of the Constitution, nothing more or less than an act of rebellion, and as such the Federal government has not only the constitutional right, but the constitutional duty, to put it down, if it has or can command the means to do it.

The Federal government, in the present war, is not warring against any State, or seeking to coerce any State as such, into submission; for no State, as a State, has withdrawn or could withdraw from the Union, since any action of the people of any State to withdraw itself would exceed the constitutional right of the State, and be a simple usurpation of power. No States have seceded, for no State, by the Constitution of the United States or by its own Constitution, could secede. The so-called Confederate States of America have, therefore, no legitimate authority either within the States themselves or as against the Union. This Southern Confederacy is simply a league of conspirators and rebels. The Federal government in making war against them, therefore, only makes war in its own defence and in vindication of the constitutional rights of the several States; and in doing it, it is only performing its own imperious and constitutional duties. The war is not a war between the North and South, between the Free and the Slaveholding States, for or against slavery, but is, on the part of the Government, simply a war against traitors and rebels to the States and the Union.

The fact that the Rebellion is confined principally to one section of the Union, or the fact that a considerable portion of the Union are involved in it, makes no difference as to its character. The right of the Government and the essential character of the war remain the same, whether the Rebels are few or many, whether they are Northern or Southern, slaveholders, or non-slaveholders. If it be the right and duty of a government to maintain itself and to put down armed conspirators and traitors against it, there can be no question that the Government has the right and

the duty to put down this Southern Rebellion, and that all loyal citizens are bound to aid it in doing so with their property and with their lives. There never was a more causeless rebellion, one more unprovoked, more unjustifiable, or more guilty. There is not one word to be said in defence or in extenuation of the actors in this foul conspiracy. Consequently no war on the part of a government to put down a conspiracy against its own rights and existence, to vindicate itself and maintain the supremacy of the laws, ever was or ever could be, more just and deserving of the support of all loyal subjects and good citizens.

The Rebel forces are not only forces arrayed against legitimate authority, but they are forces so arrayed under circumstances of peculiar aggravation. The government they seek to cast off or to overthrow is a free government, under a constitution that provides for its own amendment. If the people of the Slaveholding States had wished to separate from the Union, and to form themselves into a separate and independent government, or to become a nation by themselves, there was a legal and constitutional way by which they could have been gratified. If they had felt that their interests, their peculiar institutions, their sentiments and convictions made a longer connection with the non-Slaveholding States undesirable, they might easily have obtained a Convention of all the States, which, no doubt, would have authorized their separation, and enabled them, in a legal and peaceful way, to have established themselves as a separate nation. If they had made their request known in a legal way, and had made it manifest that a separation was their unanimous, or very general desire, we are confident that the majority of the non-Slaveholding States would have permitted their separation, and consented to a proper boundary line and to a just and equitable division of the public property and of the public debt.

But they did nothing of this. They first attempted to gain the supremacy of the Union, and, failing in that, they attempt violently its dissolution. They respect no oath of allegiance which they had taken to the Union, and begin by taking possession of the public property, the forts, arsenals, and mints, and trampling the laws of the Union, as well as the rights of property, under foot. Their first acts are acts of plunder and robbery; their second proceeding is, in the most open and avowed manner, a levying of war on the Union and threatening its destruction. No attempt

at a peaceful separation was made till after they had committed gross acts of aggression, violence, and plunder, and they had trampled on the Federal laws, and broken all their obligations as loyal citizens to the Federal government, as well as to their own State governments. These are aggravating circumstances, and mark the character of the chief actors in the Conspiracy with a degree of atrocity that does not attach to ordinary rebels. They might have had all they wished, without violence or wrong done. But their acts show clearly that their object was not so much separation from the Union and the formation of a new government for themselves, as the subjection by force, or humiliation of the Federal government and its loyal supporters. Evidently their *animus* was bad, not so much to form a Southern confederacy as to subject the Union to their domination and to force their policy and respect for their institution of slavery upon the people of the non-Slaveholding States. It was not so much a new government they proposed to themselves, as the possession of the administration of the existing government, which they had failed to secure at the ballot-box, or a reconstruction of the Union under their dictation on the basis of negro slavery. They counted, but vainly counted, as the event has proved, on being able by aid of their Democratic friends at the North, to bring into their scheme all the States of the Union, with, perhaps, the exception of the New-England States. Could any government that had the least consciousness of its duty or the least respect for itself stand still, look quietly on, and suffer this nefarious plan to be carried into execution without offering the least opposition? Would it not have been to fail in its most imperious duty, to abdicate itself, or to commit suicide?

The fault of the Government is not that it has called loyal people to the support of their own government which they themselves have constituted, but in suffering the Conspirators to work so long without any serious attempt to arrest them. During the four years of Mr. Buchanan's administration, they not only worked without opposition from the Government, but even made use of its authority, its offices, and its patronage, to further their purposes. We will not say Mr. Buchanan was himself a rebel, we will not say that he favored the plans of the Conspirators, but we will say that, down to nearly the close of his administration, he gave them free scope for their operations, and pro-

ted them by his authority. He kept their chief instruments in his Cabinet and suffered in their interest their agents to deplete the Treasury and bankrupt the Government; to deprive the forts in the Slaveholding Section of the Union of all sufficient garrisons; to leave the arsenals, mints, and public property in the same Section, for the most part, under the command of officers of doubtful attachment to the Union, and exposed to easy capture by a handful of rebels; to transfer arms, ordnance, and military stores very unnecessarily from the Northern to the Southern States, thereby depriving the loyal Section of arms and munitions of war, and furnishing them to the disloyal populations; to scatter the small Federal army at the most distant points, whence many months must elapse before they could be collected in defence of the Government; to disperse our few war ships to the most distant quarters of the globe, or to place them within reach of the intended Rebels. He used all the patronage of the Government and all his personal influence to prevent the selection of a Union candidate to succeed him; and, when pretended secession broke out, though he feebly remonstrated against it, he declared officially that no coercion must be used. No one man in the country is so responsible for the present war as the late President of the United States, for it was his duty and it was in his power to have dismissed at an early day the traitors from his Cabinet, to have supplied their places by loyal and honest men, to have foreseen the coming danger, and to have effectually guarded the government against it. He might and he should have suppressed the Conspiracy before it came to a head, or been ready to have crushed the rebellion at the very instant of its breaking out. Unhappily he did no such thing, and his name must go down in our annals branded with infamy, or with imbecility.

The fault of the present Administration, if any is to be laid to its charge, is not in the resistance it offers to rebellion, but in its having too long followed the do-nothing policy of its predecessor, or in having been too timid, hesitating, or uncertain, during the first weeks of its existence. Yet, if it were so, something can be said in its excuse, perhaps in its justification. It came into power under all the embarrassments which the previous Administration had created for it, without an army or navy, with an exhausted treasury, with a majority of the people on a popular vote

against it, with all the civil offices of the Government at home and abroad filled with its enemies, and ignorant of what military or naval officers it might or might not trust. It might have distrusted, as we ourselves did, the loyalty of a large portion of the citizens of the non-Slaveholding States, and doubted whether its call for forces to put down the Rebellion would have been generally responded to. The event, as we have seen, shows that if it ever entertained this doubt or this distrust there was no solid ground for it, and since it has shown itself determined to resist the Rebellion, to use all the forces military and naval of the loyal States to crush the Rebels and save the Union, it has risen in the respect and in the affections of the nation, at the South no less than at the North. If there still lingers a doubt or a distrust in its regard, it is not because it makes war on the Rebellion, but because it is feared it is not prepared to make it with sufficient boldness, energy, and determination. Yet the doubt or fear which may still linger in some minds, we think, is unjustifiable. The Administration understands its duty, and is prepared to perform it. That in the beginning it was timid, hesitating, uncertain as to the policy best to be adopted, is possible; but, assured now of the support of the loyal American people, even of the great majority of those in the non-Slaveholding States who, in the late Presidential election, voted against it, it feels its strength and understands what its dignity and honor as a government demand; its timidity has passed away; it no longer hesitates, and is determined to vindicate the Constitution, to preserve the Union, and to crush speedily and forever its foes. In this it is manifestly right, and every American citizen is not only free, but bound in conscience to support it to the full extent of his ability.

Yet, in thus vindicating the Government and its determination to put down the armed Rebellion against its authority, we by no means express or feel any hostility to the people of the Slaveholding States; we regard them, as we do the people of the non-Slaveholding States, as our countrymen, and feel that in supporting the Government of the Union we are not invading, but defending their rights and interests. We deny that they have received any wrongs worth mentioning from the North. There is not, and there never has been, any intention on the part of the citizens of the Free States to violate or misinterpret the Constitution

against them. There is not, and there never has been, any determination or wish on the part of the Republican party even, to interfere with their peculiar institution, or to deprive them of their property in slaves. This party has not been organized to deprive them of their equal rights under the Constitution, but to resist the aggressions of the slaveholders upon the equal rights of the non-Slaveholding States. Where slavery has a legal existence, the Republican party by its own doctrines respects and defends it; but where freedom is the law, there the party defends and respects freedom,—resists and repels the attempt to displace it for slavery. But the people of the South have been misled by their disloyal and ambitious leaders, and also by the anti-Republican journals like the New-York *Herald* and *Express*, of the North, who, for partisan purposes, have misrepresented and most foully calumniated the Republican party. They have been misled and drawn into their present rebellious position or hostility to the Union by the exaggerations, perversions, and falsehoods of their Northern friends and allies, who have assured them that the Republicans, if attaining to power and place, would abolish slavery or encourage insurrections among the slaves, and induce them to re-enact the horrors of St. Domingo. All this is false. Even the wildest and maddest of the Abolitionists of the North, with a very few individual exceptions, would shrink with horror from any thing of the sort.

For thirty years or more the South have been taught to regard the North as their enemies, and made to believe that they could not live in peace with us; they have been taught that we of the Free States are mere money-makers, destitute of any high moral or religious principle, selfish, calculating, cold-hearted, and, worse than all, mere cowards. Their teaching has been bad and has led them into grave mistakes. For those who have misled them we have no excuse, no palliation to offer, not a word in extenuation of their offence to utter. They knew better, and have sinned against light and knowledge. For them we have no mercy; let them meet, as they deserve, the traitor's doom;—not because they are Southern men, or slaveholders, but because they are conspirators and rebels, bent on destroying the Government under which they were born, to which they owe allegiance, and which, with all its faults of administration, is the freest and best government ever insti-

tuted by man, and which, from its foundation, has been, with that of Great Britain, the hope of the friends of liberty throughout the world. It is not against a despot, or a tyrant, or a foreign domination that they have conspired, but against their own legitimate government, whose only defect, if defect it have, is that it claims too little power for itself, and leaves too much freedom to the citizen. The American citizen who seeks to overthrow the American government is not only a traitor, but a liberticide, a dis-humanized monster not fit to live or to inhabit any part of this globe: he has no suitable place this side of hell.

We fear no longer the ultimate fate of the Union; we feel full confidence that it will be preserved, and be henceforth stronger and more beloved than ever. The South will come to know the North better and to entertain for it a much higher esteem. It will learn that all the chivalry of the Union is not confined to the Slaveholding States. It will find that, if the people of the North are an industrious and business people, if they are principled against duels, loth to believe in the necessity of war, and slow to engage in a fight, it is from no lack of the sense of honor, from no deficiency of courage, or want of pluck. It will learn, we doubt not, that the people of the Free States, though they can bear much, are not all-enduring; that with them even there is a point where forbearance ceases to be a virtue; and that they can give as well as receive blows. It will learn, perhaps to its cost, that there is as much high spirit, gentlemanly feeling, chivalric sentiment, and noble daring, among our farmers, mechanics, merchants, shop-keepers, and cotton-spinners, as among its own slave-owners, nigger-drivers, and clay-eaters. It will learn that its estimate of our character has been founded on ignorance and prejudice; and, when the Federal armies have defended the Government, defeated and annihilated the Rebellious forces arrayed against it, preserved it, and caused once more its time-honored flag to float in the breeze from the capitol of every State in the Union, it will feel that we are not only fit foemen, but a people that they may well be proud to own, love, and respect, as their friends and countrymen. Far be it from us to undervalue the fine qualities of the Southern people, their frankness, their spirit, their generous and elegant hospitality; but they will be taught before the end of this war that the freemen of the North have

qualities in no sense inferior, and which, when known, will probably prove equally attractive.

It is customary to speak of war, especially of civil war, as a great calamity; but the war itself is not the evil. The evil is always in the causes that lead to it, in the humors that are in the system; war itself is but the effort of the constitution to throw off these humors and to regain its soundness and strength. Peace is always more corrupting than war; for in peace are generated the humors that render war necessary. The civil war in which we are now engaged, though the effect of great and deplorable evils, baseness, and criminality, will not itself prove a calamity. It will be the thunder-storm that purifies the moral and political atmosphere; it will enable us to see and understand the wrong principles, the mischievous principles we have unconsciously fostered, the fatal doctrines we have adopted, the dangerous tendencies to which we have yielded. It will teach us that a majority of votes cannot make a statesman out of a pot-house politician, or give a man any additional quantity of brains. It will teach us that henceforth it will be necessary to seek honesty, loyalty, ability, fitness in our candidates for office, not mere availability. It will also teach us that republics, no more than monarchies, can safely preach the divine right of revolutions; that loyalty is as necessary a virtue under a republican as under a monarchical form of government; that every government must be based on right and not on mere opinion, and be able to use force to protect itself against all classes of enemies, domestic as well as foreign; that mere public sentiment is never sufficient to protect or sustain it; and that there must always be placed a sufficient armed force at its command. It will teach us, that while the people may be the motive power, they can never be safely the governing power of the state.

We, as a people, have had much need of this lesson. In asserting popular sovereignty, in appealing to the people, and exaggerating both their wisdom and their virtue, we have overlooked the necessity and authority of government; we have forgotten that freedom is impossible without order, and order impossible without authority, and authority able to make itself respected and obeyed; we have forgotten that *démagogie* is not statesmanship, that liberty is not license, and that the elevation of our party to power does not necessarily secure good government or promote

the welfare of the country; we have forgotten that the first necessity of every people is authority, and the first duty of every citizen is obedience to law. Here has been our first and greatest mistake, into which we have been led by the wild democratic doctrines of European Liberals warring against the authority of absolute princes. We have approved the rebellion of the Tuscans against their legitimate government, the secession of the Æmilian Provinces from the Pontifical State, the rebellion of Sicily and Naples against their king, the hostile attitude of Hungary against her lawful sovereign.

But, if in this we have been right, by what right do we complain of the secession of South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, or Tennessee? Secession and rebellion were all well enough when they took place only in Europe; but we see at once that they cannot be tolerated for a moment when they are attempted among ourselves. We shall learn, then, from the present contest that we have very unjustly and imprudently asserted the "sacred right of insurrection," and henceforth be prepared, while we fearlessly maintain the rights of the people, to respect and vindicate the rights and authority of governments.

We, as a people, have fallen into another grievous error. We have depreciated and ridiculed the military. We have fancied that the great business of government could go on, internal and external peace be maintained, the laws executed, the honor and dignity of the nation asserted and vindicated without an armed force; we have been afraid of increasing the Army and Navy, and have proceeded on the assumption that no emergency could arise when either would be necessary. But with a sufficient army and navy at the command of the Federal government, this civil war could never have broken out. Even Mr. Buchanan would have suppressed the Rebellion in its very inception, and millions and millions of property, as well as thousands and thousands of lives, would have been saved to the nation. Henceforth, we trust, we shall cease to fear to sustain a large and respectable military and naval force, both as a necessity of authority and as an economical arrangement. We are far less likely to fall under military rule with a large military force at the disposal of the government, than we are by having it unarmed and at the mercy of unprincipled adventurers like Jefferson Davis and his associate Conspirators. We shall henceforth be obliged to maintain a large,

well-disciplined and well-appointed naval force in order to recover our prestige, and to exert our legitimate influence among the great and leading nations of the world. We showed our weakness under Mr. Buchanan's Administration, when we dared not reinforce or provision a Federal garrison against the protest of one of the pettiest States of the Union. We gave the European nations just cause to despise us, and to treat our power with contempt. The military spirit awakened and the military resources of the nation called forth by the present Administration, have done something, perhaps much, to raise us in the estimation of foreign powers; but fully to regain and preserve our rightful position, we must, after the present war is over, keep on foot an army of not less than a hundred and fifty thousand men, and have a naval establishment that will enable us to assert equality with the first maritime powers of Europe.

We write with a full conviction that the United States, in this civil war, will succeed in suppressing the formidable Rebellion against their authority; but we do not expect them to succeed without a long, severe, and bloody struggle. We do not think lightly of the resources of the Rebels, or of their courage and resolution. We think they will not only be able to bring large forces into action, but that they will fight skilfully and bravely. Their Commander-in-Chief, who, we understand, is Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, is not a man of high military character, or in himself a very formidable general; but he has under him a large number of able officers, educated at our national Military Academy, trained and disciplined in the Federal Army, and ranking among the first and best of the officers of that Army. These officers have military science, military skill, and their military reputation to sustain. The men they will lead into action, though not taking discipline kindly, and not the best materials in the world for regular soldiers, are strong, alert, and brave, accustomed from their childhood to the use of arms, generally good marksmen, and must be expected to fight desperately and often successfully. We do not persuade ourselves that they are to be easily beaten, or that the Rebels can be subdued in a single campaign by any force the Federal government is likely to bring against them. Indeed, it is better for the country that they should not be. The practical lessons of the war will be lost for both North and South, unless it is long and severe, making a

large portion of our young men practical soldiers, and imposing upon the whole country great privations and manifold sufferings.

The true way to regard this war is to regard it as a chastisement from the hand of Divine Providence, as a just judgment from God upon our nation for its manifold sins; but a judgment sent in mercy, designed not to destroy us, but to purify and save us, to render us a wiser, a better, a more virtuous, a more elevated, and a more powerful people. It is intended to try us, to inure us to hardship, to make us feel that all mere worldly prosperity is short-lived and transitory, and that no people that departs from God, neglects eternal goods, and fixes its affections only on the low and perishing goods of sense, can ever hope to be a great, a strong, and long-lived people. Let us then welcome the sufferings, the privations, the hardships, the toil, the loss of affluence, the poverty that this war is sure to bring upon no small portion of our population. Let us welcome them as a severe but necessary chastisement, and let us wish the chastisement to be severe enough to correct us and to ensure our amendment and our future progress. Unless such be the case, no cause of the war will be removed; its seeds will remain, and at the first favorable opportunity will germinate anew, grow up, blossom, and bear their deadly fruit.

What will be the final effect of the contest on the slave question, we pretend not to predict. Nobody has engaged in the war with the intention of putting an immediate end to slavery: all who have responded to the call of the President and buckled on their armor, have done so to vindicate the Constitution, to enforce the prevailing laws, and to preserve the Union. But if the Rebels prove themselves able to protract the struggle and to gain some victories, if they carry on the war in the manner indicated by the murder of the lamented Ellsworth, and large numbers of our fathers, husbands, brothers, or sons fall, and the passions of the non-Slaveholding States become roused and embittered, slavery must go, and the war will be in effect a war of liberation. We, for ourselves, seek not this result, for we see not what disposition could be made of the slaves, if emancipated. But that this result will come, we think by no means unlikely. In the meantime, let us say distinctly that while we should disapprove of all attempts to excite the negroes to insurrection, we earnestly protest, in case

insurrections among them should take place without our agency, against employing Federal troops in suppressing them. As long as the slaveholders are in rebellion against the Union, we say let them employ their own forces in keeping their slaves in subjection. If this weakens their force against us, so much the better for us and so much the worse for them. We are not enough in love with slavery to volunteer it any protection. The "pound of flesh" stipulated in the bond we will pay to the exact scruple; but if the slaveholder asks for more, let the penalty fall on his own head. While he remained a loyal citizen and discharged his obligations to the Union, we were bound to give up his fugitive slave; but when he turns rebel, and arms himself to overthrow the Union, we are by his act absolved from that obligation, and he must expect from us no assistance in recovering or in keeping his slave property. If his slaves run away, escape from his control, they are for us free, and we will bid them take care and not be caught; and if, in order to preserve the Union, it is necessary to allow the slaves to emancipate themselves, we shall not grieve, but shall be much better pleased than we are with the necessity under which our fathers felt themselves, in order to found the Union, to bind themselves to give up to his owner a fugitive slave.

But we have exhausted our space. It is a trying moment for our Republic. Popular institutions themselves are on trial. The cause of self-government throughout the world is at stake. But let not absolute monarchs, the *oscurantisti*, or the friends of despotic power rejoice or persuade themselves that the cause of liberty is lost. The Republic yet stands, and with the brave old veteran, the well-tried soldier, the hero of so many battles who now commands her armies, and who is more than a match for any military skill or science that can be brought against him, continue to stand it will. It has, we think seen its darkest day. The New World will yet prove true to its mission, and be, as it has been from the first, the asylum of the oppressed, and the home of freedom. We bid our friends abroad, who are struggling for free governments or constitutional guarantees for liberty, be of good heart, keep up their courage, continue their efforts; we shall not fail them, but prove ourselves firmer and more efficient friends of the cause than we have ever heretofore been.

ART. V. — *Deuxième Lettre à M. LE COMTE DE CAVOUR*, Président du Conseil des Ministres, à Turin. Par LE COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT l'un des Quarante de l'Académie Française. Paris: Jacques Lecoffre. 1861. 8vo. pp. 80.

THE troubles in our own country and the stirring nature of the events during the last three months, as well as our inability during that period to use our eyes either for reading or writing, have prevented us from keeping as well posted as usual on European affairs. The preservation of our Republic, and with it the hopes of the friends of free government throughout the world, has claimed our first attention, and made even the great movements in Europe appear to us of but secondary importance. We have hardly kept run of the insurrectionary movements in Poland, Hungary, or Italy, and know little of what are the prospects of the "Sick Man" of the East. The most we have learned in regard to the Old World is that Spain is rapidly rising to a first-class Power, which gives us pleasure; that peace is still maintained between France and England; and that Austria is making energetic and, we hope, successful efforts to reconstitute her empire under a liberal parliamentary government. The French, we are informed, have withdrawn their troops from Syria; but the Imperial government promises not to abandon the Syrian Christians to the tender mercies of the Turks. The French troops, at the time we are writing, still occupy Rome, and though several Powers have recognized the new kingdom of Italy, the affairs of the Peninsula would yet seem far from being settled.

Next after the affairs of our own country, those of Italy have for us the most interest; and, if we believed that the interests of our religion were inseparable from the Italian political movements, they would have more interest for us than even the civil war in which we are now engaged at home. Religion is man's supreme law, and its interests take precedence of all others. Without religion no man can attain to the end for which he has been created and redeemed, as without religion no people can be really free and fulfil the legitimate purposes of social existence. Christianity is the only religion; and there is no Christianity in its unity, integrity, and efficiency, without the Church; and

no Church without the Papacy. The body without the head is a lifeless trunk; and the Pope is the visible head of the Church. It is necessary to the well-being of the Church that the Pope should be free and independent in the exercise of his spiritual functions. If the loss of his temporal Estates and the establishment of the unity of Italy under Victor Emanuel or any other constitutional sovereign would deprive the Holy Father of his spiritual freedom and independence, we should consider the success of the Italian national movement the greatest possible calamity not only to Italy, but to the whole Christian world. But, as yet, we are not fully convinced that such would necessarily be the fact. It always depends on the Pope himself whether he shall be free and independent or not; for it is always in his power to follow the example of his predecessors for three hundred years under the Pagan emperors, and to suffer martyrdom. Never did religion flourish more, or the Church gain more brilliant conquests, than when the election to the Supreme Pontificate was an election to the martyr's crown. It may be a great convenience for the Supreme Pontiff to be also a sovereign prince and reign as an earthly potentate; but we cannot discover as this is an absolute necessity in the constitution of the Church. We know from history that the Popes governed the Church, watched over its interests, and performed all the functions as visible Head of Christ's kingdom on earth for seven hundred years without being recognized as sovereign temporal princes. Whether the possession of the supreme temporal power over a small Italian state has ever tended to secure their spiritual freedom and independence, has ever been of any real advantage to the Church, or rendered their spiritual power more acceptable or more efficient, is a question which it is not our province to discuss. It may have been necessary, or, at least, useful, in past times, before the consolidation of power, and the formation of the great centralized kingdoms and empires of Europe; but we are not certain that it is either the one or the other in the present changed circumstances of the political world, and therefore we regard the movements going on in Italy mainly as political movements in which the interests of religion are only indirectly and temporarily involved.

One thing is certain, that, since the general rejection by Christian nations of the divine right of governments and the recognition of *de facto* governments as legitimate,

which, in principle and in fact, places right on the side of might and vests the sovereignty in the strongest or the successful, the temporal independence of the Pope can be only nominal, for, as the sovereign of only a small state, he lacks and must lack the power to vindicate it by force, whenever seriously attacked by any of his neighbors. He may be independent in theory, but in practice he does and must depend on the policy, the diplomacy, or the rivalries of the great Powers of Europe. The policy of states and empires has long since ceased to be dictated from the Vatican; throughout all Europe the temporal power has, as a fact, long since escaped from its subjection to the spiritual; and the Powers of Europe, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, hold themselves free to support or to war against the Pope, according to their own views of their own political interests. There is not a single European Power that is prepared to sacrifice the slightest political interest for the sake of sustaining the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See; all are ready to use the Sovereign Pontiff or to cast him aside, according to their reasons of state. Nothing seems to us farther from the truth than to suppose that there is still a political Christendom existing. There may be sovereigns who have Catholic faith and piety, but there are really no Catholic governments. The political order throughout the world is as un-Catholic, though perhaps not as anti-Catholic, as was the political order of the Roman empire under Decius and Diocletian. There is no political power on which the Pope can rely, and no sovereign in Europe that he can summon to his aid when his states are invaded. How, then, can we say that his temporal sovereignty aids and supports his spiritual freedom and independence?

We state facts as they are, not as we would have them. We are far from holding that the changes which have gone on in the world, which have involved, if not the subjection of the Church to the state, at least her separation from it, have been for the better, or are, in any sense, deserving the approbation of the wise and good. But this is not the question with which we have now to deal. The changes have been effected; the facts are as they are; and the question is, what is the best manner of dealing with them? To attempt to maintain the temporal sovereignty of the Pope over a small Italian state, in the face of these changes seems to us impracticable, and not likely, even if practicable, to render him more free and independent in the ad-

ministration of ecclesiastical affairs. To treat these changes as though they had not been effected, to proceed on the assumption that things are as they were in the Middle Ages, when the Sovereign Pontiffs exerted a real influence on the politics of princes and states, is not the part of wisdom; to attempt to roll back these changes and to restore the order that has passed away is, in our judgment, impracticable and impossible, even if desirable; to declaim against them, or to sigh and weep over them, may be the part of the conquered, but can never be that of wisdom and strength. True wisdom, it seems to us, requires the friends of religion to accept these changes as facts accomplished, and to endeavor to adjust ecclesiastical and all other arrangements to them.

But, while we say all this, let it be distinctly understood that we recognize in the fullest and strictest sense the rights of temporal sovereignty possessed by the Holy Father, and that only by an act of gross injustice, of the grossest injustice indeed, can he be deprived of them. The Pope is the oldest sovereign in Europe, and no sovereign in Europe holds his states by a better title, or by one so good, so sacred, or so inviolable in its nature. Let it also be understood that we give no heed to what has been said against the Papal government in past or in present times. The only fault that we have ever been disposed to find with the Papal government is that it has been too lenient and too paternal in its character. The charges of cruelty and tyranny brought against it we throw to the winds; we believe none of them. That government was legitimate in its origin, and by no act or acts has it, so far as we can discover, ever forfeited its original right. No government has ever labored more earnestly, more faithfully, more perseveringly for the good of its subjects, with more benevolence, or with more intelligence. The difficulties in the case grow not out of any duty neglected, or of any wrong done by the Pontiff-kings, but simply out of the fact that the political world has lost its respect for right, and the maintenance of the Papal government in its independence and integrity is incompatible with modern politics, or the political system originated in the sixteenth century by the successors of St. Louis of France, and solemnly adopted and proclaimed as the public law of Europe by the Peace of Paris, March, 1856.

Need we say that we do not approve that system, which

in reality is only political atheism. We denounced that Peace when it was made, and our pages from first to last have teemed with the strongest denunciations against political atheism. We denounced in the strongest and most pointed terms that we could use, the war of England and France against Russia, even before it was declared, as an unprovoked and unjust war, and likely to have a most unfavorable influence for a long time to come on European politics. We foretold and denounced the policy of Napoleon III. long before any of our Catholic contemporaries had ceased to regard him as a new Charlemagne, or a second St. Louis. We exposed and denounced the policy of his Italian campaign before it was commenced, and none of our Catholic contemporaries have denounced in severer terms than we the invasion of the Pontifical rights and territory by Sardinia, or the invasion of the realm of the King of the Two Sicilies by that prince of filibusters, Joseph Garibaldi, and we are sorry to find that our government has accepted, even in defence of a good cause, a battalion called the *Garibaldi Guards*. In our opposition to all these movements prompted by and resulting in the coronation of political atheism, we have gone before all our Catholic contemporaries, and, on more occasions than one, have found ourselves standing alone in that opposition. Let it not be said, then, that we have approved, or that we approve in any way, shape, or manner, the policy either of Napoleon III. or of Count Cavour, that has brought the Holy Father as temporal sovereign to his present deplorable condition.

Whatever others may say for themselves, *we* are innocent of ever having done any thing to favor that policy; and if Catholics, especially Catholics in influential positions, had generally opposed that policy as early and as earnestly as we did, it could never have been carried into effect. We read with admiration, with hearty assent, the eloquent protests of our prelates throughout the world against it, and only regret that they come too late. It cannot be denied that Catholics everywhere have shown a singular want of foresight, and, if we wanted any argument to prove that the Church stands not in human wisdom or in human sagacity, we should find it in their misplaced confidence in the modern Cæsar, and the praises they have lavished on his new-fangled political system. No sovereign was ever more frank or was less liable to be accused of concealing his policy. All his antecedents, all his writings, all his

surroundings, as well as his public declarations, proved clearly and conclusively that he was and would be no sincere friend of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See, and, while he would not openly break with the Church, he would never suffer any respect for her, or for the rights of her Pontiff to interfere in the least with his state policy. The very fact that he was the Nephew of his Uncle proved this, and if any of our prelates for one moment doubted it, or trusted that by their flatteries and servility they could persuade him out of it, they have only their own want of foresight to complain of. No doubt he would have been glad to have had a Confederated Italy with the Pope for its nominal head; but that it was his determination from the first to deprive the Holy Father of all real and effective temporal power cannot reasonably be doubted by any one acquainted with the *Idées Napoléoniennes*. Our prelates have done well in placing on record their protests against the violation of international law, the contempt of the rights of independent sovereigns, as well as of the ordinary principles of religion and morality of the Sardinian government in its attempts to grasp the sovereignty of all Italy; but we should have prized them much more, and they would have been much more effective had they come some years sooner.

There is no real difference of opinion on the merits of the Italian question between the eloquent author of the pamphlet before us and ourselves. We are as indignant at the Napoleon-Cavour policy as he is, and we are as far as he from approving the acts of Sardinia towards the Papal government, the Duchies, and the Neapolitan kingdom. We hold, as well as he, that it is never lawful to do evil that good may come. But the evil has been done, the wrongs have been committed, and we see no human power adequate to avenge them. It seems to us in vain to appeal to the Catholic world, for it has been by professedly Catholic hands that the evil has been perpetrated. The fault cannot be charged in this case to the open and avowed enemies of our religion, but is undeniably the fault of those who profess to honor the Pope as their Spiritual Chief. Our Lord has been rejected and crucified by his own people. We deny not, we excuse not, we palliate not their wickedness. But, after all, to what good recall and dwell upon it? Why war against irrevocable facts? Why attempt the impossible? Why break our heads against the inevitable?

We cannot alter that which is past. It is beyond our control. The only difference, if difference there be, between the noble author and ourselves is that he resists even after resistance has become useless, and we cease to resist or even to protest after, in our judgment, the fact is accomplished; from that moment we turn our-eyes from what has been, to what is best now to be done, and we reserve all our strength to mould the future in accordance with our wishes.

We believe great evil has been done, grave wrongs committed, but we do not believe it all over with the Church or with humanity. In the darkest day "the old God," as say the Germans, "still lives," that his Providence is as young, as fresh, as vigorous, and as worthy of reliance as ever. We are among those who believe it never wise to sit down and waste our energies in sighing over the sins we have committed, but to look out for the virtue, and engage with redoubled vigilance in the performance of the virtue, of which we are still capable. As long as God lives we will never believe in the permanent triumph of evil, or in the impossibility of repairing the greatest wrongs that may have been committed. The Church is as present, is as powerful to-day as she was when she went forth with the Apostles from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to conquer the world. The loss of temporal sovereignty by the successor of Peter, the loss of all her temporal goods, the reduction of her ministers to mere staff and scrip will not make her weaker than she was when Peter erected his Chair in the capital of the Pagan world. Perhaps this loss would even prove to be a gain. Woe to him who despoils the Church, but not therefore woe to the Church despoiled. What the Church has once done she can do again, and perhaps could do more without than with the worldly trappings with which she has so long been encumbered.

We by no means despair of the future; we by no means despair of seeing religion again recovering its hold on men's hearts and on men's consciences; we by no means despair of seeing again peoples and nations, sovereign princes and states recognizing the authority of Peter, and acknowledging the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal; we by no means despair of seeing re-established that system of Christian politics and international right which the Church, through her Sovereign Pontiffs, labored so long and earnestly to introduce and establish among Christian nations. Political atheism is a falsehood, and no falsehood can live.

Its triumph can be but temporary, and last no longer than the heated passions which have given it birth. The Church will regain her power and her rightful supremacy, but probably not in a society modelled after that of the Middle Ages. She then worked through princes and nobles, hereafter she must work through the people; she then operated by diplomacy and force, she must hereafter operate through the intelligence and conscience of the people elevated to an effective power in the management of their own public affairs.

This is the belief of Count Montalembert as of ourselves, and hence his earnest, persevering, and consistent efforts for free or constitutional government. It has been with him a principal object in this very Letter to Count Cavour before us, to vindicate the Sovereign Pontiff from the charge of having, in his late Allocutions, declared the incompatibility of the Church with modern civilization or of Catholicity and liberty brought against him by the infidel and non-Catholic press of Europe, and owned and defended by the principal Catholic journals, and no small part of the Catholic clergy of Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain. We have good authority for saying the Holy Father has declared no such thing, and that whatever sympathies there may have been among Catholics at Rome or elsewhere with the old political order, now warred against almost everywhere by the irrepressible instincts of the human heart, there has been no committing and no intention of committing the Church, by her Supreme Chief, to its preservation or to its restoration. Nothing has been said, nothing is implied in what has been said, in condemnation or censure of those Catholics who, like ourselves, have maintained the compatibility of religion and liberty, who have steadily opposed Cæsarism, and sought the freedom of the Church in the general freedom of the citizen.

That the Court of Rome has lavished encouragements on those Catholics who have been foremost in the war against the political and other changes effected by modern civilization, we are far from denying, or that in this that court has not furthered the interests of religion, or taken the best method of winning back to their submission the world escaping from the control of the Church, we are just as far from doubting. Our Catholic duty binds us to obedience to all orders in relation to spirituals emanating from the supreme spiritual authority; but our Catholic faith does not bind us

to believe that the Court of Rome, any more than any other court, is infallible in its political administration or in matters of mere human prudence. We are free to hold and to say that we think the Court of Rome has committed a mistake in not following up the liberal policy inaugurated by our present Holy Father on his accession to the Papal throne, and in encouraging such men as Louis Veuillot, or such journals as the late *Univers*, or the present *Monde*. These men and journals, in consequence of the encouragements they have received, have gained an undue influence in the Catholic world, which they have exerted, so far as we can see, only for evil. They have misled a large number of the bishops and clergy in France and elsewhere, alienated the affections of many of those who, from the noble stand taken by Catholics in 1848 and 1849, had been strongly attracted towards her, and have seemed to commit the cause of Catholicity irrevocably to Cæsarism. Deeply now do Catholic interests suffer from this, as we believe, mistaken policy. The cause of absolutism in Europe is everywhere falling; Austria abandons it and seeks to give herself a liberal constitution, and even the Emperor of France has judged it prudent to permit a freer expression of opinion and greater publicity on political subjects than were at first allowed in his empire, and has gained the adhesion of a large class of liberals whose support might have been obtained for the Catholic cause. But, notwithstanding this, the Church is not and cannot be committed to the cause of despotism, and Catholicity itself is still, as ever, the friend and the support of all true or desirable liberty.

We are well aware of the defects of modern civilization; but these are defects which cannot be supplied without religion. Both civilization and religion suffer when separated. Civilization without religion necessarily becomes low and materialistic, and religion, when it fails to animate and direct civilization, fails in an important part of its work. The great evil of our times lies in the fact of their separation, and though neither is the other or a part of the other, yet, for the perfection or complete actualization of each, both should act in union. We gain nothing for religion by standing aloof from modern civilization and denouncing it as low, earthly, and unchristian, for it is not in our power to arrest its tendency, or in its power, without the assistance of the Church, to correct its defects or elevate its character.

When God would redeem man and raise him to the plane of a supernatural destiny, he makes himself man, assumes flesh with all its infirmities, sin excepted. In this is the principle of all reform, the higher seeks the lower, the perfect completes the imperfect, the firm take up and heal the infirm. God did not wait for man to come to him; he descended to man. So must it be with regard to civilization. If we would redeem it, and give it an elevated tone and character, the Church must accept it, take it to herself, and breathe into it her own pure and divine spirit. There is no intrinsic and invincible incompatibility between modern civilization and our holy religion; the Church can exist and perform her functions in a free as well as in a despotic state; the Church can deal with republics as well as with monarchies, and the people can be made as efficient servants of God as princes and nobles. Railways, steamboats, and lightning telegraphs may be used by ministers of religion as well as by ministers of state, and nothing can better serve the interests of the Church than the general education and intelligence of the people. There is nothing in Catholic doctrine, nothing in the teaching of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, or in the canons and definitions of Popes and Councils that makes it less Catholic to travel in a railway car or a steamboat than in an ox-cart, a coach drawn by horses, on horseback, or in a ship propelled by sails, to spin cotton by the mule or jenny, than by hand; or to recognize the sovereign authority of a national assembly than of a prince "born in the purple." There is, then, no more necessary hostility between Catholicity and modern civilization, than there was between it and the mediæval.

The republican movements of the day have generally assumed a character of hostility to the Church, we grant; but not because there was any inherent hostility between them and our holy religion, nor because republicans, as such, are unwilling to submit to its authority, but because they have found, or imagined they found, the power and influence of the Church directed against them and wielded in support of despotism. The Church has no doubt suffered much and must suffer still more during the transition from the previous political order to that which is now in process of establishment; but she has suffered no more, and is likely to suffer no more, than she suffered in the transition from the imperial Roman system of the first centuries to the feudal system of the Middle Ages, or from the feudal

system of the Middle Ages to the monarchical system established in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the first she lost the greater part of the East; in the second fully one-third of the North and West; in the present transition she need lose no nation, and would lose but few individuals, if her children could be persuaded that the republican hostility is only accidental and not necessary, or could understand that the friends of constitutional government have hearts no less susceptible of religious influence than are the hearts of the friends of despotism. The evil lies in regarding what is accidental and temporary as inherent and permanent. If the ministers of religion would take as much pains to prove to the party of progress that they can have all the progress they desire without abandoning the Church, that they do to prove to them that their progress without religion is no real progress and can have only a fatal result, the evil would, in great part, be removed, and religion and liberty be permitted to walk hand in hand. The great mistake is in supposing that the error is not mutual, but all on the side of the liberal movement. Unhappily the friends of religion and the friends of progress fall into precisely the same error, each hold that liberty and religion are mutually repugnant one to the other. Hence those in whom the passion for liberty predominates break from the Church and make war on religion, while they in whom religion predominates break with modern civilization and anathematize liberty. Each is alike hostile to the interests both of the Church and of civilization; both need to correct their views, for both lose sight of the real relations between the natural and the supernatural. True wisdom demands the conciliation of religion and liberty, so that there shall never be imposed on any one the terrible alternative of choosing between them or of sacrificing the one to the other.

Nevertheless there is something to be said in extenuation of the conduct of those Catholics who refuse to accept modern civilization and its changes, and in defence of the policy which for the last few years has apparently been pursued by the Court of Rome. Rome has been placed in a difficult position; she has been opposed and her very existence threatened by the democratic revolutionists, and has had only the despotic and arbitrary governments of Europe on which to rely for her defence against them. To have declared in favor of the liberal movement or to have

withheld her encouragements from those who combatted red-republicanism or socialism, even from the point of view of Cæsarism, might have been to throw away all the temporal support on which she could rely, and to have armed the governments as well as the mob against her; besides, Catholics are affected like others by their social position and human interests. They, no more than others, can see broken down or destroyed the order of things under which they have been born, grown up, and lived, without feeling that a great evil is threatened them or that they should do their best to resist it. Those Catholics in Europe who have resisted, and resist, the changes and revolutions still going on, have done, and are doing, no more than we who are loyal to the flag of our Union, and rapidly arming against the great Southern Rebellion, are ourselves doing. We believe it our duty and our interest to make the greatest efforts possible in defence of the institutions bequeathed us by our fathers and to preserve in its integrity and its efficiency the government we have inherited. We take our stand on the side of constituted order, of legitimate authority, of loyalty. European Catholics who resist the revolutionary movements of their respective countries do the same, and must be regarded as acting from as pure, from as high, from as noble, and from as disinterested motives as ourselves. They believe in neither the wisdom nor the necessity, in neither the justice nor the utility of the changes proposed to be effected, and therefore are fully justified in their own minds and in their own consciences in offering the most effective resistance to them in their power. Taking their stand-point, we cannot censure them, but, if we have any sense of loyalty, or honor, or chivalric sentiment in our natures, we must applaud them; for then we could see no more merit in the party they resist than we ourselves can see in our Southern rebels and traitors.

The complaint we make of them is not that they resist political and social changes in their capacity as loyal citizens or subjects, but that they attempt to bind the Church to the order they defend and to render her interests inseparable from its preservation, thus calling to their aid a power to which they have no right and committing the Church to an order which is passing away. They seem to us to continue their resistance in the name of religion when resistance has become vain. We resist firmly and with all our power the attempt of the rebels in our own country to dis-

solve the Union and to set up a separate nationality for themselves, because we believe it our right and our duty to do so, and also because we believe we have the power to make our resistance effectual. Yet, were, which God forbid! the Federal arms to be defeated, the powers of the Federal government to be exhausted, the Rebels victorious, and there ceased to be any reasonable prospect of subduing them and preserving the Union in its integrity, we should believe it wise and just and even our duty to cease resistance and to assent to a separation of these States and the formation of a Southern Confederacy as a free and independent state. We may be wrong, but we regard the conservative cause in Europe as a lost cause, and that the longer the struggle to preserve it continues, the more disadvantageous to the conservatives will be the peace or final adjustment of the controversy. We think better terms can be obtained now than after a longer struggle.

Yet in all this we may be wrong, just as those at home and abroad are wrong who advise a peaceable acquiescence in the demands of our Southern rebels and in a final separation between the Slaveholding and the non-Slaveholding States. Certainly our noble friend, Count Montalembert, in whose judgment we place great confidence, does not believe the battle to be as yet finally lost. He believes it still possible to defeat the Napoleon-Cavour policy, to retain the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See, and to re-establish the Holy Father in the full possession of all his temporal rights. He is nearer the scene of action than we are, and knows far better than we do, the agencies at work and the temporal resources of the Holy See. It may be that he is justified in his hopes, and that our fears are groundless, or that we have taken as *un fait accompli* what not only is not effected, but not likely to be effected. We assure him that we shall be much better pleased to find that he is right than we shall to find that we are right. We love not changes, and, if the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See can be preserved, and preserved in peace, in harmony with the wishes and interests of Catholic Europe, we shall be highly gratified and most grateful to Almighty God. What we want is not that this temporal sovereignty should be abolished, is not that the Holy Father should be compelled again to take refuge in the catacombs of Rome, be an exile or a martyr, is not that he and his Court should be driven out of house and home, but that

the real interests of the Church should be harmonized with whatever is good and desirable in modern civilization.

We will say, in conclusion, that we are far from being convinced that the affairs of the peninsula are either settled, or in train of being settled speedily. In the first place, we have some doubts if Divine Providence will give a final victory to a power that has been so unjust, so iniquitous, so unscrupulous in the means it has adopted, as the Piedmontese government; in the second place, we do not believe that the Emperor of the French really wishes all Italy to be united in one kingdom under Victor Emanuel, or any other Italian prince. If he could count always on the king of Italy for his ally, he would no doubt be favorable to Italian unity, as it would strengthen France against her enemies, and, in some sense, preserve to her the hegemony of Europe; but he knows far better than we do that this is not to be counted upon. Italy once constituted and recognized as an independent kingdom will follow in its alliances its own interest, and be as likely to ally itself with England, Austria, or Russia as with France. He must see that a united Italy would be followed by the union of the Spanish peninsula under a single government, and by the unity of Germany, which, instead of strengthening France, would really reduce her to a second-class power. If he finds it impossible to carry out the policy of his uncle, and virtually to absorb the Spanish and Italian peninsulas in his own empire, he will most likely return to what for centuries has been the policy of the French government, that of permitting no great centralized Power on the frontiers of France. It has always been the policy of the French government to keep Italy divided, to prevent a union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, or the formation of a strong centralized Germany. To this policy it is not unlikely His Imperial Majesty will yet return. If so, the policy of Count Cavour will be thwarted, and the Papal states restored to the Holy See. New wars may also break out between the great Powers, which in their results may bring about, as at the peace of Vienna in 1815, the re-establishment in its integrity of the Papal government; but, if so, we hope it will be without compelling us to go over again the experience of the last forty-five years. If that government is reestablished, we hope it will be really independent and obliged to follow the policy neither of Austria nor of France, and that Italian patriots will cease to disturb the peace of Europe.

BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1861.

ART. I.—*Various Objections and Criticisms considered and answered.*

THE following Letter is from a highly revered friend, and really one of the ablest and most learned theologians in our country, whose disapprobation cannot be otherwise than extremely painful. It was written for our private admonition, and by no means intended for publication ; but, as it expresses in a brief and summary manner the objections to our views which have reached us from some other quarters, we take the liberty to lay it before our readers, simply suppressing the name of the writer, the place from which it was written, and its date :

“DOCTOR :—I have not very good news to send you to-day. I am not pleased.

“Your philosophy as a system can be maintained. But when you endeavor to make all truths, even the first and clearest principles of reason dependent and resting on it, on your intuition of God, on your *primum philosophicum*, *Ens creat existentias*, this is too much. *A priori*, the attempt to ground whatever we know for certain on a system, which, by the very fact that it is a system, and that it is contradicted by many, is uncertain, such an attempt cannot be successful. Is it not wiser to start from those simple, general principles, which have always been admitted by human reason, and leave room to no doubt or hesitation whatever ; and then, as far as we can, connect our systems with them ; so that, if we fail, yet those principles remain unshaken, but simply our system is more or less injured by that want of connection ? This seems to be more advisable. But enough on that.

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"About your Home Politics, you are perfectly free to think just as you choose : and what you choose may be the best.

"Also about 'schools, public schools, Catholic schools,' though I did not lean to your side, yet my knowledge of the country, of the state of public schools, of the resources of Catholics, was too limited to enable me to be either way very positive on the matter; especially, as bishops themselves are divided on that question. And furthermore, as you conceded that if we could get up Catholic schools well supported and managed, it would be highly desirable; and as it was only an affair of opportunity, circumstances, &c., I had not much to say against it.

"About the temporal principality of the Holy Father, you maintained that it was a serious inconvenience, in modern times, to religion itself; that the Pope could do well enough, if not better, without it; that Italians were incensed against the Church itself, as a spiritual and divine institution, on account of that temporality, &c. You maintained, also, that notwithstanding these considerations, no power on earth had a right to deprive the Holy Father; you condemned in the strongest terms the sacrilegious invasion of the Roman states by the Sardinians; you hoped for the Church far better times and nobler triumphs, &c. I said again, at the time, that an honest man can entertain all these notions.

"But since then, I have taken a wholly different view of the case. The atrocities committed by Piedmontese, and of which I sent you some instances from the *Civiltà*, and the reaction which bursts out in every part of the kingdom of Naples, &c., have convinced me that, in poor Italy, there is to be seen now, what we enjoyed in France, during the blissful years of 1789, *et seq.*, namely, the unmitigated Reign of Terror, and the domination of murderers. I regret deeply having at any time said a word in favor of these basest rabble. I have been thoroughly deceived, and I believe now firmly that, in Italy, the Pope is more than ever the true friend and defender not only of right, but especially of liberty; and that, if he is driven away from Rome, liberty will go with him, and disappear from where he is not. So I think now, after closer examination. *Errare aut errasse humanum est.* I should like to know if this be to your taste. I fain persuade myself that you cannot be very far from the same conviction. In fact, I see now in Italy, on the part of the pretended liberals, nothing but falsehood, hypocrisy, iniquity, abominable tyranny and cruelty, which cry to Heaven. And perhaps you yourself do not see much more, as a phrase, or rather the whole page 416 seems to indicate.

"Also you have spoken several times against the Scholastics, and in your last number, pages 287 and 288, you say things rather harsh. Of course, I do not admit that. It would afford me great pleasure to know even one of these 'subtler errors of the day,' save those based on geology and modern discoveries, any speculative or

metaphysical error, the solution or the principle of solution of which is not to be found in the books of the Scholastics.

"But the article I regret most, and which is the cause of this letter of mine, is the one headed 'Catholic Polemics.' Assuredly, we must present truth in such a way as to be understood by those whom we address; and who ever denied it? But if we must proceed, as you do yourself when speaking on hell, this is another thing.

"Really, my dear Doctor, I have been horrified at it. What then becomes of the *Ite in Ignem Eternum*, of the several passages where this fire is called *Inextinguibilis*, of this well known text of Isaias: '*Quis habitabit ex vobis cum ardoribus sempiternis?*' and of so many others, and of all catechisms together? To say that the reprobate can be restored to the natural beatitude they might have enjoyed in *status naturæ puræ* is a heretical proposition. Besides, if they undergo the loss of God, as you concede, and if this be a punishment, how can they feel any amount of happiness; unless you contend that the loss of God is a trifling affair; or unless you put them on the same level as children who have not been baptized; neither of which can be held consistently with the teaching of the Catholic church. But I have no time to argue at length. It would take me a month to explain what came to my mind when reading that article. My dear Doctor, I tell you again I feel a great deal of pain on account of it.

"Besides, how can you say with justice, page 358, that 'we must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, &c.,' and a few lines before, that 'it is the duty of Catholic publicists never to take any deeper, broader, or loftier views than are taken by the most ignorant or uncultivated of Catholic believers, &c.?'

"I have just done reading the '*Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*,' by Dr. Newman. Nothing can be more original, more deep, and more orthodox, and not only no ignorant Catholic, but even very few among the most learned, could go so deep, and explain so philosophically the origin and causes, &c., of Protestantism in England; and you, yourself, were you shackled and fettered when formerly you wrote so beautifully and vigorously in behalf of the Church? If you were, indeed it is a fact I never suspected in the least. Now your Review is no more the same as before. I do not know why. I cannot account for the change. But change there is, and a striking one. Assuredly, you have still admirable passages. But you have taken the habit of mixing up with them passages of quite a different nature, which grate terribly on the ears of your friends.

"I object also to the beginning of the *alinea*: 'In our historical reading,' p. 360. It contains a real offence to the Bishops, and

also especially to the five last pages, from the *alinea*, 'finally,' p. 373 to the end; except the last lines, which breathe a noble spirit, a truly Catholic heart. Ah, Doctor, if your excellent qualities could be cleared from some little defects, which impair them and lessen the fruits they can produce, you would be an accomplished man. I have no time to write any more, and this even is too long.

"Be assured that there is in my remarks, much less in my heart, not the slightest degree of bitterness against you. Nothing will ever make me forget the good you have done to the Catholic cause, and till the end I will remain

"Your most affectionate and devoted friend."

To this Letter we subjoin an article from *The Catholic*, published at Pittsburg, July 13th, 1861, because it is, with the exception of the last paragraph, written with more candor and fairness, and with a graver attempt at argument than we usually meet in the columns of the so-called Catholic papers when referring to our review :

"Towards the end of the third article of the July number of his Review, Dr. Brownson throws out some suggestions as to the real Catholic doctrine on certain points, which are combated by the rationalists of the day. He is anxious apparently to reduce the teaching of the Church within as narrow limits as possible, in order the better to recommend it to unbelievers. Whatever may be said of the merits of this system in general, we are afraid that in the particular instances he has selected, the Reviewer has gone too far.

"He first offers the following explanation of the Catholic doctrine of hell: 'Though only the elect can be saved, we know of no authority for denying that all men may not attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature.' The authority for denying this view is plain enough. All theologians assert that it is rash (and some go farther) to deny that the fire of hell is not metaphorical, but real, though no doubt, different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth. The foundation for this assertion is the frequent use in the Scripture of the word fire, to express the sufferings of the damned, under circumstances that entirely preclude any but a literal meaning. Add to this the following words of the Athanasian Creed, which every Catholic must receive as an authoritative exposition of faith, 'qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam æternam; qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. HÆC EST FIDES CATHOLICA.' And although these last words do not refer exclusively to the sufferings of the damned, yet they include this point, as well as the others explained in the Symbol. Now, if the fire which torments the damned be a real fire, and be eternal, it is manifest that the explanation suggested in the Review cannot be maintained.

"Again, the Reviewer overlooks another well-defined doctrine of the Church. The Council of Florence defined, and the definition is repeated in every profession of faith proposed to the Oriental schismatics, that the souls of those who die in actual, as well as of those who die in only original sin, 'mox in infernum descendunt, *pœnis tamen disparibus puniendæ*.' Now, the mildest doctrine that a Catholic can defend in regard to infants who die in original sin, is that they are excluded from the beatific, or supernatural vision of God, but enjoy that which would have been allotted to the state of pure nature. Then, according to the definition that the punishment of those who die in actual sin, is different from that of those who depart with original sin, the punishment of the first class of sinners must necessarily be something more than what the Reviewer represents it to be. Nor is this reasoning unsupported by positive authority. Innocent IV. (lib. III. Decretal, Tit. 42, cap. 3, *Majores*), lays down as a principle that the punishment of original sin is the privation of the vision of God, (*carentia visionis Dei*), and the punishment of actual sin consists in the *torments of an everlasting hell*, (*gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*.) This authoritative declaration prevents us from limiting the punishment of actual sin to the privation of the beatific vision, and clearly indicates that besides this the damned have to suffer perpetual torments. And from this we think we can conclude that the Reviewer's question, whether we can hold and defend the view he proposes 'compatibly with our faith as a Catholic,' must be answered in the negative.

"Dr. Brownson next introduces various questions in regard to the Holy Scriptures, in the settlement of which he thinks he can improve on the solutions given in 'popular theology.' The Council of Trent (Sess. IV.) has defined that God is the author of the Old and New Testaments; it gives a list of the sacred and canonical books, and anathematizes those 'who refuse to receive for sacred and canonical the entire books, with each of their parts,' as they 'are commonly read in the Catholic Church, and as they are to be found in the Old Vulgate edition.' To say that a book is sacred and canonical, is to say that it is inspired, or that God is its author, and this certainly forces us to defend that 'every historical statement made therein is strictly exact.' The sacred writers no doubt 'followed their own reason, judgment, and taste in their forms of expression, in the selection of the imagery and illustrations which they adopt, and in the arguments which they use or put forth in defence of the truth revealed;' but in all this they were guarded from error by the infallible assistance of the Holy Ghost, and the same Holy Spirit moved them to write what they did write. This is the view of the inspiration of a sacred book, which must be held to make good the assertion that God is the author of the entire book, and each of its parts. We do not know whether the Reviewer counts the Jesuit Patrizi among 'popular' theologians; at

all events he has, we think, settled conclusively the question of the nature and limits of inspiration in a dissertation on the subject, which he published in Rome, in 1857, and in which he defends the view which we have briefly stated.

"Again, the Council of Trent, *ad coercenda petulantia ingenia*, decreed that no one relying on his own learning should interpret the Sacred Scriptures, in matters of faith and morals, pertaining to the establishment of Christian doctrine, contrary to the sense which has been holden and is held by our holy mother the Church, or contrary to the *unanimous* interpretation of the Fathers. This decree is more than a sufficient answer to the questions put by the Reviewer in relation to traditionary interpretation. A fuller explanation may be found in any 'popular' theology.

"Lastly, the Reviewer complains that scholastic theology represents the supernatural as isolated and arbitrary. This, we must confess, is a novel view of scholastic theology. This theology follows closely the definitions of the Church, and if there is any obscurity on the question of the supernatural, it is because the more difficult and abstruse points, as Pope Celestine I. long ago remarked, have not been defined by the competent authority. The Reviewer must pardon us if we still prefer the teaching of scholastic theology to any unintelligible jargon about methexia, and mimesis, and palingenesia, and cosmic cycles. There is no use of attempting to improve on the simplicity of faith, and as Gregory XVI. complains in his Brief against Hermes, 'besides the evil wrought by those who openly defend rebellion against the Church, great harm is done by those, who through the love and desire of novelty, always learning and never coming to the knowledge of truth, become masters of error, having never been the disciples of truth, and while boasting that they defend, in reality attempt to corrupt the sacred deposit of faith.'"

We add also the following paragraph, which we clip from the *Catholic Mirror*, published at Baltimore, as, before we get through, we shall make it the subject of a remark:

"*Messrs. Editors*:—Let me call your attention and that of the readers of *Brownson's Review*, to page 371 of the last number, where the former champion of the Church calls in question an article of Catholic faith, namely, the eternity of the pains of hell. This point was solemnly defined in the fifth General Council, held at Constantinople, in the year 553. *Qui stat, videat ne cadat*.

"A PRIEST."

The writer of the Letter says: "Now your Review is no more the same as before. I do not know why. I cannot

account for the change. But change there is, and a striking one." The change can hardly be great or striking, it seems to us, if it cannot be told wherein it consists. Of this alleged change we ourselves are not aware. We have, we confess, for the last few years endeavored to write in our own natural style rather than in a style formed in imitation of the Scholastics, in which we were never at home or at our ease. We have also taken up other questions, and have endeavored to address ourselves more to the general comprehension of the American mind, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, than we did in the beginning of our Catholic career. We labored at first to bring out and vindicate what may be called the extrinsic authority of the Church; but, having said all that we had to say on that point, we have since labored more especially to bring out and vindicate what may be called her intrinsic authority, in order to show that the extrinsic is not arbitrary, mechanical, or isolated in its character and operation, but has its basis in the intrinsic, in the very nature and constitution of things. In the earlier volumes of our Review we labored to develop and apply to the various relations of life, social, domestic, and individual, the admonition of our Lord, *Quærite primum regnum Dei et justitiam ejus: et hæc omnia adjicientur vobis*. In the later volumes we have been endeavoring to develop and apply to the various questions that come up the theological maxim, "*Gratia supponit naturam*," grace supposes nature. In this, indeed, there is a change of subject very allowable and very necessary, unless we would be continually repeating ourselves, but no change of doctrine or purpose, tone or spirit.

If there has been any change of purpose or of doctrine in our Review during the seventeen years of its devotion to Catholicity, we are unconscious of it. As far as we know ourselves we are the same man that we were at first, only trusting that we may have profited somewhat by our experience; we are, to say the least, as firm in our Catholic faith as we were seventeen years ago, as deeply devoted to the Church, as anxious to serve the cause of truth, and as earnest to secure the salvation of our own soul. The only changes we are conscious of are such changes as invariably take place in every convert when his first fervor has passed away, when the novelty of his position has worn off, and he has become acquainted with the stern realities of the new world into which he has entered.

From our entrance into the Church up to the present moment, those outside have consoled themselves with the constant prediction that we should change and abandon the Catholic religion, as we had abandoned the several forms of Protestantism to which we had been previously momentarily attached; and we fear that these predictions have had some influence on a certain number of our Catholic friends, and disposed them from the first, if we failed to repeat our profession of faith, to suspect us of having changed or being on the point of changing back to our old misbelief or no-belief. Now we wish to say, once for all, that when we entered the Catholic Church we did it deliberately and from full conviction; we knew what we were about; we then made our solemn profession of faith and pledged ourselves to God and to man to abide by it; we then pledged ourselves to submit to the authority and to hold the doctrines of the Church. We consider this pledge sufficient, and do not consider it necessary for us to repeat it in every number and in every article of our Review. In a worldly point of view, we had nothing to gain by becoming a Catholic; in a worldly point of view, we have nothing to gain by remaining a Catholic. We came into the Church because thoroughly convinced and firmly persuaded that she is God's Church, and that out of her communion there is no salvation; we remain in the Church because we retain the same conviction, the same persuasion, and know that if we were to leave her we could never save our soul, see God, or enjoy the happiness of heaven. What she teaches us, we believe; what she commands us, we are prepared to do without question or hesitation. Let us know she teaches a doctrine, we ask nothing further; let us know that she declares such or such to be our duty, and we at once admit that we are bound to do it, and that if we do not, we are wanting not only in our fidelity to her, but in our obedience to God. What more can be asked of us, or what more can we say? Do you believe us? Then this is enough. Do you not believe us? Do you believe that we lie, lie to you and lie to God? Then nothing that we could say would be of any avail. But till we *persist* in maintaining some condemned doctrine, or in defending things prohibited by the Church, you are bound to believe us and to be satisfied with our Catholic disposition and intentions.

That we may err, that we have erred in our writings in regard both to doctrine and opinion, is very possible; to

this the best of men are liable, for, as says our reverend friend in his Letter, "*Errare aut errasse humanum est.*" But can any one, however hostile to us, charge us with persisting in an error of any sort after it has been clearly shown to us that it is an error? Have we ever resisted authority in either doctrine or practice? We may have been ignorant of some definitions of the Church, and unwittingly said things contrary thereto, but when those definitions were brought to our knowledge, have we ever refused to accept them or to retract any thing we might have said not in accordance with them? Have we ever set, or even shown a disposition to set ourselves above authority and to write or teach any thing contrary to the teachings of the Church? No enemy can say that we have. We have for seventeen years conducted a Catholic Review, and no Bishop or Archbishop can say that we have ever persisted in any doctrine or opinion which he informed us was contrary to our Catholic faith or Catholic duty.

Our reverend friend says: "Your philosophy as a system can be maintained," that is, maintained compatibly with our faith as a Catholic, we suppose he means. This is all we need ask, and we may pass over his criticisms, the more especially, since they do not happen to bear upon either our method or our principles. In point of fact, we have no system of philosophy, defend no system, and are opposed to all attempts to construct a system; for all systems of philosophy are abstract, and therefore lack reality. They are at best only logical representations, not of reality, or things as they are, but of our mental conceptions of things. Our philosophy, so far as philosophy we have, is realism, that is, deals with things as they really are, and not as they may exist in our abstract conceptions. When we assert *Ens creat existentias* as the ideal formula embracing all truth, we assert the real order; and we assert real being and real existences in their real relation. Our reverend friend must concede to us, that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, all things visible and invisible; he must also concede, that what is not God, and yet exists, is creature; that what is not creature, and yet is, is God, and that the relation between God and creature, or between Being and existences, is expressed by the creative act; therefore he must concede that all truth, whether truth of being, truth of existences, or truth of relation, is embraced in the ideal formula. Furthermore, as Ens, or God, is

real and necessary being, and includes in himself all real and necessary being, he must concede that, whatever is contingent, depends upon the creative act, and exists only by virtue of that act. How, then, can he object to our formula as the *primum philosophicum*?

We thank our reverend friend for informing us, that we are perfectly free to think as we choose about Home Politics, and also for admitting that he had not much to say against our views on the subject of Education, especially, as he says, as the bishops themselves were divided on that question. With regard to our views of the temporal Principality of the Holy Father, he says, he said and believed, when they were put forth, they were such as an honest man might entertain; but he now, it would seem, thinks differently, and claims the benefit of the proverb, *Errare aut errasse humanum est*. That proverb, we suppose, may be as available for us as for him; and in all cases, and on all subjects, we trust we shall ever be as ready as he to retract any views we have expressed, the moment we are satisfied they are erroneous. The subject, however, is one which cannot be re-opened, at least for the present, in our pages. We will only say, that our friend will find in our Review the conviction, as strongly expressed as he expresses it, that the Pope is more than ever the true friend, not only of right, but especially of liberty. Our views on the whole question, especially on the conduct of the Sardinians and the revolutionists in Italy, have been given as fully in our pages as it is necessary to give them; and we have nothing further to say on the subject, only that if we have said any thing untrue, or inconsistent with our faith or loyalty as a Catholic, we are ready to make such explanations, modifications, or retractions, as the Holy See may require of us.

Our reverend friend complains that we have several times said things rather harsh against the Scholastics. This is possible; but he might have added, that we have several times said things very much in their favor. Does he forget that the Scholastics have said much harder things themselves of each other, than we have ever said of any of them? Does he hold that we are bound, as Catholics, to maintain every doctrine, every opinion, every form of expression, which may be found in the Scholastics, either as philosophers or as theologians? Does he maintain that the human mind has henceforth nothing to do, but to repeat, in a diluted form, the Scholastics, and that it is never lawful for a

Catholic to go beyond the compendiums of their speculations furnished by our modern theologians? Did not the Scholastics in method, in form, and in expression, depart widely from the Fathers? Wherefore, then, should it be unlawful for us, provided we hold fast to the faith, to depart in like respects from them? Am I, as a Catholic of the nineteenth century, bound to follow, in my method of philosophizing, St. Thomas, any more than St. Thomas was bound to follow the method of St. Augustine? St. Thomas, as a philosopher, simply reproduces Aristotle, and departs from him only when forced to do so by his faith as a Christian. Is it unlawful for me, as a Catholic, to dissent from Aristotle? Must I, too, take that Pagan philosopher as *Magister*, as *Philosophus*, whose *dictum* is authority in every matter pertaining to the province of human reason? If so, what say you of St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Thomassin, Bossuet, Fenelon, and Cardinal Gerdil, not to name others hardly less eminent in philosophy and theology, who were very far from swearing by the words of the Stagirite? We have always understood, that in philosophy the Church leaves us free, so long as we do not contravene her dogmas, or depart from the Catholic faith.

The writer of the letter says: "It would afford me great pleasure to know even one of those 'subtler errors of the day,' save those based on geology and modern discoveries, any speculative or metaphysical error, the solution, or the principle of solution of which, is not to be found in the books of the Scholastics." The term *scholastics* is rather vague, and our friend allows himself a very wide margin. By the Scholastic philosophy we, in our remarks referred to, meant not merely that of the mediæval scholastics, but that generally taught officially in our schools and colleges, such as we find it in our more commonly used text-books. With this philosophy, which professes to follow in the main St. Thomas, and is of the Peripatetic species, we have maintained, it is impossible to refute the subtler objections of our day urged against the Catholic Church. There are many of these subtler errors; but as our friend asks for only one, we will name modern pantheistic rationalism, as held and defended by recent German authors. We find in this philosophy neither the refutation, nor the principle of refutation of this subtle form of rationalism. Taking the principle of the Peripatetics, *Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, it is impossible to refute modern sen-

sism. Denying, with what we call Scholastic philosophy, or the philosophy of the schools, intuition of God, it is impossible, by any logic we are acquainted with, to prove the existence of the Supreme Being as distinct from the universe; and denying, with the same philosophy, all intuition of the creative act, it is equally impossible to prove the existence of a universe distinct from God or the Supreme Being. It would be easy for us to show the truth of these assertions; but as we could not do it without scandalizing many worthy people, we let them stand as simple assertions, leaving it for our friend to refute them, by refuting on the recognized principles, and by the approved methods of the Scholastic philosophy—Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel, Bauer, or even the *Ethics* of Spinoza.

We do not say that it is impossible to refute these subtler errors to which we allude by the Scholastic philosophy, to the satisfaction of those who are ignorant of them, or even as they may be reproduced by our professors; what we mean is, that it is impossible with that philosophy, according to its systematic principles and method, to refute them, to the conviction of those who hold them, and as they hold them. German rationalism, which in its later forms is a far more subtle pantheism than that of Oriental emanationism, is, so far as we are informed, met and refuted by no official philosophy, or philosophy suffered to be taught in our schools, as it is conceived and held by the German rationalists themselves. No doubt our professors prove clearly enough, that it contains many errors and even absurdities; but we refute no doctrine for its adherents, till we distinguish its truth from the error they mix up with it, and show them that truth freed from its accompanying error, and integrated in our own doctrine. Men embrace an erroneous system, and adhere to it, not for the sake of the error, but for the sake of the truth it contains; and they hold the error, either because they do not distinguish it from the truth, or because it seems to them impossible to hold the truth without holding it. We should all remember that the intellect can never be false, and, therefore, that in every doctrine which the intellect may embrace, there is and must be an element of truth. That truth the Catholic, if he understands his own religion, accepts, and shows to exist, in its unity and integrity, in the doctrine of his Church. This is the fact which he must make evident to every non-Catholic in order really to refute him. Now,

how can you tell me, on your Scholasticism, what is the truth the German rationalist holds, and which, to his mind, consecrates the error of that rationalism ; or how will you show him that in your own doctrine you avoid his error, and accept and integrate his truth ?

We repeat here what we have often said in our Review, that we do not refute false doctrines simply by pointing out their falsehood ; we must do it by distinguishing between the true and the false, and showing that we accept the true, and integrate it in a higher unity. This is an important consideration for all who seek the conversion of non-Catholics. In the earlier volumes of our Review we wrote not a few articles against Protestants and unbelievers in favor of Catholicity, which were perfectly satisfactory and conclusive to our Catholic friends, but which had little or no effect upon those who held the errors we labored to refute, except to puzzle and bewilder them. There was something not unjust in their reply : " Your arguments are logical ; they are well put ; they silence, but they do not convince." They did not convince any who needed to be convinced, for the simple reason, that we did not distinguish their truth from their error, and show them that we held the very truth they in their own minds saw, and held it in its unity and integrity free from their error.

This is the grand mistake of most controversialists with their opponents. They begin by denouncing their errors, and passing over, without recognition, the very important, the very essential truths which, notwithstanding those errors, they may hold, and then attributing their failure to be convinced to the perversity of their wills, the hardness of their hearts, or their love of error. No man hates truth or loves error, and no man is ever unwilling to give up error for truth, when he is convinced that it is only error that he gives up, and only truth that he is required to accept. Why is it the Protestant adheres to his Protestantism ? Because his Protestantism is a pure, unmixed falsehood ? No. But because he has in it certain elements of truth which he loves and prizes, and which he erroneously supposes he would be required to give up, were he to become a Catholic. To induce him to become a Catholic it is not necessary, nor is it profitable to insist, in season and out of season, on his error, but to show him that his truth is ours, is held by us as firmly as by him, in a higher unity than he has, in its true place and relation in the whole body of truth.

The hardest thing for us Catholics to conceive of, is, that they who are not Catholics may have, and in fact do have much truth, and that we do no harm to the Catholic cause, and in no sense deny the catholicity of our religion by recognizing and frankly accepting the truth they have. In fact, we hardly believe practically, that our religion can be regarded as catholic if we admit those outside are yet not destitute of some portions of truth. We are apt to think that whatever truth we concede to them is so much subtracted from our stock. Yet the concession implies no deficiency on our part, or that the truth which we concede them to hold is sufficient for their intellectual and moral life and fecundity. The Catholic Church embraces the whole truth and nothing but truth; in her alone is truth to be found in its unity and universality as a complete and living whole. Out of the Church truth is indeed held, but held in fragments, isolated from its proper relations, without unity or integrity, and therefore without life, vigor, or fruitfulness. No people in any age has been so degraded, so completely dishumanized, so absolutely severed from God as to have no truth; for to be absolutely destitute of truth, to be reduced to pure falsehood would be absolute intellectual death and annihilation. It is because those outside of the Church are not destitute of all truth, because they have some elements of truth that we are able to hope for their conversion, for it is only on the truth which they have that we can base our arguments or our reasoning designed to bring them to the truth which they have not. Bearing this in mind, our labors would be much more successful, because we should proceed in our controversies with non-Catholics with more respect for their understanding, and more readily win their sympathy and affection.

Perhaps, after all, the suspicion that we have changed, which some of our Catholic friends seem to entertain, grows out of the fact that we really have changed our method of dealing with those outside of the Church, and, instead of laboring primarily and chiefly to prove that they are wrong and on the road to destruction, we have labored to make them understand that we recognize what they have that is true and by no means wish them to abandon any truth they have. We have sought latterly to defend Catholic interests and to win the ears and the hearts of those separated from us, by showing them, on the one hand, that Catholicity repels nothing which they hold affirmatively, or most value

in their own doctrines, and, on the other hand, that what they really object to in the Catholic Church and is practically effective in keeping them out of her communion, has no real foundation in Catholic doctrine, in the constitution, discipline, teachings, or practices of the Church, although some of it may be true of the notions and practices of many Catholics. Here, we apprehend, is the cause of much of that distrust of us which some have latterly entertained.—It has led us necessarily into a style of remark and to the adoption of a line of argument not usual with Catholic controversialists—or, as to that matter, with any class of controversialists, Catholic or non-Catholic. It has led us to acknowledge and accept much that is true in our opponents, and to acknowledge and rebuke not a few notions and practices we find among our own Catholic brethren. It has had the effect not of diminishing our intolerance of error, but of making us less intolerant to those separated from the Catholic communion. It has also led us to seek to present Catholic truth under those relations and in those forms which would render it intelligible to the non-Catholic American mind, and prevented us from adopting as the rule of our action: “See no faults in a friend, and no good in an enemy.” But whether right or wrong in this, we have believed that we were proceeding upon a truly Catholic principle, and laboring in the most effectual manner in our power for the advancement of Catholic interests. It is for the authorities of the Church to decide whether we have adopted an un-Catholic principle, an un-Catholic method, or whether, supposing our principle and method be true, we have erred in our development and application of them or not. If they say we are wrong under either head, we are ready to make the correction or the modification that shall be exacted of us.

A due consideration of what we have just said will explain, if it does not justify, what appears to our reverend friend as objectionable in our article on *Catholic Polemics*, and which he says is the cause of his Letter to us. “Assuredly,” he says, “we must present truth in such a way as to be understood by those whom we address; and who ever denied it? But if we must proceed, as you do yourself when speaking on Hell, this is another thing.” This concedes the principle we contend for; but the reverend author, we trust, will permit us to say that to present truth in such a way as to be understood by those whom we ad-

dress, is to present it in such a way that it shall be seen to be consistent with, and to include the truth they already hold. This is all that we have aimed at in any thing we have written, or insisted upon as necessary to be done.—Whether in attempting to do it we have ourselves fallen into error or not, we leave to others to decide.

Our reverend friend says he “has been horrified” at what we say when speaking of hell. We very frankly admit, and we shall by and by explain wherein, that some expressions escaped us which are inexact and may lead to the inference that we hold in regard to the punishment of the wicked in hell, a doctrine which we do not hold and had no intention of suggesting. But our friend should bear in mind that we were in fact laying down and defending no doctrine on the subject; we were simply stating certain problems of very great importance in the present state of religious controversy in our own country, in regard to which further definitions of the Church seem to us to be needed. We did not attempt to dictate what those definitions should be, nor did we give anybody the slightest reason to suppose that we were unprepared to accept them, let them be what they might. We thought and we still think, that there are questions which are asked in relation to the future condition of the reprobate that have not been answered by any formal and express definitions of the Church, and on which therefore opinion is as yet free.

Our friend cites against us some passages of Scripture and refers us to all the catechisms; the writer in the *Catholic Mirror* refers us to the Fifth General Council for a solemn definition of the Church against us; *The Catholic* refers us to the words of the Athanasian creed, *qui bona egerunt ibunt in vitam æternam; qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. Hæc est fides Catholica*, to the definition of the Council of Florence, which declares a difference of punishment between those who die guilty of actual sin and those who die in only original sin, and to the *Decretals* which assert that the punishment of actual sin is *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. Conceding these authorities to be definitions, they do not touch the problem we proposed to be defined, for we have never questioned, or thought of questioning the fact that the reprobate are punished eternally in hell. Our questions, which, let it be understood, we did not answer—related not to the fact or duration of punishment, but to its nature and to the principles on which it is inflicted.

In regard to the reference of the writer in the *Catholic Mirror*, we can only say that we have been unable to find any thing of the sort in the Acts of the Fifth General Council held at Constantinople in 553, or even in the Acts of a Synod held by the Archbishop of the same city a short time previous at the request of the Emperor, against the Origenists, and which are sometimes included with those of the Council itself. There is in them not the slightest reference to the subject. It is true Denzinger in his *Enchiridion* refers us to the Acts against the Origenists, but the Acts as he gives them are wholly silent on the question. A friend, quite competent to the task, whom, in consequence of our continued inability to make much use of our eyes, we requested to examine the Acts of the Council in question as given by Hefele in his *History of the Councils*, the fullest and most recent authority on the subject, assures us that he can find no reference in them to the question of the punishment of the wicked. Hefele also maintains, and very conclusively, it has seemed to our friend and to us, that the name of *Origen* even, if not the whole of the 11th Canon inserted in the Acts of the Council as we now have them, is an interpolation. St. Gregory the Great tells us expressly that the only subject treated in the Fifth General Council was that of the *Tria Capitula*. It would be well for our newspaper writers to consult the original authorities before citing them.

The definition of the Council of Florence adduced is not in point, for we did not question that it had been defined, that there would be a difference of punishment between those who die in only original sin and those who die in actual sin. The theologian in *The Catholic* reasons well as he understands our question, but not as we understand it ourselves. The passage from the *Decretals*, is referred by *The Catholic* to Innocent IV.; Denzinger refers it to Innocent III., and we find it in the *Decretals* of Gregory IX, referred to the same Pope, which seems the more probable as Innocent IV. was not Pope until some time after the death of Gregory IX. The sentence quoted can hardly be regarded as a definition, because it was not the point in question before the Pontiff. It appears in a letter from Pope Innocent to the Archbishop of Arles against the Albigenses and other heretics, who contended that baptism is uselessly conferred on infants. The letter contains a condemnation of this heresy and an argument against it,

and the particular passage cited comes in incidentally in the course of the Pontiff's reasoning.

But let this be as it may, the *dictum* of the Pontiff is given substantially in the language of Scripture, and leaves the sense of the text referred to undefined. The same may be said of the passage in the Athanasian creed. The texts adduced by our friend from the Scriptures are not definitions, for the questions we asked relate precisely to the sense in which these texts are to be understood. That the wicked "descend into hell," that they go *in ignem eternum*, that they dwell *cum ardoribus sempiternis*, are points which we did not, and, as a Catholic or a believer in the Holy Scriptures, could not question, or represent as undefined. In what sense are these expressions to be taken? The writer of the Letter as well as the theologians of the *Mirror* and *The Catholic* seem not to have perceived the real character of the questions we raised, or the points that we considered as in need of further definition. The main points we had in view were set forth in two questions which we asked, raised by the book we were reviewing. 1. Does the Church teach that the punishment of the wicked in hell is vindictive or simply expiative? 2. Does she teach that the punishment is everlasting because the reprobate continue everlastingly to sin? In development of these questions, we say:—

"Certainly the Church teaches that they who die unregenerate shall never see God in the beatific vision, that is, be united with God by the *ens supernaturale*. This loss or deprivation of heaven is a penalty of sin, and is undoubtedly everlasting. But has she defined that the wicked in hell are continually committing new sin, that they continue through eternity uttering new blasphemies against God, which call down upon them new showers of Divine wrath? Are their hearts devoured by a literal worm that never dies? Are they subjected to a material fire that is never quenched? Are they doomed to those sensible tortures which the imaginations of our preachers so often attempt to depict? If they continue to commit sin, how can we say that Christ has triumphed over sin, that he has overcome Satan and destroyed his works? If their punishment is purely vindictive, not expiative, how can you reconcile it with the love, the mercy, or the goodness of God? Would the worst man that ever lived, animated by the most vindictive passions that ever raged in the human breast, not recoil from inflicting any thing like so severe suffering upon his most bitter and most hated enemies? Is there not here a point in which popular

belief needs to be modified? Can the everlasting existence of evil be by any means reconciled with the universal dominion of good? Has the Church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe, that any thing is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked except their exclusion from supernatural beatitude? May we not hope that the sins of this life may in some sense be expiated, and that the reprobate, though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesia, may yet find their sufferings gradually diminishing, and themselves attaining to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude? We know nothing in the definitions of the Church opposed to this, and therefore, though only the elect can be saved, we know no authority for denying that all men may not attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature. If this view may be taken, or if this theological explanation of the Catholic doctrine of hell is admissible, many of the most serious objections urged by thinking men against the Church would be removed. Are we or are we not at liberty to take this view and offer this explanation? Can we hold and defend this view compatibly with our faith as a Catholic?" pp. 371-2.

Here it will be perceived that the questions we put had reference, not to the duration of punishment, but to the principle on which it is inflicted, and to its nature and intensity:—1. Are the wicked everlastingly punished because they are everlastingly sinning? 2. Is their punishment vindictive or simply expiative? 3. Does it necessarily include any thing more than is implied in the loss of heaven or supernatural good? 4. Does it necessarily, though none but the elect can receive any supernatural good, exclude the reprobate from all diminution of their sufferings under the expiation eternally going on, or from gradually attaining to that degree of imperfect good foreshadowed in what theologians call the state of pure nature? What we really say is, that we know nothing in the definitions of the Church that forbids us to hold the milder view indicated in these questions. Our critics adduce no definitions of the Church to the contrary; they seem to have fastened upon one or two expressions which are not exact, and which are only incidental, and to have passed over what was the real intent and meaning it is evident to the candid and careful reader we must have had.

No doubt we indicated, clearly enough, that we should like to concede, if we could do so compatibly with Catholic faith, that the punishment of the damned is not everlasting because they are everlastingly sinning, that is, committing

new sin; and that it is expiative, and not, at least in the popular sense of the word, vindictive. Our critics have overlooked this point, which was the great point with us, and assumed that our intention was to maintain that the expiation would ultimately end, and the reprobate be finally restored to natural beatitude. The phraseology we used, perhaps, justifies this assumption, for we say, "May we not hope that the sins of this life may, in some sense, be expiated, and that the reprobate may attain to as great a degree of good as is foreshadowed in the state of pure nature, or to that sort of imperfect good which is called natural beatitude." This phraseology is not sufficiently exact, and does not precisely express the meaning that was in our own mind when using it, and we thought we had sufficiently guarded ourselves against any erroneous interpretation, by the different phraseology which we used in connection with it, namely, that "though they can never receive any part or lot in the palingenesia, may yet find their sufferings gradually *diminishing* and themselves *attaining*," not *attain*, to the sort of imperfect good in question. We ought to have been more explicit, and to have stated more fully and more distinctly our meaning, or to have left that particular point untouched, as with us it was not of primary importance.

It was far from our intention to imply, or in any manner to indicate, that the punishment of the wicked could ever absolutely end, or that they could ever fully attain to natural beatitude, in the sense that term is taken by theologians. We knew perfectly well that, as a Catholic, we were bound to maintain that the reprobate descend to hell, and that hell is eternal; that all the reprobate go *in ignem æternum*, and that the punishment of those who die guilty of actual sin, is termed *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, and we never thought of calling this in question, or of asking if we might lawfully concede any thing incompatible with it. There was no intention of intimating that the expiation could ever be completed, or that the natural beatitude could ever be perfectly realized. Consequently there was nothing in our meaning to militate against the eternal punishment of the wicked, or in favor of the notion of their ultimate redemption from hell, or even complete restoration to natural beatitude.

Our reverend friend tells us, that to assert that "the reprobate can be restored to the natural beatitude they

might have enjoyed in *status naturæ puræ*, is a heretical proposition." We wish he had told us on what authority this rests, or when and where this proposition has been declared to be heretical. Yet we have said nothing that implies that it is or can be compatible with Catholic faith, for we did not assert any *restoration* to that beatitude. The most that can be made out of what we said is, that we thought it not contradictory to any definition of the Church to concede that the sufferings of the damned may be eternally diminishing, without ever absolutely terminating, and that they may be eternally approaching that sort of imperfect good, foreshadowed in what theologians call the *status naturæ puræ*, without ever fully attaining to it. But it must be borne in mind, that we did not mean by the natural beatitude, to which we supposed them to be approaching, the beatitude implied in the state of pure nature, on the supposition that man had been originally created, and left in that state; but as implied in the present decree of Providence, according to which man was created for supernatural beatitude, and exists in a state of pure nature only as that nature has been despoiled by sin of its supernatural endowment and the original gift of integral nature; whence it follows that the natural beatitude possible in the present decree of Providence, is necessarily far below what theologians understand by that term, that is, the beatitude man might have enjoyed, had he been created in the state of pure nature, and always remained in it. We meant, and could mean only the natural beatitude that is foreshadowed in that state, taken as it exists, and must exist, in the present order of Providence.

There is and must be a great difference between what may be called pure nature, originally endowed with the gifts of integrity, and raised to the plane of a supernatural destiny, and violently despoiled by sin of these gifts and the supernatural elevation, and the same nature originally created without these gifts and this elevation, and for a purely natural destiny alone, because the latter would never be exposed to the pain or regret of the loss of a good which never existed for it, and for which it was never designed, while, in the former case, it must suffer eternally not only the absence of supernatural beatitude, but, in the case of adults, the pains of feeling and knowing that it so suffers by its own fault. Created and endowed as we originally were, the reprobate not only do not attain to supernatural

beatitude, but suffer eternally its loss; while, had we been created in a state of pure nature, there would have been no loss of that beatitude, and, consequently, no pain, mental or sensible, consequent upon such loss. Very different, then, must be the state of the reprobate, even supposing them to attain to the degree of natural good foreshadowed by pure nature, as that nature actually exists, from what it would have been had they been created in pure nature alone, for a purely natural destiny.

Our friend asks us: "If the reprobate undergo the loss of God, which you concede, and if this be a punishment, how can they feel any happiness, unless you count the loss of God a trifling affair, or unless you put them on the same level as children who have not been baptized,—neither of which can be held, consistently with the teaching of the Catholic Church?" We hold neither. The loss of God is no trifling affair, for it is the loss of our supreme good, and of the Supreme Good itself; and we do not place those who die in actual sin on the same level with infants dying unbaptized, for infants so dying are punished for no actual fault of their own, and the others suffer not only what these infants suffer, but also punishment for their actual sins. The infants suffer simply the penalty of original sin, which is *carentia visionis Dei*, the absence or privation of the beatific vision, while the others suffer the torture of a perpetual hell, or loss, through their own fault, of that vision, or their supreme good. The difference between the two must be great, because, in the one case, there must necessarily be the eternal tortures of remorse and regret, while, in the other, there can be only the simple absence of a good which had not been lost, but never possessed or refused. The difference between not having and having lost, and that through our own fault, is not, and cannot be small, and is, perhaps, all the difference between *carentia visionis Dei* and *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*.

Happiness, in any full or adequate sense of that word, we do not suppose the damned enjoy, or ever can enjoy; but between happiness, in its full and perfect sense, and the possession of some sort of imperfect natural good, there is, in our mind, a difference. Being and Good are identical; and as all existence, by virtue of the fact that it is existence, participates of Being, all existence must in some sense be good; and since all existence proceeds from Being, and by the very law of its nature tends to return to Being as its

final cause, there can be no existence absolutely without good, in either its first cause or its final cause. To be absolutely severed from good, either in the first cause or in the final cause, would not be its eternal misery, but its absolute annihilation. Evil is never positive, but always negative. The only evil there is for any existence, is in not returning or attaining to its final cause, or to God, as the end for which it was created. Evil, then, can never be any thing more or less than the incomplete or imperfect return of the existence to its final cause. As every existence does and must tend in some degree to its final cause, there must always be for it some degree of good. This good, however imperfect or incomplete, however far short of that for which man was created it may fall, since it relates to the end, participates of the nature of beatitude, and so far may be called a degree of happiness; but in the damned it can never be so called, in any full or adequate sense of that term, and is always more appropriately called misery than happiness.

We asked: "Has the Church really defined, and does Catholic faith really require us to believe, that any thing is everlasting in the punishment of the wicked, except their exclusion from supernatural beatitude?" None of our critics, in public or in private, have brought forward any such definition. Heaven, we had supposed, was understood by all Catholics to consist in the full and complete realization of our destiny, that is, the full and complete enjoyment of God in the beatific vision, or union with God in what theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, or *lumen gloriæ*. This is what we understand by supernatural beatitude; and it is only in the possession of this, that man attains to the end for which he was created, to his supreme good, which consists, and can consist, only in his union, through the Incarnate Word, with the Supreme Good itself. This is man's supreme good. Hell, therefore, as man's supreme evil, must, since all evil is negative, never positive, consist, and can consist, only in the negation, absence, or loss of supernatural beatitude.

All that is positive is good, as all that is positive is true. Error is in not knowing, in the absence of intelligence; for to err with regard to any particular thing, is simply, so far as we do err, not to know. This follows, necessarily, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, that "the intellect is never false." This our critics know and concede. They know,

also, that the will refers to good only, and, according to the same St. Thomas, we do and can will only good. Evil being negative, can no more be an object of will, than falsehood can be an object of intelligence.

If we suppose hell to be complete and absolute evil, we must suppose it to be pure and absolute negation, therefore a simple nullity, nothing at all, and the damned in hell not to suffer, but to be annihilated. There must be, then, something good even in hell, and good either of the natural or of the supernatural order. Hell, then, cannot be instituted for justice alone, or for simple condign punishment, for all good is God, or in attaining to God as final cause. Justice is not God, but only a divine attribute in a secondary sense, having relation simply to created existences, and is itself exercised never for its own sake. It proceeds from, and must be exercised in subordination to Good, the Supreme Good. Hence, St. Thomas says, hell is ordained for good and not for justice alone? How, then, can we regard hell as a condition in which all melioration of the damned is impossible? Or understand by its eternity any thing but the eternal impossibility under which the damned are placed of ever attaining to their true destiny, which is in the supernatural order alone? If this be so, is there any error in supposing that hell is simply the absence or the loss of the supernatural, or in further supposing that this absence or loss does not necessarily exclude the damned from all good or amelioration of their condition?

We have already seen that all existence is good in relation both to the first cause and the final cause, and that its complete severance from good in either would be not its complete misery, but its absolute annihilation. Hence, St. Augustine argues that simple existence is itself good, and says that it is better for the damned "to exist than not to exist," or that no conceivable suffering can make it better not to be than to be. If hell were the negation of all good, it would be a simple nullity, and therefore inconceivable, for negations are conceivable only by virtue of the positive. Hell can be something real, actual, only in the respect that it participates of good, we might, perhaps, say, of heaven. Hence, some writers place hell itself in Paradise, and the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus in the Gospel would seem to indicate that those in hell can converse with those in Paradise. But be this as it may, hell cannot be the absolute contradictory of heaven. It can be its contradictory

only as the finite is the contradictory of the infinite, and, therefore, must participate of heaven or beatitude, as the finite does of the infinite, or else it could not exist at all.

The good of which even those in hell participate, and in relation to which their condition can be eternally meliorating or growing better, must be either in the natural order or in the supernatural. If, with the Augustinians, we maintain that *status naturæ puræ* was never an actual, or even a possible condition, and, therefore, that there is and can be no natural beatitude, we must maintain that this good pertains to the supernatural order, and is an initial palingenesia which can never be completed. But, if we maintain with the theologians of the Society of Jesus and those who follow them, that such state was possible, we may deny it all supernatural character, and maintain that it is good only in the natural order. Our critics take this latter view, and hold that natural beatitude, to a certain extent, is possible, and may be asserted for all who descend into hell with only original sin. This is the doctrine in accordance with which our questions were framed, and we are disposed to adhere to it, because we cannot understand how any one can even be initiated into the supernatural order without regeneration, or the new birth, which is a birth by the election of grace, and not by natural generation. But whether we are at liberty to hold the one or the other, is not the point in question, for we affirm neither. We have no doctrine of our own on the subject, and we are prepared to accept the real doctrine of the church, on this, as on all other points, the moment we know what it is.

The mistake of our critics has been in supposing that in what we said, we were dogmatizing, and under the form of questions, insinuating what we believed Catholic doctrine ought to be, not simply asking what, on the points indicated, it really is, or what it permits us to concede to those whom we would convince of the truth of our religion. We were not advancing opinions to be held, but stating problems to be solved, and whose solution might lead to important modifications, not of Catholic faith, or Catholic doctrine, strictly so called, but of theological systems, and forms, or modes of expression, intended to harmonize revealed truth and the truths of reason. Suppose all the points which it has been assumed we asserted, or denied, as to the future punishment of the wicked, are untenable, and would be in fact heretical, as well as unreasonable, it would make nothing against our

orthodoxy, for we did not, in point of fact, either assert or deny any of them; the most that could be said, would be that we confessed ourselves ignorant of some things which we ought to have known, and therefore did discredit to our understanding, not to our faith. We insist on this, because all our critics treat us as if we were dogmatizing, laying down Catholic doctrine, not merely proposing problems to be solved.

We have no difficulty with the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the wicked. We believe firmly that the wicked go into an eternal hell, in which they suffer eternally for the sins of this life. We see, not only in the special definitions of the Church, but in the very philosophy of our religion itself, an invincible and necessary reason why it should be so. There is no injustice in excluding the finally impenitent from heaven; and their eternal exclusion from heaven is their eternal hell. There is no injustice, nothing at which our reason revolts, in excluding from an inheritance those who never had any title to it, or, having had a title, have voluntarily forfeited it. Heaven, presented as a reward, necessarily implies merit, and consequently where the merit is wanting, it cannot be bestowed. Nor is there any difficulty in believing that the wicked who have failed to merit heaven, and for their demerit descend to hell, are left to suffer the inevitable consequences of their demerit. Remaining as they must forever below the line of their supreme good, they must forever remain with their destiny unfulfilled, their supreme good unattained and unattainable. Being below their destiny, with their existence uncompleted, they remain inchoate existences, grovelling forever in the darkness of the senses, and consequently suffer the *pœna sensus*, as well as the *pœna damni*.

Thus far there is no conflict with reason; and the common sense of mankind in all ages and nations justifies the Catholic doctrine of hell. The difficulty is not here. The difficulty commences the moment you assert in addition the vulgar doctrine of an eternal positive hell, in which the wicked are doomed to inconceivable tortures in addition to those which follow logically and necessarily from their non-conformity to the divine order, and their voluntary failure to attain the end for which they were created. This hell revolts our natural sense of justice, and the supposition that the Church teaches it, is, perhaps, in our times and country, the gravest obstacle to the acceptance of the claims of our

religion that the Catholic polemic has to encounter. Now, the point we raised was, does the Church anywhere assert such a hell, a hell which must be purely vindictive in its character, and exist from no necessity that we can see in the laws of Divine Providence, and for no end beyond that of pure vindictive justice itself, which is not and never can be a supreme end either with God or man, since justice is ordained to good. Is there any definition of the Church that requires us to believe this? We ask not what theologians may say on the point; but we ask what the Church herself says, for it is precisely the agreement or non-agreement of popular theology, or we might better say, popular preaching, on the subject with the real teachings of the Church, or strictly Catholic doctrine, that we wish to know. Must we on our faith as a Catholic assert this arbitrary, artificial, additional, and supernatural hell, or not? This is the question we want answered. Is the hell with which the Church threatens the wicked any thing more or less than the loss of heaven? This is the question we want answered, and we want it answered so that we may know how to govern ourselves in meeting the objections of a large class of non-Catholics to the common doctrine with regard to the future punishment of the wicked, or the eternal penalties of sin.

We certainly accept the definition of the Council of Florence, that there is a difference between the punishment of simple original sin and the punishment of actual sin, and we accept fully the definitions, if definitions they are, of Innocent III., that the penalty of original sin is *carentia visionis Dei*, and that of actual sin is *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. But this is not the question. What are we to understand by this *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*? 1. Are we to understand by it any other punishment than that which, according to the divine constitution of things, or the universal cosmic laws, sin unrepented of and unredeemed necessarily brings with itself, implied in that very common saying with regard to the sinner, he has already "hell within him," or he already suffers the "misery of hell?" 2. Is this *cruciatus* punishment by literal or material fire? With regard to the first question, we have already said all that seems to us proper or necessary; it remains for us to say a few words in regard to the second.

The Catholic says that "all theologians assert that it is rash (and some go further) to deny that the fire of hell

is not metaphorical, but real, though no doubt different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth." But if it be conceded that the fire of hell is different, or even different in many respects from the fire which we have on earth, it is no longer fire in the literal sense of the word, but something else; if something else, or if a fire of a different sort, it is no longer what we mean by fire, and the word fire can apply to it only in an analogical or a metaphorical sense. We cannot, then, say that the fire of hell is literal material fire. If we say it is literal material fire, how can it operate upon an immaterial and indissoluble spirit, save through the medium of a material body, since it operates only by disintegration? In such a case we should be obliged to deny, contrary to what the Church has defined, that the wicked dying descend immediately into hell, and maintain that they do not receive the punishment of hell until after the resurrection and the reunion of soul and body. Furthermore, if the body raised from the dead and reunited to the soul be a material body and subject as now to the action of fire, it would be shortly consumed, and there would be an end of the punishment by fire. If we suppose the body to rise differently constituted so as to resist the action of fire, so that the fire could not disintegrate it, then the fire could cause it no suffering, and there would and could be no punishment by fire. The punishment of the damned, then, by material fire, that is, by the element which we on earth call by that name, would be inexplicable without the constant miraculous interposition of the Creator. Are we required to believe in such interposition? After all, do not these expressions of the Holy Scriptures and the theologians, relating to the corporal sufferings of the damned and their punishment by material fire, pertain, like those which represent God as being angry, as repenting, and as having hands, arms, feet, sides, and nostrils, to the mimesis of religion, true as addressed to the senses and to the imagination, but not to be taken literally when addressed to the intellect, or the noetic faculty?

All language is mimetic or symbolic and is borrowed from the imagination and senses, and its true sense for the intellect is that which in it is copied or symbolized. Every word, we might almost say, is an allegory, at least a metaphor, and has a meaning deeper than what appears. We act always on this principle in interpreting those passages of Holy Scripture, which represent God with human pas-

sions and feelings, and acting under human forms ; why are we not to observe it equally when interpreting those passages which speak of the punishment, the sufferings, the tortures of the damned ? The Holy Pontiff uses the word, in speaking of the punishment of hell, *cruciatu*s, derived from *crux*, a cross, but he does not, we presume, and cannot take the word in its literal sense, for we cannot suppose that he means to teach us that the damned are literally crucified in hell. He uses the word in a figurative sense, and borrows an image from the suffering on the cross to represent in a vivid and striking manner the extreme suffering of hell. May it not be that the inspired writers have borrowed an image from the action of material fire on bodies and the extreme pain which follows such action to express the great or extreme pain of those doomed to a perpetual *gehenna* ? The word *gehenna* itself is taken figuratively, for literally it means the valley of Hinnom, which was just outside of Jerusalem, where were cast the offal of the city, and the dead bodies of malefactors. Nothing is more common than to use the word *fire* in a figurative sense. We speak of the "*fires* of passion," the "*fires* of wrath," the "*fires* or flames of desire," and surely we can conceive of no greater suffering than a soul consumed by an eternal desire which can never be satisfied, devoured by a burning thirst which can never be quenched, an everlasting craving for something which it has not and cannot have, and without which its destiny is not and cannot be fulfilled.

Consider what must be the condition of those who have lost heaven, who have lost forever their supreme good, the complement of their being, the fulfilment of their nature, who must always remain, as it were, dishumanized, incomplete, unfinished, inchoate existences, devoured by a sense of their own incompleteness, by a want of what they have not, a hungering and thirsting after that which they cannot get, after that which they can never hope to obtain, all increased and intensified by the knowledge that it has been through their own fault, their own folly, their own perverseness, that they have been reduced to their deplorable condition. Will the addition of any image drawn from the effects of literal fire heighten their sufferings, or represent their tortures in a clearer, more striking, or more appalling light ? Suppose a soul to have lost heaven, what greater wretchedness or greater evil can you suppose it possible to befall it ? What greater evil can you suppose, after all, it possible for

the wicked to endure than the loss of the supernatural, which is the true end, the true good of man ?

If the theologians asserted that it is *de fide* that the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, or what they call the *pœna sensûs* is punishment by literal or material fire, and that the *ignis æternus* or *inextinguibilis* must, according to the teachings of the Church, be taken in a literal sense, we, of course, should not dare to controvert them. Their unanimous or general assertion as to what is of faith, is conclusive in all cases, for it is through them, through her Doctors, that the Church herself teaches. But they nowhere assert, as we have been able to discover, that it is *de fide*. They indeed defend the literal interpretation as the more probable or the most probable, and argue strenuously in its defence ; still, that this interpretation must be adopted is only a theological opinion, and, if it be rash without very strong reasons to differ from them, we can never be bound to insist on that opinion as Catholic faith, when setting forth or defending our religion in our controversies with non-Catholics. In these controversies we have the right to adopt the principle of probabilism, and no right to insist on their accepting as Catholic doctrine any thing not strictly *de fide*. The question here is not what is the more probable opinion, or what is the safer opinion for a man to adopt for himself, but what he is absolutely bound to accept and insist on as Catholic faith. Nor are we in these controversies debarred from offering to our opponents interpretations which appear to them and to us more reasonable or less objectionable than the commonly-received theological opinion, in case we can do so without contradicting the definitions of the Church, or running athwart the principles or analogies of faith. We do not say the opinion of the theologians is false or erroneous, but we think we have a right to maintain that no definition of the Church requires us to accept it, or forbids us to adopt a different opinion, providing we have strong and urgent reasons for so doing ; we think we have a right to examine the arguments or reasons the theologians adduce in defence of their interpretation, and to exercise our own judgment in accepting or rejecting them. Do we here misunderstand or mistake the liberty allowed by the Church to the Catholic polemic ? If we do, we wish to be set right.

It is generally agreed, we believe, that the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, which is the special punishment of those

who die in actual sin, is identical with the punishment by fire, and also the punishment in which the body participates, if indeed it be not purely a corporeal punishment. But if it be so understood, it is a punishment which the wicked cannot suffer until the resurrection of the body and its reunion with the soul. But is this reconcilable with the Constitution *Benedictus Deus* of Benedict XII., which defines: "Quod secundum Dei ordinationem communem animæ decedentium in actuali peccato mortali, *mox* post mortem suam ad inferna descendunt, ubi pœnis infernalibus *cruciantur*," or with the definition of the Council of Florence already cited: "Illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato, vel solo originali decedunt, *mox* in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen *disparibus* puniendas?" These authorities seem to us to define that those dying in actual sin descend immediately to hell, and immediately suffer the infernal pains, from which those who die in only original sin are exempt, and which Innocent III. terms *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*. If the tortures of hell understood by the *pœna sensûs* be by literal fire or corporeal, how can we say that the wicked begin to undergo them immediately after death? As between death and the resurrection the damned must be regarded as disembodied spirits, how can they during that period suffer corporeal pains? This difficulty we have not seen cleared up, and, till it is, we see not how we can understand by the *pœna sensûs* and the *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus* either corporal pains or a punishment by literal fire, which can affect the soul only through the medium of the body.

We are told on very high authority that infants dying unbaptized, go not only *in infernum*, but *in ignem æternum, ad tormenta*, and actually suffer the pains of hell. The *Ite in ignem æternum* of the Gospel is said to all who are found on the left or not found on the right. As none are found on the right except those who enter the kingdom of heaven, and as those who die in infancy unbaptized do not enter into the kingdom of heaven, they must be on the left, and therefore sent away into everlasting fire.

This St. Augustine appears to us to teach; for he says: "Venturus Dominus, et judicaturus de vivis et mortuis, sicut Evangelium loquitur, duas partes facturis est, dextram, et sinistram. Sinistris dicturus, *Ite in ignem æternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus*: dextris dicturus, *Venite, benedicti Patris mei, percipite regnum quod vobis paratum est ab origine mundi*. Hac regnum nominat,

hac cum diabolo damnationem. Nullus relictus est medius locus, ubi ponere queas infantes. De vivis et mortuis iudicabitur: alii erunt ad dextram, alii ad sinistram: non novi aliud. Qui inducis medium, recede de medio: non te offendat qui dextram quærit. Et te ipsum admoneo: recede de medio, sed noli in sinistram. Si ergo dextra erit et sinistra, et nullum medium locum in Evangelio novimus: ecce in dextra regnum cælorum est, *Percipite*, inquit, *regnum*. Qui ibi non est, in sinistra est. Quid erit in sinistra? *Ille in ignem æternum*. In dextra ad regnum, utique æternum; in sinistra in ignem æternum. Qui non in dextra, procul dubio, in sinistra: ergo qui non in regno, procul dubio, in igne æterno.”*

St. Fulgentius, *apud* Billuart, says: “Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites, non solum homines jam ratione utentes, verum etiam parvulos qui . . . sine sacramento S. baptismatis . . . de hoc sæculo transeunt, ignis æterni sempiterno supplicio puniendos; quia etsi propriæ actionis peccatum nullum habuerunt, originalis tamen peccati damnationem carnali conceptione et nativitate traxerunt.”† St. Gregory the Great, speaking of the same, says, “Ad tormenta perveniunt,” and also, “Perpetua tormenta percipiunt et qui nihil ex propria voluntate peccaverunt.”‡ Bellarmine, as cited by Bossuet and the French Bishops in their denunciation of the *Nodus Predestinationis Dissolutus* of Cardinal Sfondrato, (not Sfrondata, as incorrectly printed in our last Review,) says: “Fide Catholica tenendum, parvulos sine baptismo decedentes absolute esse damnatos: nec sola cælesti, sed etiam naturali beatitudine perpetuo carituros, qui nempe sunt eruntque semper aversi habitualiter a Deo, deguntque ac semper degent in carcere inferno,” and also, “sub potestate diaboli in carcere inferno, loco horrido ac tenebricoso.”§

These passages would seem very clearly to indicate that infants dying without baptism suffer the *pœna sensus* as well as the *pœna damni*, are punished not merely with the loss of the beatific vision, but with the fires of hell; yet Innocent III. says expressly that the penalty of original sin is simply *carentia visionis Dei*, and all, or nearly all our theologians agree in maintaining that, though such infants can never see God in the beatific vision, they yet do not

* Sermo CCXCIV. c. 3., Ed. S. Maur.

† De Fide ad Petrum, c. 27.

‡ Moralium, lib. IX. CXXI., Ed. Migne.

§ Bossuet. Paris: Junier et Leroux. 1846. Tome XI. pp. 10 & 11.

suffer the tortures of the damned or punishment by literal fire, and they explain away the force of such passages as we have cited, with St. Thomas, by saying: "*Quod nomen tormenti, supplicii, gehennæ, et cruciatus, vel si quid simile in dictis sanctorum inveniatur, est large accipiendum pro pœna, ut ponatur species pro genere.*"* But if they have a right to understand these strong expressions in a figurative or metaphorical sense, so as to exclude the *pœna sensûs* and the literal fire of hell when applied to infants, taking them simply as implying punishment in general, why may not we, in like manner, understand them in a figurative or metaphorical sense when applied to those who die in actual sin? If, notwithstanding the assertion that unbaptized infants are said to go into "eternal fire," to "torments," and to suffer the "tortures of hell," we may still maintain that their punishment is simply *carentia visionis Dei*, and that they enjoy a certain degree of natural good, why must we maintain that those guilty of actual sin, because they are said to go *in ignem æternum*, and their punishment is described as *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, suffer material fire and are excluded from every degree of the same good? Even supposing this, there would still be, as we have already seen, the disparity between the punishment of those in original sin alone and those guilty of actual sin, asserted by the Council of Florence and Innocent III., for, in the former, there would be only the simple absence of the supernatural good, while, in the latter, there would be not only the absence, *carentia*, but the loss accompanied by the eternal regret, the eternal remorse, the eternal consciousness of having lost it by their own sin and folly, which would add to want eternally unsatisfied the gnawing of a worm that never dies.

It is very evident from all the authorities on the subject that those who die with original sin alone and those who die with actual sin in addition, are alike excluded "from the face of God," alike under "his wrath," alike are "damned," alike "go to hell," alike "go into eternal fire," alike "dwell with the devils in the prison of hell and the regions of eternal darkness." The difference, then, between them would seem to be confined to the difference in their internal state, not to their external condition. Their punishment may differ and must differ in degree; but degrees are said only

* De Malo, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1.

in reference to the same order; between different orders there is no relation of degrees, for no comparison can be made between them; the one class may suffer more or less, but the sufferings of all must be of the same kind. If, then, it is maintained that the one class may be said to go to hell, into eternal fire, and to be tortured, and yet to suffer no corporal pain, but to enjoy natural beatitude, or at least a very high degree of natural good, it would seem to be necessary to maintain that the other class are not doomed to any positive corporal punishments, but may yet have some degree, though a far less degree, of that same good.

When we speak of hell as a place, *locus*, a region, we speak mimetically not methexically, to the senses and imagination, not to the reason and understanding. Hell is a state or condition to which they are doomed who have not attained, and never can attain, to the end for which they were created, which is in the supernatural order, the palingenesia whose completion is glorification. All who enter not into the kingdom of heaven, *regnum celorum*, are doomed to this state or condition, as is implied in the authorities which speak of all classes of sinners as alike going to hell. All classes of sinners are doomed to this state or placed in this condition, the generic character of which is the want or loss of the supernatural, in which, and in which alone, is the complete fulfilment or realization of the end for which we exist. We see, then, no reason why we may not say, as we said in our last Review, that the only thing eternal in the punishment of the wicked is the loss of the supernatural. Our error, as we understand it, was not in assuming that the damned might be gradually attaining, under the continual expiation of their sins, to some degree of natural good, but in using language which seems to imply that they might ultimately attain to the full and complete enjoyment of what our theologians understand by natural beatitude, something far higher than any good which we suppose ever to have been foreshadowed by pure nature as it exists, or can exist, in the present decree of Providence. But we have dwelt too long on this subject; we pass to another.

Our reverend friend asks: "How can you say with justice, page 358, that 'we must be content to repeat the arguments stereotyped for our use, although those arguments may rest on historical blunders, metaphysical errors, &c.,' and a few lines before, that 'it is the duty of Catholic publicists never to take any deeper, broader, or loftier views,

than are taken by the most ignorant and uncultivated of Catholic believers, &c.'” If our highly esteemed and reverend friend will have the goodness to recur to our Review, and mark what we actually say, he will find that we do not assert that we are so required by our Catholic faith, by our Church, or her authorities, but “by those who affect to give tone and direction to Catholic thought and action,” by whom we, of course, mean not the Bishops, or those who have the right by divine appointment to direct Catholic thought and action. We speak of those who *affect* to give tone and direction, by whom it needs no extraordinary sagacity to discover we meant simply our so-called Catholic newspapers. We spoke also of a very general understanding in the Catholic community, whose understanding we are very seldom in the habit of confounding with the understanding of the Church. What we complained of was not any thing Catholic, or authorized by Catholic authority, but of an opinion very widely adopted at the present moment by Catholics, and sustained and defended by our Catholic journals. The Church herself allows us all the liberty of thought and discussion we ask; but we maintain in our article, and very justly, we think, that there is in the Catholic community, at the present time, a fear of free thought and bold utterance, which tends to cramp, and hamper, and discourage those who really would and really could do something to win back the intelligence now alienated from the Church within the bosom of her communion; a fear which is fostered by our press into an unjust intolerance, to the great detriment of the Catholic cause.

Our friend also asks, “And you, yourself, were you shackled and fettered when formerly you wrote so beautifully and vigorously in behalf of the Church?” Of course not. We asserted, and always assert, all the liberty we find necessary to defend the cause of Catholic truth, and are and will be “in bonds of no man.” But, then, does our reverend friend forget at what expense we have done and still do it? Does he forget the clamor that was raised against those very articles to which he refers, both in private conversation, and in the so-called Catholic press? Does he forget that, from first to last, we have had a much more difficult task to maintain ourselves against the mistrust, the complaints, the fault-finding, not to say the calumnies and vituperations, of some of our Catholic friends, than against the objections and arguments of our non-

Catholic opponents? We are sorry that the reverend author of the Letter should appeal to our own experience, for that affords but too strong a confirmation of the assertions we made. There have been many Catholics, both cleric and laic, true-hearted Catholics, who have stood by us from the first, and nobly sustained us; but there have been, from the first to the last, not a few, both cleric and laic, who, like our friend, have been horrified at what we have said, and like him could say, "My dear Doctor, I tell you again, I feel a great deal of pain on account of it," if not a great deal of indignation and absolute hostility.

The writer of the Letter says again: "I object also to the beginning of the *alinea*: 'In our historical reading,' p. 360. It contains a real offence to the Bishops." The best answer we can give to this is to reprint *in extenso* the passage to which it refers:—

"In our historical reading we have found no epoch in which the *directors of the Catholic world* seem to have had so great a dread of intellect as our own. There seems to obtain almost universally the conviction expressed by Rousseau, that "the man who thinks is a depraved animal." There is a wide-spread fear that he who thinks will think heretically. The study, therefore, of our times is to keep men orthodox by cultivating their pious affections with as little exercise of intelligence as possible. There is no doubt that for the last hundred years the intelligence, at least what is regarded as the intelligence, of the world, has been divorced from orthodoxy. During this period the most successful cultivators of science, of history, literature, and art, have not been Catholics, or, if nominally Catholics, with little understanding of the teaching, or devotion to the practice, of the Church. The natural sciences, zoology, geology, chemistry, natural history, ethnography, metaphysics, and to some extent history itself, have been anti-Catholic, while the popular literature, that which takes hold of the heart and forms the taste, the mind, and the morals of a nation, has been decidedly hostile to the Church. It is very likely this fact that has created the aversion in Catholic minds to free and independent thought, and driven them into the extreme we complain of. They see how un-Catholic is thought in its modern forms and developments; they see how rapidly and how rashly the world rushes into the most fatal errors; and therefore they fear to trust thought, and consequently seek to restrain it. This is their excuse. Yet it is no full justification. The true policy, in our judgment, would be not to yield up thought and intelligence to Satan, but to redouble our efforts to bring them back to the side of the Church, so as to restore her to her rightful spiritual and intellectual supremacy. In-

stead of foregoing thought and intelligence, and contenting ourselves with pious affection which, when divorced from thought, becomes a mere weak and watery sentimentality, we should grapple with them, master the age precisely in that in which it regards itself as strongest, increase our efforts to enlighten the people, and gain for them the superiority not merely in faith and piety, but in secular knowledge and science. Intelligence can be mastered only by intelligence, thought can be overcome only by thought.

"There never has been an epoch in the world's history when the policy now generally pursued could have been more unwise, or likely to be more fatal, than the present. Now less than ever can we keep people in the faith by mere ignorance and prejudice, or even by early association and affection. We cannot keep our people ignorant of error if we would, and do what we will we cannot prevent them from being more or less affected by the spirit of the age. In no country have we an orthodox Cæsar to protect the flock with his armed legions, or to keep down error by civil pains and penalties, even were that desirable. The civil government nowhere protects the Church, any farther than it hopes to use her for its own purposes. There is no longer any reliance to be placed upon the civil power, however deeply some may regret it. The Church is obliged to fall back on her own resources as a spiritual kingdom, and the last vestige of the old union of Church and state, will ere long be everywhere effaced. The most the Church can hope from the state hereafter is to be let alone, and it will be much if Catholics are allowed to be free in the general freedom of the citizen. Respect for authority is gone, or at least greatly weakened, among Catholics no less than among non-Catholics. Clerical admonitions and prohibitions have not the weight they once had, and men every day grow less and less submissive to their pastors; loyalty to the state has ceased to be regarded as a virtue; and filial obedience to the Church is every day growing weaker and weaker. All the old external bulwarks and defences of faith and piety, are broken down. All things are questioned. Nothing is too sacred to be examined. The authority of the Church, the divine institution of the clergy, the truth of the sacred mysteries of religion, nay, the very providence and even existence of God, are brought into public discussion. Doubts on all points are entertained and boldly uttered. Nothing is regarded as fixed and certain. Now this state of things must be met, and met effectually. But how can we meet it, if thought is discouraged, free discussion prohibited, and our people kept as far as possible in ignorance of all not absolutely necessary to salvation?

"We are very far from pretending that the changes which have taken place in society, in men's convictions and affections, are for the better, or not to be deeply deplored. The state of things which has passed away, and in reference to which most of our clergy have

been educated, may have been far better than that which now obtains; it may be that we have fallen on evil times—worse times than the Church has ever before seen—but the changes have taken place, and we have to meet things as they are, not as they were. It is idle to attempt to recall the past, to re-establish that which has passed away. We must always take things as we find them, avail ourselves of the present good, and war against present evils. The Church is placed in the world to teach and to govern it; but she has her human side, and on her human side she is affected by all the changes which go on around her. Her principles are invariable and eternal, but her modes or methods of acting on the world must be adapted to its ever-varying wants. The Church cannot, any more than the state, be unvarying in her external policy, because she has not unvarying circumstances or an unvarying world to meet. At every moment she must deal with the world as it is, not as it has been or as we may wish it to be. What she has now to meet are the peculiar evils of our own times; she has to meet the existing state of things. This we, her children, should understand, and we are wanting in our fidelity to her if, governed by old associations and inveterate habits, we throw obstacles in her way, and labor, intentionally or unintentionally, to hinder her from doing it."

Here it will be perceived that there is at least no direct reference to the Bishops and Prelates of the Church: we speak not of the directors of the Catholic Church, but of the directors of the Catholic world, who are laymen, princes and nobles, as well as ecclesiastics. We should be sorry to be found wanting in reverence to the Bishops or Prelates of the Church, yet, we presume, it is no irreverence to say that they are infallible only in teaching faith and morals. No man who has read the history of the Church can say, that large numbers of them, in particular countries and particular epochs, have not often been mistaken in their human policy, and failed in their vigilance and in the performance of their pastoral duties. No man can honestly deny it, and to attempt to enforce silence by the *argumentum ad verecundiam* is neither wise nor honorable. The Catholic Church has and can have no dread of facts, and, as St. Gregory the Great says, the scandal of hushing up iniquity is greater than that of publishing it.

The only question that should be asked with regard to the statements in the passages we have quoted, is, are they true? are they correct statements of facts? If they are not, then let it be shown that they are false, and us be condemned for publishing falsehood. If they are true, if they

are facts, it is idle to war against us for telling them, for facts they are and will be, whether we tell them or not. If we simply state what is true, and state it for a good and lawful purpose, in a Catholic spirit, you have no right to complain of us or to censure us for stating it. The most you could do would be to show that we had stated it unnecessarily, and might have gained the good we seek without doing it. In reply to this last supposition, however, we would say that it often becomes necessary to say things which we might and ought otherwise to pass over in silence, in consequence of what is said bearing on them by others. Let non-Catholics keep silent with regard to the matters touched upon in these passages, and let the so-called Catholic press also keep silent with regard to them, and we, we readily grant, would have no occasion to introduce them, and might, with some justice, be required to keep silence also; but, so long as non-Catholics do not keep silence in regard to them, and so long as your so-called Catholic journals are permitted to discuss them, and in a false and injurious sense, misleading both Catholics and non-Catholics, we think it unfair to insist on our keeping silence, and unjust to blame us for stating the case as it actually is.

The writer says, he objects "also especially to the five last pages, except the last lines, which breathe a noble spirit, a truly Catholic heart," and he adds: "Ah, Doctor, if your excellent qualities could be cleared from some little defects which impair them, and lessen the fruits they can produce, you would be an accomplished man." Our friend should remember, as says the Lion in the fable, "it is a universal remark that we great beasts have generally certain little defects, and therefore be not too severe upon us." We have never set up to be a perfect man, and nobody is more aware of our defects than we are ourselves; we labor constantly to supply them, but, we fear, not with much success, and it is no doubt idle to expect us ever to be an "accomplished man,"—by which we suppose our friend means *un homme complet*.

We have no room to enter farther into the explanation or defence of the contents of the pages last referred to, and in fact no disposition to add any thing to what we have already said. The article on *Catholic Polemics* was forced from us by a deep sense of the defects of our more generally adopted method of Catholic controversy, and by our earnest desire to place that controversy on higher

ground, to give it more earnestness, depth, and comprehensiveness, and to adapt it more directly to the wants of the higher intelligence of our age and country. That we have been in some respects unjust to our Catholic contemporaries, that we have not been sufficiently careful to specify their good intentions and their good deeds, or sufficiently attentive to their susceptibilities, or *amour-propre*, is very possible, and, so far as such may be the case, we regret it. That, in our earnestness to elevate the Catholic community, to quicken intelligence in our Catholic people at home and abroad, and to gain for the Catholic population of our own country that moral weight to which they are entitled by their numbers, and that intellectual and scientific superiority to which they are entitled by the truth and sublimity of their faith, we have used in some instances too strong expressions and gone too far, is also possible; but, if we have really done so, it has been unconsciously and unintentionally.

We know that many very worthy people, let it be permitted us to say in conclusion, are strongly opposed to the discussion or agitation of such questions as several which we have treated or touched upon in our pages. The design of the article on *Catholic Polemics*, was to meet and answer their objections, by showing that these are great and practical questions, not raised, indeed, by us, but by modern intelligence itself, or that they are forced upon the Catholic polemic by the present state of theological and philosophical controversy. The great objection to discussing them that has been urged against us, is the danger of unsettling the minds, if not the faith, of the unlearned and the simple, who are incapable of comprehending the questions themselves, or of even understanding the solutions that may be offered. This objection, certainly, has some weight, and no one should wantonly or unnecessarily raise or provoke discussions which might tend to unsettle the simple, or to scandalize the weak; but it is no less necessary to avoid scandalizing the intelligent and the strong, and it will never do to let the questions raised by the learned and intelligent, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, go unanswered, for fear of injury to the weak and the illiterate. The Church looks to the welfare of the former, no less than to the peace and quiet of the latter.

It is no doubt true that, since controversies in our day must be carried on before the public at large, and all classes

take more or less part in them, there is a serious difficulty in entering into those profounder discussions, in solving those more abstruse questions, and in meeting those intellectual difficulties demanded by the educated and cultivated classes, whether in or out of the Church, without more or less disturbing a very large class of simple believers, who have been instructed only in the nakedest elements of their faith. But this only proves, what we have always insisted upon, that in our age and country the faithful must be educated, must be instructed, and that our only reliance, under God, for the preservation and progress of religion, is in elevating and enlarging the intelligence, not merely of a few, but of the mass of the people. You cannot, if you would, carry back the discussion of the graver and more difficult questions to the cloister, or confine it within the walls of a seminary; our enemies have brought it before the public, and it is before the public, not in our cloisters and schools alone, we must accept and meet it. Of the very last importance, then, is it, that, instead of being gratified or pleased with the ignorance of a large portion of the people, and studying to keep them unacquainted with every thing not strictly necessary, *necessitate medii ad salutem*, we should labor to overcome that ignorance, to enlighten the people to the greatest degree possible, and thus prepare them for the new position in which the changes in modern society have placed them. Instead of studying to keep the people ignorant of the objections raised either to Catholic doctrine or to Catholic practice, we must labor to prepare them to meet those objections, or, at least, to appreciate the answers which our learned theologians and philosophers may give. If we fail to do this, and seek to suppress all discussion, or to prevent the agitation of any question in public which is above the knowledge or comprehension of the illiterate and simple, we shall fail to win back intelligence to the Catholic cause, and confine our Church only to the ignorant and the weak, who will be constantly leaving her communion, in proportion as they acquire a taste for intelligence, and find a little mental activity quickened within them. It is this fact, or supposed fact, that we have wished to bring out, and force upon the attention of the Catholic public.

We confess, it has seemed to us, that the leading public opinion of Catholics neglects this fact, and proceeds on the assumption, that the more ignorant we can keep our people,

the more effectually we can restrain curiosity and suppress inquiry in regard to the great living and practical questions of the day, the more effectually we shall serve the interests of religion. We do not believe this is true. We believe ignorance is a vice, and the most fruitful mother of vice; and that the ignorance of a very large mass of our Catholic population in this, and all other countries, is the greatest obstacle to their own virtue, and to the diffusion and conquests of the Catholic faith that we have to overcome. It is with this conviction that we have written. It is with this conviction that we have said those things which have so grievously offended not a few worthy Catholics. It was no wish of ours to offend them, and we assure them we have never caused them pain without causing ourselves still greater pain. But the Catholic Church does not constitute a Mutual Admiration Society, and it is no part of the duty of a Catholic publicist to follow the public opinion of even Catholics, unless he is satisfied that that public opinion is sound, and in accordance with the best interests of Catholicity.

We may be told, as we have been told more than once, that to correct this public opinion, to look after what is the true interests of religion, and to determine what will best promote them, here or elsewhere, is not the business of the Catholic publicist, but solely of those to whom the Holy Ghost has committed the authority to teach and to govern the Church. It certainly is not the business of the publicist to decide, as one *having authority*, what is or is not best fitted to promote the interests of religion, nor has he any right to go or to protest against the decision the legitimate authority comes to and officially proclaims on the subject; but where there is no decision of authority—where authority has not pronounced, or within the limits of its decision, he has the full and unquestionable right to express his convictions, and to give plainly and strongly the facts and reasonings on which those convictions are founded, not, indeed, as acts of authority which must not be questioned, but as arguments addressed to reason, and, if you choose, to the reason of Ecclesiastics as well as to the reason of laymen; for we are not to suppose that men, in becoming Ecclesiastics, abandon reason, or are placed beyond its reach. No men have, or ought to have, reason in a higher degree than Ecclesiastics, or to be more within or under its influence. If the publicist undertakes to dictate to them on his own authority, or to bring the pressure of an unreasoning

public opinion to bear on them, they have a right to be offended, and to exert, not only all their reason, but all their Ecclesiastical authority against him. But if he seeks merely to influence them by reason, by his facts and arguments,—to convince them by an appeal to their reason, that *this* course is better than *that*, and that *this* policy is safer than *that*, we see not wherein he offends their dignity, fails in his reverence to them, or transcends his own legitimate sphere. We yield to no man in our reverence for the Ecclesiastical character, in our respect for authority, or in our readiness to submit to its decisions; but we know something of our own age, and we know very well that people in our age do not, will not, and cannot be made to submit to authority on the principle of simple, blind obedience. The Clergy must not merely insist that it is all over with religion when reverence for the Clergy is gone, but they must command that reverence by their own personal worth and character; they must magnify their office, as well as depend on their office to magnify them; they must show a real, as well as an official superiority, and lead us by showing their intrinsic, as well as their extrinsic authority to be our chiefs and guides.

In saying this, what say we that can offend any Ecclesiastic, or in what respect do we encroach on his office, or take his business out of his hands? Do you say it implies that Ecclesiastics have not always understood and adopted the best possible course for the advancement of religion? Suppose it does; what then? Does not the Church operate *more humano*, and does not our friend say, *Errare aut errasse humanum est*? The Clergy in what is human may, because generally better instructed, be less liable to err than laymen, but they are not, nor do they claim to be personally inerrable. The most that what we say implies is, that the Clergy, or a portion of the Clergy, continue a policy, once good and proper no doubt, after the various social and intellectual changes that have been going on have rendered it advisable to adopt a new and different policy. This may happen to the best of men without implying any reproach; nay, it may happen in consequence of what in them is really laudable, that is, the dread of change and innovation.

Confining our remarks to our own country, we think that a very considerable number of our Clergy, we by no means say all, for it is not true of all, have not duly considered

the changed position of Catholics in the United States from what it was when the good Dr. Carroll was consecrated the first Bishop of Baltimore. Then little could be contemplated by the Bishop or his Clergy but the simple preservation of the faith, and ministration to the spiritual wants of the few Catholics then in the country; then the chief duty evidently was to keep Catholics Catholic, and to give them the Sacraments, and wait for time to soften prejudice and conciliate opposition; no great impulse could be given, or be expected to be given, to the work of conversion, and very little thought was necessary to be given to the social position and action of Catholics, save so far as necessary to prevent them from committing the Church to one political party or another, or exciting the hostility of non-Catholics against them.

But since then great changes have taken place. Catholics by natural increase, by immigration, and by conversion, have increased from thousands to millions, and we are now numerically a very considerable portion of the American population, for we number more communicants than any one Protestant Denomination amongst us. Our position has changed; our wants have changed; and, in some respects, our duties have changed. Our duty is not now merely to keep our people quiet in the faith, and protect them from the attacks of non-Catholics, but to endeavor to extend our faith, to convert unbelievers and misbelievers, and to Catholicize the country. Our Clergy are not now merely chaplains to a foreign immigration or an isolated colony, but belong to a Hierarchy which embraces the nation, and hold the position, have the duties, and, we say it with all reverence, should have the aspirations of a national Clergy, in the good, not the exclusive sense of that term. They have now imposed upon them the great work of bringing this whole country into the bosom of the Catholic Church, so that our Bishops shall be recognized as Bishops, and submitted to as such, by the whole population of their respective Sees. The work, then, which the Clergy have to do for religion at the present time in this country, seems to us two-fold: first, to administer to the spiritual wants of those already within the fold, and, second, to labor to prevent the loss of educated, intelligent, and aspiring sons of Catholic parents, and to recover to the faith those who are now in heresy or infidelity.

It is only in this latter work that a Catholic publicist, as

such, can perform any important part, or be an auxiliary of the Clergy. If he is to render any essential service in the performance of this work, the Clergy, we have maintained, and still maintain, must allow him to deal frankly and freely with the great practical questions which are uppermost in the minds of these two classes of our countrymen, and to meet the various objections in their minds alike to Catholic doctrine and practice, and to the opinions and practices of Catholics, whether these objections are theological or philosophical, political or moral. To understand and answer these objections does not necessarily demand the Sacrament of Orders; and so long as the publicist keeps within the limits of faith and sound doctrine, there should be, in our judgment, no interference with his freedom, though he should treat many questions which, if we looked only to the peace and quiet of the simple and illiterate among Catholics, it would be far better not to agitate at all.

Such are the views which we have entertained of our rights and duties as a Catholic publicist, and we have supposed we could entertain and act on such views without going beyond our province as a layman, or showing any want of reverence for the sacerdotal character and office. That we have done our part in the work well, or with any degree of success, we do not pretend; nobody is, or can be, more aware of our short-comings and of our failure to realize in execution our own ideal, than we are. To have done our part in this work as we conceive it should be done, would require qualities, an ability, and philosophical and theological attainments to which we lay no claim. We have done, however, what we could, and being what we are and are likely to remain as long as we live, in the best way we could. We have never felt ourselves competent to solve all the questions raised by the age; but we have felt the importance of the questions themselves and the necessity of meeting them. The most that we have done, for it is the most we were able to do, has been to call attention to them, to fix the mind of intelligent Catholics on them, and to make some suggestions, perhaps not useless, in the attempt to solve them. No doubt there are hundreds and thousands amongst us able to do the work far better than we have done it; and, if we have had the presumption to engage ourselves in it, it has not been through any overweening confidence in our learning and ability, of which we think very lightly,

but because we saw here in our own country no others engaged in it, who seemed likely to do it any better than we could. Here are our answers to the various objections brought by our theological friend and other critics against our course as a Catholic Reviewer. It is for others to judge whether these answers are satisfactory or not, and to acquit or condemn us as they see proper.

ART. II.—*Della Filosofia della Rivelazione* di VINCENZO GIOBERTI. *Pubblicata per Cura di GIUSEPPE MASSARI.* Turin and Paris, 1856.

A WESTERN editor, who has little occasion to put up the Scotchman's prayer, "O Laird! gie us a gude conceit o' oursels," attempts to be witty and merry over our advocacy of the *synthetic* method in our last Review; and others have been at some loss to understand what is the precise difference between the synthetic and analytic methods we recognize. To our merry critic we probably have no answer to give that would be intelligible; to the others who ask rather than seek to give information, and who experience a real difficulty on the subject, we may reply that analysis considers a subject in its several parts and these several parts abstractedly or as isolated, while synthesis considers the subject as a whole and the several parts in their relation to the whole or as integrated in it. In all philosophizing, as in all reasoning, there must be both analysis and synthesis; and we do not understand, and never have understood by the synthetic method the exclusion of analysis. In the synthetic method synthesis predominates and controls the analysis; in the analytic method analysis predominates and controls the synthesis. In the synthetic method we use analysis to *find* the synthesis; in the analytic method we use analysis in order to *construct* a synthesis.

We call the Scholastic method the analytic method, not because it does not aim at a synthesis, but because it aims at a logical synthesis, which is a mere abstract synthesis, not at the real synthesis of things. It constructs, it does not find a synthesis; and hence its synthesis is not a real synthesis but a simple sum or summary. By it we attain

to abstract conceptions, we see or study truth in detail, in its separate or detached parts, not in its real relations as a living and organic whole. There is, we should be sorry to question, back of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas a real, a living synthesis, as there is back of all the definitions of the Church the living synthesis proceeding from the creative act of God and revealed by the Gospel, in which every definition of the Church, every special doctrine of the *Summa* is integral, and may be seen to be so by an intellect capable of taking in the whole, and every part in its real relation to the whole ; but this real and living synthesis is not continually kept in view, is not clearly and distinctly brought out, and by ordinary minds is neither discovered nor suspected ; each proposition stands, as it were, alone, as an independent proposition, not as a part bearing a relation to the whole, and having its truth and significance only in that relation. All minds of the first order are synthetic, and comprehend the parts in their relation to the whole, while minds of the second, or an inferior order are analytic, and are capable of comprehending the whole only in its parts, and lose themselves in particulars. Hence it is that our later philosophers and theologians who profess to follow the mediæval masters give us in either theology or philosophy at best only a summary of particulars united by no common bond, integrated in no common principle that unites and vivifies the whole ; hence modern official philosophy is a *hortus siccus*, and theology a *caput mortuum*, or rather a cabinet of specimens, where each specimen is properly labeled and numbered. To be a first-class philosopher or a first-class theologian now-a-days demands only a good memory, or readiness in reading or deciphering the labels and numbers.

Synthesis, rightly understood, is not something we attain to or construct by our logical analyses, but is the real relation in which things actually exist, and to find it, we must study things as they really are, and see them in their real relation to their first cause and to their final cause. In following the synthetic method we start from the original synthesis of things, intuitively given, and which is the basis of all the real as of all the knowable, and study to bring back to this synthesis and integrate in it the several particular things we observe and analyze, for these things have no meaning, no reality even, out of this synthesis, or, if you prefer it, their synthetic relation. Thus, if you dissolve

the synthesis and take either of its terms as isolated, you attain not to truth, but either to pantheism or to nullism. The creative act is a nullity if isolated from *Ens* or Being whose act it is, as creatures or existences are nullities if isolated from the creative act on which they are absolutely dependent. Dissolve the synthesis and take the first term, Being, and proceed analytically from the idea of Being to the idea of creation, and the only idea of creation you can attain to is that of a necessary creation, or the pantheism of Cousin, because analytic judgments merely bring out the contents of the subject analyzed, and in them subject and predicate are identical, and the predicate adds nothing to the subject. If the subject is real, necessary, and eternal Being, creation, as analytically deducible therefrom, must be itself real, eternal, and necessary Being, and therefore no creation at all; God and the universe would be identical. Exclude the subject and proceed to deduce the idea of Creator from the simple analysis of existence, you would equally fail to attain to the idea of God, since, as we have said, analytic judgments add no predicate to the subject, and can bring out only what is already contained in it, though before analysis not apprehended.

The illusion of our philosophers and some of our theologians on this point is in the fact that they unconsciously in analyzing existence or the contingent, do recognize and assert the necessary and real as creating it. The contingent is dependent and therefore cannot stand alone on its own basis, and is inconceivable without that which is not contingent on which it depends for existence. In itself, isolated from God, it is simply nothing. The analysis of nothing gives nothing; from nothing, nothing comes. Therefore analysis of the simple idea of existence, or existence by itself alone, conducts directly and immediately to nullism. Here are the two rocks on which modern philosophy splits. German philosophy, starting from Being, or what it calls the Absolute, remains forever in Being or the Absolute, and can never assert the contingent or relative. Cartesianism, or the prevailing French philosophy, starting from personal existence, or the contingent, remains forever in it, and can never get beyond subjectivism, to the assertion of real and necessary Being, that is to say, is doomed to end in simple nihilism. This too was the case with all ancient Pagan philosophy, for that dissolved the original synthesis by leaving out the copula, and turned forever in the sub-

ject, real and necessary Being, or in the predicate, contingent and dependent existence.

We avoid either error only by recognizing the original synthesis, or divine synthetic judgment intuitively affirmed to us, Being creates existences. Having in this judgment the three terms which embrace all reality, analysis of any one of the terms is subordinated to it, and enlightened and directed by it. Analysis is, then, obliged to study things not merely in themselves but in their relations, and thus remains within the region of reality. In this original synthetic judgment there are the three terms of a judgment proper, subject, predicate, and copula, and these three terms are not only the basis or foundation of all reality, but they run through it and are preserved through all the range of secondary causes and effects; so that following the synthetic method, analysis cannot isolate or take things out of the relations implied or asserted in this judgment. The proper subject of analysis becomes under the synthetic method not particular things in their isolation, but particulars in their relations to the general or the whole; it becomes simply an instrument of synthesis, and serves only to render more apparent or more striking the real synthesis which embraces all things, Being and existences in their actual relations.

All philosophy deserving that name is necessarily synthetic; it is really the *σοφία* of the Greeks, the *sapientia* of the Latins, and is properly defined, the science and application of principles. Its aim is to ascertain and to comprehend the real principles of things, *causæ causarum*, understood both as first principles and last principles, or as first cause and final cause, and their application in the order of production and in the order of consummation, or in the first and second cosmic cycles—as Gioberti would say, in genesis and palingenesis or palingenesia. Such being the nature and aim of philosophy, it is only sad merriment that sneers at our preference of the synthetic to the analytic method, and a merriment which proves that he who indulges it has yet to obtain the first philosophic conception; and that how much soever he may have read in philosophical works, how much soever he may have studied Dmowski, Liberatore, Bouvier, or the Lugdunensis, he has not entered even the vestibule of the temple of philosophy, far less its adytum.

This being premised, we can understand what should be meant by the Philosophy of Revelation. By revelation we

understand the making known, or the communication to man in a supernatural manner, an order of truth above the natural order or that which comes within the range, by its own unassisted powers, of our natural reason. By the philosophy of revelation is to be understood the truths so made known or communicated, considered in their relation to the natural, or what we may term the rational order, or the comprehensions of both orders of truth in their real relations to one another, or their real synthesis, and in their relation in common to God the source of all truth, the first cause, and to God the end of all existence, or universal final cause. The propriety of a Philosophy of Revelation rests on the assumption that there is a real relation, independent of our thought, which our thought does not create, but simply discovers or apprehends, between the two orders of truth, that they are not two mutually independent orders, but mutually touch and complete each other, and are both to be taken into the account when seeking to explain the origin, the progress, and the end of either. Neither order stands by itself alone or is for itself alone, but each is for the other; and neither in the most general and ultimate end of man is completed without the other, or the design of Providence in regard to man and the universe fully accomplished. To explain this relation, to show the mutual harmony of the two orders, the unity of their origin, the one common law to which they are subjected, and their final integration in union with God as the universal final cause, was the purpose of Gioberti in the work some fragments of which he had only written when death overtook him. Whether his work, had he lived to complete it, would have been all that could be desired on the subject, may well be doubted; but that it would have thrown great light on many of the highest, most important, and most difficult problems with which the human mind grapples or can grapple, no one who has made himself at all acquainted with the philosophical genius and vast erudition of this remarkable man can for one moment question. The fragments which his friend has collected and here published are so many *Torsos* for the study of the philosopher and the theologian. Much is wanting; but what we have are master-pieces in their way.

In our last Review we criticised unsparingly what we regarded as the errors into which the author has fallen. These errors are: 1. Confounding the natural and super-

natural, or virtually denying all real distinction between them; 2. Identifying the Second Person of the Trinity with the creative act; 3. Representing the Incarnation as the completion of the act of creation, and each man as an inchoate God, or a God that begins; 4. Representing original sin as dialectic as well as sophistical; and 5. Asserting that all truth and life consist in relation. Some of our merry critics, who come under the description of what the late Daniel Webster called *captores verborum*, whether in good Latin or not, would add a sixth, namely, that he uses the terms *methexis* and *mimesis*, or in Italian, *la metessi* and *la mimesi*; terms with which they probably are not familiar, or at least affect not to understand.

In a reply to these merry critics, we may say the words are not uncommon in contemporary Italian, and the genius of our language admits the incorporation of either Greek or Latin words in scientific writing, when needed. The terms in question are very convenient, and have no equivalents in Anglo-Saxon. They cannot be translated literally and exactly by any terms we are acquainted with in English or in Latin, and therefore in translating we transfer them in their Greek, not in their Italianized form. They are good Greek, and are used by Plato and by Clemens Alexandrinus substantially in the sense in which they are used by Gioberti, and pertain to a deeper and truer philosophy than they who object to them appear to have mastered. Amongst Latin authors, St. Augustine is the only one we have found thoroughly acquainted with the philosophy to which these terms pertain. He uses in their place *intelligibile* and *visible*; but, though the best terms he had in Latin, they are not their exact equivalents. The *methexis* is indeed the intelligible, but it is the created intelligible; the *mimesis* is the visible, but it is the visible that imitates or symbolizes the created intelligible. Properly speaking, however, the intelligible is not created, and therefore its substitution for the *methexis* is liable to lead to a very important, a very mischievous error, traces of which we find in some Scholastics and especially in our modern German rationalists.

Methexis is the *genus*, the *universal* of the Schoolmen; but it defines what neither *genus* nor *universal* does, and avoids the error alike of the Realists, Conceptualists, and Nominalists. What are *universals*? what are *genera*? ask the Schoolmen. Some answer, they are mere words;

others that they are mental conceptions; others that they are entities. The last were called Realists; but, if you say *universals* or *genera* are entities, then you can have man without men. The first were called Nominalists; and if you say with them *universals* or *genera* are mere words with nothing corresponding to them existing *a parte rei*, then you have men without man, and the generation of individuals is inexplicable and inconceivable. If you say with the second, or Conceptualists, that they are mere mental conceptions, you escape no difficulty of the Nominalists. Later writers call them ideas, and understand by ideas *essentiæ rerum metaphysicæ*, that is to say, the types or exemplars of things in the divine mind, and therefore indistinguishable from the divine essence itself, which is either nominalism or pantheism, according to the point of view of the interpreter.

The word *methexis*, which implies participation, expresses accurately the truth which the Schoolmen failed to discover, or at least to express. *Genera*, according to the philosophy to which this word pertains, are not merely participated by individuals, whence generation, but themselves participate of Being; so that the methexis participates of Being through the act of creation, like every creature, and is participated of by the individuals of the race, and expresses precisely the relation of the genus to the Creator and to the creature, subsisting never without either. The methexis is never without the mimesis, or the mimesis without the methexis—the race without the individual, or the individual without the race, which it individuates, imitates, and symbolizes.

We shall understand this better by bearing in mind that God created all things, and caused all things created to bring forth fruit after their kind. Thus there is to be considered, first, creation; second, generation, production, not reproduction, as too often improperly asserted. The methexis of the universe is created, and is, in Gioberti's philosophy, the creative act extrinsecated, or the extrinsecation of the *Verbum*, the Word, extrinsecated in an individual male and female of each kind or species. If we speak of man, the methexis was immediately created and individualized in Adam, in whom there is the perfect union of the methexis and the mimesis, or the completion of the methexis with the mimesis. But from Adam, from whose side Eve was taken, or who was, as in the first chapter of

Genesis it is said, created male and female, the individuation of the methexis goes on from generation to generation. The same order is constituted in principle through all the genera and species of the universe. The methexis is actual in relation to the Creator, potential in relation to individuals. But the methexis has and may have other applications, for the analogy of generation runs through the whole of the Creator's works, and in all created things which can be objects of our thought, we may discover the methexic and mimetic elements, often expressed by the terms substance and form, the real and the apparent, the thing and its symbol, the type and its fulfilment. When the Scriptures say, God is angry, or he repents, they speak mimetically, symbolically, and the methexic truth is what is really intended by these forms of expression. All language is either methexic or mimetic according to the point of view from which it is considered; mimetic as to the form, methexic as to the noetic truth expressed; mimetic as a sign, methexic in that which is signified to the understanding. The terms may thus be universally applied, and their application is warranted by that great principle which St. Thomas, after Plato and St. Augustine, lays down, that God is *similitudo rerum omnium*, or that all things, in their order and according to their kind and species, copy or imitate him as their grand archetype or prototype. All orders of the cosmos or visible universe exist methexically and mimetically, the methexic manifesting itself continually in the mimetic, and the mimetic struggling eternally to become methexic. In this way the life, the discord, and the harmony of the universe are produced and perpetuated.

Since writing our previous article on Gioberti, a learned friend, far better versed in the language and thought of Gioberti than we are, has suggested to us that most of our criticisms are mistakes, and rest either on our misapprehension of the real meaning of the author, or on our having taken the opinions of a particular school of theologians for Catholic doctrine itself. We charged Gioberti with confounding the natural and supernatural, or with recognizing no real distinction between them, or with virtually denying all supernatural *order* as distinct from the natural and above it. This his friend says is not true, for the author asserts most positively such order, and his whole philosophy of revelation demands it, only what we call the supernatural he calls palingenesia, and places in the second cycle, or the

return of man to God, as his final Cause. The whole Christian order originates in and depends on the Incarnation indeed, but it is ordered in relation to man's destiny, or return to God as his supreme Good, not to his origin in God as his first Cause, and, therefore, though it may have, since it proceeds from God, within itself the two motions, it must necessarily, when taken in its cosmic relation, pertain to the second cycle, as Gioberti asserts. It is a new creation, indeed, for it originates in the immediate creative act of God, but it cannot be regarded as an original creation throughout, otherwise it could not be palingenesia, *regeneration*, or a new birth. It has reference to generation, and renews it by grace.

The friend of Gioberti continues: "The doctrine you oppose to the author is untenable, for it makes the natural and the supernatural two distinct, independent, and disconnected creations, with only an arbitrary and unreal relation between them. Neither has any reason in the other. On your doctrine nature might easily suffice for itself, and complete itself in its own order. Man, if he had been left to nature alone, even as his nature now subsists, could have had not only no conception of any thing above nature, but no aspiration even to any good above natural beatitude, above the limited, the finite, and, consequently, no aspiration to possess an infinite and unbounded good, contrary to the teaching of the Fathers and great Doctors of the Church, especially St. Thomas. Man, on the theory of the natural and supernatural you have adopted and refined upon, is not even *in potentia* to the supernatural. How then do you bring the supernatural to him, or bring him to the supernatural, and supernaturalize your natural man? On your theory you do not harmonize nature and grace, the natural and supernatural; and, in spite of all your efforts, run into an absurd dualism. There is and can be on the supposition of the *status naturæ puræ* no commerce between the natural and supernatural, and can at best be only a sort of pre-established harmony, like that which Leibnitz imagined to explain the relation between soul and body. You fall into the very analytical errors you seek to avoid, and instead of being a synthesist, are a dualist.

"You complain of Gioberti that he denies the *status naturæ puræ* imagined by theologians, and undertake to prove that such state cannot be denied without contradicting the definitions of the Church, especially the definition

given in the condemnation of the fifty-fifth proposition of Baius: *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur*. This and the other propositions of Baius condemned by St. Pius V., you should bear in mind, were not condemned as in no sense true, but as false and heretical in the sense of the *asserters*, that is, in the sense in which they were maintained by Baius and his adherents. They maintained that God must have originally created and endowed man with the natural powers and faculties necessary to attain his destiny; but as man, as he is now born, evidently has not those powers and faculties, he could not have created him from the beginning such as he is now born. In this sense the proposition is condemned, and what is really asserted by the condemnation is not that God could have created man such as he is now born, but that he could have created man without the natural powers and faculties necessary to attain to final beatitude. This is evident from the Bull of the Holy Pontiff, and has been clearly shown by Berti, the theologian of Benedict XIV., and is confirmed, in some sense, by the refusal of Benedict XIV. to approve the condemnation of the doctrine of Berti which the Archbishop of Sens solicited. 'Berti,' says Père Gratry in a Note to his *Connaissance de Dieu*, 'maintains the existence of a natural, innate desire in man of the intuitive vision. He has for him the whole Scotist school, before and after Baius. He has for him St. Thomas in the two *Sums*, and the greater part of the Thomists, especially Durandus and Soto. Molina and Estius, though not admitting the existence of this natural desire, agree that it is permitted to hold it, and that it is even the common opinion of the Scholastics, whose doctrine Molina sums up in the sentence: *Beatitudinem in particulari esse finem nostrum naturalem, non quoad assecutionem, sed quoad appetitum et potentiam passivam*. Suarez makes the same avowal. But Bellarmín (de Gratia, I. cap. 7) is remarkably explicit on this point, and full of the Augustinian sense. He asserts, after remarking that non parva quæstio est sitne sempiterna beatitudo, quæ in visione Dei sita est, finis hominis naturalis aut supernaturalis, *Beatitudinem finem hominis naturalem esse quoad appetitum, non quoad assecutionem*; and adds: *Non est autem natura humana indignum, sed contra potius ad maximam ejus pertinet dignitatem, quod ad sublimiorem finem condita sit, quam ut eum solis naturæ suæ viribus attingere possit.*'

"As it is allowable to assert the existence in man of the natural innate desire of beatitude possible only in glorification, or *visio Dei intuitiva*, and as it is agreed on all hands that this desire cannot be naturally fulfilled, it is perfectly true to say that God could have created man in the beginning such as he is now born, that is, with the innate natural desire of a good, or beatitude, without the natural ability to attain to it. In other words, you cannot conclude from the existence of the desire the natural ability to attain its satisfaction, because it may have entered into the designs of Providence to satisfy it by supernatural means. On the other hand, we cannot conclude from the absence of the ability, the non-existence of the desire.

"The existence of this desire of beatitude, without the natural ability to fulfil it, or to attain its satisfaction, that is, to see God in the beatific vision, is a proof that God could not have created and left man in a state of pure nature, for it is repugnant to his goodness, or even justice, to suppose him to have created man, and implanted in his nature desires for which he provides no means of satisfaction. This principle is recognized by all our theologians in their arguments from reason and nature for the immortality of the soul. The desire, if natural, and placed in the heart by the Creator himself, is a pledge or promise on the part of God of the means of its fulfilment. In giving the desire, he promises to render the end attainable. But as the end is not and cannot be attainable by any natural faculty, God gives, in the very nature of man, a pledge or promise of the supernatural, and, therefore, the *status naturæ puræ* is not only not a real state, but an impossible state. This desire is for an infinite and unbounded good, which is and can be only God, the Supreme Good itself. This good is not attainable by any of the powers conceded to man in the *status naturæ puræ*; and as the only good to which that nature, supposing it to be possible, can attain, is only an imperfect, a limited good, it can never satisfy our natural desire, and therefore can never be natural beatitude, or that in which the soul can repose in peace. The notion, then, of a natural beatitude, therefore of the *status naturæ puræ*, is untenable, and must be given up.

"In contending for the state of pure nature, you have followed, indeed, the theologians of the Society of Jesus, but you have departed from the great current of Catholic theology, and are yourself more exposed to censure from

maintaining it, than Gioberti is for denying it. You should have remembered, in arguing against him, that you were opposing to him only a modern theological opinion, not the generally received doctrine of Catholic fathers and theologians in all ages. You should have remembered that Gioberti has with him St. Augustine, St. Thomas, the greater part of the Thomists, all the Scotists, and especially the Augustinians; and as these have never been condemned or censured by the Church on this point, he is, at least, as safe in agreeing with them as you are in agreeing with the Jesuits. Besides, his view belongs to a much deeper, a more philosophical, and less superficial theology than that which I must believe you have quite too hastily adopted. You started right in your *Admonitions to Protestants*, commenced some years ago, but as yet left incomplete, apparently because you hesitated to follow out the principle on which you had proceeded, that nature does not suffice for itself, and has not, and cannot have its beatitude in its own order. It is to be regretted that you abandoned this sound Augustinian principle, and became entangled in the specious, but superficial sophisms of a school of comparatively recent date, and which has exerted a pernicious influence on modern theological and philosophical studies.

"Even they who assert the possibility of the *status naturæ puræ*, are obliged to concede, as a matter of fact, that man has his destiny in the supernatural order, or, as Gioberti would say, ultra-natural, an order lying beyond nature, not included in the cosmos, but necessary to its completion or fulfilment. Perhaps a deeper philosophy, and a more careful study of the subject, would lead them a little farther, and show that God, having given to man the natural desire for beatitude attainable only in glorification, this supernatural order was thereby rendered necessary, that nothing short of a supernatural union with himself, through the Incarnation, could possibly secure beatitude. Beatitude demands the complete and perfect satisfaction of desire, its complete and perfect fulfilment; but the desire, as we find it in man, can be satisfied or fulfilled with nothing short of glorification. God might, perhaps, have created man without this desire; that is to say, he might have created him a pure animal; but then he would have been no longer man, or endowed with a rational soul. Having determined to create man or rational soul, he could not give him beatitude in a created order, for no rational

soul can be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite, and not even God can create the infinite. The only possible beatitude for a rational soul is in the possession of God himself; and as no created nature can, by its own powers, however high you exalt them, attain to this possession, beatitude can never be naturally attainable, and can be attainable only by supernatural means, aids, or assistance. The supernatural, in your sense of the word, then, must have entered into the original design of the Creator in creating man, and be assumed as necessary to complete or fulfil it.

“Your objection, then, to Gioberti, that he represents the palingenesia as the second cycle, and asserts it to be necessary to complete the first cycle, or what is initial and inchoate in genesis, rests on no solid foundation. It is founded in a mistake on your part, and shows the inadequacy of your theology, and not the unsoundness of his. For what else can it be than what he represents it, if it is any thing? You seem to suppose that making it the complement of what is initial in nature is to confound it with nature, and to deny all real distinction between the natural and the supernatural. But this is not so. Gioberti defines the supernatural to be the immediate act of God, or that which God does immediately, not through the medium of second causes, and therefore he terms it the inexplicable, not because it is without law, for every act of God is law, but because it is explicable by no natural law, or laws inherent in the cosmos. Here is a very intelligible distinction between the natural and the supernatural. Moreover, your insinuation that he confounds the supernatural with the superintelligible, is unjust. The superintelligible is that which exceeds our capacity to know, as the essences of things, but may still be in the order of nature, and to an intelligence capable of taking in the whole of nature, explicable by natural laws. The supernatural is not superintelligible regarded as the immediate act of God; a miracle is a supernatural act, but not superintelligible; it is simply inexplicable by any natural law, and therefore is called supernatural, and referred to God as its immediate author. What has misled you, was your feeling that Catholic faith obliges us to maintain the possibility of natural beatitude, therefore, that nature may be completed in her own order without supernatural assistance, or its elevation to a higher order, that is to say, that the desire for the infinite, innate

in man and inseparable from his nature, can be satisfied with the possession of the finite, the creature, or mere created good. If you had seen that natural beatitude is impossible, and that the cosmos must be completed in palingenesis, or not completed at all, and man fail to return to God as final cause, you would have seen that the assertion of Gioberti by no means confounds the natural and the supernatural, or obscures the distinction between them.

"I am surprised that you have overlooked in all your criticisms on Gioberti what he calls the faculty of *sovrintelligenza*, which lies at the basis of his whole theory of the supernatural. You may dispute whether what he describes should be called a faculty or not, but you cannot deny and must assert in the soul a consciousness of its own insufficiency, and its aptitude for a knowledge which it has not, and cannot attain to by its own natural ability. He defines it the soul's consciousness, or sense of its own potentiality. It is this faculty in the soul, not of knowing the superintelligible indeed, but of knowing its own impotence, that renders it capable of receiving the revelation of the superintelligible, and understanding the necessity of the palingenesis to reduce its potentiality to act, and to complete in glorification what is now initial in its existence. The soul has an internal sense of its innate capacity for the infinite, for an unbounded good, for glorification in union with God as its final cause, and it is from this internal sense that springs that unbounded desire that can be satisfied with nothing short of possessing the infinite. Some little attention to this part of Gioberti's philosophy would enable you to understand how the supernatural may at once be natural or supernatural, according to the point of view from which it is considered; supernatural considered in its origin and end, and as a means or medium to an end; natural when considered as fulfilling the natural desire of the heart, and supplying man's natural impotence, or actualizing his potentiality. Christianity, I need not tell you, while it reveals the origin, is the religion of the means and the end, and, therefore, if it have reference to man at all, must be the completion of man's second cycle or return, without loss of individuality, to God as his final cause or last end. In the very nature of the case, regeneration, as it presupposes genesis or generation, cannot be in the first cycle, but must be in the second, and pertain to man's return to God, and not to his process, by way of creation, from

God. It, as supernatural and therefore depending on his immediate act, no doubt proceeds from God, but it is not a procession of existences from God, for the existences it concerns have already proceeded from God as their Creator, and are presupposed in genesis. The creation in the case is not the creation of new existences, but the creation of new or additional means by which men already created may attain to their true end. Creation as the medium or means to the end, or the motion of the means from God, Gioberti, of course, concedes, and, in this sense, what you assert with regard to the two cycles in the palingenesia may be conceded; but it makes nothing to your purpose, for, to be any thing to your purpose, there must be created originally a palingenesiac order of existences superior to and distinct from the cosmic, and then the palingenesiac return of existences to God would not be the return and glorification of men, but of this new palingenesiac order of existences. In your endeavor to maintain two corresponding cycles in two orders, you have really separated those orders, disjoined them one from another, and failed to connect in any way or manner the cosmic with the palingenesiac order, and to provide for the redemption, elevation, or glorification of men. You have dis-humanized Christianity, and therefore in principle denied the Incarnation, or that the Word was made flesh. Not your philosophy, but your theology has misled you, as it has misled many others, and made it impossible for them to show any synthetic relation between the natural and the supernatural, or between the Incarnation and the salvation and glorification of men. But connecting the supernatural order synthetically with the supernatural, and understanding the palingenesia not as a new creation, save as to the medium, as regeneration and not as generation, and you will have no difficulty in accepting Gioberti's doctrine, that the second cycle is palingenesiac, completing nature, or what is inchoate or initial in the cosmos. It is only in this way that you can really assert Christianity as mediatorial and teleological, and connected in any way with the human race.

"You object, in the second place, that Gioberti identifies the Second Person of the Trinity with the creative act. You misapprehend him, or, at least, do not fully comprehend what he means. He identifies indeed the Word, *Verbum*, with the creative act of God, but only in the sense of the Greeks, who term the Word the substantial Act by

which God creates all things, as says St. John: Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν, δ γέγονεν. *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt: et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est.* It was not, of course, Gioberti's intention to assert that the Word is the creative act of God *ad extra*, and therefore to identify the Λόγος with creatures, or the external act; but, unless we would quarrel with St. John, he is the internal act by or through which all external acts are performed. This sufficiently disposes of all you say under this head.

"You object, in the third place, that Gioberti represents the Incarnation as the completion of the act of creation, and each man as an inchoate God, or a God that begins. What else should he represent the Incarnation to be, except the completion of that act? That act is not completed without the return of existences to their final cause, and that return is only in the Incarnation, through which man attains to glorification. You object to saying that man is an inchoate God, or a God that begins: but it is not intended by this that man grows to be literally and identically God, but that he is progressive and crescent *ad infinitum*, and that the only term of his development and growth is God, for God alone is infinite; but Gioberti takes care to state particularly that man remains always, though united with God, individually distinct from him. As to his infinite growth and progress in the palingenesia, you must concede it, for it is asserted in asserting that man desires the infinite, and can find beatitude only in possessing it. As to your objections to the assertion that Christ is God, because perfect man, they spring from your not considering that man is completed, perfected only in God.

"You object to Gioberti that 'he represents original sin as dialectic as well as sophistical.' Yet you must admit yourself that sin is permitted by God himself, and therefore that it must spring not from a defect in the Creator's works, but from what in them is good and excellent, and also that it must serve in his design some good and excellent purpose, otherwise he would not have permitted it, or the Church sing, *O felix culpa!* Only a noble and rational nature can sin. Brutes cannot sin, nor even children before they come to the use of reason. The higher and nobler the nature, the greater the sin. As it springs from reason or rational nature, it is dialectic, and as it is an abuse of that nature, a misuse of human freedom, our

creative power as second cause, it is sophistical. But as it tends through discord and the battle of opposites to the realization of harmony and union, it is also dialectic.

In the fifth place, you find fault with Gioberti for saying that "all truth and life are in relation—*versano in relazione*." But you yourself maintain that all life is in relation, and maintain that things out of their real relations are dead, abstractions, nullities. Truth is, as St. Thomas maintains, in relation to some intelligence, and is affirmed of the object *a parte rei*, only in the respect that it is related to a knowing mind, either divine or human. It is the adequate object of intelligence, say the Schoolmen. It is then in relation. Moreover, if you identify it, as you do, with reality, real and necessary being, you must bear in mind that being, the very essence of God, is in relation, for God is in his essence triune, essentially the three relations expressed by the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Thus all your objections are futile, unfounded, or founded in your own errors and misapprehensions, and you seem to me to have treated Gioberti very much as your picayune critics treat you, ascribing to him your own prejudices, errors, and narrow conceptions, instead of rising to the dignity and comprehensiveness of his doctrine."

We cannot say that these explanations, offered or suggested by Gioberti's friend, completely satisfy us; but they certainly relieve Gioberti's doctrine from the principal objections we brought against it. His friend is rather severe on us, but we never complain of severity if backed by intelligence, which in this case is the fact. Our readers will bear in mind, that we criticised Gioberti's doctrine simply as we understood it. But we conceded, at the conclusion of our article, that "it is possible that his friends may insist that his language admits of a different interpretation, one, if not in consonance with scholastic theology, at least in consonance with Catholic faith." The fact is, we had some misgivings on the point, and, had we not lost temporarily the use of our eyes, and been pressed for time, we should have further examined it, and rewritten our article before printing it. But what is printed, is printed, and must remain. Some of our criticisms are evidently unfounded and unjust. The answer of Gioberti's friend to our fifth objection, that truth and life are in relation, is to us satisfactory and conclusive, and wholly relieves Gioberti's doctrine from the charge of pantheism, which we

brought against it. It proves that the creative act may be *actus ad extra*, and not, as we supposed Gioberti must hold, an act simply immanent in the actor, that is to say, in God himself. We have not, it is true, been in the habit of using the word *truth* in the sense which Gioberti, after St. Thomas, uses it, or is said to use it, by his friend. We use it in the sense of that which is, and therefore as identical with real or necessary being, or God, as existing independently, without any reference to its being the object of intelligence. In this sense it would obviously be improper to say that truth consists in relation; for although the distinction of three Persons in God implies three essential relations in Being, it does not seem to us to imply that Being itself is in relation. There are the three relations in Being, but the Being is essentially one, for we are obliged to assert, while asserting the three Persons of the Godhead, unity of essence. The suggestion, therefore, of the three essential relations of the Godhead, does not seem to us to prove that all truth is in relation. Gioberti's doctrine, however, is relieved from the charge we brought against it, by supposing him to adopt St. Thomas's definition of truth, and considering truth as consisting in the object regarded in relation to the intelligent subject. This is sufficient, and saves his doctrine from the error of the Hegelians and the Buddhists, which we supposed it to involve.

The answer to our strictures on Gioberti's doctrine in regard to original sin, is less satisfactory, and, as at present informed, we cannot see how sin, which is sophistical in its nature, can ever be dialectic. All sin is founded in pride, and is sophistical in that it denies the copula of the ideal, or divine judgment, *Ens creat existentias*, and assumes that existence is God, which it is not, save *mediante* the creative act. All sin, as all error, is pantheistic, virtually pantheism, the supreme sophism; because dialectics, or every logical judgment, requires the three terms, subject, predicate, and copula. So far we understand and agree with Gioberti, that sin is sophistical. But how sophistry can have its dialectic side, we do not understand, for we do not understand how the denial of any one of the three terms, on which all dialectics depends, can of itself induce the assertion of the term denied. We understand perfectly well that it is better to be a man than a brute; that it is better for a creature to be created with a noble and rational soul, and endowed with free will, though he may abuse his freedom,

than it would be to be created without such soul or such endowment. But we cannot understand how the abuse of the freedom can of itself work any good, any more than we can understand how negation can make itself affirmation. That the nature from which sin springs is dialectic, therefore good, and tends to good in spite of the sin, and even that sin may be the occasion of good, of even a higher good than might otherwise have been attained to, and therefore the goodness of God not only stand unimpeached, but be made even more manifest by permitting it, we can very well understand and do most fully believe; but that the sin, as an efficient cause, contributes to this end, we do not and cannot believe. We must stand by what we said on this point in our previous article, at least till we receive further explanations than any that have yet been offered us.

Indeed, we see not how Gioberti himself can, consistently with what he concedes as to the future destiny of man, really maintain that sin has its dialectic side. He defines sin as a fault of dialectics, which, according to his doctrine of the dialectic constitution of things, is correct. A fault may be the occasion of improvement, because its consequences may lead us to efforts which attain to a better understanding of principles and a more faithful adherence to them, than might otherwise have been the case. A man who has committed a fault and repaired it, in many respects stands higher than one who has committed no fault, that is, taking man as he is now constituted, and in the relations we are obliged to consider him; but then the fault must be repaired before any advantage is derived, or even derivable from it. Say the redeemed and the beatified may sing *O felix Culpa*, certainly the unredeemed and the damned cannot so sing. Now, according to Gioberti, himself, the sin, though repaired in the methexis, or the race, is not universally repaired in the mimesis, or individuals; and to me, an individual, it is nothing that the race is redeemed and beatified, if I remain in sin, and suffer eternally in hell its consequences, without hope, or possibility of redemption or beatification. In the palingenesia there is, indeed, the methexis, as well as in generation; but the methexic principle in palingenesia is grace, and, in relation to it, those not regenerated by grace are as the unborn in the order of generation. The unregenerate remain forever in a sophistical state, and never attain to dialectic union and harmony; for them there is always a term want-

ing, and no logical conclusion is possible. How, then, in regard to these, can you say sin has its dialectic side, or that in them sin has been the occasion even, of any good? Are not those who die in actual sin even worse off than those who die with only original sin? Do they not suffer a greater, a severer punishment? In these you see the natural consequences and the full effects of sin, and these are evidently extremely sophistical. Where in these is your dialectic side of sin? Even if you suppose the punishment of sin is expiative, and tends to the melioration of the damned, it is not the sin, but the penalty, that works the melioration. And besides, the melioration, though eternally going on, can never overcome the original sophism, and re-establish dialectic union and harmony, that is, their return to God, or union with him as their final cause. If, in the race and individuals saved, the sin has been overcome, the fault repaired, and a higher good obtained, it has not been the sin that has done it, but grace, the methexic principle of the palingenesia.

Nor is it necessary, in order to reconcile the permission of evil with the providence of God, to assert a dialectic side for sin; it suffices for this to maintain with St. Augustine, that simple existence is itself good, and that it is better for the damned, even though they have thrown away the opportunity and means of beatitude, to exist than not to exist. God has done them no wrong; he has even done them a good in creating them, and still does them good in continuing them in existence. It is no objection to Divine Providence or Divine Goodness to say, that the good they receive is imperfect good, inferior to that of the blessed in heaven; for if it were, it would be equally an objection to there being different degrees in intelligence and happiness, or in glory, of the saints, and to the whole hierarchical order of the heavens, as well as of the earth. To vindicate the ways of God, it is only necessary to show that all he does is good, and that existence is always better than non-existence; otherwise you would be obliged to maintain that God must create every existence possible for him to create, and exhaust on each creature his whole creative energy, which, if it could be exhausted, would not be infinite, and would therefore imply that God himself is not infinite.

The explanations offered in reply to our second and third Objections are upon the whole satisfactory as far as they go, and enable us to see that Gioberti's theory of the Incarna-

tion may have an orthodox sense. Gioberti considers the Trinity as the archetype of creation, and that God being essentially three distinct Persons in one essence, impresses this original type on all his works; hence they are all dialectic, as represented in the ideal formula. The Word, *Λόγος*, or Second Person, may be regarded as the copula of the divine Being, according to the Greek doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, as creation proceeds from God through the Word, the substantial Word externated in the creative act. The Incarnation is the summit or perfection of the creative act, in which the created is united or made one with the Creator, and surely creation can go no farther, rise no higher. The point we overlooked here, is that the assumption of human nature in the Incarnation is in reference to the second cycle, and not to the first, not a new creation, but the completion or fulfilment of creation. This assumption founds, if you will, a new order in relation to the means and the end, but not in relation to the origin. It is supernatural, because immediately effected by God, and not, as the rationalists pretend, through the operations of nature or second causes. It is first effected, completed in the individual, to be, in some sense, successively effected or completed in the race, for Christ becomes the father of mankind in the palingenesia, as Adam was the father of mankind in the order of genesis. "He is God, because he is perfect man," does not mean that God is rendered actual by the perfection of man, but that man perfected, raised to the highest power, is God in the sense in which we say Christ is God, not God by the conversion of the human into the divine, but by the assumption of the human by the divine, and its elevation to be not the divine but the human nature of God, and, in this sense, not in the sense of the rationalists, we must understand the expression, man is an inchoate God, or a God that begins, or in other words, that man completed, or what is initial in man fulfilled and realized in the palingenesia, is union or oneness with the infinite, God. We shrunk from the phraseology, because we took it in the sense in which we had long found it taken by the rationalists and transcendentalists, and supposed that Gioberti used it in the same sense. Gioberti really means by it nothing more nor less than that man, through grace, is infinitely progressive and crescent, or that his progress has for its term the infinite, that is to say, God himself.

In the Incarnation the human is assumed by the divine, and man becomes God through the Divine Person who has assumed it. This union is full and complete, and raises man to infinite power. It is in him individual, but the individual is, so to speak, methexic, as was Adam. In Adam was contained methexically the whole human race in the order of genesis ; in Christ was contained the whole human race in the order of palingenesia, and the regenerated, those born of grace through him, bear a like relation to him to that borne by individuals in the order of genesis to Adam. Hence completed or attained to the term of rebirth, they become Christs, as individuals in the order of genesis become men ; they become one with Christ, are methexically Christ, and, as Christ is God, they become God. But as individuals do not lose their individuality in becoming Adam, so the regenerate do not lose their individuality in becoming Christ any more than the human nature assumed by Christ loses its distinctively human character and becomes identically the divine nature. This point Gioberti is careful to mark, and, while he preserves in the Incarnation the distinction of two natures united in one Person, he retains in the deification of the race the distinct human individuality, and avoids thus the prominent errors of modern rationalists and pantheists. So it is suggested to us Gioberti should be understood, and, so understood, there is nothing, it strikes us, in his doctrine of Incarnation incompatible with rigid orthodoxy, the definitions of the Church, the teachings of the Fathers, or the great mediæval Doctors.

The answer of Gioberti's friend to the first objection we raised, founded on the denial of the *status naturæ puræ*, or natural beatitude, is, perhaps, sufficient to prove that our objection was not well taken, and is not, at least in all its parts, tenable. We reasoned from theology as we had been taught it, in accordance, as we supposed, with what was the generally received doctrine of theologians. It is true that we originally held and proceeded in all our reasoning on the assumption that man has no natural beatitude, that his beatitude is and must be in the supernatural order. On this assumption, which accorded with all the principles and reasonings that had brought us into the Church, we commenced the series of Essays which we called *Admonitions to Protestants*, and in which we intended to accomplish a work not dissimilar in its design to the work Gioberti has sketched out, but not completed, in the vol-

ume before us. We stopped almost at the beginning, because we were told by a learned Jesuit Father that the line of argument we were pursuing rested upon assumptions which the Church had condemned. He assured us that the Church had defined that God could have created man in the state in which he is now born, sin excepted, consequently in a state of pure nature, therefore with simple natural beatitude. He cited in proof the condemnation of the 55th Proposition of Baius, already cited, *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur*, and referred to what he assured us was the common doctrine of theologians, that infants dying unbaptized, not only do not suffer the tortures of the damned, but enjoy a high degree of natural beatitude. We found the Jesuits, who have in modern times been the leading theologians of the Church, very generally holding and teaching the doctrine of a *status naturæ puræ*, and we supposed, that if we did not accept it, we were at least not at liberty to deny it. We knew, however, that we were permitted to hold the Augustinian doctrine, and to maintain that man has his beatitude only in the supernatural order; but, engaged in a war against Jansenism, anxious to save nature, to assert the natural order, and maintain human freedom, we slid insensibly, we hardly know how, into the doctrine of the Society, and have latterly followed it in all our theological discussions, whether with Catholics or non-Catholics. Without attempting here to decide between the two schools, it is certain that Gioberti has a right to follow the Augustinian school, and may therefore present the palingenesis as the completion or fulfilment of the cosmos in the sense suggested by his friend.

Assuming that the *status naturæ puræ* was possible, we naturally concluded that it had its complement in its own order, and therefore could be fulfilled or attain to beatitude in the order of nature itself, consequently that the supernatural, or the palingenesis, was necessary only in the bounty of God, which would confer on mankind an infinitely higher beatitude. We therefore represented the two orders, natural and supernatural, as two parallel orders, and conceived each order as having its own principle, medium, and end, and when, therefore, we found Gioberti presenting the palingenesis as the second cycle completing the cosmos, or what was initial in genesis, we conceived him to be confounding the two orders, and denying all real distinction

between the natural and the supernatural; for our view was that the supernatural could complete only what was initial in the supernatural. The desire common to all men of beatitude, and which can be only supernaturally fulfilled, we explained not as innate in man, but as the result of his original supernatural elevation from which he fell, and of the original revelation of a supernatural end made to our First Parents in the Garden, and continued, in some form and some measure, among all nations by tradition down to our own times. But the Fathers and the great mediæval Doctors, and nearly all modern theologians, if we except the theologians of the Society, and perhaps we should not except all of them, hold that this desire is natural, is inherent in the very nature of a rational soul, and therefore may with strict propriety be called natural. Without the satisfaction of this desire there is and can be no beatitude, and, as this desire cannot be satisfied with any natural or created good or without the possession of the infinite, it follows necessarily that man can have his beatitude only in the supernatural order, and we may maintain with Gioberti that palingenesia completes the cosmos or what is initial in genesis.

The objection of Gioberti's friend to our view that the two orders are parallel, not the supernatural the completion of the natural, is well put; for it is evident that Christianity is the religion of the means and the end, is mediatorial and teleological, and must therefore presuppose nature and be designed to raise and conduct it to beatitude. This, after all, is what and all we really meant, and Gioberti's doctrine better expresses our meaning than we had expressed it ourselves. His doctrine, after all, is only what we had been trying to bring out in our various essays intended to explain and bring out the theological maxim *Gratia supponit naturam*. Furthermore, the question—if we assume that the two orders are parallel and not the one the completion of the other—how we connect them one with the other and show a synthetic relation between them, is very pertinent, and very difficult to answer, if indeed it be not unanswerable. This explanation may therefore be accepted. Perhaps, in point of fact, it was we and not Gioberti that was denying that "God could have created man in the beginning such as he is now born," for we are not sure but the doctrine we accepted denies that God can create man with any natural desires that cannot be satisfied in the natural order.

The heresy of Jansenism, which we had been told over and over again was only a logical conclusion from Augustinian premises, can be avoided, and nature asserted and vindicated on Gioberti's doctrine as well as on that of the Society. The essential error of Jansenism is, as we have often expressed it, in asserting the nullity of nature in order to assert the efficiency of grace ; but the assertion of the palingenesia as the second cycle or fulfilment of what is initial in genesis, does not lessen nature or displace it in order to make way for grace. It presupposes and accepts nature, and completes it, fulfils what is initial in it, and enables it to repose in the infinite, where, and where alone is beatitude for a rational soul. It destroys or changes none of our natural faculties ; it restricts in no respect the sphere of natural reason, for the man elevated to the palingenesiac order by regeneration remains man as fully as he was in the order of genesis ; he may be more, in fact is more in relation to his final end ; but is not and cannot be less. Nature is retained, for it is nature that is to be completed, fulfilled in the infinite, in glorification, which is what we have been so long laboring to establish and maintain against those who are constantly decrying nature, and representing reason as a false and illusory light. This is enough, and whether we come to it by the theology of the Augustinian school or that of the illustrious Society of Jesus, it makes, it seems to us, no difference.

These explanations and remarks show that, notwithstanding our criticisms, Gioberti on the points to which we objected may be explained, and should be explained, in an orthodox sense. We are the better pleased with this conclusion to which his friend has helped us, than we are with the one to which we ourselves came. There is always pleasure to a generous mind in the rehabilitation of characters that have been very generally assailed, especially when they were men eminent for their rich and original genius, and for their vast and profound erudition. To completely rehabilitate the character of Gioberti, and to prove his strict orthodoxy throughout, may be impossible, and we think that, notwithstanding all that has been said, or can be said, in his favor, he has fallen into some very grave errors. But he was certainly one of those men whom we would not lose to the Church, or to humanity. No man has lived in our day who has treated the highest and most difficult problems which concern the human race, with more

earnestness, with more real learning, or with greater science, clearness, and depth. There are points, and those of grave import, in the volume before us, not yet touched upon, where, as at present informed, we cannot by any means go with him, but the example of such a mind in this picayune age of meticulous orthodoxy, surveying with freedom and profound intelligence the whole field of theology and philosophy, of society, government, and morals, and fearlessly, in bold, manly, and dignified tones, expressing his honest and earnest convictions, is of the highest utility, and in the energy and activity it gives to thought and intelligence, the noble ardor with which it inspires lofty minds and generous hearts, far more than atones for all the errors into which it may have fallen. Every age has its own peculiar character, and its own peculiar wants, and the great want of our age is of great men, men who have force of character, patience and industry in study, strength and courage to break through the narrow and narrowing conventionalisms which cramp, belittle, and nullify the great majority even of those who pass for learned, intelligent, and thinking men.

Our old form of civilization is passing away, and there comes a fearful crisis in human affairs; a new order of civilization is gradually forming under the old, and will soon throw it off. With the change in the order of civilization will come, and must come, changes in the forms of all things pertaining to civilized life. You had great changes in the sixteenth century; society itself underwent a transformation; so did theology, science, art, and literature. The Society of Jesus performed no inconsiderable part in this transformation; it aided in recasting society; it recast theology, morals, science, literature, and art, and led them, and controlled them for two hundred years and over. But the world they formed is itself now passing away, or undergoing a new transformation, and we are passing through a crisis, though different from that of the sixteenth century, no less grave, or likely to be less serious, in its consequences. What we want are men to meet this crisis, men who know the present, know the past, and are able to foresee the future,—men who know what in the past must be retained, what in the present cannot be successfully, and ought not to be resisted, and what direction the future ought to take, in order more effectually to advance the interests of religion, and to promote civilization. Such men we cannot

have, unless we treat them in a liberal and generous spirit, unless we cherish them as Providential men, show ourselves lenient toward their errors and short-comings, and grateful for every needed and opportune word they may utter, though a word unfamiliar to our ears, and bearing even the marks of novelty. We want no new faith; we want no new principles; we only want the faith of the past renewed in the present, and the great and glorious principles which lie richly strown through all the works of the Fathers and great Doctors, brought out anew and wisely applied to the new wants and new circumstances of the new world springing into existence.

Starting now from the position that the natural is completed in the supernatural, we must assert a real relation between the two orders, depending on the creative act itself; for, if there were no real relation between them, the supernatural, though it might be substituted for the natural, could never be its completion. This relation must be, not arbitrary, factitious, or mechanical, but a real, a living relation, and enter into the actual constitution of the Creator's works. If man is destined to a supernatural end, he must have a natural desire for that end, or be naturally *in potentia* to it, and therefore have in himself an inherent and natural want, which only the supernatural can fill up or satisfy. This natural desire or want through which the supernatural is really connected with or joined to the natural, or through which a living union is effected between them, is called by our theologians the natural and innate desire of beatitude, which can be attained to only in the possession of the infinite, of an unbounded good, that is to say, of God, the Supreme Good in itself. It is only by virtue of the fact of the existence in man, in his very nature, of a desire for beatitude not attainable in the natural order, that the philosophy of religion becomes practicable, or the relation between the natural and the supernatural, between reason and revelation, becomes capable of a scientific exposition. If we suppose in man nothing corresponding to what Gioberti calls the faculty of *sovrintelligenza*, or the soul's consciousness of its own infinite potentiality, reason and revelation would not only be distinct, but absolutely dissonant and their harmony be inconceivable, for there would be nothing in common between them, and no principle on which they could be harmonized; in fact, the supernatural could never be made intelligible to man, not even analogically, and faith

in the revelation of the superintelligible would be absolutely impossible, since no such revelation could be made even by Omnipotence to man. We say not merely that it could not be proved, but we say it could not be made, because a revelation, whatever the matter revealed, can be made only to reason, and it can be made to reason only on the ground that reason has the faculty or capacity of receiving it.

Nothing is more certain with regard to man than this faculty, as Gioberti calls it, of superintelligence, or the consciousness of the soul of its own inability to suffice for itself and its need of attaining to that which transcends its natural ability. Nothing is more certain than that the soul is conscious of capacities not fulfilled, of a potential knowledge not yet attained to, of a potential happiness not yet realized, of the capacity of eternal progress and an unbounded good. Hence, the soul's unrest, its dissatisfaction with its present state, and hence hope and effort.

"Hope springs eternal in the human breast;
Man never is, but always to be blest."

Nothing is more certain than that the desire of beatitude of which our theologians speak, is indestructible in the constitution of human nature as it now actually exists, than that man is devoured by a craving for what he has not, and that his soul is eternally tending upward to something which infinitely transcends its powers of attainment. It is from the secret consciousness which every soul bears within itself of a destiny to which it has no natural ability to attain, and of which it comes short in its highest and best sustained efforts, that springs all the tragedy of human life, that low melodious wail, or that loud and deep lament which marks the genuine poetry of all ages and nations.

But as this potentiality of the soul is not and cannot be actualized in the natural order, we may say, and say truly, that the natural has a presentiment of the supernatural, and hence it becomes possible by supernatural means to make known to man the superintelligible, and to enable him to attain that beatitude after which he never ceases to sigh and yearn. It is here in this fact of the soul's constitution, that the natural and the supernatural touch each other and come into dialectic harmony and union. This point is more clearly brought out and established by Gioberti as the basis of his *Philosophy of Revelation*, than by any other theological writer we are acquainted with; and nowhere does

his rich genius, his original intelligence, or his vast erudition, stand him in better stead, than in showing and vindicating the synthetic relation of the natural and the supernatural. Probably the most important of his various publications was one of the earliest, entitled *Teorica del Sovrannaturale*. His theory of the supernatural is very profound, and is not easily mastered. We do not regard ourselves as having by any means fully mastered it; but from what we do understand of it, we are satisfied that it furnishes the principles of a real harmony between reason and revelation, and the basis of a solid union between rationalism and supernaturalism. The work before us was intended to be the development and application of this theory, showing that it is only in Catholicity that the various fragments of truth scattered through all other religions are collected, united, and integrated in one original, symmetrical, complete, and living body of truth. Whether he has really succeeded in showing this or not, this is what needs to be done, and what must be done to save our age from pantheism and materialism, from petty rationalism and stolid atheism, and to recall it to the life and vigor of a reasonable, a sublime, and an energetic faith. Whoever does this work will have given what in its fullest, deepest, and highest sense is to be understood by the PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

This brief statement will show the importance, nay, the necessity of those researches, discussions, and speculations to which many excellent and saintly men are and always have been opposed. There have always been in the Church a class of men whom we may call "Literalists," who attach themselves to the literal statements of the Holy Scriptures, to what they call the simplicity of faith, and oppose all philosophical efforts to bring the natural and the supernatural into harmony. Thus, at that early day, we find St. Irenæus opposing the Christian Philosophical School of Alexandria, of which Clemens and Origen were, if not its founders, its most successful continuators. But he did not succeed, and his followers have not succeeded in preventing the great Doctors and Theologians, like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas, from laboring with untiring industry, and with all their genius, intellectual power, and erudition, to show the harmony of the natural and the supernatural, and the real synthetic relation there is between them. The human mind is so constituted that, if it acts at all, it must reduce, or labor to reduce, all branches

of its knowledge and belief to a principle in which they are seen to be consistent, and but parts of one uniform and indissoluble whole. It is in vain we war against this tendency of human intelligence. It is in vain we dwell on the dangers to which it exposes the simple believer, the errors and absurdities to which its indulgence may lead. We cannot suppress this tendency without suppressing the human mind itself, and even St. Irenæus himself is obliged to follow it to a greater or less extent in his writings against heretics, especially against those philosophical heretics, the Gnostics, so often reproduced in our own day by rationalists and transcendentalists. Every man, if he thinks at all, if he be really a man, and conscious of the dignity he possesses as a rational soul, wishes and must wish to render to himself an account of his own faith, whether in the natural or the supernatural.

Although there has always been a party in the Church opposed to this tendency, and therefore to all philosophizing on the subject of religion, the Church has never sanctioned their opposition, but has accepted and availed herself of the labors of the theologians and philosophers. She has accepted human intelligence; she has respected human reason, and aided and blessed its cultivation. She has canonized St. Augustine; she has canonized St. Anselm; she has canonized St. Thomas; she has canonized St. Bonaventura, and marked her high appreciation of Bossuet and Fénelon. All who engage in constructing a philosophy of religion are liable, no doubt, to fall into many errors; but it is even better to err than never to think; it is better sometimes to be wrong than never to be right; and a living dog is better than a dead lion. All that can be asked of those who err is humility, docility, and a willingness to correct their errors when clearly and distinctly pointed out to them by the competent authority. Even the errors of great men are often more instructive and more salutary than the commonplace truths of little men; for they become provocative of thought and inquiry, and the occasion of the attainment to higher truths and their fuller appreciation.

ART. III.—*Introduction Historique et Critique aux Livres du Nouveau Testament.* Par REITHMAYR, HUG, THOLUCK, &c. Traduite et Annotée par H. DE VALROGER, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception. Paris : Lecoffre & C^{ie} 1861. 2 Tomes. 8vo.

WE are not able to review these two goodly volumes, and to speak of their contents according to their merits, because, owing to the continued inability to use our eyes, we are unable to read them, and because, though we know French very well by sight, we know it but imperfectly by hearing. The well-known character of the works translated, as well as of the translator, is a sufficient pledge of their great merit, and of their being up with the literature of their subject. Germany has been, for the last sixty years, the classic land of Biblical literature; and nowhere has that literature called forth more serious or profound study, attracted a higher order of intelligence, or been more successfully prosecuted; and nowhere is it so advanced as in the more distinguished German writers. We were tolerably familiar with the results obtained in Biblical literature some twenty-five years ago, but of the results obtained since then, which, we are assured, are of vast importance, we are comparatively ignorant. These results a competent French critic has assured the public may be found well summed up and clearly set forth in these two volumes, much enriched by the valuable notes of the translator. The German authors translated may not be the most brilliant or daring, but they are among the most solid and really erudite of German authors who have devoted themselves to Biblical literature; and Père Valroger himself is one of the most learned Biblical scholars in France. We have no hesitation, then, in recommending the work as the best Historical and Critical Introduction to the New Testament that has as yet been published.

We welcome the appearance of these volumes, because they indicate a return of Catholic scholars to a field which is properly their own, and which was so successfully cultivated by their predecessors, especially the learned Benedictines, but which they have, except in Germany, apparently, to some extent neglected since Don Calmet, as they have so many other fields of literature and science. Since the close of the seventeenth century till quite recently, Catho-

lics have suffered themselves, in almost every branch of learning, of science, and literature, to be surpassed by the non-Catholic or anti-Catholic world. We are indebted, in the main, to non-Catholic, and, in some instances, to anti-Catholic authors, for the illustration and vindication of our own Catholic antiquity. The best history of the life and times of St. Gregory VII., before that not yet completed by Gfrörer, a convert from Protestantism, we owe to Voigt, a Protestant minister, as we do the best history of the life and times of Innocent III. to Hurter, another Protestant minister, though since become a Catholic. We know no Catholic historian who has treated the history of the Middle Ages with so much learning, so much impartiality, and in so true a historical spirit, as Professor Leo; and, with all its faults, Ranke's *History of the Popes* is superior to any thing we have of the sort from Catholic sources. If we have returned to the study of history, and have ceased to apologize for our own mediæval antiquity, we are indebted to the labors, the researches, and the truthfulness of those not of our communion. We have caught the stimulus from them, have been spurred on by their example, when we ought to have taken the lead and been first in the field. Protestants have also preceded us in the application to Biblical history and criticism of the new facts discovered by profounder historical researches, and disclosed by modern travellers and the more familiar acquaintance with the language, the manners, the customs, the geography, and the natural history of the East. It is with no pride, but with a sort of humiliation, that a Catholic reviewer is obliged to make these confessions; and, therefore, it is with no little gratification we perceive our own scholars disposed to regain the pre-eminence they once held, and the possession of which they should never have suffered themselves to lose.

It is not precisely that our scholars, during the last century and half, have ceased to study, or have not kept themselves up with all new facts and discoveries, but that they have seemed to want the tact, the capacity, or the ability to use effectively the materials they amassed, and to adapt themselves to the new modes of thought and expression which had come into vogue. The world, which they had cast in their own image, they found crumbling away around them, and seemed to imagine that the most that remained for them was to prevent themselves from being buried in

its ruins. The new world springing up around them, emerging from the general chaos, and only half-formed, has filled them with fear, as a strange and unnatural monster, which could neither be driven back, nor moulded into any shape of beauty or loveliness; they have been paralyzed by the strangeness of their position, and lost their creative faculties. The crisis of the eighteenth century was to them inexplicable, and they knew not how to meet it; they saw not how the old that was passing away, and the new that was emerging, could have any principle in common, nor how their life could flow on in unbroken stream from the foot of the Cross to the final consummation of the world, unless they could drive back the new and recall the old. Thus they suffered the leadership in science and literature, in history and criticism, to pass from their hands into the hands of those who were animated by the new spirit, and moved by the genius of the new world springing into existence. Though professing a faith which is always young, ardent, and vigorous, which never grows old, but has always the future before it; though belonging to a Church which recognizes in man the principle of progress, and is the medium of his progress to the infinite, which takes the infant at his birth, and carries him onward and upward, until he becomes one with the infinite and eternal God, they lost their hope, became retrograde in their movements, and wasted their energies in bewailing a past that can never return, while they suffered the spirit of progress to pass into the non-Catholic world, which had no right to it, except through their fault, which could not guide it, and could at best only break it or materialize it.

The fault has been, not in the defect of study, not in the defect of learning, not in the defect of special science or special knowledge, but in the defect of appreciation of the new state of things in which our scholars found themselves placed; in not understanding that nothing good ever passes away, that no order ever falls into the past till its work is done, and it has no longer any power to serve the cause of God or man;—in not understanding that the new order springing from the destruction of the old, is not the destruction of what was good in the old, but its rejuvenation under new forms better adapted to the future progress of religion and civilization. The new is always the continuation of the old, a new birth from the past, in which the past lives a new and more vigorous life. The man of true ge-

nus and of true life is he who sees the moment when the change has become inevitable, accepts what it has that is good, and conforms to it. He is not one who hurries it on, never one who seeks it, but he is always one who sees it, and accepts it the moment it has become inevitable, and can no longer be successfully resisted. Our Catholic scholars, frightened by the convulsions, the upheavings, the *bouleversements* of the eighteenth century, failed to perceive that even then the Spirit of God brooded over the chaos, commanding light to spring out of darkness, and order out of confusion; they saw not that the world, which they felt slipping from their grasp, which was so lovely in their eyes and so dear to their affections, had itself sprung from a chaos no less wild and weltering. But happily a change has come over the spirit of their dream; they are beginning to recover from their fright; they are beginning to feel that there is a future before them, and great and glorious deeds for them to perform. They are, therefore, fast resuming their ancient leadership, and uniting in those labors which were interrupted for a season, and which will once more invigorate, harmonize, and embellish the moral and intellectual universe.

We are especially gratified to see our scholars returning to Scriptural studies. In the estimation of Catholics, still more than in the estimation of Protestants, the Bible is the "Book of books;" and we could better afford to spare all other books, ancient or modern, than the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments. The Church has always encouraged their reverential study and pious meditation. Taken as the original medium of the revelation of God to man, as Protestants take them, they lose much of their value, for they are then, to a great extent, especially as to matters of doctrine, unintelligible. Even a superficial perusal of them should suffice to convince the impartial, unprejudiced, and passably-intelligent reader, that they could never have been designed to teach originally and explicitly the doctrines contained in divine revelation, because they nowhere contain those doctrines drawn out in systematic form, and clearly and dogmatically stated. The Old Testament contains the earliest traditions of the human race, the laws, the ritual, the history, the moral and devotional literature of a peculiar people living for two thousand years or more under the special providence of God. The New Testament contains brief synopses of the life, the sayings,

the doings, and the sufferings of our Lord while tabernacling in the flesh,—the Acts of the Apostles, or at least of several of them, together with doctrinal, moral, and monitory Letters addressed by St. Paul to several particular Churches and to the Hebrews, of St. Peter, St. James, St. John, and St. Jude to the Christians at large, two Letters to private individuals, and the remarkable book, which to most minds is a sealed book, the Apocalypse. All the writings of the Old Testament proceed from God through believers, and are addressed to believers, and presuppose the Jewish faith as already known. The writings of the New Testament, again, are addressed to believers in the Christian faith by Christian Apostles and Evangelists, and, though inspired writings, they presuppose the faith to have been already revealed and received. Nowhere do they present themselves as the original medium of the Christian revelation. They speak of it as something already communicated, already believed; allude to it as something known; and simply seek to explain it more fully, to confirm it, and to induce its recipients to practice in accordance with its requirements. Surely such writings were never designed to be the immediate and direct source whence those who were absolutely ignorant of revealed truth were to derive their knowledge of Christian faith or of Christian duty.

The unintelligibility of the Scriptures is not entirely owing to the obscurity of their language, the nature of the subjects they treat, the fact that they are inspired, and treat of the highest and sublimest themes which can engage the attention of the human mind; but to the fact that we come to them without the necessary preparation, without the preliminary knowledge which they presuppose in the reader, and without which their various allusions, hints, and illustrations cannot be understood. Look at them in what light we will, they are incomplete in themselves, and can be understood only when read in the light of the Christian faith as first orally taught, and as it has been preserved in the tradition of the Church. Read as they who reject that tradition must read them, they are, to a great extent, unintelligible, and there is scarcely any error conceivable that they may not be made to teach, or, at least, to favor.

Take, as an illustration, the question we find put to the Apostle in the Acts by one who felt it necessary to secure his salvation, "What shall I do to be saved?" The Apostle

answers: "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and be baptized; and thou shalt be saved." Here is a very plain question, put in the simplest manner possible; the answer seems equally plain and simple. Two things only are required; "to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ," and "to be baptized." But what are we to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ? "Simply to believe," says the Unitarian, "that Jesus Christ was the Messiah promised to the Fathers and foretold by the Jewish prophets; and therefore to have the true Christian faith," he concludes, "it is simply necessary to believe that Jesus was the promised Messiah." We may accept the interpretation, without accepting the conclusion. Suppose the inquirer, as was probably the case, to have been a Jew or a Jewish proselyte, and therefore already instructed in divine revelation, the answer would be sufficient and exact, because the two things named were all that he needed in addition to what he already had. But suppose the question to have been asked by a Gentile or one absolutely ignorant of the faith of the Synagogue, the answer would have been neither exact nor sufficient; for such a one would require something more than simply to believe that Jesus was the Messiah promised to the Jews, and to be baptized in his name. So simple a faith accompanied by the mere external act of baptism, any man's reason tells him, could have in itself no necessary connection with eternal salvation. The answer of the Apostle becomes true, full, and adequate for all men only when we have the traditional teaching of what it is to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and to be baptized. If we have not the true doctrine in our minds, we cannot find it in the Scriptures; but when we have been taught it, when we know what it is, we can then go to them and not only find it there, but find it set forth in the clearest, the fullest, the most attractive, and the most impressive form. The Scriptures are, therefore, for believers, not for unbelievers, for those who, up to a certain point at least, have already been instructed in the doctrines and precepts of the Gospel.

We have many instances of persons brought up in heretical communions, but honest and candid, sincere and earnest, who have come to the true faith by simply reading and meditating the Scriptures. But this is because they had, not only Christian dispositions, but also the elements of the Christian faith already in their minds, and those seminal principles of the truth which the reading of the Scriptures

and meditation thereon are sufficient to cause to germinate, grow up, and fructify. But we have no well authenticated instances of individuals having no previous instruction in Christian doctrine or in Christian modes of thought, who have, by simply reading the Scriptures, been brought to the knowledge of the Christian faith, or who have been able to construct from them any clear, consistent, and definite system of doctrine whatever. The Bible Society circulates innumerable copies of the Holy Scriptures among the heathen, but we have never heard that the reading of them has brought any of the heathen to a belief, even a human belief, in Christianity. In some instances, no doubt, the reading of them has shaken their belief in the religion which they had received from their fathers; but instead of making them believers in Christianity, it has made them disbelievers in all religion. These considerations alone are sufficient to prove that the Protestant doctrine with regard to the sufficiency of the Scriptures is untenable. Even Protestants themselves do not rely on their own doctrine, and, whenever they can, they send with the Bible their missionary or doctrinal tract. But taking the Scriptures as the Church takes them, and reading them in the light of her teaching or the catechism, after we have been instructed in the principles of our faith and in our duty, we shall find them the best of all possible helps to the full understanding of Christian doctrine, the best of all possible helps to the understanding of Christian morals, and the most instructive, inspiring, and edifying of all spiritual reading; we shall find them an inexhaustible fountain of truth and wisdom, of moral principle, as of true and sublime devotion.

The doctrine of the Church with regard to the Holy Scriptures has been much misunderstood and grossly misrepresented. She has never objected to or discouraged the reading of the Scriptures, nor has she ever regarded their reading as undesirable or unprofitable. She approves, and always has approved, the use of the Bible, and objects, and has objected, only to its misuse. She holds it to be written by inspiration, and profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in righteousness, to perfect the man of God, and prepare him for every good work. But she does not recognize it as the original medium of divine revelation, or as sufficient to teach the true faith to one who has received no preliminary instruction and no prior notice of that faith.

To put it into the hands of one who through the living teacher, or through traditional instruction, had received no preparation for reading and understanding it, would be as absurd as to put into the hands of the student a book on algebra before he had learned the first four operations of simple arithmetic. The principle on which she proceeds is adopted and acted on by the various Christian sects, as well as by her, and to as great an extent, else why do they have their Sunday-schools, their catechisms, their commentaries, their theological seminaries, their professors of theology, their preachers and teachers? The Presbyterian reads the Bible in the light of Presbyterian tradition; the Anglican, in the light of Anglican tradition; the Unitarian, in the light of Unitarian tradition; the Methodist, in the light of Methodist tradition; and hence we find that the children of Presbyterians tend naturally to grow up Presbyterians, of Methodists to grow up Methodists, of Anglicans to grow up Anglicans, of Unitarians to grow up Unitarians. The only difference there is between the Church and the sects on this point is, that their traditions, in so far as they are peculiar, date back only to the time of the Reformers, whereas her tradition dates back from the time of the Apostles, and is Apostolic, and therefore authentic.

The Evangelical sects, even while asserting the sufficiency of the Scriptures, do really recognize their insufficiency. They all recognize the necessity of a guide and interpreter to the understanding of Scripture not to be found in the Scriptures themselves; for they maintain that they are sufficient only when interpreted to the understanding of the reader by the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost. No man goes farther in asserting the weakness of the human understanding, or its insufficiency by its own light to understand the Holy Scriptures, and deduce therefrom the true Christian faith, than your stern, rigid, arrogant, and inflexible Presbyterian minister. No man is farther than he from accepting the doctrine of private judgment as held by Unitarians and rationalists, and as ordinarily combated by our Catholic controversialists. No man feels more deeply, or maintains more rigidly or explicitly, the necessity of an infallible guide and interpreter for whoever would read the Scriptures with understanding and profit. "Thinkest thou that thou understandest what thou readest?"—"How can I unless some one show me?" These questions are as significant for him as they are for a Catholic, and he concedes

that he cannot understand what he reads, unless some one shows him or unfolds to him the interior sense, the real meaning of the words he reads. This *some one* he holds is the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, who inspired the Scriptures themselves. The only controversy there can be between him and us, is on a question of fact, not a question of law or principle. No doubt, if, as he supposes, he has the Holy Ghost for his illuminator and instructor in reading the Scriptures, his understanding of them is correct and worthy of all confidence. Let him prove the fact, and there is no longer any dispute between us. But he must excuse us, if we refuse to accept it as a fact on his bare word, especially since we find others, as much entitled to credit as he is, who claim to be illuminated and taught by the Holy Ghost, and whose understanding of the Scriptures is almost the very contradictory of his.

The principle insisted on by the Church is a very plain and a very reasonable principle, one that accords with the historical facts in the case. The original revelation, she says, was not made to mankind by writing, or through the medium of a book. It was made in the beginning immediately by God himself to certain chosen individuals, who communicated it to others. Mankind knew and believed the truth, knew and believed the one true religion, at least in its substance, long before any book was written, or letters had been invented. The primitive believers under the Christian dispensation were taught the faith orally by those who had been orally instructed by our Lord himself. The faith thus orally taught and transmitted by the Apostles to their successors, becomes the internal light by which the language of Scripture is interpreted and understood. Something of this sort is obviously necessary in the case of all language, whether written or unwritten. Written language is unintelligible to those who are ignorant of the characters in which it is written, or who have not learned to read. It is equally unintelligible to those who, though they know the characters and are able to read, yet do not understand the meaning of the words written. All words, whether written or unwritten, are signs or symbols; but they are signs or symbols only to intelligence; they signify, they symbolize nothing to one absolutely void of understanding. The interpretation of the sign or symbol comes from within, not from without; and if the sense be not, in some respect, already in the intelligence, there is and can be no real or

true interpretation of the sign or symbol. Why, then, find fault with the Church for adopting a rule which is universal, and which must be followed, or no instruction can be given through the medium of language, either written or unwritten? She has received the sense of the Holy Scriptures from the Holy Ghost, and by putting the faithful in possession of this, as she does, by means of analogies borrowed from nature, and accessible to the reason common to all men, she supplies the light and guidance necessary to enable them to read the Holy Scriptures with profit, and without perverting or wresting them to their own destruction.

The Church undoubtedly requires her children to read the Scriptures with a reverential spirit, since they contain the revealed word of God, and it is God himself that is speaking through them. She also requires them to read the Holy Scriptures under her guidance, her direction, and not to interpret them in opposition to her teaching; because, as her teaching is from the Holy Ghost, by His assistance, and under His protection, any interpretation of Scripture contradicting that teaching would necessarily be a false interpretation, since the Scriptures are also from the Holy Ghost. But this does not mean that no one can read the Scriptures unless a priest stands at his back with a ferula in his hand, or that we have not the free use of our own reason and understanding in reading them, and developing and applying their sense. It does not mean that the errors of transcribers or of translators may not be corrected, or that we may not use all the helps to be derived from history and criticism, from science or erudition in correcting them. It does not mean that we may not use profane science and literature, the researches of geographers, the facts brought to light by travellers and the students of natural history, in illustrating and settling the literal meaning of the Sacred Text. It does not mean, any more, that we must understand and apply every text or passage, word or phrase, in the precise sense in which we find it understood or applied by the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, or even by Popes and Councils. It means simply that we are not at liberty so to interpret Scripture as to derive from it any other doctrine than that which the Church teaches, or to deduce from it any sense incompatible with faith and morals as she defines them. It is so we understand the doctrine of the Church on the subject, and, so understood, her doctrine by no means cramps

the intelligence, or restricts in any narrow or unreasonable degree the free and full exercise of our highest and best reason in understanding and applying the sublime truths they contain.

The abuse of the Holy Scriptures by the sects, and their exaggerated notions about Bible-reading, have no doubt had an influence on many Catholics, and tended, by way of reaction, to prevent them from reading and studying them as much as they otherwise would. The exaggerations of error tend always to discredit truth. The fear of being Bible-readers in the Protestant sense has, not unlikely, kept many from being Bible-readers in the Catholic sense. The necessity of repelling and refuting the exaggerations of Protestants has, in many instances, prevented us from insisting with due emphasis on the great advantage to be derived by the faithful from the daily reading and study of the written word of God, and substituted for them a whole host of devotional and ascetic works, many of which are of doubtful merit and doubtful utility. If faith has not suffered, piety, at least, has suffered therefrom; and we attribute no little of the weak and watery character of modern piety to the comparative neglect of the study of the Scriptures, and to the multiplication of works of sentimental piety. The piety these works nourish is just fit to accompany the meticulous orthodoxy now in vogue, and is a natural growth of the nursing and safe-guard system now so generally insisted on. Faith, in our days, is weak and sickly, and piety dissolves into a watery sentimentality, rarely able to rise above "Novenas and Processions" in honor of some saint. It has become a sensitive plant; it lacks robustness and vigor, and is unable to meet the rough and tumble of the world.

The Fathers studied and expounded the Scriptures, and they were the strong men, the great men, the heroes of their times; the great mediæval Doctors studied, systematized, and epitomized the Fathers, and, though still great, fell below those who were formed by the study of the Scriptures themselves; the Theologians followed, gave compendiums of the Doctors, and fell still lower; modern Professors content themselves with giving compendiums of the compendiums given by the Theologians, and have fallen as low as possible without falling into nothing and disappearing in the inane. In devotional and ascetic literature there has been the same process, the same downward tendency.

The remedy for the evil, in our judgment, is in returning anew to the study of the Scriptures themselves, and in drawing new life and vigor from their inspired pages. The words of man, however true or however noble, can never be made to equal the words of God; and the words of Scripture diluted down through twenty generations of men, each leaving out something of their divine significance, and adding something of human pettiness and weakness, can never be so effective in quickening and strengthening as they are as given us originally in the Scriptures by God himself. Orsini's or Gentilucci's *Life of the Madonna* is, no doubt, very beautiful; but it falls infinitely below in moral grandeur, in its inspiring effect, to the few simple words touching our Lady given in any one of the Gospels themselves. There is much that is beautiful in our *Loves* and *Months of Mary*, but far less than in the *Magnificat*, the *Canticles*, or the *Psalms*; and all that is in them that has the slightest value for the soul is borrowed, and, we may say, diluted from these sources. Let us, then, go back to the Scriptures, study them as did the Fathers, at least as did the great mediæval Doctors. Let us take in the sublime instruction as it was dictated by the Holy Ghost, and in language more beautiful and more sublime than ever did, or ever could, originate with uninspired men. Our faith will profit by it; it will become broader, purer, sublimer, and more comprehensive; it will become stronger, more robust, more energetic, and more able to withstand the seductions of error, or the temptations of vice. Our devotion will become more ardent, more solid, more enduring, flowing from a fixed and unalterable principle or conviction, not from mere temporary feeling or animal excitement; and our morals will conform to a higher standard, and we become capable of greater sacrifices and more heroic deeds.

What we in the English-speaking world most want is a good, faithful, and elegant Translation of the Scriptures. To no mere English reader will the Latinized language of our Douay Version ever be attractive, especially if he has been early accustomed to read the Scriptures in the Version made by order of James I. of England. Archbishop Kenrick has done much to correct and improve this Version, but still it falls, even in his amended edition, far short of what an English Translation of the Holy Scriptures should be. His Critical and Explanatory Notes are of great value,

of greater value than their brevity and modest character would lead the majority of readers to suspect. But his language is not free, pure, idiomatic English. He has adopted many felicitous renderings from the Protestant Version; he has, in some instances, substituted English for Latin words, and has gone as far as his plan permitted, and, perhaps, as far as he could go without too rudely disturbing the associations of those readers who know the Scriptures only in our Douay Version; but it is to be regretted that he adopted so narrow a plan, and did not allow himself greater liberties in the same direction. We have heard much talk of a new translation to be undertaken and completed under the direction of Dr. Newman; but, as far as we can learn, this new translation has not as yet been commenced. In fact, we do not believe that it is possible in the present state of our language to make a new and original translation, which would be acceptable to those familiar with the Scriptures in their original tongues, or even the Latin Vulgate.

We have heretofore expressed our opinion, that in any attempt at a re-translation of the Scriptures into English for Catholics, King James's Version should be taken as the basis, correcting it according to the readings of the Vulgate, and avoiding its mistranslations and its few grammatical and literary errors. Never was our language in so good a state for the translation of the Scriptures, as it was at the time when that Translation was made. It had then a majestic simplicity, a naturalness, an ease, grace, and vigor which it has been gradually losing since, and which, if not wholly lost, we owe to the influence of that Translation together with the Book of Common Prayer. We have no Catholic rendering of that noble hymn the *Te Deum*, and we do not believe it would be possible now to make in our language a translation of it, at all comparable to that which is found in the Anglican Liturgy. As this version of the *Te Deum* may not be known to all our readers, we copy it as a noble specimen of our language at the time it was made.

"We praise thee, O God; we acknowledge thee to be the Lord.
All the earth doth worship thee, the Father everlasting.

To thee all Angels cry aloud; the Heavens, and all the Powers
therein.

To thee, Cherubim and Seraphim continually do cry,
Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of Sabaoth.

Heaven and earth are full of the majesty of thy glory.
The glorious company of the Apostles praise thee.
The goodly fellowship of the Prophets praise thee.
The noble army of Martyrs praise thee.
The holy Church, throughout all the world, doth acknowledge thee,
The Father, of an infinite majesty ;
Thine adorable, true, and only Son ;
Also the Holy Ghost, the Comforter.
Thou art the King of Glory, O Christ.
Thou art the everlasting Son of the Father.
When thou tookest upon thee to deliver man, thou didst humble
thyself to be born of a virgin.
When thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death, thou didst
open the kingdom of heaven to all believers.
Thou sittest at the right hand of God, in the glory of the Father.
We believe that thou shalt come to be our Judge.
We therefore pray thee, help thy servants, whom thou hast re-
deemed with thy precious blood.
Make them to be numbered with thy saints, in glory everlasting.
O Lord, save thy people, and bless thine heritage.
Govern them, and lift them up for ever.
Day by day we magnify thee ;
And we worship thy name ever, world without end.
Vouchsafe, O Lord, to keep us this day without sin.
O Lord, have mercy upon us, have mercy upon us.
O Lord, let thy mercy be upon us, as our trust is in thee.
O Lord, in thee have I trusted ; let me never be confounded."

No translation of the Scriptures into the English of our best writers at the present day, could be endured by any reader of taste and judgment. Every day does our language depart more and more from the grandeur, strength, and simplicity which marked it in the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth ; and proves very clearly, that the reading of the Scriptures, at least in the English version, is growing less and less common, or that scholars who have never familiarized themselves with that version, and formed their taste by its study, have gained the mastery in our modern literary world. Say what we will, since the time of Burke, the Celtic genius, aided by French influence, has been triumphing over the old Anglo-Saxon ; and pompousness of diction, and diffuseness of style, have taken the place of terseness and simplicity. These facts render it impracticable for even our best scholars to produce a new translation of the Scriptures that could ever equal, in literary merit, the Protestant Version.

It is true, the version called the "Douay Bible" was made and published before that of the translators designated by King James,—the New Testament, at Rheims, in 1582, and the Old Testament, at Douay, in 1609; but it was made under great disadvantages, by Englishmen exiled from their own country, living, and, in part, educated abroad, and habitually speaking a foreign language. They were learned men, but they had, to a great extent, lost the genius and idioms of their own language, and evidently were more familiar with Latin and French than with their mother tongue. Such men could not produce a model translation; nor could we, as English scholars, wish the best translation they could produce to be the model or standard to which our language should be obliged to conform. We give all honor to their memory, and we laud from our hearts their earnest and well-meant efforts; but we are unwilling to accept their translation even as they left it, as that in which the English-speaking world should study the Scriptures, far less as remodelled and emasculated by the excellent but tasteless Bishop Challoner, in which English and American Catholics now generally study them. In literary merit it can in no respect compare with the Protestant Version; compared with that, it is weak, tasteless, and inharmonious. We might prove this by illustrations taken anywhere; but take, as it first occurs to us, the first verse of the first Psalm. In the Douay Version it reads: "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the way of pestilence." In the Protestant Version it reads: "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful." In this last version the parallelism of the Hebrew is better preserved, and the moral idea is carried out without change or interruption. But, in the first, the moral continuity is broken, and there is a sudden transition from the moral to the physical order, by substituting "the chair of pestilence" for "the seat of the scornful," which is not only better English, but a more faithful rendering of the original. Take another illustration, from the prayer of Habakkuk. In the Douay Version it reads: "O Lord, I have heard thy hearing, and was afraid. O Lord, thy work, in the midst of the years, bring it to life. In the midst of the years thou shalt make it known: when thou art angry, thou wilt remember mercy.

God will come from the South, and the Holy One from mount Pharan. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth is full of his praise. His brightness shall be as the light: horns are in his hands. There is his strength hid: death shall go before his face. And the devil shall go forth from his feet." The Protestant Translation reads: "O Lord, I have heard thy speech, and was afraid: O Lord, revive thy work in the midst of the years, in the midst of the years make known; in wrath remember mercy. God came from Teman, and the Holy One from mount Paran. Selah. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise. And his brightness was as the light; he had horns coming out of his hand: and there was the hiding of his power. Before him went the pestilence, and burning coals went forth at his feet."

Perhaps neither version can here be accepted as faultless; but certainly "I have heard thy *speech*" is better English than "I have heard thy *hearing*." "God will come from the South and the Holy One from mount Pharan." Why translate the word *Theman*, a proper name in Hebrew, and not the corresponding word *Pharan*? Why interpret the symbol used by the prophet in one instance, and leave it uninterpreted in the other? There is no question as to which of these two translations is the most elegant and genuinely English; but a better translation than either is, perhaps, the following, from Dr. Noyes, excepting that we prefer the word "Lord" to the word "Jehovah."

"O Jehovah, I have heard thy words, and tremble.
O Jehovah, revive thy work in the midst of the years,
In the midst of the years make it known,
In wrath remember mercy!

God cometh from Teman,
And the Holy One from mount Paran;
His glory covereth the heavens,
And the earth is full of his praise.
His brightness is as the light;
Rays stream forth from his hand,
And there is the hiding-place of his power.
Before him goeth the pestilence,
And the plague followeth his steps."

"Rays stream forth from his hand" is better either than "*horns* are in his hauds," or "he had *horns* coming out of

his hand ;" yet the word *stream* is, perhaps, too modern, and we should, perhaps, prefer the rendering suggested in a Note to the Douay Bible, "beams of light came forth from his hand." The great fault of Dr. Noyes' Translation is in his too wide departure from the phraseology of the Protestant Version, and the too modern cast which he gives to his language. We speak, of course, from the purely literary point of view, offering no opinion as to the fidelity, or want of fidelity, to the original of the author's rendering. It may seem remarkable, however, to the English reader that, of the three translations cited, the first renders the original in the past tense, the second in the future, and the third in the present.

The Protestant Version almost always uses the words *righteous* and *righteousness*, and the Douay uses the words *just* and *justice*. These terms are not synonymous in our language, and should never be used indiscriminately. When we speak of a man who is rendered righteous by the merits of Christ, we should use the term *just*, as implying, not only that the man is righteous, but that he is so through justification. But when we speak generally of the quality, or the state in which a man is placed by its possession, it is better English to say *righteous* and *righteousness*, than it is to say *just* and *justice*. We are glad to find that Archbishop Kenrick translates the *agite penitentiam* of the Vulgate by the English word *repent*, which, though it does not fully express the force of the original Greek term, better expresses the sense of the Latin; than the *do penance* adopted by the English translators. The Archbishop well remarks, that "*do penance* is by usage determined to signify the practice of penitential works, rather than the exercise of the virtue itself." *Repent* is a consecrated English word, and is far more agreeable to our ears than the awkward phrase *do penance*, unless where direct reference is had to the performance of penitential works. We wish, therefore, in any future edition of a translation to be used by Catholics, whether done on the basis of the Protestant Version or not, the revisers will allow themselves a discreet liberty in following the real genius of the English language, and make such changes in regard to terms heretofore used, as that genius demands. In the technical language of our religion, there must necessarily be great differences between us and Protestants; but we think it desirable that the differences should be no greater than is absolutely necessary

to express the differences of our faith and worship, our practices and usages. We ought, as far as possible, to speak a common language, which, to a great extent, we may do ; because, however far Protestants may have strayed from the unity and integrity of the faith, they still retain much in common with us.

We have no intention, in any thing we have said, to derogate from the authority of the Latin Vulgate. That text, corrected or amended according to the most authentic copies, is authoritative for all Catholics, and is, according to the judgment of the most eminent critics, upon the whole, the nearest approach to the exact reading of the original Scriptures which is now possible. It is, and must be, for Catholics, authority in all doctrinal discussions. We have not been speaking of it, but of an English translation, which may be read by English readers with pleasure and profit ; but not of a translation that is ever to supersede for the theologian the Vulgate, or to be clothed with authority in controversies. Our simple suggestion is, that such translation should be made on the basis of the Protestant Version, but conforming to the readings of the Vulgate where they differ from those of the received Greek and Hebrew texts. Such a translation, we think, would gradually come into general use, and ultimately supplant, in the English-speaking world, the Protestant Version now in use. It would quietly settle the dispute between Catholics and Protestants as to the use of the Scriptures in the Public Schools, remove a great objection which Catholics now have to those schools, and go far to relieve us from the necessity we are now under of establishing separate schools for ourselves. But, however this may be, we cannot close these desultory remarks, without urging upon all Catholics the most attentive and assiduous study of the Holy Scriptures, as the best means of enlightening and confirming their faith, of elevating their devotion, of purifying and strengthening their piety, and giving robustness and vigor to their religious life.

ART. IV.—*L'Abolition de l'Esclavage*. Par AUGUSTIN COCHIN, ancien Maire et Conseiller de la Ville de Paris. Paris: Jacques Lecoffre. 1861. 2 Tomes. 8vo.

THE reasons assigned for not being able to review the excellent work of Père Valroger, apply with equal force against our ability to review, as its merits deserve, the admirable work, by our highly esteemed friend, M. Augustin Cochin, on *The Abolition of Slavery*, which he has recently published, and of which he has done us the honor to send us a copy. We have, however, so far violated the strict injunctions of our physician as to look at a few of its pages, enough to enable us to judge of its general character, and to pronounce it a work of rare merit.

The first volume gives the result of the abolition of slavery by France and England in their Colonies, and establishes the fact that it has been effected without ruin and without disturbance. A storm, an insect, a year of drought would, in a material point of view, have caused more evil; while, in a moral and religious point of view, the good has been immense, although few precautions had been taken to secure it. The second volume is devoted to the United States, Holland, Brazil, the Spanish and Portuguese Colonies, the slave-trade, Africa, and the influence of Christianity on slavery. We have noticed a few trifling inaccuracies in regard to our own country. The author reckons Wisconsin among the Slave States; but we are happy to say that Wisconsin is not only a Free State, but one of the most decided anti-slavery States in the Union. He says New York was originally settled by Germans—it was originally settled by the Dutch from Holland, who are not usually called Germans by us, though of the Germanic family. Maryland was not colonized by Irish Catholics, but by English Catholics and Protestants. George Calvert had an Irish title, but was himself an Englishman. These errors, however, are very slight, and detract nothing from the real value of the work. As far as we have been able to read it, we have found the views of the author very just, philanthropic, liberal, and truly Christian. Two able or more intensely interesting volumes on the subject of the abolition of slavery, it has not been our good fortune to meet; and they are creditable in the highest degree to the ability, industry, and noble sentiments of their distinguished author.

The question of the abolition of slavery is becoming with us a practical question in a sense it has never before been. The Rebellion of the Slave States, which has for its object, not so much the dissolution of the Union, or the separation of the South from the North, as the reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery, or, as the Vice-President of the Confederate States has it, with "slavery as its cornerstone," and therefore the extension of slavery over the whole country, cannot fail to force this question upon the grave attention of every citizen of the loyal States, who loves his country, and believes in the practicability of freedom. The Slave States, by their rebellion and war on the the Union, are compelling us to regard this question as one which must soon be practically met, and are forcing all loyal citizens to make their election between the preservation of the Union and the preservation of slavery. This, whatever the Federal administration, whatever individuals or parties in the Free States, with, or without Southern or pro-slavery proclivities, may wish or desire, is pretty soon to be the inevitable issue of the terrible struggle in which our glorious, and hitherto peaceful Republic is now engaged. Perhaps, at the moment we write, the last of August, a majority of the people of the Free States may not only shrink from this issue, but even honestly believe it possible to avert it altogether. The bare suggestion of the abolition of slavery may shock, perhaps, enrage them; but events march, and men who mean to be successful, or not to be left behind, must march with them. Another disaster, like that of Bull Run, or another unsuccessful action, like that of Wilson's Creek, where the brave and noble-hearted Lyon fell, a martyr to the cause of his country, and a victim to the failure of his government to send him timely aid, will do much to change the feelings and convictions of the loyal citizens of the Free States, and, perhaps, force them to give up the last hope or thought of preserving both the Union and the institution of slavery. It requires, however chary our public men may be even of whispering it, no extraordinary sagacity or foresight to perceive that, if the present war is to be continued, and the integrity of the nation restored and maintained, the war can hardly fail to become a war of liberation, or that the Northern blood and treasure, which it demands for its successful prosecution, will demand in return, as their indemnification, the emancipation of the slave, and the universal adoption

for the South as well as the North of our Free Labor System.

We need not say, for the fact is well known to our readers, that no man, according to his ability and opportunity, has, since April, 1838, more strenuously opposed the abolition movement in the Free States than we have; not because we loved slavery, or had any sympathy with that hateful institution, but because we loved the Constitution of the Union, and because we believed that liberty at home and throughout the world was far more interested in preserving the union of these States under the Federal Constitution, than in abolishing slavery as it existed in the Southern section of our common country. But we believe, and always have believed, that liberty, the cause of free institutions, the hopes of philanthropists and Christians, both at home and abroad, are more interested in preserving the Union and the integrity of the nation, than they are or can be in maintaining negro-slavery. If we have opposed abolition heretofore because we would preserve the Union, we must, *a fortiori*, oppose slavery whenever, in our judgment, its continuance becomes incompatible with the maintenance of the Union, or of our nation as a free republican state.

Certainly we said in the article on *The Great Rebellion* in our last Review, the North has not taken up arms for the destruction of negro-slavery, but for the maintenance of the Federal government, the enforcement of the laws, and the preservation of the Union. This is true. The liberation of the slave is not the purpose and end of the war in which we are now engaged. The war is a war against rebellion, an unprovoked and wicked rebellion, engaged in by the Rebels for the purpose of making this a great Slaveholding Republic, in which the labor of the country shall be performed by slaves, either black or white; and if, to defeat the Rebellion, the destruction of slavery be rendered necessary and be actually effected, it will change nothing in the character or purpose of the war. It will have been necessitated by the Rebellion, and the Rebels will have only themselves to thank for the destruction or abolition they force us to adopt in defence of liberty, the Union, and the authority of the government.

The real question now before the loyal States is not, whether the Rebellion shall be suppressed by force of arms, or a peaceful division of the country into two separate and independent Republics submitted to. Any one who has

any knowledge of the plans and purposes of the Rebels, knows well, that the division of the territory of the Union into two independent Republics is far short of what they are aiming at. The leaders of the Rebellion, they who planned it, they who have stirred it up, and armed it against the Union, have worked themselves into the conviction, that slavery is not to be looked upon as an evil, under certain circumstances to be tolerated, but as a good to be desired, which religion and humanity require not only to be perpetuated, but extended the farthest possible. Their doctrine is, that liberty is not practicable for a whole people, that it is practicable only for a class or a race; and that republicanism can subsist and be practically beneficial, only where the laboring class is deprived of all political and civil rights, and reduced to slavery. Their plan, their purpose is, the reconstruction of the Federal government in accordance with this theory, not merely to cut themselves loose from all companionship with the non-Slaveholding States of the North and North-West. They propose to extend slavery over the whole Union, and, in those States where negroes cannot be profitably employed as laborers, to reduce, perhaps gradually, but ultimately and effectually, to the condition of slaves, the present class of free white laborers, who in the Free States are, to a great extent, Irish and Germans, by birth or immediate descent.

The reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery is the real aim of the chiefs of the Southern Rebellion, which reconstruction would give them a government similar in its essential features to that of ancient pagan Rome, and a government, if the States held together, prepared for future conquest. The Union reconstructed, it could proceed to the conquest of Mexico and Central America, and reduce their negro and colored populations to slavery, which would be counted their Americanization. This done, it could proceed, beginning with Cuba, to the annexation, one after another, of the West India Islands. It then could extend its power over the whole continent of South America, and threaten an advance upon Eastern Asia, and the annexation of all the cotton-producing countries and tropical regions of the globe, and through the monopoly of cotton, rice, and tropical productions in general, to obtain the control of the commerce and credit of all nations. Such, to a greater or less extent, is the dream which Southern statesmen have indulged, and which they have taken the

first step toward realizing. In its full extent no sane man supposes the dream practicable; but its practicability, up to a certain point, has been demonstrated by the success which has hitherto attended the Rebellion, for, up to the present, successful it undeniably has been. The Confederates have brought into the field a more effective, if not a larger force than the Federal government has thus far brought against them; and, from the Potomac to the Mississippi, they hold the strategic lines, and can be met by the Federal forces only at great disadvantage. As yet not one of those lines has been wrested from them.

Now, suppose we adopt the policy urged upon us by the peace-makers, traitors, and cowards of the loyal States, consent to a peaceful division of the United States, and recognize the Southern Confederacy as a separate and independent nation, what would be the result? Two comparatively equal independent Republics, existing side by side? Not at all. Spread out the map of the United States before you, and see which Republic would have the advantage in territory, soil, climate, productions, and all the sources of national wealth, strength, and material greatness. You would give to the Southern Republic full three-fourths of the whole territory of the Union; for the South would consent to no division now, that did not include the States of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and all the territory South of the line running due west from the north-west angle of Missouri to the Pacific. You would give up to the South, to what would then be a foreign power, the whole Gulf coast, and the whole Atlantic coast, except the narrow strip from the Penobscot to the Delaware. You would leave the North a majority of the present population of the country, and nominally the superiority in wealth, it is true: but as the present superior numbers and wealth of the North depend chiefly on our superiority in commerce and manufactures, their superiority could not be long maintained. The Southern Republic, producing raw materials consumed chiefly in Europe, would be a great exporting republic, and would naturally in its policy favor exports to European markets. From those markets where it disposes of its raw materials, it could, by means of a lower tariff on imports than the Northern Republic could afford to adopt, more easily and cheaply supply its own demand for imports than it could from our Northern markets. It would thus drive our manufactures from its markets, and,

by importing from abroad for itself, greatly diminish our manufactures, and at the same time both our foreign and domestic trade. In addition, we should not only lose our Southern market for our imports and manufactures, but should hardly be able to keep our own. Imports would seek Southern ports, and, in spite of any possible cordon of custom-houses and custom-house officers, would find their way into all the border States of the Northern Republic and up the Mississippi and Ohio into the great States of the West and the North-West, to the most serious detriment of our own trade and manufactures, and consequently to the retention of our relative superiority in wealth and population. In spite of our industry and our enterprise, we should soon find ourselves a state far inferior in wealth and numbers to our Southern neighbor.

Moreover, the great agricultural States of the Mississippi Valley, finding the natural outlets for their productions held by a foreign power, and themselves unable to wrest them from it, would be compelled by their own interests to secede from the Northern Republic, and to join the Southern Confederacy. The secession of these, which would be followed by that of all the States west of the Rocky Mountains, would necessarily compel the secession of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and their annexation to the same Confederacy. This would reduce the Northern Republic to the New England States ; two of which, Connecticut and Rhode Island, would, most likely, follow New York, and there would remain for the Northern Republic only the States of Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, which could escape absorption in the Confederacy only by its refusal to accept them, or by joining with the Canadas and the other British Provinces, and coming again under the British crown. Such would be the inevitable result of the proposed peaceful division of the United States, and the formation of two separate and independent Republics out of their territory, if the Southern Confederacy held together ; and such is substantially the plan of reconstruction contemplated by the Southern statesmen, as is evident from their leaving their Confederacy open to the accession of new States ; as was avowed in this city, last December, by Mr. Senator Benjamin, now the Attorney-General of the Confederate States ; and as asserted openly by Southern sympathizers everywhere at the North. All this is notorious, and is only what any man accustomed to reason on

such subjects, and familiar with the geography, soil, and productions of the Union, sees must and would inevitably result from the policy recommended by our peace-men, cowards, and traitors.

But peace, even on as favorable terms as we have supposed, cannot now be made. Six months ago, perhaps it might have been; but now, flushed with their recent successes, in possession of the principal strategic lines, and able to prosecute the war with more vigor than we have yet shown, the Rebels will entertain no question of peace short of our subjugation, or, what is the same thing, disbandment of our armies and quiet submission to the principles and theory on which their Confederacy is founded. Look at the question as we will, we have now no alternative but to subdue the Rebels or be subjugated by them. We must either depose that Confederacy, and enforce the authority of the Federal government over all the rebellious States, or it will enforce its authority over the Free States, and impose upon them its System of Slave Labor. If it enforces its authority over us, there may still, perhaps, be liberty for a class or caste, but our laboring classes will no longer be freemen; they will be placed on a level with the negro slave on a Southern plantation. For the Christian Commonwealth founded by our fathers, toiled for, and bled for, we shall have re-established a Pagan Republic more hostile to the rights of man and the rights of nations, than was ever pagan Greece or pagan Rome. We put it to our Christian countrymen, if such is the Commonwealth their fathers fought and suffered through the long Seven-Years War of the Revolution to establish, and if they can be contented to let the hopes of liberty in the New World set in a night of blackness and despair.

We know very well that we have fallen far below the virtues that founded this Republic, and gained this New World to civilization; we know that a long career of uninterrupted prosperity and unbounded luxury has done much to corrupt us; we know that the labor in one-half of the Republic being performed by slaves, and the greater part in the other half performed by emigrants from foreign countries, has caused a lamentable forgetfulness of those principles of liberty so dear to our fathers, and produced amongst us a laxity of principle, an indifference to law, a disregard for personal rights and personal independence, without which no republic can long subsist and prosper; but we

are not yet willing to believe that we have fallen so low, become so corrupt, so indifferent to liberty, or so dead to all moral considerations, as to be prepared to submit, for the sake of gain, or of preserving our manufactures, without a struggle, to the indignities the Southern Confederacy would heap upon us, or to the adoption of the base and inhuman principle on which that Confederacy is avowedly founded. If we retain any thing of our manhood, or any memory of the Christian virtues of our ancestors, we can never submit to be slaves ourselves, or take part in reducing any portion or class of our fellow-men to slavery. If there is any virtue left in us, we must resolve that we will be free ourselves, and do all in our power to secure freedom to all other men, whether white or black, yellow or copper-colored. If we do not, we are indeed "degenerate sons of noble sires," and deserve, as we shall receive, the scorn and derision of the whole world. Political and party leaders, greedy for the "pickings and stealings" of office, who are innocent of ever having entertained a statesmanlike idea or a moral conception, may cry, like the false prophets whom the Lord, in Holy Scripture, rebukes, "Peace, peace," and seek to embarrass the government and give aid and comfort to its enemies; but we hope there is still virtue enough left in the people of the loyal States to estimate them at their true value, and to treat with indignation and scorn their counsels. Whatever the result of the contest, the vocation of these leaders is gone; and the best use to which you can put a man who now cries out for "peace," for "compromise," for "submission," and charges the Government with having provoked an "unholy and unnecessary" war, is to treat him as loyal Union men in the South are treated by the Confederates. Such men, whatever their pretensions, are really traitors, and deserve a traitor's doom; or, if not traitors, they are idiots and lunatics, and should be provided for in asylums. It is no time to mince our words, or to study out honeyed phrases; we must call things by their right names, and treat all who are not for us, as against us. We have something more than even the Constitution and laws to maintain; the very existence of the nation is at stake; and, as no means are scrupled at to destroy it, we have the right to use all the means which the law of self-preservation renders necessary or expedient.

We wish our readers and the public at large to understand that we are in war, and to let it get through their heads

that the war which the Rebellion has forced upon us, is no mimic war, is no child's play, and is not to be conducted to a successful issue on the principle of treating the Rebels as friends, giving them every advantage, and doing them no harm. They are in downright earnest, and are putting forth all their strength, and doing their best to subjugate us; and we also must be in downright earnest, put forth all our strength, and do our best to subjugate them. War cannot be conducted on peace principles, or successfully conducted by men who do not enter into it with spirit, resolution, and energy. We have no disposition to censure the civil or military authorities of our country; they have labored under great embarrassments, and have had no ordinary difficulties to contend with; but we must be excused, if we say that as yet they have given us little evidence of their being in earnest, or of their believing in the reality and important character of the war. Up to the disaster of Bull Run, military operations seem to have been conducted in subordination to the projects of politicians and the especial benefit of contractors. The war was apparently treated as a secondary affair, a mere bagatelle, or a toy for children to amuse themselves with; in scarcely an instance was it treated as a grave affair, demanding for its prosecution the whole strength and energy of the country. Some doubted if the South would really fight, and it seemed to many, that all we needed to rout their armies, suppress rebellion, and re-establish over the seceded States the authority of the Federal government, was a large number of regiments having no existence except on paper or in the imagination of those who wished to sport the epaulettes of a Colonel. This delusion has passed away. But still, at the time we are writing, it has hardly got through our heads that we are really engaged in war, and a war involving the very life or death of the nation. The mass of those who really believe we are in war, still think the war is one that may be carried on without any serious detriment to our ordinary avocations or pleasures, and one not likely to come home to our own bosoms and business. Very few of us see that every thing we hold dear in this world is at stake, and that we have to struggle not only to defeat a foreign enemy, but to defend our own firesides and altars, our own wives and children, and our own personal liberty. Country gone, all is gone; and unless we become more in earnest than we have hitherto been, and put forth a civil and

military force and energy which we have not yet displayed, nor judged it necessary to display, our country cannot be preserved.

We cheerfully concede that much allowance is to be made for the Administration, in the novel and unexpected position in which it has been placed. With no preparation to meet a rebellion on a formidable scale, with doubts as to how far the patriotism of the loyal States could be relied on, with the Army and Navy filled with traitors, or with officers at best indifferent to the cause of the Union, surrounded by weak, timid, and corrupt politicians, and the important, though subaltern, offices of the various departments of the civil government filled with men desiring success to the Rebels, and ready to use all the opportunities afforded by their position to secure that success, the Administration may be excused for having hesitated, before feeling the public pulse, to adopt the bold, energetic, and decisive measures the crisis demanded. It was embarrassed by the legacy left it by its predecessor, and also by the fears, timidities, hopes, and advice of the Union men in the Border States, who begged it not to be precipitate, lest it should plunge those States also into open secession. This fear of driving the Border States into secession has been from the first the bugbear of the Administration, and its chief embarrassment. It prevented it from taking, at the outset, those bold and decisive measures which would have forestalled the Rebels, and confined the Rebellion to South Carolina, Georgia, and the Gulf States. Its efforts since to organize and strengthen a Union party in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee, have impeded, rather than aided, its military operations, and lost it a campaign, without gaining it any real additional strength.

There is only one way of dealing with rebels; it is for the Government to be prompt, to strike quick, and to strike hard. If it hesitates, if it temporizes, if it seeks to conciliate, or shows that it fears to strike lest the blow recoil upon its own head, it is only by a miracle that it can be saved. Its policy will be set down either to conscious weakness or to conscious wrong, and the rebels not only gain time, but, what is even more important to them, they gain confidence in their own cause, which more than doubles their forces, while the friends of the Government are disheartened, rendered timid, if not alienated. A bold, energetic man at the head of the Government, one year ago, would have crushed

out rebellion before it could really have come to a head even in South Carolina. A man able to create public opinion, not merely to follow it, at the head of the Government last March, would have confined the rebellion within the limits it then had, and, long before this, would have reduced Florida and Louisiana to their allegiance, and thus have broken the back-bone of rebellion, and prepared the way for its speedy and utter annihilation. Hesitation and delay in dealing with rebellion, is the worst policy possible.

That its dilatory and timid policy was on the part of the Government, a mistake, a blunder, no one can reasonably doubt. But it would be a mistake, a blunder no less fatal, for the friends of the Union to blazon it forth so as to weaken the confidence of the people in the Administration, and diminish its power for good. The President is worthy of all confidence for his honesty, integrity, and patriotism; and, if he will rid himself of the embarrassment of political jobbers and tricksters, dismiss and visit with adequate punishment all secessionists, traitors, or lukewarm patriots in the employment of the Government, and put honest and capable men in their places, men who know their duty, and have the courage to perform it, who love their country and are ready, if need be, to sacrifice themselves for it, he may retrieve the past, recover all the ground that has been lost, conduct the war to a successful issue, and, if not precisely the man best fitted to the crisis, yet stand in American history second only to Washington, if indeed second even to Washington himself. Never had a President of the United States so glorious an opportunity to prove himself a man, a statesman, a true civil hero. He has, we are sure, the disposition, let him prove that he has the courage and ability not merely to follow public opinion, not merely to follow the people, but to go before them, and, by kindling up a resistless enthusiasm in them, lead them on to victory.

The American people, especially of the North, are a susceptible people, and can feel and respond to the force of genius as readily and as heartily as any other people on the face of the globe. No people in the world are susceptible of a deeper or more abiding enthusiasm; no people better appreciate the value of a good battle-cry; and it has been a mistake on the part of the Administration, not to have better appreciated their real character. It has failed to give them that battle-cry. It has been too cold, too prosaic, and has pronounced no spirit-stirring word. Instead of

kindling up the enthusiasm of the people, it has looked to the people to quicken its own. Instead of inspiring them, it has waited for them to inspire it. This has been a grave mistake. Men placed at the head of affairs, are placed there to lead, not to follow, to give an impulse to the people, not to receive it from the people. If the Administration has life and energy, if it has ability and genius, let it no longer hesitate to use them, but put them forth in that free, bold, and energetic manner which will carry the people with them, and command victory.

We insist the more earnestly on this, because the mass of our people have so long been accustomed to sympathize with rebels, to aid and encourage revolutionists abroad, and to visit with their severest denunciations the acts of the legitimate government to suppress insurrection, to put down revolutionists, and vindicate its authority, that they cannot be rallied with much enthusiasm under the simple banner of Law and Order. Their first emotion is to sympathize with rebellion, wherever it breaks out, even though against their own Government. They hold as a principle, as that on which their very national independence is based, the "sacred right" of revolution; because they generally take it for granted that all rebels and revolutionists are the party of liberty, warring against despotism, and for the rights of man. Would you rally them and render them invincible against the foe? You must give them another battle-cry than that of "Law and Order," or you will not stir their heart, that mighty American heart which conquered this country from the savage and the forest, proclaimed and won its independence, constituted the Union, and made the American nation one of the great nations of the earth. It is not for us, even if we were able, to give that battle-cry; it must be given by genius in authority, and fall either from the lips of the President, or the Commander-in-Chief of our armies. Neither may as yet be prepared to utter it; but, if this nation has a future, if its destiny is, as we have hitherto boasted, to prove what man may be when and where he has the liberty to be himself, uttered by one or the other it ere long will be, and in tones that will ring out through the whole Union, and through the whole civilized world now anxiously listening to hear it. The Union is and must be sacred to liberty. Here man must be man, nothing more, and nothing less. Slaves must not breathe our atmosphere; and we must be able to adopt the proud boast of

our Mother Country, "The slave that touches our soil is free." This is the destiny of this New World, if destiny it have,—the destiny our fathers toiled for, fought for, bled for, and to this we their children must swear to be faithful, or die to the last man.

We have spoken thus far as the American, the patriot, and the devoted defender of republican institutions; but we must be permitted also to speak as the Catholic publicist. We have, from the first, maintained, and with the fullest approbation of the Catholic authorities in this country, that Catholic morality enjoins upon all Catholics, whatever their rank or dignity, to be loyal to the legitimate government of their country, and to be ready to defend it, when called upon, at the sacrifice of their property, and even of their lives. That the Federal government is the legitimate government of the American nation, no Catholic can reasonably doubt. We may, as Catholics, lawfully resist tyranny or usurpation, but we cannot conspire to overthrow a legitimate government, which has not transcended its constitutional powers, or resist its authority without failing not only in our civil, but in our Catholic duty. The Federal government is no usurpation; it is a legitimate government; and it has never lost its legitimacy by any act of tyranny or oppression. No such act has been or can be pretended. Rebellion against it, therefore, is not only a crime, but a sin. The principle here asserted is that which we defended for years against the revolutionists in Europe, and it has been on the ground that such is the teaching of the Catholic religion, that we have repelled with indignation the charge brought against us by Know-Nothings, that Catholics are not and cannot be loyal American citizens. We have labored, in opposition to the Know-Nothings, to show that Catholics are bound by their very religion to be loyal; and we have ventured to assert that, if the Republic were threatened, or an attempt made to dismember the Union, Catholics would be the first to rush to its rescue, and the last to desert it.

The assertion we ventured has not been entirely justified. The conduct of our Catholic population, especially that of their leaders, has not wholly answered our expectations. Of the twelve journals in the English language, published in this country, and professedly devoted to Catholic interests, we can name only *The Catholic*, published at Pittsburg, and the *Tablet*, in this city, as decidedly loyal.

The *Telegraph and Advocate*, published at Cincinnati, is occasionally loyal, and so also, perhaps, is the *Buffalo Sentinel*. The *Metropolitan Record* was, when last we read it, striving hard to be on both sides. All the rest are really secession sheets, and exert, whether avowedly or not, all their influence against the Federal government, and in favor of that of the Southern Confederacy; for we count every journal favorable to the Secessionists, that opposes the war, and clamors for peace. Of the clergy, the greater part of whom have been born or educated abroad, a large majority have Southern sympathies, and a portion of them, a small minority, we hope, are decidedly disloyal. The Bishop of Charleston, South Carolina, sang, we have been told, the *Te Deum* over the fall of Sumpter. Much allowance, no doubt, must be made for bishops and priests residing in rebel States, and it would be too much to ask them to proclaim on all occasions and under all circumstances Union sentiments; their silence may often be excusable, and sometimes justifiable. Still they are bound by their religion to instruct their own people in their duty of fidelity to the government of the Union, and they have and can have no authority under that religion, or in consonance with it, to hold disloyal sentiments, denounce the loyal States, and sing *Te Deums* over the defeats of the government to which they owe allegiance. The Bishops both of Charleston and of Richmond appear to have done this; and, if they have done so, no reverence or respect for their Episcopal character should be allowed to excuse their treason, or make us hesitate to charge them with violating their Catholic duty, and doing all in their power to justify the Know-Nothings in their grave charges against the loyalty of Catholics. Catholic morality is as obligatory on priests and bishops as it is on laymen, and from its obligations they can neither absolve themselves, nor be absolved even by the Pope. The right of the Supreme Pontiff to absolve from their oath of allegiance the subjects of a prince who, according to the law of God and the constitution of the realm or empire, has forfeited his right to reign, we have uniformly maintained, and still hold; but we have never maintained, and cannot maintain, that he has the right to absolve from their allegiance the subjects of a prince who holds his power legitimately, and has done nothing to forfeit his trusts; and certainly we cannot concede to simple bishops and priests a power which we do

not and cannot concede to the Supreme Pontiff himself. We do not, in such a case, deny the absolving power to their chief in order to claim it for them.

But we are gratified to know that the Catholic people, moved by their loyal and patriotic instincts, are nobly redeeming their Church from the false position in which the disloyalty or mistaken policy of the majority of their journals, and a portion of their bishops and clergy, have had a tendency to place her. Though, for the most part, wedded to the Democratic party, which has brought the country to its present critical state, and bitterly prejudiced against the party that elected our present Chief Magistrate, and especially against New England Yankees, regarded by them as fanatics, bigots, and the enemies of all good, they have nobly volunteered to fill the ranks of our army, and generously shed their blood in defence of the Union. No class of American citizens have, in this respect, surpassed them, and indeed they have set an example worthy of all imitation. Catholics have, considering their numbers, more than their proportion in the regular army and volunteer forces of the Union, and Catholic soldiers, whether we speak of officers or men, are surpassed by no others now in the field. The loyalty of the majority of the Catholics of the North must be held to efface the disloyalty of the few Catholics of the South; and when this war has been prosecuted to a successful issue, we doubt not that the loyalty of Catholics will cease to be called in question, and both Catholics and non-Catholics will mutually feel that they are citizens of a common country, and form but one political people.

That the attempt of some of the so-called Catholic journals to make Catholics believe that the so-called Confederacy is less anti-Catholic in its sympathies than the North, and that the North, when the Rebellion is suppressed, will turn its arms against Catholics, may have influenced, and may still influence a few, especially Irish Catholics, whose misfortune it often is to trust their enemies, and suspect their friends, we do not deny, and we regret it. But the notion is absurd, and always has been. The South is more infidel or pagan, and far less Christian than the North, and is and always has been, as we might expect, far more anti-Catholic, and, when not absolutely indifferent to all religion, far more bigoted than the North, if, by the North, we refer to New England. There is no part of the Union where Catholics are better treated, and suffer fewer annoy-

ances, than in the New England States. Nowhere in New England will a Catholic priest or a Catholic layman, if a gentleman, miss the treatment due to a gentleman, whatever some of our journals may allege to the contrary.

It is, no doubt, true that Messrs. Wise and Hunter, who are secessionists, did good service to the Democratic party,—which, by the way, is not the same thing as doing good service to Catholics,—in arresting the Know-Nothing movements in Virginia; but to defeat the Know-Nothings was for them a political necessity. Had the Know-Nothings triumphed in Virginia in 1855, the chances of either of these individuals becoming a candidate for the Presidency would have been less than nothing. Their success depended on the success of the Democratic party, and that party could succeed in no non-Slaveholding State without securing the Catholic and foreign vote. Deprived of that vote, the Democratic party was, and still is, in a hopeless minority in every one of the Free States. The opposition to the Know-Nothings, therefore, no more proved a disposition on the part of Messrs. Wise and Hunter favorable to Catholics, than it proved their loyalty and devotion to the Union. The Secession leaders, no doubt, mean to use Catholics in their struggle for a separate nationality, or the reconstruction of the Union; but there can be just as little doubt that, when they have gained it, they mean to proscribe them, as they have openly avowed, for they wish to perpetuate slavery, and the Catholic religion everybody knows is hostile to slavery, and the Church everywhere exerts her influence against it. There is no safety in this country for our religion but in restoring and preserving the Union, and securing the liberty of the Church not as a political grant or favor, but as one of the inherent and inalienable rights of man.

Still we regret that a certain number of Catholics, misled by their demagogues, unite with the followers of Breckenridge of Kentucky, Bright of Indiana, Vallandigham of Ohio, and the Senators from the Border Slave States not yet in open rebellion, in opposing the war for the maintenance of the Union, and in calling upon the government to discontinue it, and to make peace at once. In this they are the dupes of pretended patriots, but real traitors, and serve the cause of rebellion more effectually than they could if its open and declared adherents. The pretence, or the belief that our difficulties could now be settled by a Con-

vention, or compromise, or any concessions short of our absolute submission to the demands of the Rebels, is the idlest thing in the world. The time for Conventions, for compromises, or for conciliatory measures, has gone by, and no man not really in league with the Southern Rebels, no patriot, no friend of the Union, with the slightest grain of intelligence, can for a moment seriously believe in their practical utility. There never has been a time since the election of Mr. Lincoln when any conciliatory measures, or any constitutional compromises, short of a complete surrender to the demands of the Southern leaders, could have been of the slightest avail. The last Congress was disposed to go farther in the way of compromise, and to make greater concessions for the preservation of peace, than wisdom or prudence dictated. But there were no terms of compromise the seceded States would accept, short of their full and unequivocal recognition as a separate and independent nation. They openly refused to return to their allegiance, even on the adoption of the so-called "Crittenden Compromise," and declared their separation final and irrevocable, leaving it for us to go to them, but absolutely refusing to come to us. The Border State Convention, whatever may have been the honest intention of many of its members, was a mere farce; for we doubt not that it was, from the first, the intention of the leading politicians in all the Border Slave States to make common cause with their Southern brethren. The present government had exhausted all the hopes of a peaceful solution of our difficulties, before it took the step which was made the pretext for war against it. From the first, Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri were pledged, as far as their leading statesmen could pledge them, to the Southern cause, and, from the first, the question with all the Slaveholding States was separation, or the reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery; and we entirely mistake the temper of the Southern statesmen and of the people of the Slaveholding States, if we suppose them prepared to make peace on any other terms now. There is no Peace party, no Union party in any Slaveholding State, except, perhaps, in Missouri and Kentucky, North Carolina, and Western Virginia, on which the slightest reliance can be placed. The Union men in all the other Slave States, or sections of Slave States, not excepting Maryland, are the weak, the passive, the imbecile portion of their population. The talent, the energy, the deci-

sion, the governing capacity in all the Slaveholding States, whether the minority or the majority, are on the side of the Secessionists, and secession has a far stronger party in every one of the Free States, than the Union has in any of the Slave States, except those already named.

There is no use of attempting to disguise the facts from our own eyes. The Slaveholding States constitute really a united people, a more firmly united people in opposition to the government than we of the Free States are in support of it. Any policy, civil or military, based on a contrary supposition will prove a blunder, and disastrous in the end to the Federal cause. The South have a fixed and definite policy, which they are enthusiastic in carrying out, and they will stop at no means, however unscrupulous, judged by them necessary to their purpose. They have chosen war, and they will accept peace, until compelled, only on their own terms. Thus far the war has been mainly a success on their part, and they are far from having exhausted all their strength. Indeed they believe they are able to sustain the war as long as we can, and to sustain it successfully to the end. Nothing is more idle, then, than to suppose that the matter can now be conciliated by politicians, or that the government, without abdicating itself, has it in its power to make peace. The government has no alternative, if it would sustain itself, and preserve the integrity of the nation, or even its own honor, but to prosecute the war, and prosecute it with all the vigor and all the forces and means it can command. For men, then, who profess to be attached to the Union, to talk of "peace," of "conciliation," of "compromises," of "conventions," is the veriest twaddle, or would be, if it were not the grossest outrage upon common sense and common decency. • As we have said, all these things have gone by; and to attempt to recall them from the dead past, or to galvanize them into life, is only to betray our own stupidity or our disloyalty. No; we must fight, fight manfully to the end, and teach rebellion a lesson that it will not soon forget.

We love peace as much as any man does or can, and no man, in proportion to his means, suffers more by the present war, than we do. But the Scriptures tell us, "Follow after the things which make for peace," not peace at any price; and, now that we are in war, we insist on prosecuting it till the basis of an honorable and durable peace can be obtained. The recognition of the Southern Confederacy

and disbandment of our armies would not, as we have shown, secure this peace; because the project of the Southern leaders is not merely a separation from the Union, but a reconstruction of the Union under their control on the basis of slavery. Are we asked, why not quietly submit to the reconstruction demanded? Would there not still be a union of the States under a Federal government? And suppose that it did recognize slavery, what harm in that? Nearly all the States once held slaves, and the Southern States have grown and prospered, become great and powerful with the institution of slavery, and even by it; that institution has not only contributed to the greatness, strength, and prosperity of the South, but has been the basis of the commercial and manufacturing prosperity of the North; why, then, should the North oppose it, or hesitate to adopt it? The Union reconstructed on the basis of slavery would be far greater, more homogeneous, stronger, and more prosperous than it has ever hitherto been; and the reconstruction demanded is not merely in the interest of the South, but in the interest of the whole country; why not then accept it?—So we have found men not in a madhouse reasoning here at the North, and so, perhaps, some misguided citizens really believe.

We reply to this reasoning—1. The reconstruction proposed would be the destruction of the present Union, of the Union effected by our fathers, and indeed of the nation which it formed, hitherto symbolized by the "Stars and Stripes." It would be the destruction of our present nation, and, at best, only the substitution of another nation in its place. Now, it so happens that many of us have an ardent attachment to the Union, in which we were born, and under which we have thus far lived, and do not choose to expatriate ourselves, or to be forced to become the subjects of another government. For ourselves, we were born an American citizen, and, wherever the vicissitudes of life may cast our lot, an American citizen we will live and we will die, and no consideration under heaven shall ever induce us to abjure allegiance to the Federal government, or swear allegiance to any other sovereign. Except for gross tyranny or oppression, we deny the right of expatriation, just as we deny the right of secession or revolution. This feeling which we express may be treated lightly by traitors, rebels, and peace-men, and sneered at as mere sentimentality; but we must be permitted to say, that, where it is wanting in any

considerable number of the population of a country, there is and can be no real loyalty, no genuine patriotism, and therefore no firm support for a national government, no secure reliance for the nation in its moment of peril. To transfer our allegiance from the present Union to a new Union not growing out of it, but established in spite of it, and on its ruins, would be to convert us into foreigners in our own country; it would wound, in its most sensitive part, the patriotism of the people, and obliterate from their hearts all sentiments of national honor and loyalty, and therefore the very condition of the existence and durability of the nation, and consequently of the reconstructed Union.

2. A nation to be great, to be strong and what the true patriot desires it, must have a solid foundation in truth and virtue, and aim at something higher, nobler, more spiritual, than mere material conquest, or material wealth and prosperity. Whatever Southern slaveholders or Northern merchants and manufacturers may think, there is a Moral Governor of this world, and the nation that constitutionally and habitually violates the great law of right and wrong, and contemplates only material grandeur and material goods, either will not long subsist, or subsist only as the scourge of the nations. We want not that paganized Republic of which the Southern leaders dream, and with which they seek to allure us to union with them, even were it to become as great, as powerful, and as magnificent as was ancient Rome, once the haughty mistress of the world. Such a republic would contribute nothing to modern civilization, nothing to the intelligence, the virtue, or the happiness of mankind. It would be at war with all Christian principles and tendencies, and could only prepare the world for a return of heathen darkness and barbarism. It would be anachronous. It would be out of place in modern society, and out of time in the progress of civilization. It would be a retrograde movement, and therefore a movement against the laws of Providence, as well as against the true interests of mankind.

3. There are some among us who still retain a conscience, and are foolish enough, if you will, to believe that all men are created equal, and have certain inalienable rights, of which civil society cannot divest them, except in punishment for crime. There are people who believe in the practicability of republican institutions, which, though not securing to all men equality of rank or condition, shall yet secure

to all their native and inherent rights as men. Such people are honestly opposed to slavery, and can never, without the last struggle, submit to the formation of an aristocratic state with slavery for its corner-stone. It might have been wise and prudent to acquiesce in the institution of slavery as a local institution in some of the States of the Union, where it existed prior to the Union itself, or had since been suffered to acquire, a legal, or *quasi*-legal existence, so long as it could not be reached without doing violence to the Constitution; but it would be something very different to consent to the reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery, and to give it through the Constitution a legal *status*.—Slavery, say what we will of it, is a great moral, social, and political wrong, and that, too, whatever be the complexion of the slave. If there be any truth in Christianity, if there be any truth in the teachings of the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church, God never gave to man the dominion of man; and hence St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, and others, tell us that the first rulers of mankind were called *pastors* or *shepherds*, not *lords* or *dominators*; and that God gave to mankind dominion over the irrational creation, but not over the rational. The Church has tolerated slavery, where she lacked the power to abolish it; but her whole history proves that she sets her face against it, and uses all the means at her disposal; without shocking the public peace, or creating tumults and disorder, to prepare the slave for freedom, and to secure his ultimate emancipation. The negro is a man—is a human being—a member of the human race; and, whether naturally inferior or not, to the boasted Caucasian variety, he has the same natural and inherent right to liberty that has the white man, and the wrong of enslaving him is just as great as it would be if he were white. The laboring man, whether white or black, may be a poor man, but God has given him the right to be a free man, to be his own man, not another's.

As to the argument of our Southern slaveholders, and apologists for slavery, that the slave is better cared for, better fed, and better clothed than our poor laborers at the North, they weigh nothing with us; because they relate only to the human animal, and not to the man. If the slave were a mere animal, had no rational soul or moral nature, if he were indeed an ox, a horse, or a dog, we should not complain of his condition, or offer any objection to slavery. We believe that the *animal* in the slave is often better pro-

vided for than the animal in the poor white laboring man; but the *man* is and must be neglected. It is the *man* that is wronged and outraged, the *man* that is debased and enslaved; and the slaveholders know very well that, in order to keep their slaves in subjection, they must close to them, as far as possible, all the avenues to intelligence, debar them from all intellectual and moral culture, and keep them as near the level of brutes as they are able; they must stifle in them the *man*, and prevent the development in them of that "image and likeness" of God in which they were created. It is this that renders slavery an outrage upon humanity, and has excited against it the indignation of the whole Christian world.

We cannot, therefore, consent to the reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery. We believe in the rights of man; we believe in liberty; we would secure to all others that liberty which we demand for ourselves; and we believe slavery a great wrong, a sin against humanity, which is sure, sooner or later, to bring down the vengeance of God upon every people that adopts and insists on perpetuating it. The nations of antiquity had slaves; where are those nations now? Pagan Greece and Rome had their slaves; and where are Greece and Rome to-day? The Ottomans have had their slaves, and the Ottoman empire is now in its agony. Spain became a great slave power through her colonies. Most of those colonies has she lost, and she herself has fallen from the first power, below the rank of a second-class power of Europe. The same may be said of Portugal. Only those nations in Europe, which have emancipated their slaves, freed, or are freeing their serfs, show any signs of longevity. Let the fate of all slaveholding nations be a warning to all those weak, cowardly, or traitorous men at the North, who would consent to the reconstruction of the Union on the basis of slavery. Let them reflect that "the wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God;" and every slaveholding nation, whatever its spasmodic piety, or its hypocritical professions, does forget God, who never refuses to hear and ultimately to avenge the slave.

4. Finally, passing over all thus far adduced, we cannot consent to such a reconstructed Union, because it would contain in it no element of strength and durability, but the seeds of its own dissolution. It would be based not only on slavery as its corner-stone, but on the right of any or

every State to secede, whenever it should choose, without the other States having any right to call it to an account for its secession. This recognized right of secession may work no great harm to-day, while the Confederate States are united in a grand struggle for separate existence, or national reconstruction; but the moment that struggle is over and peace is restored, it would begin to operate, and render the Confederate bond a mere rope of sand. State jealousies would spring up, and new secessions would commence; the Union would hardly be reconstructed before it would be redissolved into its original elements, and there be as many separate and independent governments as there are individual States. We tried confederation before constructing the Union, and found that it would not work; and the Union itself, if it has any defect, is in the fact that it leaves the Federal power too weak for an effective central power, or to constitute the people of the several States really and practically one political people. The new Confederacy would be still weaker, exaggerate this defect, inasmuch as it would recognize the right of every individual State to secede whenever it judge it for its own interest, convenience, or pleasure to do so. Is it to be hoped that the Confederacy would be conducted with so much wisdom and propriety as never to give umbrage to any State, or that disappointed and ambitious politicians in any State would never find or make a cause for dissatisfaction, and, like the politicians of South Carolina, whirl their State out of the reconstructed Union? Even now, we are told, South Carolina and Georgia are beginning to manifest symptoms of dissatisfaction with the Confederate government, and we can readily believe that, if the pressure of a common danger were removed, each of them would lose no time in raising the "Lone Star" of independence, and seceding from secession.

However attractive, then, might be the dream of a reconstructed Union on the basis of slavery, we could never hope to realize it; for we could never hope to preserve it for any considerable length of time in its integrity. There would soon be disaffection at the South; there would be disaffection at the North; and there would always be disaffection in the consciences of all good men, of all true Christians in all sections, created and sustained by the moral and social plague of slavery. Here are reasons amply sufficient why we should not discontinue our efforts to pre-

serve the Union as it is, and why we should not make peace with the Rebels on their own terms, or accept their proposition of substituting the Constitution of the Confederate States for the Constitution of the United States.

The government, we insist, had no alternative in the outset but to abdicate itself, or to resist the rebellious movements with all the forces at its command. It has no other alternative now, and the men who would urge upon it any other policy can be commended for their loyalty only at the expense of their intelligence. The only fault of the government has been in having too long pursued a conciliatory policy, in having delayed too long the necessary measures to vindicate its own dignity and authority, in adopting timid and half-way measures, and in having prosecuted the war with too little vigor, and with too great tenderness toward the Rebels. But it is no time now to call up its past delinquencies, and parade them before it. Nothing remains for it but to let the past go, and henceforth treat secession as rebellion, and the seceders and their aiders and abettors as traitors. We wish it to prove that it has the courage and the disposition to treat them as traitors, wherever it meets them, or is able to seize them. We desire it to understand that there is war, real war, downright earnest war, and a war to be conducted not on the principle of respecting the feelings of the enemy, and of doing him no harm, but on the principle of striking him where he is weakest and sorest, and availing ourselves of every advantage against him allowed by the laws of civilized warfare. The Rebels offer no advantage to us; they avail themselves of every advantage against us in their power, respect none of our susceptibilities, and take no pains not to wound our feelings; we must mete them the measure they mete. They allow in their States, where they have the power, the utterance of no Union sentiments, of no Union speeches, or Union harangues, and they hang, imprison, or banish every Union man they can lay their hands on, who keeps not his Union sentiments to himself. We must mete out a like measure to every rebel or secessionist we find in the loyal States, and silence every voice raised against the right of the government to vindicate and preserve the Union by force of arms. It is madness to send our sons and brothers to fight rebels in Virginia, Tennessee, or Missouri, while we suffer their friends, aiders, and abettors to spout their treason and disloyal sentiments

here at home. It is not only madness ; it is a moral wrong ; it is, as some would say, worse still,—it is a blunder.

Do not tell us that this would be contrary to the Constitution and the free expression of opinion. Traitors and friends of traitors have no Constitutional rights, for they are in rebellion against the Constitution itself, and no man can stand on his own wrong. Free expression of opinion ! Just as if the question between lawful authority and rebels were a question on which there could be two honest opinions ! Is it a question of opinion, when a nation is engaged in a struggle for its very existence, whether its children shall support it or not ? Is it a matter of opinion whether the nation shall be preserved or not ? Is it a matter of opinion, when I am assailed by an assassin, whether I have the right to resist him or not ; whether I shall quietly submit to be assassinated, or snatch the dagger from his hand, and plunge it into his own heart ? Have men lost their senses ? Are we to argue the question whether the sun shines in the heavens or not, when we see it with our own eyes ? Down with such intolerable cant about “ Constitutional liberty,” and “ freedom of speech or opinion ! ” How, if the Constitution is gone, trampled underfoot by rebels, do you expect to maintain constitutional liberty, or any other kind of liberty worth having ? Understand at once that we are in war, and in a war for the preservation of the Constitution, for the preservation of liberty, political, moral, mental, civil, and social, and that it is never permitted to plead the Constitution and liberty against the measures necessary for their maintenance. Do understand, if understanding you have, that we are in war for the very existence of the nation, and that, if the nation goes, constitutions and liberty go with it. It is only by preserving the nation in its integrity and its majesty that the Constitution can be maintained, and the liberty it secures enjoyed. Neither the nation nor the Constitution can afford protection to those who would only use their liberty and the Constitution to destroy them.

The measure we suggest may be severe, and such as in ordinary cases of rebellion ought not to be resorted to by a free government. But we are engaged in suppressing no ordinary rebellion ; we are engaged in suppressing a rebellion of vast proportions, of vast resources, and of strength hardly inferior to that of the loyal States themselves. We can put it down ; and, God helping, we shall put it down ;

but not without exerting all our strength, and availing ourselves of all the means to suppress it authorized, we will not say by the Constitution, but by the recognized laws of war. War has its own laws; and, while it lasts, it overrides all other laws, and, if need be, places the Constitution itself, so far as it would be a barrier to its success, in abeyance. *Salus populi lex suprema est* is a universally received maxim, and the safety of the nation is the only law which can control military operations, or determine the measures necessary or proper in the preservation of the war.

It is all very well for your Breckenridges, your Burnetts, your Brights, and your Vallandighams, *et id omne genus*, to prate in Congress and elsewhere about the unconstitutionality of the acts of the President; we know not, and care not, whether those acts were Constitutional or not, so long as we know that they were necessary to the maintenance of the Union, the majesty of law, and our national existence itself. How long must it take the petty political attorneys to learn that the nation is above the Constitution, since it makes the Constitution, and its preservation is more than the preservation of the Constitution, and therefore that all acts necessary to maintain the integrity of the nation and its authority are always lawful, authorized by the highest of all laws? Only they who uphold the Constitution, sustain the Union, and labor to save the Constitution, can plead the Constitution and laws in their favor. They who rebel, or aid and abet rebels, by their very act of rebellion put themselves out of the protection of the Constitution and laws, and cannot demand their protection, and should not be permitted to expect that it will be extended over them. The Constitution and the laws are for loyal citizens,—not for rebels and traitors. Let, then, the measures suggested or recommended be severe, let them be such as in peaceful times, when the Constitution and laws are unresisted and everywhere cheerfully and respectfully obeyed, would be unconstitutional and indefensible, that, in times like these, when the very existence of the nation is at stake, is no objection to them. The first law of nations, as well as of individuals, is self-preservation. It is unconstitutional and illegal to hang innocent and peaceful men; but it is neither illegal nor unconstitutional to hang murderers. It is unconstitutional and illegal to shoot down innocent and peaceful men arrayed in the field before you, even though they have arms in their hands; but it is not

unconstitutional or illegal to shoot them down in self-defence, or in defence of the Constitution and laws. Let us, then, hear no more about the constitutionality of this or that measure clearly necessary to the safety of the nation, and the preservation of the Union under the existing Constitution.

In a state of war every thing has to give way to military necessity, private property, liberty, and even life itself. The state may take, if its necessities demand it, the private property of its citizens to the last cent, and it can command any citizen it sees proper, to march to meet the enemy, and, if need be, and the fate of war so decide, to lay down his life and, what his dearer than life, his liberty, for his country. On this principle the Federal Government now calls for troops, and imposes heavy taxes on our property for the support of the war; and loyal citizens cheerfully respond to its call, because they know it has the right to do it, and because they know that, if the country be lost, all is lost, life, liberty, and property themselves.

A heavy tax is imposed by the present war on the citizens of the loyal States, although the war has been brought about without any fault of theirs, or any act of theirs having rendered it necessary. Are they to bear the whole burden it imposes, without any indemnification, or without any attempt, at least, to make the rebellious States, whose treachery has created the necessity for it, bear any portion of it? Shall not they who dance pay the piper? In preserving the Union, do we not do it for the benefit of the disloyal, no less than for the benefit of the loyal States; and must we, because we are loyal, bear the whole burden of preserving it? The Union has as much right to tax disloyal as loyal citizens, and to collect the tax from the disloyal in the most ready and practicable way possible. Hence Congress, at its last Session, passed an Act confiscating the property of disloyal citizens of the States now in rebellion, and authorizing its seizure wherever it can be found. This is only simple justice. They whose misconduct has created the war, should be made, as far as possible, to bear its burden, or to indemnify the loyal States for the expenses it compels them to incur.

But military necessity may require us to go even farther than this late Act of Congress. The laws of war and military prudence authorize us to strike the enemy where he is most vulnerable, and where the blow will inflict on him the

greatest damage. No just war is ever prosecuted for the sake of war. War, for the sake of war, is in all cases unjustifiable. War is justifiable, and can be engaged in by a Christian people, only when it looks to peace for its end, or, which is the same thing, the removal of the causes which have rendered it necessary. If it may be justly resorted to, it is always lawful so to conduct it as in the speediest and most effectual manner possible to remove those causes, to redress the wrongs for which it is waged, and to bring about the desired peace. We are never morally obliged to meet the enemy on his own chosen ground, or to fight him with an equality of forces or weapons. We have the right to choose our own time, place, and mode of attack, and to choose such time, place, and mode as will be the most inconvenient or distressing to him, and the most effectually cripple his resources, crush his power, and compel him to surrender. If he has a weak spot, one weaker than another, we have not only the right, but in common prudence and common humanity are bound to seek out that spot, and there strike our heaviest and deadliest blow. Thus, if there is a disaffected party in the enemy's country, we have the right to encourage and strengthen that party. Hence the Government has labored to strengthen and encourage the Union men in Western Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and by so doing has prevented these States and parts of States from joining openly in the Rebellion. On the same principle it has a right to go farther, and make friends and allies of all classes of the population of the rebellious States that it can influence, and that, too, without reference to the condition in which they have heretofore been placed by the laws or usages of those States themselves.

This brings us to the question of the slave population in the rebellious States. In these States there are over three millions of the population held by the laws or usages of those States as slaves. These people are an integral portion of the people of the United States, owe allegiance to the Federal government, and are entitled to the protection of that Government. The Government has the same right to make friends and allies of them, and to enroll and arm them against the Rebellion, that it has to make friends and allies, or to enroll and arm the white population of Western Virginia or of Eastern Tennessee. It makes nothing against this that these people have heretofore been slaves by the laws or the usages

of the States in which they reside; for those laws or usages are deprived of all force against the Union by the very act of rebellion. Rebellion dissolves all laws for the protection of the life or property of the rebels. By the very act of rebellion, the rebel forfeits to the government against which he rebels both his property and his life, and holds henceforth neither, save at its mercy or discretion. If it were not so, the government would have no right to confiscate the property of rebels, or to attempt to suppress a rebellion by force of arms. If the slaves held in the rebellious States are property, they are forfeited to the government, and the government may confiscate them, as cotton, rice, tobacco, or any other species of property found in the hands of the Rebels. The same principle that gives to the government the right to confiscate a bale of cotton owned by a Rebel, gives it a right to confiscate every negro slave claimed by a rebel master. This is perfectly clear, and is implied in the recent Act of Congress on the subject. But if these people held as slaves are not property, they are and should be regarded as citizens of the United States, owing allegiance to the Federal government, liable to be called into the service of the Union in the way and manner it deems most advisable, and, if loyal, entitled to the same protection from the government as any other class of loyal citizens. Nobody can pretend that the Federal government is obliged, by virtue of the laws or usages heretofore existing in the Slave States, to treat these people as property. Whatever might have been its obligation before the rebellious acts of those States, that obligation is now no longer in force.

But if it be required to treat them as free and loyal citizens by the military operations for the preservation of the Union, or even to remove the causes of the present rebellion, the government is bound so to treat them. The only doubt that can arise is as to the fact, whether it would or would not prove useful to this end. It may be objected to such a measure that it would deprive us of the aid of Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee, and drive into open hostility to the Union Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. This objection deserves grave consideration. But it is in substance the objection that has embarrassed the government from the outset, and compelled it to take only half-way measures to suppress the Rebellion. For ourselves, we cannot respect the fear to which this obligation appeals. Fear is the worst possible counsellor in the world, and the government that

hesitates to adopt the best policy for fear of alienating its friends, is lost. Let the lines be at once sharply drawn between our friends and our enemies. In a crisis like the present, lukewarm friends, or friends who will be our friends only by virtue of certain concessions to their interests or prejudices, are more embarrassing than open enemies, and do more to weaken our forces than if arrayed in open hostility against us. If these States are for the Union they will insist on no conditions incompatible with the preservation of the Union; they will make sacrifices for the Union, as well as the other loyal States, and there is no reason why they should not. There is neither reason or justice in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the great States north-west of the Ohio, pouring out their blood and treasure for the gratification of the slaveholding pretensions of Maryland, Kentucky, or Missouri. The citizens of these States who own slaves, are as much bound, if the preservation of the Union requires it, to give up their property in slaves, as we at the farther North are to pour out our blood and treasure to put down a rebellion which threatens alike them and us. If they love their few slaves more than they do the Union, let them go out of the Union. We are stronger to fight the battles of the Union without them, than we are with them.

But we have referred only to the slaves in the rebellious States, and, if it is, or if it becomes a military necessity to liberate all the slaves of the Union, and to treat the whole present slave population as freemen and citizens, it would be no more than just and proper that, at the conclusion of the war, the citizens of loyal States, or the loyal citizens of loyal sections of the rebellious States, should be indemnified at a reasonable rate for the slaves that may have been liberated. The States and sections of States named have not a large number of slaves, and, if the Union is preserved, it would not be a very heavy burden on it to pay their ransom; and to paying it no patriot, or loyal citizen of the Free States would raise the slightest objection. The objection, therefore, urged, though grave, need not be regarded as insuperable; and we think the advantages of the measure in a military point of view, would be far greater than any disadvantage we have to apprehend from it.

Whether the time for this important measure has come or not, it is for the President, as Commander-in-Chief of our armies, to determine. But, in our judgment, no single meas-

ure could be adopted by the government that would more effectually aid its military operations, do more to weaken the Rebel forces, and to strengthen our own. Four millions of people in the Slave States, feeling that the suppression of the Rebellion and the triumph of the Union secures to them and their children forever the *status* of free citizens, are more than a hundred thousand men taken from the forces of the enemy, and twice that number added to our own; for they would not only compel the Rebels to keep a large force, that might otherwise be employed, at home, to protect their own wives and children, but would deprive them of the greater portion of that labor by which they now subsist their armies. Now slavery is to them a source of strength; it would then be to them a source of weakness. Its abolition would, in our judgment, be striking the enemy at his most vulnerable point, precisely where we can best sunder the sinews of his strength, and deal him the most fatal blow.

Moreover, it would not only bring to the assistance of the Federal arms the co-operation of the whole colored race in the Union, but would secure us, what we now lack, the sympathy and the moral aid of the whole civilized world, and remove all danger of our coming into conflict with either France or England. The war would be seen then likely to effect a result with which Englishmen and Frenchmen could sympathize, and, instead of wishing for the success of the Southern Confederacy, they would wish with all their hearts for the success of the Federal arms. It would do more than this. It would bring to the aid of our volunteer force from one hundred to two hundred thousand brave and stalwart volunteers from the Free States, aye, and even many from the Slave States themselves, who will not, and cannot be induced to volunteer their services in a war which, even if successful, promises to leave the institution of slavery not only existing, but more firmly established than ever. Everybody knows that slavery is at the bottom of the whole controversy, and that the real object of the Southern leaders is not simply to protect slavery against Abolition movements where it exists, but to extend it over the whole Union, and make the American Republic a great Slaveholding Republic. And there are men in large numbers amongst us, men who have had no sympathy with Abolitionists, who see and understand very well that, even were we successful in putting down the present re-

bellion, no real union between the North and the South could be restored, and that no durable peace between them could be re-established, if slavery continued to exist. These men enter not and will not enter heartily into the war, unless they see clearly and feel fully assured that it will result in the final and total extinction of slavery throughout the Union and all the territory it may now possess or hereafter acquire.

The present rebellion proves, what thoughtful and far-seeing men in all sections of the Union have long seen and said, that the preservation of the Union with the Slave System of labor extending over one half of it, and the Free-Labor System over the other half, is, in the ordinary course of human affairs, an impossibility. Senator Seward, or rather Mein Herr Diefenbach in our Review before him, was right in saying there is an "irrepressible conflict" between the two Systems. They cannot long coexist together in peace and harmony; there is an irrepressible tendency in each to exclude the other; and no possible wisdom or prudence, on the part of any administration, can harmonize their coexistence under one and the same government. You must make your election between the Systems, and adopt for the whole country either the Slave System, or the Free-Labor System; and the real significance of the contest in which we are now engaged, is as to which of these Systems shall be the American system.

However homogeneous in race or character, habits or manners, may be the people of a country in the outset, they separate, and grow gradually into two distinct peoples, with almost entirely different ideas, habits and customs, if one half of them in the one section adopt the Slave System, and the other half in the other the Free-Labor System. We have already in the United States, notwithstanding our common origin, our common language, the similarity of our laws, and our habitual intercourse, grown almost into two distinct nations. The Confederates are Americans indeed, for they have been born and bred on American soil; but they no longer retain the original American character; while in the Free States, bating the alterations effected by foreign immigration, that character is substantially preserved. We of the North are the same people that made the Revolution, won American Independence, and established the Federal government. This divergence showed itself even at the time of the Revolution; and it has been growing greater and greater from the beginning of the

present century; and if the two Systems of labor are continued on American soil, must continue to grow still greater and greater, till the people of the two sections grow up into two absolutely distinct and mutually hostile nations, no longer capable, but by the subjugation of the one by the other, of existing under one and the same government. The only way this divergence can be checked, the unity and homogeneousness of the whole American people recovered and preserved, is by the assimilation of the Labor Systems of the North and the South.

We of the North cannot and ought not to accept the Labor system of the South. But the Slave States, by their unprovoked rebellion, have given us an opportunity of performing an act of long delayed justice to the negro population of the Union, and of assimilating the Southern Labor system to ours. This assimilation is at the bottom of the Southern Rebellion, and the South has risen in arms against the Union, chiefly for the purpose of extending her Labor system over all the Free States. In doing so, she gives us the right, in our own self-defence, to extend our Free-Labor System over all the Slave States,—a right which, but for her rebellion, we should not have had under the Constitution.

If this prove a disadvantage to the Southern States, owing to the peculiar character of their laboring population, they have no right to complain, for it is a disadvantage they have brought upon themselves. But this will be a disadvantage only as compared with us of the North; for it will be better for the South herself to have her negro population free laborers, than it is to have them slaves. In counting the population of the South, we must count not merely her white, but also her black and colored population. The moral, spiritual, and material well-being of her four millions of black and colored people must be considered, as well as the moral, spiritual, and material well-being of her eight millions of whites. These black and colored people are as much human beings, whose welfare is as important and as necessary to be consulted by the statesman, the political economist, the moralist, and the Christian, as that of any other portion of her population; and what they would gain by their emancipation should be thrown into the balance against what might be lost by their former owners. But even the three hundred and forty-seven thousand slave proprietors would, in reality,

lose nothing, or gain in moral more than they would lose in material prosperity. We do not believe Southern society would, in case of emancipation, be equal to what it would if the whole population were of the white race. The negro element would remain in that society, and, wherever it remains, it will be an inferior element ; but far less so as free, than as enslaved. The white population of the South must always suffer this drawback for having collected, or submitted to the collection of a large African population on their soil, and they have no right to complain if obliged to make expiation, as long as the world stands, for having introduced and sustained the institution of negro slavery. But aside from the disadvantage of having its laboring population of a race with which the white race will not mingle, the South would gain by the assimilation of her Labor system to that of the North.

M. Augustin Cochin has proved, in the work before us, that slavery can be abolished, and the slaves converted into free laborers, without any serious detriment, even to the former slave proprietors. We all know that free labor is more economical than slave labor, and therefore that a freeman is worth more, under the point of view of national wealth, than a slave. The conversion of the four millions of slaves now in the Southern States into freemen, would very much increase, instead of diminishing, the aggregate wealth of those States ; and if a portion of this increased aggregate wealth should pass from the hands of a few slave proprietors, and into the hands of those who have heretofore been allowed to hold no property, the aggregate well-being of the whole community would also be augmented instead of diminished, and therefore the South, regarded as a whole, or looking to her whole population, would be unquestionably a great gainer by the change. It would not in any respect be depopulated or impoverished, but would be in the way of a more rapid increase of its population, and of that wealth which constitutes the real strength and prosperity of a state. What we propose, then, would in no respect be ruinous, or even injurious, to the Southern States themselves, but would be a real advantage to them, and secure them after the peace all the real greatness, strength, and prosperity states with a mixed population of white and black are capable of. The proposition, then, involves no wrong, no injustice, no injury to the white population of the Southern States ; while

it would be an act of justice, though tardy justice, to the negro race so long held in bondage, and forced to forego all their own rights and interests for the pride, wealth, and pleasure of their white masters.

It seems to us, then, highly important, in every possible view of the case, that the Federal government should avail itself of the opportunity given it by the Southern Rebellion to perform this act of justice to the negro race; to assimilate the Labor system of the South to that of the North; to remove a great moral and political wrong; and to wipe out the foul stain of slavery, which has hitherto sullied the otherwise bright escutcheon of our Republic. We are no fanatics on the subject of slavery, as is well-known to our readers, and we make no extraordinary pretensions to modern philanthropy; but we cannot help fearing that, if the Government lets slip the present opportunity of doing justice to the negro race, and of placing our Republic throughout in harmony with modern civilization, God, who is especially the God of the poor and the oppressed, will never give victory to our arms, or suffer us to succeed in our efforts to suppress rebellion, and restore peace and integrity to the Union. We have too long turned a deaf ear to the cry of the enslaved; we have too long suffered our hearts to grow callous to the wrongs of the down-trodden in our own country; we have too long been willing to grow rich, to erect our palaces, and gather luxuries around us by the toil, the sweat, and the blood of our enslaved brethren. May it not be that the cry of these brethren has already entered the ear of Heaven, and that He has taken up their cause, and determined that, if we refuse any longer to break their chains, to set them free, and to treat them as our brothers and fellow-citizens, we shall no longer exist as a nation? May it not be that, in this matter, we have Him to reckon with, and that the first step toward success is, justice to the wronged? We confess that we fear, and deeply fear, if we let slip the opportunity which the Southern Rebellion gives us to do justice to the slave, or to make his cause ours, in vain shall we have gathered our forces and gone forth to battle. We fear God may be using the Rebels as instruments of our punishment—instruments themselves to be destroyed, when through them our own destruction has been effected. We speak solemnly and in deep earnest; for he fights at terrible odds who has the infinite and just God against him. It may be that an all-

wise Providence has suffered this rebellion for the very purpose of giving us an opportunity of emancipating rightfully, without destroying, but as a means of preserving, the Union, the men, women and children now held in bondage, and of redeeming our past offences. If so, most fearful will be His judgments upon us, if we neglect the opportunity, and fail to avail ourselves of the right. Now is our day of grace. This opportunity neglected, our day of grace may be over, and our Republic follow the fate of all others, and become a hissing and a by-word in all the earth. Which may God in His infinite mercy avert.

Since the foregoing was in type, we have seen a characteristic correspondence between the Bishop of Charleston and the Archbishop of this city, which tends to confirm what we have said of the position of Catholics in the present Rebellion. The Bishop of Charleston is, of course, a secessionist, and, like most Southern Catholics, bitterly hostile to the North, especially New England. There are a few things in the Archbishop's reply which we wish had been omitted, as tending to foster that sectional prejudice which Southern influence has but too successfully created in our Catholic population; but upon the whole it is noble and loyal, well-written and ably-reasoned, and worthy of the high character and position of its illustrious author. The argument against secession is conclusive, and his Grace fully sustains our position, that it is the *duty* of Catholics to stand by the Union, and give, if need be, their property and lives, in its defence against the present wicked and unprovoked Rebellion. As a native-born American citizen, we thank him for his loyal expressions, and we are most grateful to him, as a Catholic, for having given the sanction of his name and position to the efforts of those in our communion who have staked their property, their reputation, and their lives even, in the noble effort to rescue the Catholic Church in the United States from the false and damaging position in which such Catholic citizens as the Bishop of Charleston and one or two others would place her. His letter is an event, and must have a marked influence on the future of Catholicity in this country and, we may say, on the country itself. It will teach Catholics that the present conflict is not a conflict between two political parties, and that the present fearful struggle in which we are engaged is not a struggle to decide whether the affairs of the country shall

be administered by the Republican party or by the Democratic party, but a conflict between loyal citizens and rebels, to decide whether we have or have not a country to govern. This is the tremendous issue involved in the present struggle, and Catholics who are worthy of the name, who understand and are prepared to follow the teaching of Catholic morality in its political applications, however strongly they may heretofore have been attached to the Democratic party, or however readily they may have listened to the counsels of men who are now in arms, or sympathizing with those who are in arms, against the national authority, must give a firm and cordial support to the present Federal administration. No matter what party elected that administration, no matter whether we like or dislike the men themselves, so long as they represent the national authority, and labor to sustain the Federal Union and national integrity, we must rally to their support. In this fearful contest, party prejudices, personal preferences, and sectarian controversies must all for the time being be sacrificed upon the altar of our country in the discharge of our high patriotic and Christian duties. This we should learn from the noble letter of our illustrious Archbishop, and we trust that those Catholics, if any such there are, who might refuse to listen to our reasoning and advice, will listen and heedfully follow what he declares to be the duty of all Catholic citizens, whether natural-born or naturalized, in the trial through which our country and republican institutions are now passing. His Grace has appreciated the duty of the citizen, and also the true interests of the Church in the United States, and it would be difficult to over-estimate the service he has rendered by his letter, to both the Church and the state.

ART. V.—*The End of the Eighteenth Volume.*

WITH this number closes the eighteenth volume and the eighteenth year of Brownson's Quarterly Review, the seventeenth year since it became decidedly a Catholic Review and devoted to the support of Catholic interests. During the seventeen years of its Catholic career, we have lost more than seventeen thousand dollars through the failure of agents and the neglect or refusal of subscribers to pay their subscriptions. This loss we could put up with so long as the Editor was able to supply it by his lectures; but, as it can no longer be supplied in that way, we are obliged for the future to adopt strictly the cash principle, and to give no credit. The Review will hereafter be sold either in single numbers or in volumes, according to the option of the purchaser; but the numbers must be paid for when purchased, and the subscriptions for the whole year must be paid for invariably in advance. All of our present subscribers who wish to continue their subscriptions, and have the Review sent to them by mail, must renew their subscription before the 1st of January, with the payment of \$3.00 in advance, and at the end of the year it will be stopped unless again in like manner renewed.

Many thousands of dollars are now due us, for which we have sent out our bills, and we respectfully request those who are indebted to us to pay at the earliest moment possible. We commenced this year with a larger subscription list than any previous year, but the interruption of communication with the South, and the stand we have taken for the Union, have necessarily limited our circulation. Still our circulation in the loyal States is amply sufficient to sustain the Review, if those who receive it will only pay us what is honestly our due. It is, we believe, a duty enjoined upon Catholics by their religion to pay their debts; and if, instead of representing us as likely to renounce our Catholic faith, our delinquent subscribers would pay their honest debts, and thus prove their own Catholicity, we think it would be better for Catholic interests. If they were dissatisfied with the Review, their proper course was to have paid up what was due, and dropped it; but to show their disapprobation of it by continuing to take it, and refusing or neglecting to pay for it, is neither in accordance with Catholic honor nor with Catholic honesty. We hope these few words will be sufficient.

We know very well that it has not been our good fortune in conducting our Review, to please all who are or call themselves Catholics; we know considerable fault has been found with us, and we have heard that there are priests even, who, when our name is mentioned, say, "Oh! do not mention Brownson. He is no longer to be named as a Catholic, but is, or is about to be, a Protestant, an infidel, or something else of the sort." This is the reward we are receiving for seventeen years of steady and persevering labor in defence of the Catholic faith and of Catholic interests, which has undermined our own health, and lost us the use of our eyes, at least for the present, and we accept it as a chastisement from our Heavenly Father due us for our many faults and numerous short-comings, and as intended to purify us, and prepare us for a different reward hereafter. But we wish to say, that we never set out in conducting our Review with the intention of pleasing anybody; our intention was in the beginning, and has been up to the present moment, to do in the best manner we were able what we considered our duty to our God, to our Church, and to our country, and that, too, without fearing any man's displeasure, or seeking any man's approbation. As for our renouncing the Catholic faith, we consider the talk there has been about that ridiculous and absurd, for never was our faith firmer, our love for the Church stronger, or our devotion to the Holy See deeper or more unreserved, than at this present moment. No hostility from without, no hostility from within, no misrepresentation or abuse, no persecution or neglect, come it from what source it may, can shake our faith, ruffle our temper, dampen our zeal, or cool our ardor for the religion which we

embraced in the maturity of our faculties and in the full strength of our manhood. Catholic we are, Catholic we will be, whatever may be the wrath of men or the rage of devils. So let that matter be put to rest now and for ever.

If we have given offence to some worthy Catholics, or created distrust in the minds of others, it has not been from any doubts of Catholicity nor from any dissatisfaction with the Church which our Lord founded on Peter; but either through our unfelicitous manner of expressing ourselves, or from the strength of our faith and the energy of our devotion to Catholic interests. Had we not believed undoubtingly the doctrines of the Church, had we not loved in our inmost heart the Church, the Spouse of Christ, the Bride of the Lamb, his Beautiful One, we should never have had the courage or the disposition to say those things which have given offence, or to have found fault with those things we encounter amongst Catholics which we are sure are no part of the Catholic religion, or consonant with the true interests of the Church in our own age or country. We may have erred in judgment; and so may they who censure us also have erred in judgment; but whether the error be on their part or on ours, no one who seriously thinks can for a moment doubt our Catholic intentions or our Catholic devotion. If we had had no Catholic convictions, if we had had no regard for the interests of Catholic truth, it would have been easy for us to have escaped censure. We needed only to follow the popular opinion of Catholics, to espouse all their traditions, flatter their prejudices, and pander to their vanity or self-love, to have been counted by them their great man, their champion, their hero. But we have not been able to do this. Our convictions have been too earnest, our views of duty too stern and rigid, and our zeal for the interests of the Church have been too ardent, to allow us to seek popularity, or to pursue a course that would win applause from people who wear the cross as an ornament, and not as a sign that they must be ready and willing to be crucified with their Lord whenever his service demands it.

Whether it is for the interest of the Catholic cause or the Catholic population of the United States that a review should be sustained which seeks and will seek no favor by dereliction from principle, and which will censure what it considers wrong or misjudged in Catholics, just as quick as in non-Catholics, we leave it for others to determine. We have convictions, and from those convictions we have thus far spoken, and, unless the proper authority in the case declares to us that they are contrary to the revelation of God, as long as we can find an organ of utterance, we shall speak freely, boldly, and as energetically as we are able. If Catholics do not want a review so conducted, they are not obliged to sustain ours, and will do well not to take it. But if they believe a review, conducted by a living man with living convictions, submitting unhesitatingly and unreservedly all he says to the judgment of the Holy See, pledging himself beforehand to abide by that judgment, let it be what it may, would be advantageous to the Catholic cause or of service to Catholic interests, perhaps they might as well continue their support to ours, which has labored faithfully to serve them for seventeen years, as to suffer it to drop, and to replace it by another.

Our own course is marked out. We know our duty as a Catholic publicist, and are prepared to conform to it; but we will not sacrifice our manhood, we will not be the tool of any man or any set of men. We cannot therefore promise, if we continue our Review, any essential change in its character from the last year. Many of the questions we have discussed will not need to be reopened, and we shall study, as we always have studied, never to be gratuitously offensive to persons within or to persons without. It is for Catholics, therefore, to determine whether it shall be continued or not. If they want it, they will send in their subscriptions, or purchase it as it appears; if they do not want it, we do not wish them to take it. We can beg, we can starve, we can die, but we cannot cease to be a man or a Catholic; and we have too much self-respect to urge any thing of ours upon a public that does not want it.

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